PEARL HARBOR: HOW AMERICA'S GUARD WAS DROPPED



Tankan Bay on Etorofu Island was the starting point of the infamous Jap voyage

The Finger Points

In the space of 24 hours last week, official Washington shelved its stirring wartime slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor" for a more politically comfortable peacetime version: "Forget Pearl Harbor."

The vehicle for this overnight transition was the release of the long-awaited Pearl Harbor report, a document actually consisting of seven separate and conflicting reports which, in the contradiction of their findings, almost matched the military and diplomatic confusion they pictured as having contributed to the disaster of Dec. 7, 1941.

For that segment of the public which had been demanding Pearl Harbor goats, there was spicy reading matter. By picking and choosing among the reports, the blame—heretofore patiently shared by Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter E. Short—could now be extended to four others: former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations at the time of Pearl Harbor, and later Commander of the American Naval Forces in Europe, and Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, then chief of the War Plans Division.

Still picking and choosing among the documents there was also to be found the contradictions—virtually complete exoneration for Hull, Marshall, Stark, and Kimmel. Similarly, President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson and the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, escaped the brush, but the reports also blamed the whole nation for the disaster, thus presumably including them. But from no quarter came even a suggestion of court-martial, not even for Short and Gerow, who were defended by no one.

Yet to those who took the time to wade through the hundreds of pages it was evident that within the document was at least a substantial record of the fumbling, the cross-purposes, and the all-around official ineptness which made Pearl Harbor possible.

Forgetting Made Easy: The manner in which the report was released by President Truman was in itself masterful maneuvering or remarkable coincidence:

¶ The day chosen was Wednesday, Aug. 29, which also was the day for the Allied landings in Japan, a major competing news story.

¶ The speed of release was equally noteworthy. At 11 a.m., newsmen were hurriedly summoned to the White House where the 130,000-word report was dumped in their laps for release two hours later. In the mad scramble that followed, the news was made available to the nation piece-meal fashion as fast as skip-reading reporters could discover pungent matter interlarded in the maze of words which an official Navy Court of Inquiry, an official Army Board, the Navy's Judge Advocate General, T. L. Gatch, Admiral Ernest J. King, Secretary of Navy Forrestal, Secretary of War Stimson, and the President had compounded.

The findings:

Navy Court: "That no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service." Recommendation: "That no further proceedings be had in the matter."

Gatch: That he agreed with the board.

Forrestal and King: That both Kimmel and Stark had been guilty of derelictions sufficient to rule that they "shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment."

Army Board: That General Marshall "failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department" by not keeping General Short fully advised of the "growing tenseness," particularly with reference to vital information available sixteen hours before the attack which indicated the Japs would strike. That General Gerow had similarly failed. That Secretary of State Hull had addressed a final note on Nov. 26 to Tokyo that the Japs considered an "ultimatum," which "to the extent that it hastened [the] attack was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy Departments to gain time for preparations for war." Recommendations: "None."

Stimson: That the board's criticism of Marshall was "entirely unjustified . . . It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the chief of staff . . ." that he "strongly" disagreed with the board's criticism of Hull; that its mem-

Wide World photos

Pearl Harbor figures: Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Grew

PEARL HARBOR: HOW AMERICA'S GUARD WAS DROPPED

bers' comment "was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry."

Blaming a Mood: To these findings, President Truman appended one of his own—a formal statement agreeing with Stimson that Marshall should bear no blame. It made no mention of Hull.

Next day, newsmen were again summoned to the President's office. Mr. Truman launched a discussion of Pearl Harbor, declaring that "the country is as much to blame as any individual" because it was "not ready for preparedness." Then he joined Stimson in absolving Hull, indicating that he would have done it the day before if he had had time to read the reports in full.

A few hours later, the State Department, apparently through Hull's urging,

VICTORY TIDES

Some Plain Speaking About Pearl Harbor

by Admiral WILLIAM V. PRATT, U.S.N., Ret.

As a former Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Pratt speaks with unique authority on the Navy's Pearl Harbor report.

The report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the disaster at Pearl Harbor is now public property. It is not a satisfactory report. It is full of holes, which Fleet Admiral King and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, in searching analyses, have exposed. There was too much whitewash in the report, too much detail spent in explanation of why the attack was inevitable and the results unavoidable, and too little said about the steps which should have been taken at least to mitigate the results of the attack, even if it was inevitable.

