

FACTS ABOUT PEARL HARBOR

BY

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

193 Plant Street
Groton, Connecticut
June 3, 1958

The Honorable Clarence Cannon
Congressman from Missouri
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Your remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives on May 6, 1958 were recently called to my attention. They included the following passages which I quote from the Congressional Record of May 6, 1958,—

“A subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations held hearings in which it was testified that at the time of the attack the Naval Commander, Admiral Kimmel and the Army Commander General Short were not even on speaking terms. And the exhaustive investigations by the commission appointed by the President and by the Joint Committee of the House and Senate showed that although both had been repeatedly alerted “over a period of weeks prior to the attack” they did not confer on the matter at any time.

“At one of the most critical periods in the defense of the nation, there was not the slightest cooperation between the Army and the Navy.

“Had they merely checked and compared the official message; received by each, they could not have failed to have taken the precautions which would have rendered the attack futile and in all likelihood have prevented the Second World War and the situation in which we find ourselves today. . . .

“It was not the Japanese superiority winning the victory. It was our own lack of cooperation between Army and Navy throwing victory away. . . .

“When the Jap naval code was broken and when for some time we were reading all official messages from Tokyo to the Japanese fleet, much of this information came to Admiral Kimmel at his Hawaiian headquarters.”

From your remarks I have learned for the first time the origin of the lie that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the attack. I would like very much to know the identity of the individual who gave this testimony before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee.

In regard to the alleged lack of cooperation between General Short and me your statement is completely in error. We did consult together frequently. As a man in your position should know before making the charges you have made, the Naval Court of Inquiry which was composed of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, all of whom had held high commands afloat, made an exhaustive investigation and reached the following conclusion:—

“Finding of Fact Number V.

“Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this is true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of common interest, but invariably did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States - Japanese situation or on their general plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other to a degree sufficient for all practical purposes.”

Your statement that the actions of the 1941 Hawaiian Commanders might have prevented the Second World War and the situation in which we find ourselves today is utterly fantastic. The Hawaiian Commanders had no part in the exchange of notes between the two governments and were never informed of the terms of the so called ultimatum of November 26, 1941 to Japan, nor were they notified that the feeling of informed sources in Washington was that the Japanese reply to this ultimatum would trigger the attack on the United States. To blame the Hawaiian Commanders of 1941 for the situation in which we find ourselves today is something out of Alice in Wonderland.

With regard to the Japanese messages intercepted and decoded, exhaustive testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Joint Congressional Committee of Investigation shows that none of these decoded messages received after July 1941 were supplied to me and none were supplied to General Short.

My book, “Admiral Kimmel’s Story”, contains a collection of documented facts which support this statement and give the text of important decoded intercepts which were withheld from me and from General Short. These decoded intercepts were in such detail that they made the Japanese intentions clear. Had they been supplied to the Hawaiian Commanders the result of the attack would have been far different if indeed the attack would ever have been made.

I know of no other occasion in our military history where vital information was denied the commanders in the field.

To make unfounded charges against me and General Short to support your argument is grossly unfair and a misrepresentation of facts. The success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of inter-service rivalries at Pearl Harbor. This success was caused by the deliberate failure of Washington to give the Commanders in Hawaii the information available in Washington to which they were entitled. This information which was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders was supplied to the American Commanders in the Philippines and to the British.

I request you insert this letter in the Congressional Record.

Yours very truly,

Husband E. Kimmel

193 Plant Street
Groton, Connecticut
July 7, 1958

Honorable Clarence Cannon
House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations
Eighty Fifth Congress
Washington 25, D. C.

Sir:

You have failed up to the present time to provide me with the name of the individual whom you quoted in your remarks appearing in the Congressional Record of May 6, 1958 as authority for your statement that General Short and I were not on speaking terms when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. I know that to be wholly false and believe I am entitled to the name of the person so testifying. Whether or not he testified under oath and his qualifications. Moreover I would appreciate a definite reference to the hearing of the Sub-Committee of the Appropriations Committee if printed and if not a transcript of that part of the record to which you refer.

The receipt of your remarks in the Congressional Record of 18 June is acknowledged. It was forwarded without accompanying letter in a franked envelope bearing your name and I presume sent by your direction.

