

that the one to five minute newscast serves *no* purpose; but it would be equally absurd to suggest that such newscasts supply *sufficient* information for the detailed understanding of our world that its citizens *must* have for survival.

The fact that broadcasting is the greatest disseminator of news is beside the point. We need not only dissemination, but the gathering and treatment of news events in a meaningful manner. Too many of the nation's five thousand broadcasting stations rely upon two wire services for all their news. A substantial amount of news is gathered independently by the networks, or by the larger groups of stations, but even these additional sources are isolated in time and space. The local station may be limited in resources, but it is still best able to cover local news—a responsibility now receiving direct attention from the FCC.

Today, in a far more complex world, we are ever facing an even more dangerous situation. It is conceivable that short-sighted, even paranoid, men could destroy civilization. The broadcaster has a responsibility to warn the public of this situation, its antecedents and its implications, and all the potential paths to solution. But how can this be done when many newscasts follow the formula of a quarter century ago? Are we living up to our responsibilities with a 30-second spate of headlines or a five minute rip-and-read newscast composed of items merely of interest, not importance? Should broadcasters allow the networks to supply most of the interpretation, analysis or commentary on the world? Can our schools educate and local stations develop and use personnel with the necessary qualifications to understand and analyze the news themselves? Do caution and convenience require that important interviews and discussions be taped so far ahead that the world has moved out from under, to the embarrassment of all?

In a world that changes overnight, it is necessary to write an editorial for a quarterly magazine in generalities, not specifics. However, there are two clear points: first, that broadcasters have a special responsibility in a world that appears to be going mad; second, that the efforts in news and public affairs programing of which we are so justly proud are not enough. Without intelligent behavior the future for humanity (including broadcasters) is bleak. With thought-provoking and factual information, men of good will *can* direct their actions intelligently.

ROSE

Journal of Broadcasting, 5 Fall, 1961,

285-298

How the U.S. Heard About Pearl Harbor

BY ERNEST D. ROSE

Twenty years ago, on a sleepy Sunday, Americans heard from their radios that they were at war. Imperfect as these reports were, they were sufficient to reshape the outlook of a nation and the course of world events. Ernest Rose, Film Director and Research Associate Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, fortuitously discovered recordings of these broadcasts at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford. Although the transcripts (edited slightly for publication) are of great interest, the more sobering conclusions of Mr. Rose are of even greater importance.

. . .

NOW that the ashes of World War II have settled and national passions have shifted to different spheres in the world power struggle, much of the oratory which accompanied the events of those years has faded from memory. Of particular interest to the communications specialist, however, are those words which are uttered at the very outset of any cataclysmic event, for such statements not only reveal much about the speaker but they frequently mold an impression which remains in an audience's memory even after the initial pattern of communication changes.

What kinds of things happened to our news communication under conditions of extreme surprise, complete emotional involvement, and little first hand information? An examination of U.S. radio news broadcasts on Pearl Harbor Day gives one cause for serious reflection.

December 7, 1941

At "X" plus 1 hour and 5 minutes the Japanese carriers were taking aboard the last of their returning aircraft. (To simplify time zone differences, "X" denotes the time at which the bombing attack on Pearl Harbor ended; i.e., 9:45 A.M. Honolulu time, 11:45 A.M. PST, or 2:45 P.M. EST.) At that moment, an NBC

AT
ATTACK

1961

announcer reread the following statement relayed a few minutes earlier from station KGU in Hawaii:

BULLETIN: We have witnessed this morning the attack of Pearl Harbor and the severe bombing of Pearl Harbor by army planes that are undoubtedly Japanese. The city of Honolulu has also been attacked and considerable damage done. This battle has been going on for nearly three hours. One of the bombers dropped within fifty feet of Tanti Towers. It's no joke—it's a real war. The public of Honolulu has been advised to keep in their homes and away from the army and navy. There has been severe fighting going on in the air and on the sea . . . (Then there was an interruption followed by this) . . . We have no statement as to how much damage has been done but it has been a very severe attack. The army and the navy, it appears, now has the air and sea under control.

