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May 1942.

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STATEMENT OF REAR-ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U.S. NAVY RETIRED
MAY 1942

From the day I hoisted my flag as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 all my efforts were devoted to:

- (1) Getting the Pacific Fleet ready for war.
- (2) Insuring its security at the Pearl Harbor Base.
- (3) Evaluating and meeting by appropriate action, each situation as it was presented;

Underlying all my actions were these basic considerations;

First: Constantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. This necessitated, if maximum results were to be achieved, confinement of our operations to areas close to base (Pearl Harbor) where target and training services were available.

Second: It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short range anti-aircraft guns, aircraft detection devices, lookout equipment, splinter protection, additional personnel accommodations and many other alterations. The necessity for these installations had been brought forcibly to the attention of the Navy Department and the fleet, by the war experience of the British Fleet.

Third: Maintenance of reasonable security of fleet units, both at sea and at an exposed base, poorly equipped for its own defense. Aside from its defense, the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, presented a difficult problem which had to be met.

Fourth: Under prescribed war plans, it was essential to initiate, promptly, offensive action in the Mid-Pacific and beyond, in order to contribute to the defense of the position of the Associated Powers in the Far East and Malaya, by relieving the pressure in that theatre, which by all agencies, was conceived to be the locale of initial enemy operations. The Navy Department plan that an early offensive be undertaken in that area had a vital influence on my thoughts and actions in each new situation.

At the time of the surprise attack on December 7, 1941;

- (a) Pearl Harbor was a fleet base for upkeep, repair and recreation.

H. E. Kimmel

(b) The defense of Pearl Harbor rested with the Army, in accordance with Joint Army and Navy action, Chapter 1, Paragraph 5 (a) (2).

(c) We had an extensive training program to train new personnel in order to maintain the efficiency of all fleet units.

I knew, as responsible officers have long known, that Pearl Harbor, with its single channel and its congested moorings and industrial facilities was vulnerable as a base for heavy ships, particularly vulnerable to surprise air attack. We never had more than one third the number of patrol planes necessary to guard against a surprise air attack.

Before assuming command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941 I made a survey of the defenses of Pearl Harbor and of the security measures in effect in the Fleet. I had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that hostilities in the Atlantic might begin at any time and that a war on two fronts was possible. I felt all along that a war in the Atlantic would mean war in the Pacific also.

Recommendations were submitted on 25 January 1941 to remedy existing deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

My next step, 15 February, was to organize security measures for ships at sea, to guard against surprise attack, submarine and air. Also to organize the naval forces in Pearl Harbor to assist the Army in the defense of the base. In Pearl Harbor ships were moored to insure the best possible anti-aircraft fire in all directions.

During the ten months of my command of the Pacific Fleet, I had to evaluate the existing situation and balance constantly the requirements of training, material upkeep and military alterations of the Fleet against the security measures to be kept in effect. There was never a day during this period that the danger of surprise attack did not exist.

Obviously the maximum security could not be obtained unless we very drastically sacrificed the training of the fleet. Constant personnel changes, both of officers and men, made this training mandatory for all types of ships and aircraft.

Immediately upon taking command I took steps to coordinate the efforts of the Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Islands.

The fleet was divided into three Task Forces and the schedule of operations required at least one Task Force at sea, available to strike in the event of a surprise. Often two Task Forces were at sea at the same time but never three.

Fuel - $\frac{1}{2}$ at sea.

Day by day, during my period of command, I considered when we should establish the maximum security measures. I realized at all times that this would be a difficult decision to make, unless I abandoned the training program and started, too soon, to wear out our planes and personnel before the situation demanded it.

I had constantly to consider the physical and psychological effect on the personnel of the Fleet of long periods of peace time watch standing. Such demands might well destroy the very vigilance we were seeking to promote.

It must be evident to any one who studies my correspondence with that agency, that the Navy Department up to December 7 did not believe that Japan would make an air attack on Pearl Harbor nor that hostilities were imminent. My frame of mind was necessarily influenced by the action of the Department and the letters and despatches I received therefrom.

I went over each day all letters, despatches and intelligence reports received. On the Saturday preceding the attack we carefully evaluated the situation. Although I did not expect the United States to become involved immediately, a written memorandum, by my direction, was prepared daily as to the steps to be taken if hostilities should come. I approved the last revision on Saturday December 6, 1941.

The deficiency of material and personnel exerted a compelling influence on the measures taken prior to the attack. With adequate personnel and material it would have been possible to maintain a state of alert over a long period of time. Without adequate personnel and material, the time of the attack had to be known within narrow limits. This we did not know. On the contrary, every indication and all information lead to the conclusion that the attack would not be made when it was made.

The threat of attack existed for months.

To maintain an alert status over long periods without exhausting the personnel and wearing out the material required many times the planes and personnel that were available for reconnaissance, for repelling the attack and for destroying the enemy surface forces.

It was recognized that fighter planes are the only effective way to stop an attack by aircraft. That bombing and torpedo planes are the most effective means available to destroy fast moving surface units. That patrol planes are the most effective means to locate fast moving surface units engaged in a hit and run attack.

The number of patrol planes available were entirely inadequate for the task of maintaining a distant patrol for long periods. Detailed studies made jointly by the Commanders of the Army and Navy air forces in Hawaii, Major General F. L. Martin, Air Corps, U.S. Army, and Rear-Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, Naval Aviator, U.S. Navy, and approved by the Commanding General and Commandant 14th Naval District arrived at this conclusion long before the attack took place. There were a total of 81 patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. Of these 12 were based on Midway on 7 December. Of the remainder 6 were under overhaul leaving a total of 61 patrol planes available. To adequately patrol the Hawaiian area and insure against surprise attack it is estimated that more than three hundred patrol planes are required. Navy Department plans provided for the eventual supply of 257 patrol planes to the Hawaiian area. We had less than one third of the number considered necessary by the Navy Department.

The most effective shore based planes for long range bombing missions, and, indeed the only planes in our services at this time capable of carrying worthwhile bomb loads over long distances were the army flying fortresses. On the date of the attack, and prior thereto, there were just twelve planes of this type in the Hawaiian area and of these only six were in flying condition.

In the Fall of 1939 two divisions of heavy cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers were despatched from the fleet to base on Pearl Harbor. These with the submarines and mine craft already based thereon constituted the Hawaiian detachment of the fleet.

In the Spring of 1940 the fleet held maneuvers in the Hawaiian area joining with the Hawaiian detachment for this purpose. The fleet sailed from the San Pedro - San Diego area in April with the announced intention to return in May. Shortly before the fleet was due to depart for the West Coast orders were received to remain in Hawaiian waters for the present, but that it would probably return in a few weeks.

The policy relative to the retention of the fleet in Hawaiian waters remained uncertain for several months. This was prior to the time I assumed command of the fleet but I was in command of three divisions of light cruisers stationed with the fleet in Hawaiian waters.

After several months of vacillation it was announced that the fleet would base in Hawaiian waters and conduct drills and exercises from the base at Pearl Harbor.

It was understood that the fleet remained in Hawaiian waters to exert a restraining influence upon Japan in its program of conquest in Asia.

On various occasions the difficulties and danger of basing the fleet on Pearl Harbor were brought forcibly to the attention of the Navy Department and to the President.