Your remarks are a continuation of the frantic efforts of the Roosevelt Administration to divert attention from the failures in Washington and to place the blame for the catastrophe on the Commanders at Pearl Harbor. Your account of the testimony that General Short and I were not on speaking terms given to your committee shortly after Pearl Harbor was effectively publicized though sixteen years later

I am still denied the name of the individual who perpetrated this lie.

For four years, from 1941 to 1945, the administration supporters and gossip peddlers had a field day making statements which the wall of government war time secrecy prevented me from answering.

One of the most persistent and widespread was to the effect that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the attack. Another was that the uniformed services in Hawaii were all drunk when the attack came. This is the reason the Naval Court of Inquiry investigated these charges thoroughly and set forth their falsity in unmistakable language.

You still seek to sustain these charges by the simple expedient of attacking the integrity of the investigators and witnesses who reached conclusions or gave testimony which does not suit you.

You have slandered the honorable, capable, and devoted officers who served as members of the Army Board of Investigation and the Navy Court of Inquiry. You have also slandered the personnel of the Army and Navy stationed in Hawaii in 1941, many of whom gave their lives in defense of this country.

It is astounding to me that you should charge General Short and me of falsely testifying as to our personal and official cooperation even when as you phrase it "all but life itself depended on their convincing the world that they had been friends when they should have been friends."

The testimony on this matter given before the Naval Court of Inquiry was given under oath and was true to my personal knowledge and is substantiated by much other testimony.

You, yourself, refer to the statements in the Roberts Report to the effect that General Short and I conferred on November 27 and December 1, 2 and 3. You further state from the Roberts Report—"They did not then or subsequently hold any conferences specifically directed to the meaning and significance of the warning messages received by both." (General Short - Admiral Kimmel).

How ridiculous it is to assume that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet is unable to understand a message sent by the Navy Department without conferring with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to determine what the Navy Department meant by the messages that were sent to him and conversely that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department had to confer with the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet in order for him to know what the messages sent to him by the War Department meant. If the messages were so worded the fault lay neither with me or General Short.

You imply that my request to revise the transcript of my testimony before the Roberts Commission is censurable and completely ignore the published statement of Admiral

William H. Standley, USN, retired, a former Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Roberts Commission. He wrote regarding Admiral Kimmel—"He was permitted no counsel and had no right to ask questions or to cross examine witnesses as he would have had if he had been made a defendant. Thus both Short and Kimmel were denied all of the usual rights accorded to American citizens appearing before judicial proceedings as interested parties." Even communists plotting the overthrow of our country are accorded far more legal safeguards than were granted to me and General Short. Admiral Standley also wrote, "In spite of the known inefficiency of the Commission's reporters, when Admiral Kimmel asked permission to correct his testimony in which he had found so many errors that it took him two days to go over it, the Commission voted to keep the record as originally made although the answers recorded to many questions were obviously incorrect and many of them absurd. At my urgent insistences, the Commission did finally authorize Admiral Kimmel's corrected testimony to be attached to the record as an addendum."

Your remarks with regard to the conduct of both officers and men on the evening preceding the Pearl Harbor attack is an insult to the gallant men who died in the treacherous Japanese attack and to all the members of both Army and Navy stationed on the Island of Oahu. Infrequently there might be an individual who overindulged in intoxicants but these were promptly apprehended by the shore patrol or military police and returned to their ship or station. The evidence as to the sobriety of officers and men was clear in the documentary evidence available to the investigation boards and yet in spite of their findings you state, "But the very fact that it was considered necessary to emphasize this testimony naturally gives rise to some doubt." You apparently are quite willing to doubt the testimony given and believe the worst of the fine young men in the armed forces that were stationed in Hawaii.

I was not permitted to know what testimony was presented to the Roberts Commission and was never given an opportunity to clarify or refute any statement made before it.

I was not made a defendant before the Hewitt one-man investigation, was not called to testify, and was not permitted to have any knowledge of the proceedings. I requested authority to attend this investigation and was advised that time did not permit. When I repeated my request the Secretary of the Navy did not even reply. Perhaps the reason may be found in the testimony of Captain Safford who narrated before the Joint Congressional Committee the pressure to which he was subjected by the Committee Counsel to make him change his testimony. All did not have the strength of character of Captain Safford and some modified their preceding sworn statements.