This early bulletin was not untypical of the on-the-spot accounts received in the U.S. during the first few hours after the bombing. Except for occasional lapses, such as the wishful remark which ends the above bulletin, these broadcasts tended as a whole to be reliable, to be comparatively brief, and almost always to be reportorial rather than interpretive in nature.

On the other hand, many of these messages contained small errors as to detail, which in retrospect might be judged as relatively minor in terms of the over-all context of the message. However, these details were frequently picked up and amplified back in the States. Three such errors of detail are evident in the above example. First is a reference to the attackers as Japanese "army" planes. Actually they were all specially trained units of the naval air arm which had rehearsed the attack for weeks at a secret island base in the Kuriles where the terrain was similar to Pearl Harbor. A second inaccuracy is the statement that the battle "has been going on for nearly 3 hours." The subsequent examination of log books and records show that the first Japanese planes actually came over the harbor at 7:59 AM and the final wave departed approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes later. Since the planes were not pursued to their carriers, for all intents and purposes the raid ended at 9:45 AM. A third point refers to the attack on the city of Honolulu and the considerable damage done. A congressional investigation later revealed that about 40 explosions occurred in Honolulu. All except one of these were the result of

U.S. antiaircraft fire and not enemy bombs. Total damage to the city was approximately \$500,000.

While such factual errors seem minor in scope to us today, it is possible to trace some of the subsequent distortions in news programs at least in part to just such seemingly trivial inaccuracies. At the very least they added to the confusion of those at home who attempted to piece together the entire picture from the fragments and phrases that came from the scene of the disaster.

As the day wore on, however, direct on-the-spot news reports were heard less and less frequently as security measures were clamped into effect. Thus a considerably larger proportion of air time throughout the day was devoted to commentary by radio news analysis and military or political pundits.

One such personality was Upton Close, expert on Far Eastern affairs and a nationally prominent radio news analyst. At "X" plus 10 minutes he went on the air from San Francisco:

Hello, fellow Americans. The most fantastic thing that has yet happened in this fantastic world is the bombing of Honolulu and the bombing of Manila and the sinking of several ships off this coast. We don't know yet what is behind this—there is more behind it than meets the eye. So far the reports that have been coming in have been entirely based on military sources and military understanding and military computation. I think I have just received the most interesting and perhaps the most important sidelight on what has happened. . . .

I have just been in touch with the San Francisco Japanese Consulate General. The Consul, Mr. Yoshio Muto, was not able to talk but his representative and secretary, Mr. K. Inagaki, spoke to me from the home of Mr. Muto. He said that the attack is a complete surprise to the Consulate General here in San Francisco, that the first the San Francisco Consul General knew about it was hearing it over our radio and he implied that it was likewise a complete surprise to the Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Japanese government in Tokyo.

Now that may prove to be true. It is very possible that there is a double double-cross in this business. I suppose that if the attack on Honolulu had been made in such force as to destroy the American Naval Base there, we might believe that the Japanese government was behind it as a matter of policy. But you notice that the news gives us every assurance that it is far from destroyed and that the only thing left there now as the

result of the first attack are a few parachute troops wandering around on the sand on the north end of Oahu Island. They will soon be pulled in the bag and we'll find out who sent them. [Actually there were no paratroopers landed; only 2 or 3 pilots who bailed out of their damaged aircraft.]

It is possible, my friends, that this is a coup engineered by German influence and with the aid of German vessels in the Pacific. And again it is possible that this is a coup engineered by a small portion of the Japanese navy that has gone fanatic and decided to precipitate war. And still again it is possible that this is a coup engineered by the group in Japan that wants the group that wants war kicked out of office. And that when the thing is brought home to the Tokyo government now it might be possible for the Tokyo government to repudiate the action, call upon the nation to repair the injury to America by agreeing to American terms and precipitating a complete revolution in the government in Tokyo. All these things are possible. You will have to wait and see what happens.

Now I will be glad to go on talking as long as they wish me to take time on various phases of this situation. It seems to me that if the coup is precipitated by those fanatics who have wanted America at war with Japan and visa versa it might have been done as an answer to the messages of Secretary Cordell Hull to the Envoy Kurusu and Nomura. You notice that we are told that Mr. Hull burst out in true Tennessee language and told the Japanese that their reply was crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions.