On a trip to Washington a few months after the fleet arrived at Pearl Harbor my predecessor, Admiral J. O. Richardson, informed the Navy Department and the President that;

- (1) The fleet base at Pearl Harbor was not secure.
- (2) That the fleet, conducting exercises based on Pearl Harbor, was in a much more exposed position than if such exercises were conducted on the West Coast.
- (3) That the facilities for training the fleet were much better on the West Coast than at Pearl Harbor.
- (4) That the alterations and additions to ships of the fleet made necessary by lessons of the war, could be performed much more expeditiously with the fleet based on the West Coast.
- (5) That the fleet needed an adequate train composed of transports, cargo ships, mine sweepers, patrol vessels, food ships, ammunition ships, oilers and other fleet auxiliaries. That no effective offensive could be undertaken in the Pacific without such aids for the fleet.
- (6) That the provisions of an adequate train with trained marined landing forces and trained personnel to main the auxiliaries would influence Japan's actions much more than retaining the fleet in Hawaiian without supplying these essential needs of the fleet.

The fleet remained in Hawaiian and I relieved Admiral Richardson as Commander-in-Chief on 1 February 1941.

On a trip to Washington in June 1941 in conversation with Admiral Stark and President Roosevelt I pointed out, that:

- (1) The fleet base at Pearl Harbor due to the congestion of ships, fuel oil storage and repair facilities was exposed to attack, particularly from the air.
- (2) The single entrance channel which must be used by all ships exposed them to submarine attack.
- (3) The danger of blocking this single entrance channel must be constantly considered.

(4) In case of air attack with the fleet in port, it would take from two to three hours to complete sortie.

(5) That the only real answer was for the fleet not to be in Pearl Harbor when the attack came.

(6) That Pearl Harbor is the only refueling, replenishment and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area.

(7) That ships must spend considerable time in Pearl Harbor for the above purposes, for relaxation for the crews, and to complete the considerable number of alterations and additions required due to war experience.

From the time I joined the fleet in 1938 I was keenly aware of its deficiencies. My efforts as commander cruisers division seven and commander cruisers battle force are a matter of record in the correspondence I originated. When I became Commander-in-Chief I redoubled my efforts. I pointed out deficiencies clearly and forcefully.

Fuel Oil

I realized the exposed position of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. I took all steps within my power to minimize the damage which would be inflicted in the event of a surprise attack. I planned dispositions which would make the attacking force pay.

Shortly after taking command of the fleet, I designated Rear-Admiral C. C. Bloch, U.S.N., Commandant 14th Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer for the Pearl Harbor Base. Admiral Bloch was designated primarily because he, as Commandant of the District, would be present at all times and because he was charged by the Navy Department to deal with the Commanding General in matters of the defense of Pearl Harbor. At my insistence he, with the able and whole-hearted cooperation of the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army, coordinated the joint effort of the Army and Navy air forces in Hawaii. Command responsibilities were fixed and the allocation of the various types of planes were made automatic upon the sounding of the alarm. Frequent drills were held and the technique of the cooperating forces reached a very satisfactory state.

In correspondence with the Navy Department I demanded and plead for additional patrol vessels for the Hawaiian area and the West Coast, additional transports, cargo vessels, refrigerator ships, ammunition ships, oilers, tugs and other fleet auxiliaries. I pointed out time and again that to maintain the fleet in Hawaii and supply the material and personnel (both civilian and naval) necessary for the outlying bases and Pearl Harbor taxed our limited resources to the

breaking point. That any offensive action would require many times the auxiliaries we had.

I demanded additional carriers and recommended the conversion of merchant ships for this purpose. I particularly recommended the conversion of at least one merchant ship for each coast to be fitted for landing and launching airplanes. This in order to release one carrier on each Coast from the task of training new pilots in the technique of landing and taking off from a carrier deck. I recommended the conversion of certain sea train vessels for the purpose of transporting planes and thus to relieve a carrier from this essential task. I stressed the need for additional aircraft carriers in the Pacific. I urged the Navy Department to keep all plane carrying ships supplied with the latest type aircraft. I demanded particularly that the carriers in commission be kept supplied with planes. There was a serious shortage of fighter planes and torpedo planes to supply the carriers in existence. In the latter part of August I called specific attention to the fact that we had only 52 fighting planes available in three aircraft carriers and two marine squadrons, where 90 operating planes plus 45 spare planes were the allowance set up by the department. The number of fighting planes supplied prior to December 7 was still inadequate.

No new carrier torpedo planes were being delivered and we were far short of the allowance for these types. This in the face of the demonstrated superiority of this form of attack in frequent actions during this war.

I pointed out that, in a Pacific War, carriers, cruisers and destroyers would play the major role, at least during the early stages of the war. I stressed the need for all three of these types.

The need for additional patrol planes and for double crews for existing patrol planes was clearly indicated.

The necessity of supplying relief carrier groups which would include both planes and personnel was frequently urged.

For the existing ships, besides personnel, the most urgent items which I demanded be supplied and installed were;

(1) The various forms of aircraft warning devices and aircraft identification systems.

(2) Anti-aircraft guns and the controls for same. The principal weakness in ships of the fleet was in short range anti-aircraft weapons. At the time of the attack, with unimportant

exceptions, the only short range weapon installed was the 50 caliber machine guns and these in entirely inadequate numbers.

- (3) The installation of splinter protection around exposed guns, bridges and look out stations.
- (4) The installation of anti-aircraft look out stations.
- (5) The supply and installation of anti-submarine sound gear in all types of destroyers and patrol craft.
- (6) The supply of planes and plane crews for ship based and shore based aircraft.
- (7) The supply of the mobilization allowance of ammunition and the supply of an adequate reserve on shore at Pearl Harbor.
- (8) The supply of aircraft bombs of all types including incendiary bombs.
- (9) The supply of aircraft torpedoes.
- (10) The supply of bombs towage and handling facilities at the airfields in the Hawaiian and West Coast areas.

In supplying these items the Atlantic fleet was given first priority by the Navy Department with the result that only a small part of this work had been accomplished in ships of the Pacific Fleet at the time of the attack though structural changes and wiring had been accomplished in many ships and they were waiting the supply of manufactured equipment from the factories.

Personnel: The number of enlisted personnel supplied was never sufficient to fill the ships to their war time needs. Shortly before the attack of December 7 my staff estimated that we could usefully employ 19,000 additional men in the Pacific Fleet to man the existing ships and fill to capacity the existing Fleet training centers.

New naval ships were being commissioned, merchant ships were being manned with naval personnel, the aircraft training centers absorbed skilled naval personnel, expanding ordnance production required experts who were taken from the fleet, the ship building effort took other qualified officers, and all expending activities on shore took their toll qualified officer and enlisted personnel from the fleet.

Men did not reenlist but preferred the high wages to be obtained

in industry. Efforts were made to freeze the enlisted personnel by legislation but without success.

All these factors operated to drain from the fleet a large proportion of the qualified officer and enlisted personnel. The officer personnel was replaced in adequate numbers by newly commission reserve ensigns but, of course, they lacked experience and training. The turnover in qualified officers attached to the fleet was excessive at all times.

The newly commissioned ensigns were a fine lot and responded readily to training.