Although I requested the Joint Congressional Committee to call certain witnesses many of them were not called to testify. Among these was Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, my senior Fleet Air Officer at the time of the attack.

The Navy Court of Inquiry was the only investigation of Pearl Harbor before which I was permitted to cross examine and call witnesses. You are substantially correct in your statement that this inquiry "found Admiral Kimmel as pure as the driven snow." In more moderate language expressed by Admiral Murfin, the President of the Court, years later, "We found Admiral Kimmel had done everything possible under the circumstances."

On Advice of Counsel I declined to take part in the Hart Investigation because the stipulations demanded of me would have placed my fate completely in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. This I did regretfully because it was through my efforts that this investigation was initiated. The proceedings of the Hart Investigation were a valuable contribution.

Why were the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War so anxious to have the damaging testimony in both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Inquiry changed? The answer is very simple, both inquiries had found that the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster rested in large part at the Headquarters of our government in Washington. Admiral Standley whom I have referred to above wrote:

"From the beginning of our investigation I held a firm belief that the real responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was lodged many thousands of miles from the Territory of Hawaii."

Even the Hewitt Investigation found—

"During his incumbency as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was indefatigable, resourceful and energetic in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war."

You refer to the information that had been forwarded to me and to General Short and specifically to a message based upon information from our Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Grew, dated 27 January 1941 to the effect that the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo had heard rumors that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor but you make no mention of the letter of the Chief of Naval Operations which forwarded this information to me on 1 February 1941 to the effect that, "The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore based upon known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for the foreseeable future."

This estimate was never changed.

When you refer to—"A position so admirably defended as Pearl Harbor with every facility, submarine nets, radar, sonar, planes and ships of the line" you create a very false impression. Admiral Richardson was relieved because he so strongly held that the Fleet should not be based in the Hawaiian area.

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were woefully lacking but the War Department was unable to supply more.

Of 180 long range bombing planes authorized by the War Department early in 1941 only 12 had arrived and of these six were out of commission as they had been stripped of vital parts to enable other planes of similar type to continue their flight to their destination in the Philippines.

Of 100 Navy patrol planes authorized for the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor not one had arrived prior to December 7, 1941.

With regard to the radar installations, these had just been installed and their personnel were under training. The installation of these stations had been delayed due to the inability of the Army and the Interior Department to agree upon the location of these stations.

With reference to personnel for the ships there were serious shortages of both officers and enlisted personnel and men were constantly being detached to provide crews for ships being newly commissioned.

No one has ever explained why the weaknesses so clearly described in the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January, 1941 were permitted to continue during all the months at this outlying station whose security was vital to the safety of the fleet and of the United States.

Facilities to fuel the fleet were inadequate and a severe handicap to all fleet operations.

The only planes in Hawaii suitable for long distance scouting were the patrol planes assigned to the fleet and they were totally inadequate to cover the approaches to Hawaii. The only planes suitable for long range bombing were the six B-17 Army planes and those attached to the two carriers.

At the time of the attack the two carriers were on missions initiated by the Navy Department.

These and other deficiencies had been repeatedly reported by General Short and me as well as by our predecessors.

The messages of October 16, November 24 and November 27, 1941 from the Navy Department to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the messages of November 27 and November 29, 1941 to General Short from the War Department stressed sabotage and that an attack if made would be directed against ports in South East Asia or the Philippines. With the benefit of the intercepted Japanese messages, how they arrived at this conclusion will always be a mystery to me.

To add to our difficulties the messages also directed that, "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. . . ."

The message of November 27, 1941 from the War Department to General Short specifically directed him to, "Report measures taken". On the same date General Short re-

plied, "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy."

Recorded testimony shows this report was read by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of War Plans Army, and the Chief of War Plans Navy. There can be no reasonable doubt that this report was read and understood by these responsible officials in Washington. For nine days and until the Japanese attack the War Department did not express any disapproval of this alert and did not give General Short any information calculated to make him change the alert.

What was most needed at Pearl Harbor at this time was the information in Washington from the Japanese intercepts that indicated clearly an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Navy Department sent me various messages quoting from intercepted Japanese dispatches. I believed I was getting all such messages and acted accordingly. After the attack I found that many vitally important messages were withheld from the Hawaiian Commanders.