I have been in many a Japanese brawl, I am sorry to say, and I have seen many an argument with Japanese, that would have ended just an argument, suddenly burst into violence because something was said by one of the so-called "white people" in the crowd that suddenly lashed across the Japanese face. Now it is possible that the Japanese completely lost face and descended to the status of being willing to engage in a violent brawl as a result of this answer, although it might be that this answer and Secretary Hull's message came at the same time. But it sounds like one of those Japanese arguments that suddenly descends into violence. (Announcer: "One moment please while we attempt further contact with Hawaii.")

Seventeen minutes later, at "X" plus 1 hour and 42 minutes, Mr. Close returned to the microphone. At that moment, thousands lay dead; four of the navy's 9 Pacific Fleet battleships were sinking or already on the bottom; 4 more battleships had been

badly hit and disabled; 347 of Oahu's 394 military and naval planes had been destroyed.

Hello Americans. We have just had a flash from Toyko saying that a state of war exists with the United States. Now we begin to see through things. It's obvious that the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo took affairs right out of the hands of the civil government and has precipitated an attack and now announces that that attack is official. . . .

We are very interested in whether or not the attack on Honolulu would be called from a military standpoint a real serious attack. So far five civilians killed in the bombing of the city is certainly not what they would call a serious attack in London. We have at present two conflicting, possibly conflicting, reports about the damage done in a military sense. There seems to be no doubt that the air field at Hickman [*actually Hickam*] Field was hit and damage done which was not serious from the standpoint of flying but a tragedy in the shape of a direct hit on an American barracks which it is said killed 350 American soldier boys on the field. That's the worst thing yet.

There seems some uncertainty whether any real damage was done to the naval base. We have a report saying the *USS Oklahōma*, a battleship, one of our first class but not one of our newest, was set afire in the air attack, but it doesn't say whether it's seriously afire or not. There is another report, unconfirmed, that two U.S. warships, one of them the *West Virginia*, were sunk. I would take that just as a rumor until we have further confirmation. Now, as I have said before, the whole thing is going to come clear after we get these speeches from the Premier of Japan.

It's rather interesting to note the possibilities of the way in which the attack took place. There is one rumor that the attack took place from the south, that would be in the direction of the island of Maui. It might be that a Japanese airplane was hiding out around the little island of Maui or below Molokai. It might even have been in connection with something going on in the island of Hawaii, the biggest in the chain and the southern-most one. There's a port there called Hilo where there are Japanese in dominance. . . . We have just had a flash saying that Japan has also entered a state of war with Britain. Manila is ready now so we take you to Manila.

The general character of Mr. Close's remarks is by no means an isolated example of the kinds of statements the American peo-

ple heard during the first eight hours of radio news broadcasting on Sunday, December 7th.

For instance, at "X" plus 3 hours and 15 minutes, while rescue operations continued to occupy the attention of every spare man in the Pearl Harbor area, while fires still raged uncontrolled aboard the battleships *West Virginia*, *Tennessee*, *Oklahoma* and *Arizona*, Major George Fielding Elliott, syndicated columnist and author of several widely read books on military strategy explained in his characteristic monotone:

. . . It should be emphasized that this attack is of a suicidal nature from which few of the ship's aircraft and personnel participating have any hope of returning. [*Actual box score as close as can be determined from subsequent investigations: enemy planes claimed shot down by the U.S.—48; losses admitted by the Japanese—29; total number of Japanese aircraft participating in the attack—353.*] It is a procedure entirely in keeping with the Japanese character. A sort of desperate and sudden blow which recalled the Japanese torpedo attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur Harbor in January 1904. But this is an attack against a far more formidable foe and under far less favorable conditions.

What actual damage has been done is hard to ascertain at this moment. There are reports that two capital ships of the United States fleet have been damaged. Even if this is so, and these reports are unconfirmed, we have yet to see what the Japanese fleet will lose in the way of aircraft carriers. . . .