Two opinions of the court will bear close scrutiny. The first: "The presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules." Since when, in time of peace, are operating schedules conducted better from what was practically an office desk in a base supply and repair port than from the bridge of the flagship at sea?

Why was Lahaina Roads off Maui previously selected as a fleet operating base in preference to Pearl Harbor? Because in Lahaina Roads the fleet, great or small, was in position to raise anchor and move instantly. It did not have to put to sea by individual ships, steaming down an intricate and tortuous channel.

And why was the presence of a large number of combatant vessels necessary in Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7? It was common knowledge that by the end of November a critical situation had arisen, and that war was practically inevitable. Didn't the Taranto sinkings, which happened in November 1940, mean anything? There three Italian battleships and two cruisers, lying in an enclosed harbor, with a water depth of 42 feet and less, were sunk in a British air torpedo attack. The water depth at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet. And now the report says that it was not thought a successful torpedo attack could be made in that depth of water. What is a Commander-in-Chief for? If he is worth his salt, he does not wait for instructions at critical times, but assumes responsibility and acts.

The second opinion of the court reads: "The constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area and it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act." This is a high-sounding declaration, but contains much nonsense.

We did know that Jap submarines had been skulking around the islands for some time, which, in view of their importance, and the critical situation impending, came close to being an overt act. What apparently we did not know then, but which came out in the Army report, was that a few days before Dec. 7 Jap submarines had entered Pearl Harbor on a reconnaisance trip and then departed. This was decidedly an overt act, and the question arises, how could this have happened, had efficient precautions been taken?

However, another question comes up—by what possible stretch of the imagination could it be assumed that the putting to sea of the fleet, taking up a position of readiness in home waters, and establishing a reconnaissance patrol with everything we had available toward the end of November, when matters had become critical, could be construed as an overt act, or as striking a blow at the enemy before he delivered his attack? What were we supposed to do—sit in our shell in Pearl Harbor like a tortoise, helpless, and await the blow? Unfortunately that is just what we did, and even had a sea fight developed after the Jap attack and we had lost ships, could it have been worse than what did happen at Pearl Harbor? At least the Jap ships might have suffered also.

Bad as the case against the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, may be, that against the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, is worse, for he was the supreme naval commander and could issue commands which even the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet must obey. This practice was inaugurated in the last war when the first Chief of Naval Operations was appointed, and it worked successfully. When on Oct. 16, 1941, Admiral Stark directed Admiral Kimmel to take precautions and make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intention, or constitute provocative action against Japan, he did not follow up to see that those orders were sufficiently implemented.

By the end of November, Stark must have known war was inevitable and that the Japs always started war with a surprise attack. Common sense should have told him that our sea power must be a first objective, if the Jap Pacific campaigns were to succeed. He knew what the Japs had done at Port Arthur in 1904. In the critical period, Stark should have accepted the obligations of his office and ordered Kimmel and the fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and take a position in readiness, regardless of whose toes he trod on. If Kimmel failed to obey, Stark should have removed him. A hard-boiled and forthright leader would have done it.

PEARL HARBOR: HOW AMERICA'S GUARD WAS DROPPED

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U. S. Navy

While Kimmel received virtual exoneration from Admirals Kalbfus, Murfin, and Andrews of the Navy's Court of Inquiry . . .

made public an exchange of letters between the former Secretary of State and Stimson last year aimed at answering the Army Board's references to Hull's final note to Tokyo as "pushing the button that started the war." Hull denied that the note constituted an "ultimatum" as claimed by the Japs, contending that it was only a restatement of this nation's foreign policy.

From Short, now a Ford Motor official in Dallas, came a statement that his conscience was "clear." From Marshall, Stark, Gerow, and Kimmel no comment was available.

The Whitewash Fades: Whatever the confusion in placing blame, the combined reports, nevertheless produced a chronology of events leading up to Pearl Harbor (see page 44) that was little short of appalling. So far as the Navy's evidence was concerned, it was developed at the insistence of Forrestal and King after receiving the Navy Court's virtual whitewash of the entire record of carelessness. In the case of the Army, it was the Army Board which pulled few punches; in contrast, Stimson's efforts were mostly directed at softening the board's blows. Yet facts and conclusions were abundant:

¶ On two occasions during final negotiations with the Japs, Marshall and Stark had joined in formal requests to President Roosevelt that no ultimatum go to Japan because the Army and Navy were not ready for war.