The enlisted personnel were in the main untrained new recruits. At times as high as seventy per cent of the men on board individual ships had never heard a gun fired. Considerably more than fifty per cent of the officers were newly commissioned.

Under these conditions an intensive training and target practice program was essential. This was necessary for every ship crew as well as for every plane crew. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the lookouts, to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary and numerous other billets had to be trained before they were competent. A breakdown or inefficiency in any category might very well be costly. An intensive training program was prosecuted during all the months that I was Commander-in-Chief. We were forced to accept the risk of surprise attack, which constantly existed, or to accept an inefficient and impotent fleet.

By the early spring of 1941 target and base facilities to permit the prosecution of an intensive fleet training program had been transferred from the West Coast to Hawaii. To tow the considerable number of target rafts required, to transport the utility and transport planes, and to bring the other training auxiliaries and fleet fueling facilities from the West Coast to Hawaii was quite a task, especially so when we were so short of auxiliary vessels.

A shift back to the Coast, after this transfer was completed, entailed another serious interruption in the fleet training program, with the large number of untraining personnel in the fleet and the international situation, this was a factor that had to be considered very seriously.

The question immediately arises as to why we did not have sufficient training facilities, at both Pearl Harbor and on the Coast, to permit a quick shift of base from one to the other.

Such should have been the case, but it was not, and it takes time to remedy deficiencies.

For some years, our war plans had provided that, in the event of a campaign in the Pacific, the fleet would start the campaign from West Coast Ports. Pearl Harbor was to be utilized as a fueling, provisioning and repair base.

The longer the fleet was retained in Pearl Harbor to exercise a restraining influence on Japan, the more difficult it became, from a political standpoint, to withdraw it.

In December of 1940 and January of 1941 Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, made a survey of Army facilities and forces in Hawaii and available for the defense of Pearl Harbor Naval Base. He submitted the results of his investigation to the Navy Department via the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson. Both Admirals strongly recommended an increase in Army forces for the defense of Pearl Harbor and pointed out the possibility of an air attack and the vital necessity of providing defenses for Pearl Harbor which would provide for its security under all conditions which could be foreseen.

In a letter dated January 25, 1941 the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet called attention to the critical inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns and the small number of land based aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor. He recommended immediate measures be undertaken to correct these deficiencies and that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. He stated that this letter was prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U.S.N. and that it represented his, as well as my own, views.

Under date of January 24, 1941 the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to the Secretary of War in which he urged the reenforcement of Army forces in Hawaii to insure the security of the Pearl Harbor base. This letter was based on the report submitted by Rear Admiral Bloch and forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson. The letter from the Secretary of the Navy covered all contingencies which had been suggested.

The supply of Army planes, guns and personnel was slow and never in sufficient quantities to insure the defense of Pearl Harbor.

The compelling motive in my recommendations for the supply of additional Army planes, guns and personnel for the defense of Pearl Harbor was to make the base secure under all conditions that might arise. Fleet reenforcements to the Atlantic or, the absence

of the fleet on a mission to the Western Pacific, might present an opportunity for razing the industrial, fuel and supply facilities at Pearl Harbor.

It is axiomatic that a fleet base worthy of the name should have permanently attached to it the means for its defense under all conditions that could reasonably arise.

A fleet base is a haven for replenishing and repairing the ships of the fleet and to permit the crews a reasonable degree of rest and relaxation. Without these qualities it is not a fleet base.

I felt that a raid on Pearl Harbor while the major portion of the fleet was present was highly improbable. I know of no officer in Hawaii or in Washington who dissented from this view.

Aerial Torpedoes: The heaviest damage suffered by the Fleet, during the attack of December 7, was that delivered by aerial torpedo attack.

In a letter dated 15 February 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes, 150 feet is desired."

In a letter dated June 1941 to the Commandants of Naval Districts the Chief of Naval Operations revises the statement in the letter of 15 February to the extent of stating that torpedoes had been successfully launched in water somewhat less than 75 feet deep but that at least 75 feet was most desirable to insure that the torpedo would run. After reading this second letter my staff and I considered the aerial torpedo menace in Pearl Harbor could be discounted as the maximum depth therein was forty five feet and in the major portion the depth did not exceed forty feet.

At no time did the department exhibit any concern over the aerial torpedo menace in Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese aerial torpedoes were dropped and performed well in Pearl Harbor.

The fact that Japanese aerial torpedoes could be launched in less than forty feet of water and make successful runs, was unquestionably a considerable factor in the Japanese decision to make the attack on the fleet in Pearl Harbor.

In May and June of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battle ships, four 10,000 ton light cruisers, 18 destroyers, six transports

with practically all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small transports, and some other small craft, were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The details of this transfer were quickly known in Japan. This transfer took approximately one fourth of the fighting strength of the Pacific Fleet. It took all the transports and the trained marines from the West Coast and left us only the marines required to man the outlying islands plus the garrison at Pearl Harbor. By December 7 some additional marines had been trained at San Diego and one transport out of a total of four under conversion on the West Coast had been commissioned. The training of marines in Landing Operations had of necessity been incomplete and their equipment was entirely inadequate.

When I was in Washington in June it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers and a carrier. Due partly to my efforts while in Washington this transfer was not made.

The transfer of forces made in May and June reduced the number of fighting ships by one fourth. By our war college rules which have been evolved from years of experience the remaining fighting strength was nine-sixteenths of the strength prior to the transfer.

The policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other governments particularly Japan. Unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable. This was true just prior to December 7 and it has been true for the past twenty years. During the past four years this condition became increasingly evident to all the world. Every day that I was in command of the fleet the possibility of war with Japan existed.

Japan knew the United States would not start the war. They knew that they could choose the time and place for the initial attack. They knew that no forces relying on passive defense could be strong at all points nor could they maintain an effective alert over indefinite periods. Under such circumstances it was inevitable that we could be worsted during the first encounter. The losses might well have been much more costly to us than they were.

Our peace time intelligence methods and efforts were circumscribed by our laws, by the attitude of our government to do nothing that would offend Japan, by our tolerance of Japanese espionage efforts and by our own government's desire to do nothing to alarm our own civil population.

The Japanese labored under no such handicap imposed by their laws or their government. They took full advantage of our tolerance and did not hesitate to commit any acts which helped their government to obtain information.

The Commandant 14th Naval District was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet.

However, he was authorized to and did deal directly with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Bureaus of the Navy Department on military matters as well as on material and personnel matters.

By order of the Navy Department he was designated as Commander Naval Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. His command included Pearl Harbor, the outlying island bases of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra and also the 14th Naval District which included all the Hawaiian Islands.

By order of the Navy Department he was charged with routing all merchant shipping and the protection of same within the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. This included the maintenance of Anti-submarine patrols, both surface and air, in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

By orders of the Navy Department and the War Department the responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was assigned to the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

The local joint defense plan entitled Joint Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was submitted by the Commandant direct to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

By orders of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet the Commandant 14th Naval District was designated as the Naval Base Defense Officer for the Pearl Harbor Base and assigned the following duties:

(a) To exercise, with the Army, joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) To arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) To exercise supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) To coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarm for; attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

The Naval Base Defense Officer was also directed to:

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet the Commandant 14th Naval District:

(a) Controlled the movements of all ships in Pearl Harbor, in the entrance channel, and in the swept channel.