When the president was talking to the governor of the Hawaiian Islands, the governor reported that a second wave of Japanese planes was just coming over, which suggests that the Japanese planes, or some of them, had left, had time to return to their carrier, get a new load of bombs and fuel, and return to the attack. [*Actually there were two separate waves, 183 planes leaving the carriers at 6:00 AM followed by 170 more at 7:15 AM. None came back a second time.*] But this procedure will certainly lead the heavy American bombing planes to the carriers and the fact that the fleet has sailed from Pearl Harbor, [*Actually the remnants of the fleet escaped from the harbor more as a safety precaution, although some units did set out in a fruitless search for the enemy.*], as just reported, probably indicates that an attempt to round up and destroy the carriers is now in full swing. . . .

None of these operations, however, can overcome the fact that Japan is cornered, surrounded by forces which she cannot hope

to overcome and to which in the end she must succumb. We have heard so far of what the Japanese have done. We shall hear presently what has happened to the Japanese forces which have been engaged in these daring and distant raids. And that, we may be sure, will be a different story and one which will mark, in the opinion of well informed observers, the beginning of the decline of the Japanese empire from its present position as a world power.

Equally authoritative in tone, but less well supported, were the observations of John B. Hughes, distinguished radio news analyst, speaking at "X" plus 3 hours and 40 minutes over a rival network:

Good evening . . . It is obvious that the Japanese will attempt to develop in the South Pacific a triangular strategy. They will attempt to take either Singapore or Manila in order to establish a triangulation, as it were, a triangle of bases with Formosa, the island of Hainan and probably Manila. This is a Japanese naval strategy which has been planned and worked out in detail for a period of forty years and is to be found in all the naval books of warfare, as many of the Japanese militarists well know.

A member of the Japanese general staff told me less than a year ago that if it became necessary the Japanese militarists, rather than lose power to the conservatives of Japan, rather than sacrifice the leadership which they had succeeded in acquiring after ten years of deliberate planning and step by step procedure, would deliberately lead the nation into a war they knew they could not win.

Another very interesting point is the one made by Royal Arch Gunnison in his broadcast from Manila. He mentioned the fact that Russian planes and ships will be against the Japanese. The participation of Russia in the war against Japan on the side of the United States and Britain is a very important factor and a point upon which the Japanese have been making a tremendous effort to interfere. It was said in the past 10 days in Tokyo unofficially by a high official of the government that Japan was safe from Russia, that Russia would not fight against Japan with Britain and the United States. Royal Arch Gunnison's mention of Russia, particularly in this broadcast only ten minutes ago is very interesting, and on this side it is to be hoped that what he said is true because Britain and the United States must have Russian cooperation in order to wage the war effectively against Japan. [*Actual date of Russia's entry into the war against Japan—August 8, 1945, six days before its surrender.*]

Of all the commentaries none combined a greater mixture of false conjecture, exaggeration, wishful thinking, and rationalization than those of Fulton Lewis, Jr. Less inhibited than many of his colleagues, he spoke with the same zeal that has maintained for him a loyal following (and a steady list of sponsors) throughout the past two decades. For instance, at "X" plus 5 hours and 10 minutes, Mr. Lewis was observing:

... First of all this attack took place under, to all intents and purposes, under the white flag of truce, because that's what it did. In their language it took place while Japan was using the integrity, the fairness, the peaceful intentions of the United States to stall for time, when as a matter of fact they were all the time, very obviously now, preparing for this attack on the island of Oahu, the Philippines, Guam and the United States in general. In other words while these peace conferences have been going on over the past two weeks they have not been peace conferences at all. They have been treachery, carrying the white flag of truce. They have been lies from the ground up, and that has produced terrific and bitter resentment here in the State Department circles, in diplomatic circles in general, among the administration leaders, and in Congress.

The second thing was the manner in which this was done today. The attack on the ships in Pearl Harbor, . . . a very very foolish thing, as a matter of fact, suicidal fool-hardiness as a matter of fact, because the Japanese must know, as all the rest of the world knows, and all the rest of the navies and military men of the world know, that Pearl Harbor is the one invincible, absolutely invulnerable base in the world. It's stronger even than Gibraltar itself, and as far as any attack or siege of it is concerned there could have been no possible sane intention on the part of the Japanese to such an end.