¶ The diplomatic course set by the administration was constantly at odds with preparations in the military field—"at right angles to it," the Army Board found. Further, liaison was poor between the two branches. In the crucial hour, Nov. 26-27, the Army and Navy did not discover that Hull had terminated negotiations with the Japs until Stimson called Hull on the phone and learned about it.

¶ Not only was liaison bad between the diplomatic and military services, it was faulty between the Army and Navy, and between both of them and their Pearl Harbor commands. As a result, despite the fact that a "war warning" had been dispatched to Pearl Harbor and other outposts ten days before the attack, there was on Dec. 7 no alert against a surprise raid, no long-range patrol, no ammunition distributed to anti-aircraft guns and artillery, and no dispersal of planes on the ground. Even more tragic, the bulk of the fleet was tied up, berthed like sitting ducks.

Small wonder then that last week a howl of rage went up from the press and Congress alike. Somewhere between two extremes typified by two New York tabloids—the left-wing PM which cried that "isolationists" were to blame, ("the blind contention of the Lindberghs and America Firsters that the Japanese would not attack us"), and the right-wing Daily News which editorialized "Roosevelt Was Responsible"—stood most Americans, wanting not a settlement of old scores but the truth. That Congress would attempt to supply it with a full-scale investigation seemed probable.

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. . . the Army's investigating Generals Frank, Russell, and Grunert, on the other hand, fixed direct blame on General Short

PEARL HARBOR: THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER

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Big names evoked by the issue of Pearl Harbor guilt: Cordell Hull (with Jap envoys Kurusu and Nomura on Nov. 17, 1941), Chief of Staff Marshall, and Admiral Stark (receiving Distinguished Service Medal from F.D.R. in April 1942)

Calendar of Carelessness

The following digest of the Pearl Harbor report has been prepared by the editors of NEWSWEEK in chronological form in the belief that it will give the reader a clearer insight into the controversy:

Dec. 30, 1940: Admiral Bloch, commandant at Pearl Harbor, advised Admiral Stark in Washington of the "inability to meet hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand." Deficiencies cited by Bloch: "no planes" for distant reconnaissance, the Army's "serious" lack of fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns, and an incompleted anti-aircraft warning system.

Jan. 24, 1941: Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote Secretary of War Stimson a letter "prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan." Knox said: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the Fleet or naval base warrants taking every step as rapidly as can be done . . . The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air-bombing attack, (2) air torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily."

Jan. 27: Ambassador Grew in Tokyo cabled the State Department in Washington the following message: "A member of the embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic."

The Navy Department sent Grew's information to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii with the advice that the department "places no credence in these rumors."

Feb. 1: Admiral Kimmel became the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Feb. 7: General Short became the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

In a letter to General Short from Washington, General Marshall, Chief of Staff, outlined the problems facing the new commanding general, warning: "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine constitute the real perils of the situation."

Stimson replied to Knox's letter of Jan. 24, concurring with Knox in all respects, particularly on the Secretary of the Navy's recommendations that the "highest" priority be given the increase in pursuit planes, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-aircraft warning, and that weekly joint Army-Navy exercises be held at Pearl Harbor against surprise air attacks.

Feb. 15: From Washington, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, wrote Admiral Kimmel that after a study of the problem of protecting vessels in port against torpedo attack from planes, it had been concluded: (1) Planes must launch torpedoes at less than 250 feet, 60 feet or less preferred; (2) the minimum depth of water must be 75 feet, 150 feet would be desirable. Noting the relatively shallow depth of Pearl Harbor (about 45 feet), Admiral Stark held that this "limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles" designed to protect berthed vessels.

1st Alarm: Danger Above

Feb. 19: General Short wrote General Marshall that he had made a "pretty thorough inspection" and listed improvement of anti-aircraft defense, searchlights, defense artillery, and bombproofing of vital installations as of "great importance."