(b) Controlled the opening and closing of the anti-torpedo nets and the boom.

(c) Controlled the listening devices in the channel.

(d) Controlled the inshore patrol.

(e) Controlled the boom patrol.

(f) Controlled the ready duty destroyer.

(g) Controlled daily sweep for magnetic and moored mines.

By joint agreement between the War and Navy Departments, and provided for in War Plans and existing instructions, the Army was

charged with and responsible for the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. No orders or instructions issued at any time lessened or mitigated the Army responsibility for such defense. The Commandant 14th Naval District was charged directly with the direction of the Naval forces to assist the Army and with the coordination of such naval forces with the Army effort to defend the fleet base at Pearl Harbor.

Growing Tension: The responsible commanders in the fleet knew of the growing tension between Japan and the United States. We had been advised many times during the past year of the constant threat of surprise attacks.

For months it was known that the divergent points of policies as between Japan the United States existed. We followed the situation closely. Many times we were informed that negotiations had practically ceased and each time the negotiations were renewed. This condition existed when Admiral Nomura went to Washington in February of 1941. It continued from that time until December 7.

Warnings of Hostilities: In June 1940 the Commanding General in Hawaii was directed to alert his forces against hostile overseas raid.

In October of 1940 a detachment of battleships and other craft at anchor in San Pedro harbor left hurriedly at night as a result of warnings of an air craft attack.

In January of 1941 we were warned that war was a matter of weeks or days, that international situation continues to deteriorate. That we may become involved in Pacific and Atlantic at the same time.

In February of 1941 we were urged to put marines on outlying islands and there was much discussion about reenforcing the Asiatic Fleet. The Japanese sponsored war between Thailand and Indo China and the Toyko settlement with resulting demands upon Vichy kept us in a continual state of tension. Estimates of an advance by the Japanese against Singapore beginning on February 10 were contained in intelligence reports.

In April of 1941 we were advised that something may be forced on us at any moment which would precipitate action. That Germany probably will not fight us until Japan also does. That situation in Atlantic is obviously critical. Transfer of certain forces from Pacific to Atlantic held up until international situation clears.

In May of 1941 reminded of seriousness of present situation. What will happen in Pacific any one's guess. Japan may come in the

second Germany does - possibly preplanned joint action. Russia still a ?

In June of 1941 great activity in the Atlantic. Detachments of ships from the Pacific arrive in the Atlantic. Expedition to capture Azores planned.

In June and July of 1941 all Japanese merchant ships cleared out of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Intelligence reports indicated an advance to the southward by Japanese forces. The use of the Panama Canal denied to Japanese merchant ships and Japanese merchant ships in the Atlantic were forced to make the circuit of South America.

In July of 1941 after the German attack on Russia the Japanese advance to the southward was stopped and an attack by them on Siberia was expected. The United States freezing of Japanese funds increased the tension.

In August of 1941 we were informed that Japanese seem to have arrived at another of their indecisive periods. Hope of continuing peace in the Pacific has not been given up but it hangs by a slender thread. Japanese talk of barring ships carrying arms to Russia.

In September of 1941 we were informed that conversations with Japan had virtually reached an impasse. Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, had about reached the end of his rope; if conversations fall through the situation could only grow more tense.

In October of 1941 we were informed the resignation of Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. Hostilities between Japan and Russia a strong possibility. Possibility that Japan may attack United States and Britain

After each warning the conversations were renewed. Mr. Kurusu reopened the conversations for the last series of talks and these talks were still continuing when the attack came.

We were fully aware of previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis method to commit hostile action before a declaration of war.

Our warnings during the period immediately preceding the attack followed previous patterns and did not indicate to responsible officers in Hawaii that a Japanese attack was imminent.

We believed the Japanese were not ready to attack the United States and Great Britain. I think this belief was shared by a great many officials in responsible positions in Washington.

The responsible commanders in the fleet were not kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations. We did not know that the United States Government, in its note to Japan delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941 presented, what virtually amounted to an ultimatum. Indeed, I knew that the Chief of Staff U.S. Army and the Chief of Naval Operations had specifically recommended that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese Government.

The outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan handed to the Japanese Ambassador on 26 November 1941 contains the following passages - under steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:-

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo China.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support - militarily, politically, economically - any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

These passages in the note of 26 November constituted, under the existing circumstances, virtually an ultimatum to Japan.

I had no information that such a note had been submitted to the Japanese Government. I submit that I should have been informed of the text of this whole note at the time it was handed to the Japanese Ambassador. Failing this the Japanese had vital information originated by my own government which was denied to me.

While the responsible Commanders knew of conversations with the British, and the probability that we would support the British in the Far East, we did not know that armed support had been definitely promised the British in the event of certain specific eventualities in that area.

The messages received were carefully considered as were the intelligence reports from the Navy Department, from the Commandants 14th and 16th Naval Districts, from the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet and from our own staffs.

The necessity for taking a state of war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air raid attack was considered.

During the time I was Commander-in-Chief we went over the probabilities time and again. We went over them particularly during the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941. We did believe that the chances of such a raid, while the fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor, were very small indeed. Our intelligence reports from all sources indicated the high degree of improbability of such an attack at the time it took place.

General Short and I did confer frequently. We conferred on November 27, December 1, 2 and 3. We did discuss the question of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing Marine planes from these islands. But we also discussed everything that pertained to the general situation and particularly the situation created by the messages received. We did discuss the possibility and probability of an air attack^{at} at least one of these meetings.

As events proved defense against air raid attack was what was most required and had we considered such an air attack imminent every possible step to defend the base would have been taken automatically in accordance with existing instructions.

At all times during my period as Commander-in-Chief, the principal cooperation required in Hawaii between the Army and Navy was in preparation for defense against air raids and in welding the Army and Navy aircraft into a coordinated striking and defensive force.

Each of us knew the steps to be taken for this purpose, for the ground had been meticulously covered in written operation plans and estimates.

I went over with my own staff each message and intelligence report received. I have no doubt that General Short did the same with his staff. Furthermore, I went over these messages with my principal subordinate commanders, Rear Admiral C.C. Bloch, U.S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District, Vice-Admiral W.S. Pye, U.S. Navy Commander Battle Force, Vice-Admiral Wilson Brown, Commander Scouting Force and Vice-Admiral W. F. Halsey, U.S.N. Commander Aircraft Battle Force. Vice-Admirals Halsey and Brown were at sea when the attack took place and did not see the most recent messages. Vice-Admiral W. S. Pye, U.S.N. was in my office on the forenoon of 6 December and together we went over all the messages and discussed the situation exhaustively.

Aircraft Warning Service: Orders and instructions from the War and Navy Departments directed that the Army install and operate a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning

service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and anti-aircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

The aircraft warning service installed and operated by the Army on the Island of Oahu prior to December 7, 1941 was capable of giving a reasonably complete all around coverage to a distance of one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles depending upon conditions. Steps were being taken to improve this hastily installed and organized service by relocating observation posts in more advantageous positions and by intensive training of sufficient personnel to provide for its operation.

The few ships equipped with aircraft warning circuits did not man the circuits while at anchor in Pearl Harbor because the type of terrain surrounding the harbor made their observations of no value; while at sea, ships manned these circuits continuously.