I was never informed that Japanese intercepted messages had divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and sought minute information of the berthing of ships in those areas.

A Japanese dispatch decoded and translated on October 9, 1941 stated,

"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (those are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf)".

On October 10, 1941 another dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which described an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor.

A dispatch of November 15 decoded and translated in Washington on December 3, 1941 stated,

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

A dispatch of November 18 decoded and translated in Washington on December 5, 1941 stated,

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area N, Pearl Harbor, Mamala Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy)".

A dispatch of November decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941, stated the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu had reported that in area A there was a battleship of the Oklahoma Class; that in Area O there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as carrier "Enterprise" or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers

of the Chicago Class were tied up at docks "KS". The course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and distances apart were also described.

On December 4 a dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which gave instructions to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to investigate bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

On December 5, 1941 a dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which stated.

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future you will also report even when there are no movements".

In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking the detailed information that they sought about Pearl Harbor.

In the period immediately preceding the attack reports were demanded even when there were no ship movements. This detailed information obtained with such pains-taking care had no conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint except for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its Commander-in-Chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into sub areas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared, "imminent or planned for the foreseeable future". Certainly I was entitled to know what information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.

Yet not one of these dispatches about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor was supplied to me.

Knowledge of these foregoing dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my staff.

General Willoughby in his book MacArthur 1941-1945 quotes a staff report from MacArthur's Headquarters,

"It was known that the Japanese consul in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reports on general ship movements. In October his instructions were "sharpened". Tokyo called for specific instead of general reports. In November, the daily reports were on a grid-system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war: this was no longer a case of diplomatic curiosity; coordinate grid is the

classical method for pin-point target designation; our battle-ships had suddenly become targets."

"Spencer Akin was uneasy from the start. We drew our own conclusions and the Filipino-American troops took up beach positions long before the Japanese landings."

If MacArthur's Headquarters which had no responsibility for Pearl Harbor were impressed by this information it is impossible to understand how its significance escaped all the talent in the War and Navy Department in Washington.

The dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other Japanese dispatches decoded and translated in the Navy Department prior to the attack.

The deadline date was first established by a dispatch decoded and translated on November 5, 1941 the date of its origin.

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese - United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone".

The deadline was reiterated in a dispatch decoded and translated in the Navy Department on November 12, 1941.

"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short . . ."

"Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date".

The deadline was again repeated in a dispatch decoded in Washington on November 17.

"For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth,

but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before”.

“2. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution”.

The deadline was finally extended on November 22 for four days in a dispatch decoded and translated on November 22, 1941.

“It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.”

Again on November 24, 1941 Tokyo specifically instructed its ambassadors in Washington that the November 29 deadline was set in Tokyo time.

In at least six separate dispatches on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22 and 24 Japan established and extended the deadline finally advanced to November 29.

After the deadline date a Japanese plan was automatically going into operation. It was of such importance that the Japanese Government declared: “The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days.”

On December 1, 1941 Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington:

“The date set in my message #812 has come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.”

A dispatch on November 28 decoded and translated on the same day, stated:

“Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-

ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.”

Not one of the Japanese messages about the “Deadline” were supplied to me although the American Commanders in the Philippines were supplied with this information as they were also supplied with all the information in the decoded Japanese intercepts that were denied to the Hawaiian Commanders.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor were not kept informed of the progress of negotiations with Japan. I was never supplied with the text of Mr. Hull’s message of November 26, 1941 to the Japanese Government which has been referred to frequently as an ultimatum. Mr. Stimson characterized it as Mr. Hull’s decision to “kick the whole thing over.”

Among other terms this note provided:

“The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo China.

“The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with Capital temporarily at Chungking.

“Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific Area.”

The reply to this note was delivered in Washington within hours of the Japanese attack.

My information on this and previous exchanges between the two governments was obtained from newspapers and radio. I believe Washington newspaper correspondents and the editors of our leading newspapers were kept better informed than were the Commanders at Pearl Harbor.

After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches indicate that Japan attached great importance to the continuance of negotiations in order to conceal the plan that would take effect automatically on November 29, as evidenced by the Japanese dispatch of November 28:

“ . . . I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. . . .”