March 5: "Not satisfied," General Marshall again wrote General Short: "I would appreciate your early review . . . with regard to defense from air attack. The

PEARL HARBOR: THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER



Press and public knew trouble threatened, though commanders were placid

establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

March 6: General Short wrote General Marshall complaining of delays in obtaining aircraft-warning sites, owing to the Department of Interior and its National Park Service. He noted that existing equipment would only detect planes at 5 miles' distance; the new equipment, at 120 miles. Because the Park Service was demanding that General Short submit all plans for installations which might mar the beauty of the parks, the general urged that Secretary of War Stimson intervene with Secretary of the Interior Ickes. "I believe all this quibbling should be stopped at once," Short wrote. ". . . With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here."

March 15: General Marshall wrote General Short that he had personally conferred with National Park Service officials. "[They] are willing to give us temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable," General Marshall said. "But they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation."

On the same day, General Short wrote General Marshall concerning dispersion of aircraft. Asserting that "on all fields the planes have been kept lined up where they would suffer terrific loss," General Short mentioned that he had previously asked for money and engineers to build dispersal fields. His appraisal: "The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to attack."

March 28: General Marshall wrote General Short declaring the latter's plane dispersal proposals "undoubtedly sound," and promising the necessary funds.

On this day, joint agreements were reached between General Short and Admiral Bloch for joint air attacks if hostile surface vessels approached, this phase to be under Navy command. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor were to be under Army command.

April 14: General Short again wrote General Marshall of progress the Army was making in cooperating with the Navy in Hawaii, enclosing copies of joint defense plans. General Short said: "I have found Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative."

May 12: Instigated by the Japanese, negotiations looking toward peaceful settlement of problems were begun.

2nd Alarm: Peril in Sanctions

May 26: Admiral Kimmel wrote Admiral Stark in Washington of the importance of keeping Pacific commanders constantly informed of all developments by the quickest and most secure means available. Kimmel said: "The commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position . . . He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy . . . as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation."

May 29: From Hawaii General Short sent General Marshall plans for repelling a serious attack and reported his theory of Hawaiian defense.

June 13: The Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) wrote various naval commanders, including those at Pearl Harbor, that British tests showed torpedoes could be dropped from planes as high as 300 feet and make initial dives in water of less than 75-foot depth with excellent runs. (Actually, the Navy knew the British had made successful torpedo attacks at 42-foot depth.)

June 19: In Hawaii, General Short sent Governor Poindexter a confidential letter requesting him to call upon the commanders of island military and naval forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, and insurrection.

June 20: The Governor of Hawaii confidentially made a formal demand on General Short's headquarters to furnish adequate protection against sabotage of vital installations outside military reservations.

July 7: The Adjutant General in Washington, General Adams, wired General Short in Hawaii: "For your information. Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy . . . The Neutrality Pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by Aug. 1."

July 11: General Short in Hawaii asked for a new airfield on Oahu. Admiral Kimmel maintained a partial long-range patrol on the basis of intelligence reported by Admiral Bloch.

July 14: General Short tentatively completed plans for three types of alerts in

PEARL HARBOR: THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER

Hawaii: (1) defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities, (2) defense against air, submarine, and surface attacks, and (3) defense against all-out attack, including enemy landing.

July 25: General Marshall and Admiral Stark in Washington wired General Short a warning that economic sanctions were being applied against Japan on July 26. The message said in part: "[We] do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction . . . through use of military means, but you are furnished this information . . . that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities."

July 26: Japanese assets in the United States were frozen and licenses required for shipments to Japan. Shipment of petroleum products was banned.

Aug. 1: Six mobile radar stations were received in Hawaii, implementing three permanent radars received in June.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, supplementing the action of applying economic sanctions against Japan, decided that the United States and Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

U. S. Navy from Acme

The blow that was "impossible" brought havoc to America's big ships

Aug. 19: General Marshall wrote General Short in Hawaii concerning establishment of an air base for the Fifteenth Pursuit Group in the islands.

3rd Alarm: Tojo Takes Over

September: The operating schedule was issued this month. (Under its provisions Task Force One, including the preponderance of the battleship strength of the fleet, and part of Task Force Two —three battleships—were in Pearl Harbor when the attack came on Dec. 7. Task Force Three was at sea. The other part of Task Force Two, including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, was returning from ferrying planes to Wake. Task Force Two's three battleships were left behind because they were not fast enough to accompany the Enterprise to Wake.)

Oct. 9: Ambassador Grew reported that the frozen-credit policy adopted by the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy, and that she would be forced to act.