Sabotage: The messages received from the War and Navy Departments did not refer solely to measures to prevent sabotage though the messages from the War Department stressed the anti-sabotage features to such an extent as to minimize the necessity for other action.

So far as the Navy was concerned all practicable measures to prevent sabotage, both afloat and ashore had been in effect for months and no further action was necessary. We were concerned with dispositions and measures to meet the developments of the situation. The stress, in messages from the departments, upon anti-sabotage measures did influence the Naval Officials in their estimate of the situation confronting us.

I knew in general the action taken by the Army. I knew that a Lieut-General U.S. Army had all the information I had. I knew that Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, U.S. Navy, Formerly Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet, had all the information I had. I knew that Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, U.S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and Naval Base Defense Office, was responsible for the active part the Navy would take in the defense of Pearl Harbor; that he was responsible for the active naval cooperation with the Commanding General, Lieut-General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army. I felt I could

safely leave to these responsible, capable and experienced officers all matters of detail in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor Base.

The Commandant 14th Naval District maintained a continuous day by day plot of all ships at sea in the Pacific Ocean, in so far as he had the information. He was supplied with copies of all operation orders for ships of the Pacific Fleet and kept a plot of their positions as deduced from these orders and from radio reports received.

He maintained plots of all merchantmen in the Pacific Ocean.

He maintained plots of all Japanese and other foreign men of war from the best information available.

My office supplied him and the Commanding General with copies of our operating schedules.

All this information was available for the Army and the Commandant 14th Naval District, who was also the Commander of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and jointly responsible with the Commanding General for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, was responsible for furnishing the Army with such information of ships at sea as was required in the discharge of Army responsibilities.

I took command of heavy cruiser division seven attached to the Scouting Force in July of 1938 and operated with the fleet until I transferred my flag at Balboa in June of 1939. I then took command of three divisions of light cruisers in the Battle Force U.S. Fleet. On February 1, 1941 I hoisted my flag as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet with additional duties as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet.

While in command of cruiser division seven I made a good will cruise around South America during April and May of 1939. In April of 1939 the fleet, then in the Atlantic for maneuvers, was hurriedly despatched to the Pacific under secret orders to meet a threat in that ocean.

While in command of the cruisers Battle Force I was part of the fleet which went to Hawaii in April 1940. The fleet was retained in Hawaiian Waters until the attack of December 7, 1941 and I continued to serve with it.

During all the time I was in Hawaiian Waters from April of 1940 until 7 December 1941 there was never a time that the threat of a Japanese attack did not exist. From time to time we received warnings and intelligence reports indicating a more or less tense situation. As a matter of common knowledge the threat of a Japanese attack has existed for many years. The fleet was frequently warned by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to my knowledge, as far back as 1933 and 1934. In 1937 for a considerable period the fleet, then based in the San Pedro- San Diego area, felt there was danger of

Japanese attack.

The warnings sent during the period immediately preceding the attack of December 7 should not be completely isolated from similar warnings sent during other periods when an attack failed to materialize. Then, too, the action of the Navy Department and the tenor of letters received in this period all influenced the action taken.

In spite of the warnings received I feel that the Navy Department did not believe the Japanese would attack us at the time they did. Furthermore, the Navy Department believed the air raid on Oahu to be just as improbable as did the officers in Hawaii.

This contention is supported by the following evidence:

(a) A despatch sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was not received until after the attack was completed. This message was sent over the Army network and was considerably delayed in transmission. The Navy communication system was available and operating. If hostilities were considered to be imminent why was a message not also sent to me over the naval communication system?

The radio telephone from Washington to Honolulu was in operating condition. Why was this channel of communication not utilized? It appears that even at this time Washington did not consider hostilities to be imminent nor that an attack would be made upon Pearl Harbor.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, on December 12, 1941 at Pearl Harbor stated to me that in all the discussions of possible Japanese moves he had heard in the Navy Department, no one had once mentioned the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

(c) When the Secretary of the Navy was in Pearl Harbor on December 12, 1941 he asked me if I had received a warning despatch sent on the morning of December 7 to me and to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. When I informed him that no such message was addressed to or received by my headquarters, he said such a message had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet and he thought it had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet also. If the Navy Department thought it necessary to warn the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet why was it not necessary to warn the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet? A possible answer is that the Navy Department did not, in fact, consider hostilities with Japan imminent and that any action

by Japan would be confined to the Western Pacific and that there would be no attack on Pearl Harbor.

(d) In a letter from Admiral Stark to me dated November 25, 1941 and received by me on December 3, 1941, he warned me of the possibility that the Japanese would attack and the gravity of the situation. He mentioned that an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. He stated there are some who think it likely to occur. He did not give it the weight others did, but he included it because of the strong feeling among some people. He stated further he has generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. He still did. He rather looked for an advance into Thailand, Indo China, Burma Road area as the most likely. He doesn't know what the United States may do, he wishes he did. We may do anything or we may do nothing - he thinks it more likely to be anything. In the same letter he tells me that Admiral King (Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet) strongly recommended the transfer of certain destroyers stationed in West Coast ports to the Atlantic and the Secretary was sold on it, however, Stark had successfully resisted it to date.

(e) During the ten days preceding the attack, the War and Navy Departments proposed the transfer of some fifty Army fighting planes from Oahu to the outlying islands of Wake and Midway. They also proposed to relieve or augment the Marines with Army personnel. The Commanding General and I recommended against the transfer of Army fighting planes for technical reasons and against the transfer of Army troops until they could be equipped for the purpose. This proposed depletion of the Army fighting plane strength in Oahu by approximately forty per cent did not indicate any apprehension of an attack on Oahu.

(f) In the weeks preceding the attack by orders of the War Department and with the knowledge of the Navy Department, the major part of the flying fortresses stationed in Hawaii were transferred by air to the Philippines. Additional flying fortresses were to be transferred from the West Coast to the Philippines via Hawaii. Eventually the ones taken from Hawaii were to be replaced from the West Coast and additional ones were to be supplied to Hawaii. In the week preceding the attack of December 7 there were six flying fortresses in operating condition on Oahu out of a total of twelve planes of that type in the Island.

A flight of 12 Army B-17 flying fortresses en route to the Philippines arrived from the West Coast during the attack but had no ammunition aboard and were therefore unable to take offensive action against Japanese planes.

(g) In reply to the warning messages from the War Department the Commanding General Hawaiian Department informed the War Department at length and in detail of the steps he had taken and in the absence of a reply considered his action had the approval of the War Department.

(h) The message of 24 November to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet was to the effect that a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese was a possibility; that the Philippines or Guam might be attacked; that doubt as to the favorable outcome of pending negotiations and statement of the Japanese government supported the opinion.

This was considered a general warning and is referred to in Admiral Stark's letter of 25 November which has been heretofore discussed.

(i) The so-called War warning of November 27 stated that negotiations with Japan had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo was indicated. I was directed to make an appropriate defensive deployment only preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned. I was left to my own devices as to what constituted an appropriate defensive deployment as no such contingency has been previously discussed.

(j) The despatch of 29 November quoting the War Department despatch states negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated for all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. It states hostile action possible at any time. Desires Japan commit first overt act if hostilities can not be avoided. Directs such reconnaissance as may be practicable. Do not alarm civil population. After quoting War Department message, Navy Department adds that the shooting orders in effect in the Atlantic and South East Pacific are not applicable in other areas; that we were to take no offensive action until Japan has committed first overt act.