The great resentment comes from the fact that these bombing planes and battleships—rather these bombing planes and the gun boat off Manila came in as they did to a peaceful, unsuspecting, unwarned community, dropped bombs out of a clear sky, served no notice, gave no fair play of warfare, no decency, no fair respect. After all, a good many people may have questioned today, "Well, how was all this damage done if we had such an excellent navy and such an excellent army air corps?" Why anyone can walk in, ladies and gentlemen (laugh), to ships lying peacefully in the harbor without the slightest suspicion that attack may come—anyone can come in with bombing planes and sink anything under those conditions. And

that's exactly what happened this morning at Hickman [sic] Field. Officers, pilots, men at the field were going about their usual everyday procedure—the planes out on the field, no preparation for war, no expectation of it, no advance warning of any kind—when into that peaceful situation comes attacking planes. It is of course a one shot thing. They got away with it once—they will never get away with it again. The army and the navy privately have made that perfectly clear this afternoon, and the second attack later today on Hickman Field has proven that it isn't the same the second time. . . .

There is considerable mystery, as I told you earlier this evening, as to where these fifty bombing planes came from. . . . One of the great points of interest so far as the War Department and the Navy Department here are concerned is to find out who the pilots of these planes are—whether they are Japanese pilots. There is some doubt as to that, some skepticism whether they may be pilots of some other nationality, perhaps Germans, perhaps Italians. . . .

In the meantime, however, the American navy has steamed out under orders from Washington—has steamed out of Pearl Harbor, anchors away, and we may have more to that story of final results on these aircraft carriers and the Japanese fleet within a matter of a very few hours.

There is little question as to what will happen once there is an open engagement between the Japanese fleet and the American fleet, if it ever happens on the high seas. A very high admiral of the United States Army—I mean the United States Navy told me not four weeks ago when I asked him how long it would take for an American victory under such circumstances, he said, "Well, Fulton, we'd be glad to do that any Wednesday morning." When I asked him—told him that I would like to have lunch with him that day because I would like to get a scoop on it, he said he would try to keep it in mind but he was afraid I wouldn't be interested because by noon that day it would be old news.

To be sure not all the broadcasts indulged in all the types of misleading statements and rationalizations. Indeed, some commentators exercised remarkable restraint in view of the shortage of information available to them and the pressure from an aroused public to inform. At "X" plus 7 hours and 10 minutes a voice is just barely heard above the din in the background:

This is Eric Severeid reporting again directly from the press room in the White House. Here in the White House the vigil

SEVEREID

of reporters from all over the United States is still on. The phones are ringing . . . men are still working at the typewriters. Outside, a few yards away, in front of the main portico other reporters are still standing in a group, waiting for important personages to come in to the White House or to leave, trying to buttonhole all that they can for what information can be gleaned.

Out on Pennsylvania Avenue you can see the policemen walking back and forth, and then across the street in the dim street light you can see from this porch a mass of faces all turned this way, a patient crowd standing there in the chill evening simply watching this lighted portico of the White House as the figures come and go. And to me I must confess there is a very familiar look and feeling about this whole scene. I've seen it in similar moments in Downing Street, in the Quay d'Orsay in Paris . . . the same crowd as these watching, waiting faces of ordinary citizens of those countries.

Now there is one report which I must give you which is not at all confirmed—a report which is rather widely believed here and which has just come in. And that is that the destruction at Hawaii was indeed very heavy, more heavy than we really had anticipated. For this report says that two capital ships of ours have been sunk, that another capital ship has been badly damaged, and the same report from the same source says that the airfield hangers there in Hawaii were completely flattened out and that a great many planes have been damaged. There is no speculation about the number of planes. Now if the planes were dispersed on that airfield as they normally would have been with piles of earth around each one, the number of planes damaged probably was not great. But if the field was overcrowded for a possible emergency, then no one knows how many have been lost. Now I repeat, this report has not been confirmed but it has come in from a fairly reliable source and many reporters here indeed believe it.

It was in such tones that word of the real fate of Pearl Harbor began finally to filter through to the American people toward the late hours of that seemingly endless night.