Oct. 10: General Short's three-alert plan, issued July 14, reached General Marshall, who wrote General Short: "I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units."

Oct. 14: General Short replied to General Marshall: "The plan was to use them [Air Force personnel] for guarding certain essential utilities . . . However, this will not be necessary as the Legislature [Hawaii] has just passed the Home Guard Bill."

Admiral Kimmel issued revised instructions regarding security of the fleet in the operating sea areas.

Oct. 16: Jap Cabinet resigned.

Admiral Stark informed Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet created a grave situation; that the new Cabinet probably would be anti-American . . . that the Japanese might attack the United States and Great Britain. Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions, or constitute provocative action against Japan.

Admiral Kimmel ordered deployments as a result of a warning that Japan might attack. These included stationing submarines off Wake and Midway, sending Marine reinforcements and additional stores to Johnston, Wake, and Palmyra. He also placed on twelve hours notice certain vessels which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the scheduled sailing for the West Coast of one battleship.

Oct. 17: Tojo cabinet formed.

Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel a personal letter: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us . . . in fact I tempered the message handed me considerably . . . General Marshall . . . was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable . . . My advice to him was not to worry."

Admiral Bloch reported to Admiral Stark in Washington that the only increment made to local Hawaiian defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net-tending vessels, was the Sacramento, an old gunboat of negligible gunpower and slow speed. He urged sending a number of small fast craft with listening gear and depth charges, as well as two squadrons of planes to patrol against enemy submarines. Admiral Kimmel endorsed this proposal.

4th Alarm: 'Next Comes War'

Oct. 18: The War Department radioed General Short: "Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

Oct. 24: Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations saying the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, "including" attack on the Philippines and Guam, was a possibility.

Oct. 25: Ambassador Grew reported that the Japanese Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself.

Oct. 28: General Marshall again wrote General Short regarding use and training of the Air Force on Hawaii, saying: "I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected." (There is no evidence that General Short ever changed his plan.)

Oct. 30: Ambassador Grew warned Washington that the situation was fraught with the greatest danger.

Nov. 1: Training of air-warning and in-

PEARL HARBOR: THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER

formation-center personnel began in Hawaii. General Short requested the Navy to assist, and fifteen Army officers went to sea for that purpose. The Pacific Fleet communications officer was detailed as liaison officer with the Army. Admiral Kimmel could not supply six other naval officers requested in the information center because none was available.

Nov. 3: G-2 (Army Intelligence), Washington, informed G-2, Honolulu, that a prominent Japanese had predicted war between the United States in December 1941, or February 1942.

Ambassador Grew advised Washington that war was not only possible but probable, and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."

Nov. 5: The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, sent President Roosevelt a joint memorandum recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time because of the superiority of the Japanese fleet.

Nov. 7: Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet that relations between Japan and the United States were "extremely critical," and there was an "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force.

Nov. 11: Secretary Knox and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles warned in speeches of the impending seriousness of the United States-Japan situation.

Nov. 17: Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo we could expect "a sudden Japanese naval or military attack in regions not then involved."

Nov. 20: To their diplomatic representatives abroad the Japanese sent a message saying that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States or Great Britain a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message, and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Although this secret move was known to Washington, General Short declared he was never told about it.

5th Alarm: Expect Attack!

Nov. 22: Pacific Fleet patrol planes, under Admiral Kimmel, began operation. Their schedules stressed training and did not provide for distant reconnaissance.

Nov. 24: Spies and other sources had given the State, War, and Navy Departments reasonably complete knowledge of Japanese plans and intentions, and they were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States.

As a result, Admiral Stark sent Admiral Kimmel and other western commanders this message: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch, concurs, and requests action addresses to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately."

General Short saw and discussed this dispatch. Admiral Kimmel and his advisers did not consider that the expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included the probability of imminent attack on Hawaii. This view was taken on the ground that specific mention had been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of Hawaii.

Associated Press

Pearl Harbor set off a document bonfire on grounds of Jap Embassy in Washington

In Honolulu, officers believed the vital new Information Center (air warning) would be in operation within two weeks. Later this prediction was qualified to read: with exception of air-to-ground radio communications because equipment on hand would not permit contact to be maintained between the ground and fighter aircraft more than 5 miles offshore. Several energetic officers sought to have mobile air-warning systems operate 24 hours a day, but this was not accomplished. Colonel Bergquist (then a Major), head of the Air Defense School in Hawaii, charged the chief delay came from the Signal Corps. "I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating," Colonel Bergquist said.