Note: The conversations were resumed after this and continued to December 7.

(k) The message of 30 November to Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet indicates Navy Department believes Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus and directs certain scouting by Philippine air force to ascertain destination this expedition. On 6 December Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet reports 25 ships convoy with escort 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers and another convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers and states indications are these ships headed for Kohtron a port in Indo China.

(1) During this period several despatches were exchanged between Nagal Operations and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

(1) Navy Department is informed that Enterprise is providing transportation for 12 Marine fighting planes to Wake, flying off the carrier on 3 December. Patrol planes cover advance and return to Enterprise. Operations is informed of aircraft situation at Midway and Wake on 28 November. That essential ground material for operation 12 B-17 Army bombers is being landed at Midway. That on 28 November only six B-17 Army bombers in Hawaiian area are in operating condition. That acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases by Navy bombs now available there usable by Army with minor modifications. Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate more than 20 miles off shore radically limits their usefulness for insular defense. That additional anti-aircraft guns are required for Army and Marine defense battalions.

(2) On 28 November Operations informs Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet that Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 - 37 Millimeter anti-aircraft guns and will receive ammunition for them in February. That War Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses, but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon. That it appears advisable to transfer a marine fighting squadron from San Diego to Hawaii via the Saratoga when she proceeds to Pearl Harbor. An air mail report was requested on present defenses of all outlying bases, and increases planned in near future.

(3) Operations is informed on 4 December that eighteen marine scouting planes are being transported via Lexington to Midway.

(4) On 28 November Operations is informed that Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet has directed all ships operating in vicinity of Oahu to depth bomb all submarine contacts suspected to be hostile.

(m) The dependents of Army and Naval Personnel were permitted to come to Hawaii by commercail transportation as were civilians, until after the attack of December 7 when the order for evacuation was issued.

Aircraft Warnings: The responsibilities of the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor included the installation and operation of an aircraft warning system on the Island of Oahu for the detection of water borne and air borne craft at a distance from the Island. This was an Army function clearly laid down in existing instructions issued by the War and Navy Departments. The Commandant 14th Naval District was charged with the details of Naval cooperation in its operation. Prior to December 7 I had received no request from the Army to detail naval personnel to these aircraft warning centers. It had been reported to me on various occasions that this aircraft

warning system had been operated with a gratifying degree of success, particularly during maneuvers and exercises. The Commanding General had informed me that he could give us an all around coverage up to one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles depending upon conditions.

The only difference between the mobile sets which were operating and the permanent stations which were still being constructed at the time of the attack, was one of location - the higher the location the greater the range - the instruments in the mobile sets were identical with those to be installed in the permanent locations.

In training personnel for the operation of this equipment Army personnel had made frequent trips to sea in ships having this equipment installed. Naval personnel had worked with this type of Army equipment on shore. In the weeks prior to the attack a naval lieutenant who had had experience in the British Fleet was detailed to assist the Army with his advice and was still working with the Army at the time of the attack.

Distant Reconnaissance: To insure Pearl Harbor against a surprise attack from airplanes based on a fast carrier, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require 252 planes. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. 100 patrol planes would be required for the pool for this dawn patrol. This dawn patrol is necessary because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter, daily, many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Roughly speaking, in a 360 degree search of 800 miles radius in the Hawaiian area we can not count, on an average, of more than a seventy five per cent coverage.

Navy Department announced plans provided for the eventual supply of two hundred and fifty seven patrol planes to the Hawaiian area. On December 7 we had on Oahu 69 Navy patrol planes of which 61 were in flying condition. 12 patrol planes were based on Midway making a grand total of 81 patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. The Army had 12 B-17 Flying Fortresses of which six were in flying condition. These were the only type of Army and Navy planes on Oahu suitable for distant reconnaissance. Of the 61 Navy Patrol Planes 54 were of the P.B.Y. type which had recently arrived from the mainland. There was a practical absence of spare parts for these planes. Material difficulties were being experienced with these new planes and all of the new planes were due to be fitted with armor and leak proof gas tanks before being entirely suitable for service.

Of the Navy Patrol planes twelve (one squadron) had just returned from seven weeks extensive operations based on Midway and while operable were in need of overhaul. With minor exceptions only one crew for each patrol plane was available.

Any distant search which we could have made over an extended period would have been incomplete and ineffective.

In the detailed study or estimate from which the operating plans for the Army and Navy shore based aircraft were produced, it is clearly stated that searches around Oahu for hostile forces could be maintained for short periods only due to inadequate numbers of aircraft and personnel to man them. That the time of arrival of hostile expeditions must be known within narrow limits if an effective search was to be instituted and maintained. We did not know nor did we believe that a hostile expedition against Pearl Harbor would come when it did.

On the contrary conversations were still continuing; what evidence we had of hostile intent on the part of Japan pointed to an overseas expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo and our latest information indicated an expedition in Indo China waters headed for Kohtron. ^{a port in Indo China.} The intelligence units of my staff, the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Navy Department indicated the bulk of the carriers still in home waters and located the others in waters far distant from Hawaii.

We knew that a raiding expedition had to leave Japanese waters approximately two weeks and probably longer (due to necessity for refueling at sea) before they could make an attack on Pearl Harbor. From our information we had every reason to believe that the attack would not be made at the time it was made.

In any employment of forces a commander must guard against and counter what appear to be probable moves of the enemy. He can not guard against every eventuality. If he attempts to do so he immobilizes his own forces, employs them in profitless enterprises or so dissipates his efforts that they are ineffective. The offensive always offers the chance of surprise particularly since the advent of aircraft. We know, from numerous examples in this war, how a great many aircraft attacks have surprised the defending force even though they could estimate within narrow limits when the attack would be made.

Needless to say, had I received any intimation that an attack on Pearl Harbor was in any degree probable, we would have utilized every available facility to discover and destroy the attacking force.

In addition to the patrol planes, the Navy had prior to the attack of December 7, and based on Oahu, one squadron of twenty three marine scout bombers held in Oahu for expeditionary work. These and the Navy patrol planes were the only Navy combat planes which could reasonably be required to maintain long alert periods for the defense of Oahu.

All ships based planes (carrier, battleship and cruiser planes) are maintained in a constant state of alert while cruising at sea. During the periods in port, the crews must have some time for rest and relaxation. The planes must be tuned up. While there were fifty three battleship and cruiser seaplanes ready for use prior to the attack of December 7, their limited radius and fighting power curtailed their potential value.

There were thirty seven Navy utility and transport planes ready for service. These were planes to supply target and other facilities for the fleet. Their combat and scouting value was not great.

Fifty two planes of all types were held in storage for replacements. Forty seven planes of all types were under overhaul on shore. No crews were available to man the planes in storage or under overhaul.

Summary:

The Navy had on the Island of Oahu just prior to the attack of December 7 the following airplanes in flying condition:

- 61 patrol planes
- 23 marine scout bombers
- 53 battleship and cruiser seaplanes in port for rest and relaxation.
- 37 transport and utility planes of limited combat and scouting value.