Discussion

In spite of cautious, simply stated observations by a few scattered commentators, one can not escape the conclusion that in the over-all pattern of radio news communication that day something was drastically wrong. While on-the-spot reports were, for the most part, reliable as to general content, errors of detail in many

of them led to misinterpretation and confusion back in the States. After censorship drastically curtailed reports from on-the-scene sources, the bulk of radio news time was consumed by commentators and analysts trying to explain the meaning of situations without access to reliable first-hand information. Background to the news tended to be overly conservative and evasive. Under pressure from the public, the dominant tendency was to carry on regardless of the meager flow of "hard" news. The result was that a good deal of early information was stated and restated many different ways, and with varying degrees of indignation, throughout the day. But if that was all that happened to the news December 7th one would have only minor cause for concern.

The truth is that a disconcertingly large proportion of news analysts went considerably beyond what available facts supported in commenting on the events of that day. The result was a verbal pick-me-up, a confused concoction of defensive and aggressive statements ranging all the way from attempts to depricate the enemy's intelligence and minimize the danger on the one hand, to emotional appeals based on exaggerated retaliatory capacities or moral and intellectual superiority on the other.

It might be argued that such a position is justifiable, even desirable in a crisis. Such a commentator, it may be said, "reassures" the people, keeps them from losing all control, and lets them down easier to the blow that they must ultimately face up to. In a democratic society predicated on faith in the many, rather than an elite, superior few, such logic appears somewhat feeble. It is one thing to tell a person he has suffered a serious personal loss in a compassionate way and with rational concern for the consequences. It is quite another to imply that maybe the loss really didn't occur at all, or if it did its importance is after all questionable. If our system is based on the premise of freedom of information, that implies not only the freedom to express unpopular beliefs and minority viewpoints, but the responsibility to listen to and evaluate the unpopular and the unpleasant as well.

In opposition to the questionable policy of "soft-pedaling" or "playing-down" bad news, the broadcasts that day themselves suggest that those who were well informed, even though they were located in positions of greater danger, were far more rational

than those, either on the spot or back home, who lacked what facts were known and who supplied their own answers via wishful thinking tempered by unexpressed fears for the worst. Those on the scene spoke mainly, and reliably, of effects. Those back home dealt principally, and often inaccurately, with the causes.

To understand the implications of this, one must consider the role of the news reporter and the news commentator in our society. The man on the spot who presumably has accurate information is, under the stress of the moment in a crisis, generally less able (and sometimes less qualified) to take the broad view of events required for intelligent interpretation.

This analytical role, it is usually reasoned, belongs to a commentator who, with additional facts at his disposal, can view events dispassionately and with greater perspective on the situation as a whole. In recent years an encouraging development has been the assignment of more and more analysts to overseas tours of duty so that they might broadcast their commentary from abroad. But when accurate information is lacking, the home based commentator's role becomes an extremely difficult one.

Most radio (and now TV) news analysts have always worked in a market where each is in competition with the other for an audience. The eye of a sponsor is usually somewhere in the background. If it does not often selectively scan the news content itself it is certainly always focused on the size of the audience the commentator is drawing. With the development of the cult of the news "personalities" we have come to regard our commentators as much entertainer as oracle. In addition to his distinctive "delivery style" and his "audience appeal," the news analyst's reputation is based upon his ability to provide intelligent, rational, accurate assessments of problems and answers in the mind of his particular following. When the chips are down that audience expects him to live up to his reputation. Otherwise he runs the risk of temporarily relinquishing his image (sometimes self-created) as the man who knows, the one capable of seeing beneath the issues on the surface.

On December 7th, surrounded by anxiety and uncertainties, many of our commentators proved all too human in succumbing

to the temptation of having a right answer, reasonable sounding for the moment at least. Some simply up-dated day dreams and kept passing them on to the public almost as if the soap opera had never been interrupted by the momentous events of that tragic day.

From the hind-sight of twenty years it is easy now to sit back and Sunday-quarterback. That is not the intended purpose in recalling these events to mind. Nor will it be argued that our basic and long-cherished "right to know" may at times be over-ridden by factors of greater magnitude such as our "need to survive." What is suggested is that we may have missed the more subtle, yet equally important, meaning of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Looking back now one can easily fit together a dozen clues which we knew about in advance of the attack but which were discounted or somehow never got to the right people quickly enough to alter the course of events. The catastrophe of December 7, 1941, was as much due to rationalization, inaccuracy, and lack of coordination in our communications as it was to our inadequate preparedness for surprise attack.