6th Alarm: 'Ultimatum' Delivered

Nov. 25: Admiral Stark, replying to Admiral Bloch's Oct. 17 request that additional fast ships be sent to defend Hawaii, said no additional vessels could be supplied Pearl Harbor at present, but that certain subchasers being built and due for completion in May 1942 had been tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii). Admiral Bloch also was told by Admiral Stark there were no additional airplanes available for assignment to Pearl Harbor at the time.

Secretary Hull told Cabinet members "there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy." There was no evidence showing that Hull's statement was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces.

A Japanese task force was discovered in the Marshall Islands. It consisted of two or three carriers, fifteen to twenty submarines, and possibly other vessels. The Navy Department in Washington and naval officers in Hawaii had this intelligence, but neither General Short nor other Army officers were informed.

At a White House meeting, President Roosevelt told Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Hull, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark that the United States was likely to be attacked by Japan as soon as Dec. 1.

Nov. 26: Secretary Hull handed President Roosevelt's ten points of settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, who verbally rejected them at once. (These ten points, declared by Tokyo to constitute an "ultimatum," were not made public until after the Pearl Harbor attack.)

The following secret cablegram was sent General Short by the War Department: Send two B-24s to "photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group . . . information is desired as to location of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels, including submarines . . . insure that both B-24s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." The War Department also had information which led it to believe Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls.

Nov. 27: The Japanese task force which was to attack Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous in Tankan Bay, in Northern Japan, en route to Pearl Harbor.

General [illegible]ll and Admiral Stark

PEARL HARBOR: THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER

on this day wrote a joint memorandum to the President again requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese, as the Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan.

President Roosevelt received the Japanese ambassadors and reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points of Settlement" which the Japanese had rejected on the previous day. The request from General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese at this time had not yet reached the President.

International

Jap attack announced by Steve Early under his "We Ain't Mad With Nobody" sign

From Washington, Admiral Stark sent Admiral Kimmel this message: "Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan . . . have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days . . . You will execute a defensive deployment." This message was sent to General Short through Navy liaison.

General Short ordered the Alert No. 1, telegraphing General Marshall: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." Alert No. 1 called for only defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities. It did not call for defense against enemy attack, which General Marshall had warned was imminent.

General Marshall was in North Carolina observing maneuvers. The import of General Short's reply that he had ordered only a sabotage alert was "little noticed in the War Department."

Admiral Kimmel decided on this day that there should be no distant reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor, the only existing safeguard against attack from air without ample warning. (So far there has been no explanation of why Kimmel made the decision.)

After receiving the war warning, Admiral Kimmel's chief actions were: (1) carrying out arrangements for reinforcing limited air patrols from outlying islands, (2) ordering depth bombing of submarines contacted in the Oahu operating area, and (3) engaging in conferences with General Short.

General Short received this message from G-2, Washington: "It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possibilities that hostilities may begin."

7th Alarm: Burn Your Papers!

Nov. 28: Admiral Stark wired Admiral Kimmel that "hostile action was possible at any moment," and that it was "desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided."

President Roosevelt left Washington for Warm Springs, Ga., for a vacation.

Nov. 29: Secretary Hull told Ambassador Halifax of Great Britain that the Japanese matter "will now go to the Army and Navy."

Dec. 1: There was an "unusual change" in Japanese radio call signs. (There was no further elaboration by either the Army or Navy reports on this disclosure.)

President Roosevelt, cutting short his vacation, returned to Washington because of the seriousness of the situation.

Dec. 2: President Roosevelt formally asked Japan why it was sending forces into Indo-China.

Dec. 3: Admiral Kimmel was informed by Naval Intelligence that it was unable to locate four of Japan's ten aircraft carriers.

Admiral Stark wired Admiral Kimmel from Washington: ". . . . instructions sent to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn secret documents." General Short was not advised of this information. (However, General Short was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning his papers.)

Admiral Kimmel said that "the significance of this [Stark's] dispatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

Admiral Kimmel received from Naval Intelligence a communication stating there was "almost a complete blank of information on the [Japanese] carriers today . . . It is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

It was the rule that all vital information received by the Navy regarding security should be passed on to the Army at Pearl Harbor, and the "War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information . . . between Army and Navy was inadequate."