We had 61 Navy patrol planes plus 6 Army B-17 flying fortresses available for long range reconnaissance. The Navy Department recognized the need for two hundred and fifty seven patrol planes for this purpose as evidenced in the published plans. With an adequate number of patrol planes the principal function of the Navy B-17 flying fortresses would then be to constitute a striking force ready to attack when hostile forces were located.

The defense of Pearl Harbor was an Army responsibility. The Navy planned to augment the Army effort with such forces as happened to be in port at the time of an attack.

ARMY PLANES IN HAWAII ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

Approximate number of Army planes in Hawaii prior to the attack of December 7, 1941:

Bombers:

12-B-17 flying fortresses - 6 were in commission, others had been stripped and were out of commission due to use of equipment in planes transported to the Philippines. Three of these planes were destroyed in the attack.

12-B-17 flying fortresses arrived from the mainland during the attack. They had no ammunition. Their guns were cosmolined (covered with heavy grease) and the guns were not boresighted. Four of these planes were destroyed in the attack.

10-A-20 bombers - 9 of these were in commission. Obsolete type capable of cruising 1200 miles, 2 engine planes.

35-B-18 bombers, 2 engine planes. Capable of cruising 1500 miles. Obsolete type.

5-B-12 obsolete bombers.

Fighting planes:

2-P-38 latest type fighting planes.

95-P-40 fighting planes.

35-P-26 obsolete fighting planes.

Replaced by table furnished by General Short.

Status of ^{Army} Aircraft Army December 7, 1941 ^{before the attack}

Type	Total	Out of Commission	In Commission	Other	Other	Other
A-20	13	7	6			
B-17	12	6	6			
B-24	1	1	0			
Obsolete bombers	48	19	29	30	1	
P-40 - B + C	100	36	64	9	1	
Obsolete pursuit	61	31	30			
Observation	15	8	7	0		
Total	250	108	142	3	5	
	31	10	40	51	2	

(over)
 1421 05308 Hawaiian Army Dec 7 1941

Japanese Espionage:

Due to the high ground surrounding it, the naval establishment at Pearl Harbor is perhaps more exposed to espionage than any other naval establishment in the world. With long range telephoto lenses excellent pictures can be taken from these hills which show every ship and major activity in the area.

We knew that we were exposed to this espionage and with more than a hundred thousand individuals of Japanese blood in the Islands, we were convinced that the Japanese espionage was constant and thorough. It was however much better than we had thought.

Our laws prevented the interception of messages transmitted over our own cables. Messages obtained from our commercial cable company after the attack of December 7, and decoded within forty eight hours, disclose the fact that in the days immediately preceding the attack, the Japanese Consul in Honolulu kept the Japanese Government informed of every movement of our ships to and from Pearl Harbor.

By this same American cable, he established a system of signals to be used by Japanese agents in assisting the attacking force and particularly in keeping the attacking force informed of any movement by the American Fleet or units thereof.

The contents of these messages clearly indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent and would have been sufficient in themselves, for the United States to declare war on Japan.

The Japanese did have the most complete information on Pearl Harbor that has ever been given to an attacking force.

Under the Commanding General the Army maintained an extensive Military Intelligence Department in Hawaii.

Under the Commandant 14th Naval District who reported direct to the Navy Department an extensive Naval Intelligence unit was maintained in Hawaii.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintained an extensive intelligence service in Hawaii.

The Commandant 14th Naval District was directly responsible to the Navy Department for the Naval intelligence effort and for naval cooperation with the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence units.

The results of their efforts were made available to me in so far as they affected the fleet. I was not responsible for the work of the various intelligence units in Hawaii.

ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S MOVEMENTS ON DECEMBER 6 and 7, 1941.

The size of the Island of Oahu is such that from any point on it a motor car can reach Pearl Harbor in less than one hour. From Honolulu to Pearl Harbor it takes about twenty minutes by automobile or bus.

On Saturday December 6, 1941 I went over the whole situation with Admiral Fye and members of my staff. I spent about two hours in the afternoon talking over the situation with Captain C. H. McMorris and Captain Walter S. DeLany, U.S. Navy. About 4:00 p.m. I went to my quarters at the submarine base where I remained until about 5:45 p.m. when I went to the Haleakalani Hotel where I had dinner with Rear Admiral and Mrs. H.F. Leary, U.S.N. I was one of about a dozen guests. I left about 9:30 p.m. and returned to my quarters at the submarine base and was in bed by 10:00 p.m. I remained in my quarters until the attack commenced, when I proceeded to my headquarters arriving in less than five minutes after the attack started.

THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941

Our naval force in the Pacific was inferior in every category to the Japanese Naval Force. This was glaringly so in the case of carrier based planes. The Japanese had not less than ten, and probably twelve, aircraft carriers in the Pacific. We had three.

The Japanese had a very great superiority in cruisers and destroyers and probably a slight superiority in battleships. They had more submarines than we had in the Pacific.

Their auxiliaries, troop transports, supply ships, and all merchant marine naval assistance, were vastly superior to anything we could bring immediately into action in the Pacific.

The training of the Japanese Army in overseas and amphibious expeditions was of the highest order. Very great numbers of troops had been trained and had had experience in landing against opposition on the China Coast. United States forces in the Pacific trained in this character of operations were negligible. Only one transport was available and it had been recently converted.

All elements of the Japanese Navy had undergone rigorous training. The Japanese Naval Air Force had been engaged for four years in missions against objectives in China during actual war.

The combined Japanese air force consisted of not less than four thousand and probably six thousand planes. Their system of island air fields from the homeland to the Marshalls, and from the homeland to Indo China, permitted rapid concentrations.

Their facilities for basing aircraft in the Carolines, Marshalls and Bonin groups were excellent. The harbors in these islands were well developed and well defended.

The Japanese intelligence service was excellent. They took full advantage of our expressed desire not to offend them in any way. They took full advantage of the handicaps imposed by our own laws on our own intelligence service.

The Japanese knew that we would not attack. They knew that they could choose the time and place to attack. They knew that they could withhold an attack if our dispositions did not suit them.

They had many harbors in which to service the units of their fleet.

The United States Pacific Fleet was directed by Washington to take no offensive action but to wait until Japan committed the first overt act. It was directed not to alarm our own civil population. Messages received indicated that we still hoped to avoid war with Japan and that a Japanese attack on the United States while possible was by no means probable.

We were to take no action to offend Japan or in any way to precipitate any action.

Under a literal interpretation of our orders, if a Japanese Naval Force was encountered at sea, we were to wait until they opened fire, even though such a force were encountered just outside the American three mile limit.

If we had orders to open fire on a Japanese Naval Force encountered in the vicinity of Hawaii, or in any delimited area, our position would have been measurably improved. Our psychology and reactions would have changed completely.

Under our orders to remain strictly on the defensive, we suffered an enormous handicap both physically and psychologically.

All warnings from the Navy Department indicated a movement by Japan in the Western Pacific.

We had one replenishment base for the fleet in Hawaii - Pearl Harbor.

The United States Intelligence Service was inaccurate and misleading.

Published statements, made by public men in high position in the United States, in regard to the relative naval strength of Japan and the United States in the Pacific, misled and deluded the American people into the belief that we had an overwhelmingly superior naval force in the Pacific. They misled no one else.