In a world where the pace has accelerated many fold in twenty years the real message of Pearl Harbor may be that our "need to survive" is inextricably linked to, if not dependent on, our "need to know." In any future war we may expect no "notice" nor any "fair play of warfare" that Commentator Lewis denounced on December 7th. But the responsibility for averting such a war goes far beyond improving our intelligence network or our military communications. It resides as much with the sovereign people of the United States and the other world powers as it does with their leaders. Few dictators have been able indefinitely to ignore the organized will of an aroused people. In democracies, if the channels of mass communication are frequently utilized by our elected representatives to bring us around to the course of action they have already decided upon, let us not forget that it is within our power to use these same channels to inform them of our will in these matters.

In recent times there is some doubt whether the feedback aspect of democratic communications has been making any headway

against a veritable deluge of information from the opposite direction. It is alarming, for example, to speculate on how little popular protest we probably would have heard even if the American people had known in advance the extent of this government's involvement in the ill-fated Cuba invasion. Such a response (or, more precisely, lack of one) would probably have been due less to unflinching support of administration decisions—right or wrong, than to a lack of awareness of possible alternatives or limitations of the proposed course of action.

We live in an era when most of us get most of our information from one or another of the mass media. Super-speed and technical accuracy of communication are today commonplace both throughout this planet and beyond it. Yet twenty years after Pearl Harbor we still accept as inevitable: (1) inaccurate reporting of critical events, (2) confusion as to what kinds of facts should be withheld for the common good and what information is needed by the public to exercise its legitimate role in government, (3) frequent misinterpretation or deliberate falsification of "facts" by special interest groups, and (4) a tenacious preference for the myth of "what could be" over the reality of "what is."

There is no simple answer for the problem here illustrated; no sinecure, no formula for eradicating human frailties overnight. Nor does the weakness lie only with the speaker and not his listeners in an era when all forces interact upon each other.

"Responsibility" is not a characteristic which can be legislated into existence. Like "wisdom," it must sometimes be acquired through a long and painful series of lessons that remain in our memory. In "remembering Pearl Harbor" on this twentieth anniversary, it would be well to set out anew in pursuit of those two human goals. Perhaps in so doing we may find the clues we seek in this dilemma. For how to update the democratic handling of communications in a modern world is an inseparable part of our battle for survival.

The Evolution of FM Radio: 1941-1946

As Reported in the Annual Reports of the
Federal Communications Commission

The following verbatim extracts from FCC ANNUAL REPORTS are part of a continuing series published in the JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING that includes: "The Evolution of Television: 1927-1943" (Summer, 1960); "The Evolution of Television: 1944-1948" (Winter, 1960-61); and "The Evolution of FM Radio: 1935-1940" (Spring, 1961).

Seventh Annual Report of the FCC — 1941

High Frequency (FM) Broadcast Service (pp. 30-31)—A review of the steps leading to the authorization, in the spring of 1940, of frequency modulation (FM) on a commercial basis was included in the Sixth Annual Report of the Commission. Further refinements have been made in receivers, transmitting equipment, and antenna systems. At the close of the fiscal year approximately 14 manufacturers were active in the production of FM receivers. Available information indicates that as of November 1941 there are some 120,000 FM receivers in public use, with production estimated at about 1,500 sets a day. The majority of the FM receivers now sold receive standard band as well as FM broadcast.

Authorizations. The first construction permits for commercial high frequency (FM) broadcast stations were issued by the Commission on October 31, 1940. As of December 1, 1941, there were 67 commercial FM authorizations and 43 applications pending. Eleven construction permits had been granted for stations for the New York City area, and pending applications far exceeded remaining facilities there.

Of interest are two particular authorizations. The first is for a station to be located on Mount Washington, N. H., antenna elevation 6,300 feet, which will serve an area of 31,000 square miles. Approximately three-fourths of a million people are within satisfactory service range of this station who do not have satisfactory