Dec. 4: Admiral Kimmel was ordered to destroy secret and confidential papers at Guam.

Monitors discover Japs using code words in short-wave newscasts.

Dec. 6: All Pacific naval commanders, including Kimmel, were given authority to destroy confidential papers.

The War Department learned confidentially that the final Jap reply would bring immediate severance of diplomatic relations and that war was a certainty. But General Marshall did not see these advices until the next morning.

A tapped, highly suspicious message sent by a Jap newspaper woman from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo was handed General Short at 6 p.m. (Hawaiian time) but because he could not decipher it, "he did nothing about it and went on to a party."

Premier Tojo made a speech before the Japanese Diet which clearly indicated Jap intentions to break relations.

At 9 p.m. in Washington, Army intelligence received information implying that war might come at any hour. A copy in a locked pouch went to Col. Bedell Smith, General Staff secretary, with an

THE YEAR THAT BROUGHT DISASTER

admonition from Colonel Bratton, Far Eastern section chief, that the context was of vital importance. However, for reasons not made clear, this message did not reach General Marshall that night.

8th Alarm: A Sub Is Sunk

Dec. 7: In Washington, at 8:30 a.m., the Army Intelligence section received additional information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan. Colonel Bratton attempted to reach General Marshall. He found that General Marshall was horseback riding. General Marshall reached his office at 11:25 a.m. and held a conference with General Miles, chief of Intelligence, and General Gerow of the War Plans Division.

At 12:18 p.m. (6:48 a.m. Honolulu time), General Marshall wired General Short by commercial cable: "Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication." General Short did not get this message until after the attack.

At about 6:30 a.m. (noon Washington time) the Ward, a destroyer, and a naval patrol plane sighted and sank a Japanese submarine in the outer harbor of Pearl Harbor. The naval base was notified at 7:12 a.m. of this action. The Army was NOT notified, although the sinking "would have indicated that something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishment should have been correspondingly alerted."

Five mobile radar sets were in operation in Hawaii, but were inadequately manned. This air-warning system was in operation only from 0400 to 0700 (4 a.m. to 7 a.m.) as this was judged the most probable time for an attack. "General Short has no adequate explanation for not using radar 24 hours a day."

At 7:15 a.m. Pvt. Joseph L. Lockard, at a radar station at Opana, picked up a large number of planes approaching from the north. The radar station was scheduled to close down at 7 a.m., but because a truck had not come to take him to breakfast, Lockard continued to operate the radar screen, picking up the planes about 136 miles away.

'Forget It': Lockard telephoned First Lt. K. A. Tyler,* duty officer at the Information Center. Tyler assumed the planes to be friendly because he had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route to Honolulu from California. He told Lockard to "forget it."

The incoming planes were not identified as Japanese until they came into view and their markings were seen.

*Now lieutenant colonel; Lockard, now a first lieutenant.

At 7:55 a.m., the Japs struck Pearl Harbor.

The first wave of Japanese torpedo planes came over. They dropped torpedoes especially designed for an attack in Pearl Harbor's 45-foot shallow water. It was these torpedoes which did most of the damage to the ships. (See Admiral Pratt's War Tides.)

American planes were on the ground. "It was the custom for the planes that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning, the planes were out of gas and were not to be refueled until Sunday . . . Many of the pilots were away over the week end."

Mobile gun batteries were not in the



Newsweek

Disaster epic: 130,000 words, 2½ pounds

positions that they were to occupy in the event of hostilities. At the time of the attack there was no ammunition for them, for rifles, or for ground machine guns. It was stored in Aliamanu Crater, an old volcano about a mile from Fort Shafter.

Too Little, Too Late: General Burgin, commander of anti-aircraft artillery in Hawaii, and General Murray, commander of an infantry division, had pleaded with General Short for permission to issue ammunition so that their troops and weapons would be in readiness. General Short refused the request.

General Burgin said: " . . . they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it . . ."

When informed of the attack, General Short immediately ordered No. 3 alert, calling for all-out defense. The 24th Division was in battle stations by 4 p.m., but the Japs had by then been gone for five hours and destruction of the major portion of the Pacific Fleet had been the price of their visit. The nation was at war.