I never received this information.

Again the dispatches from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941:

“. . . to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)”

I never received this information.

Again in the transpacific telephone conversations and dispatches the same theme is stressed, be careful not to alarm the Government of the United States and do nothing to cause a breaking off of negotiations.

This information was decoded and translated in Washington on November 30 and was never sent to me.

The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29 a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect: that the plan was of such importance it involved the fate of the Empire: that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

What was the plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the unfolding of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.

No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of Naval Forces moving southward, because physical and radio observation of that movement were unavoidable. The troop movements to southern Indo China were the subject of formal exchanges between the Governments of Japan and the United States as evidenced by the communication which Mr. Wells handed to Mr. Nomura on December 2, 1941.

Other dispatches were received in Washington which gave evidence of the deepening crisis.

On the afternoon of December 6, 1941 a Japanese intercept was decoded which warned that a fourteen part message from Japan was on its way to the Ambassadors in Washington. That the time for presenting this message to our State Department would be supplied later.

By 3:00 p.m. December 6, 1941 thirteen of the fourteen parts had been received. The decoding and translation was completed by 9:00 p.m. and distributed to the most important officers of the government by midnight. Nine p.m. in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At midnight it was 6:30 p.m. in Hawaii.

When the thirteen parts were delivered to Mr. Roosevelt about 9:00 p.m., he remarked, “This means war”.

The time of delivery message and the fourteenth part were decoded and translated by 9:00 a.m. December 7, 1941, the time for delivery was set at 1:00 p.m. Washington time which was 7:30 a.m. at Honolulu and 2:00 a.m. at Manila.

Yet not one word of the receipt of these messages which again clearly indicated an attack on Hawaii were ever given to General Short and me.

The story of the whereabouts of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations and their unaccountable lapse of memory has been publicized so much that it is unnecessary for me to repeat it.

I have written a documented account of Pearl Harbor. Other accounts which also tell the true story have been published by Charles A. Beard, Charles Callan Tansill, Frederic R. Sanborn, Harry Elmer Barnes, Admiral Robert A. Theobald, John T. Flynn, George Morgenstern, Walter Trohan, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. and many others.

I repeat to you once more Mr. Cannon, the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of inter-service rivalries at Pearl Harbor. This success was caused by the deliberate failure of Washington to give the Commanders in Hawaii the information available in Washington to which they were entitled. This information which was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders was supplied to the American Commanders in the Philippines and to the British.

Finally, Mr. Congressman, the officers and men stationed in the Hawaiian Islands were fine, upstanding and well disciplined young Americans whom the American People should ever remember with gratitude and honor. In the attack launched by the Japanese they showed themselves fearless, resourceful and self-sacrificing and I shall always be proud of having commanded such men but I cannot forgive those responsible for the death of the more than 3000 soldiers, sailors and marines who died for their country on the 7th of December 1941 nor accept your insinuation that hangovers from intemperance ashore on the night of 6 December may have contributed to the delay in opening fire on the attacking Japanese planes. As a matter of fact many anti-aircraft guns on the ships were manned at the time of the attack and all anti-aircraft guns of the fleet were in action in less than ten minutes.

It is requested that you insert this letter in the Congressional Record.

Yours very truly,

Husband E. Kimmel

193 Plant Street
Groton, Connecticut
July 8, 1958

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover,

Thank you for your letter of 25 June, 1958, and your references to the Robert's Commission, The Army Pearl Harbor Report, the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Hewitt

Inquiry. I am familiar with them, but all except the Roberts Commission Report were long after the hearings of a sub committee of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives in 1942. Congressman Cannon advised me the information given to the Committee immediately after Pearl Harbor was from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I judge from your letter there was no evidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1942 to the effect that

General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Is this correct?

If this is not correct will you kindly cite the evidence in order that I may learn the name of the individual who instigated this infamous lie.

Yours very truly,

Husband E. Kimmel

January 28 1962

Mr. Cannon refused to publish my letters in the Congressional Record, but some Congressmen friends of mine did so.

I never received a reply to my letter of 8 July, 1958 to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and I have never been supplied with the name of the individual who is alleged to have testified that General Short and I were not on speaking terms.

Husband E. Kimmel

"ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY"

by

H. E. KIMMEL

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