Disposition of Forces prior to the attack of December 7, 1941

On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there were 200 ships of all types, exclusive of harbor craft, attached to the Pacific Fleet. 69 ships were in Pearl Harbor plus 19 ships undergoing overhaul at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor or alongside tenders. 23 ships were being overhauled at West Coast Navy Yards, 19 ships were in West Coast ports.

70 ships of the Pacific Fleet were at sea.

153 ships were combatant types, the remaining 47 were non-combatant types. I have included mine layers, mine sweepers and aircraft tenders in the combatant types.

57 combatant type ships were at sea. 53 were in Pearl Harbor plus 18 undergoing overhaul at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor and alongside tenders.

In the Hawaiian area;

(a) Task force Eight composed of one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers was two hundred miles West of Pearl Harbor standing to the eastward. This task force was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a squadron of marine fighting planes at Wake. The carrier launched a squadron of eighteen scout bombers at 0618 and searched a sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles. The planes were to land at Ewa field on Oahu on completion of the search.

(b) Task force Twelve composed of one carrier, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers was four hundred and twenty five miles southeast of Midway and three hundred miles to the westward of French Frigate Shoals standing on a westerly course to fly off a squadron of marine scout bombers to land on Midway.

(c) Task force Three composed of one heavy cruiser and five light mine layers was at Johnston Island exercising at landing exercises using special landing boats.

(d) A detachment of task force three composed of one heavy cruiser and four light mine layers was in the operating area at sea Southwest of Oahu.

(e) Task force Seven (Submarines) were disposed at sea as follows:

Two submarines on patrol off Midway.

Two submarines on patrol off Wake.

Four submarines making passage from Mare Island to Pearl Harbor.

(f) Task force Nine. Patrol Planes. V.P.-21 at Midway 12 planes. Remainder of patrol planes 69 based on Oahu.

(g) Task force 15. Two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and one destroyer leader were escorting convoys.

(h) In operating area off Pearl Harbor were two mine sweepers and three small patrol plane tenders, also two destroyers for inshore patrol and ready duty.

(i) En route to and from outlying Islands were two mine sweepers and two patrol plane tenders. At sea on the Coast was one aircraft carrier.

(j) There were a total of forty combatant type ships at sea in the Hawaiian area plus nine ships making passage to and from outlying islands. There were eight at sea in other areas.

(k) In Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were six battleships, one light cruiser, two old light cruisers, twenty four destroyers, eleven mine craft, four aircraft tenders and four submarines. Under overhaul at Navy Yard Pearl Harbor or alongside tenders in addition were two battleships; two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, four destroyers, seven mincraft and one submarine.

(l) Under overhaul in West Coast Ports were one battleship, six destroyers, three aircraft tenders, and five submarines. In West Coast posts were three destroyers, one aircraft tender and six submarines.

The fleet was operating in accordance with the provisions of the security plan as originally issued on 15 February 1941 and revised on 14 October 1941. This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
- (c) A combination of both.

Ships at sea were fully ready for any form of attack.

Battleships in port required two machine guns constantly manned and two 5" - 25 A.A. guns had crews standing by with ammunition at each gun.

All ships had ammunition in the ready stowage on deck adjacent to the anti-aircraft guns with crews near the guns.

A daily search of all the operating areas was made by the patrol planes patrol wing two. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the areas in which detachments of the fleet would be operating during the day. The planes conducting this search were in the air at the time of the attack.

On this morning in addition four patrol planes were exercising with submarines in inter-type tactics for communication and recognition.

The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the discovery of a submarine near the Antares returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This was at about 0645. The circumstances attending the failure to give the alarm at this time have been covered separately. At this time, however, the Ward and a patrol plane attacked the submarine and probably sank it.

At about 0752 the Navy Signal Tower sent the signal "Enemy Air Raid, this is not a drill".

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all ships and stations at 0800. At 0816 a message was sent to all ships and stations that hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl Harbor. At 0817 combat wing two was directed to locate enemy force.

About 200 Japanese fighting, bombing and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all the air fields on Oahu at about 7:55 a.m.

The first attack on ships of the fleet was made by Japanese torpedo planes. From this first flight three Japanese torpedo planes were shot down by guns of the ships, two before they had launched topedoes and one immediately after the torpedo was launched.

The damage to planes and communications delayed the start of the search and with the few planes available only a partial search of the whole 360 degree arc was immediately made.

As planes became servicable the search was extended. The ships and planes of Task force eight, twelve and three, already at sea, already at sea, were augmented by ships from Pearl Harbor. Every effort was made to locate and destroy the attacking force. While it was logical for the attack to come from the northward due to prevailing wind conditions, every positive indication, including direction finder bearings, and reports from our own forces that an enemy carrier was sighted, indicated an enemy carrier or carriers to the south and west.

Although the major portion of the planes from Oahu searched the northern and western sectors, our surface forces and carrier based planes expended their efforts to the south and west.

Efforts to locate the enemy continued through December 8 and December 9 but without results.

It is probable that the attack was launched from a position to the northward of Oahu. This is supported by various bits of evidence that became available to us after the attack. It is quite possible, however, that one or more carriers was in fact to the south and west and succeeded in eluding our surface and carrier based planes in that area.

Morale of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

In view of all that has occurred since the attack on Pearl Harbor I wish to call attention to the magnificent efforts of both officers and men during the attack on Pearl Harbor; to the successes that have attended our attacks on the mandated islands; to the raids on Wake and Marcus made by our forces; to the brilliant action of our forces in the Coral Sea.

These actions and successes indicate a high degree of training and morale. This training and the high morale obtained in all fleet units both before, during and after the attack on Pearl Harbor must be a cause of great satisfaction, to the American people. It is also an evidence of the sound basic training of the fleet, accomplished, in the face of continuing threats of attack, during the year preceding the attack at Pearl Harbor.

My Personal and Official Relations with Mr. Roosevelt

In the spring of 1915 Mr. Marshall, then Vice President of the United States, and Mr. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, headed an official party of formally open the Exposition at San Francisco and San Diego.

Lieutenant Wallace Bertholf, U.S.N. and I serving on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Lieutenant Bertholf was detailed as an aide to the Vice President and I was detailed as an aide to Mr. Roosevelt during the visit. This duty lasted for approximately two weeks after which I returned to my regular duty as fleet gunnery officer U.S. Pacific Fleet.

In the spring of 1916 I reported for duty in the division of fleet training under the Chief of Naval Operations which duty I continued to perform until the late summer of 1917 when I joined the British Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. I remained there until the American battleship squadron under Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, U.S. Navy joined the British Grand Fleet, when I was detailed as gunnery officer on Rear Admiral Rodman's staff.

During the above mentioned duty in Washington, I saw Mr. Roosevelt on about a half dozen social occasions.

After leaving Washington my next contact with Mr. Roosevelt was at a luncheon given in his honor by Admiral Rodman on board the U.S.S. New York at anchor in the Firth of Forth, Scotland in the summer of 1918.

Except when I passed him in a receiving line at a White House reception, I had no further conversation with Mr. Roosevelt until I had an interview with him in June 1941 following my appointment as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941.

Senator Barkley

Rumors have been circulated that I owed my appointment as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet to the fact that Mrs. Kimmel was related to Senator Alben B. Barkley of Kentucky and that it was his influence that determined my appointment.

Mrs. Kimmel is not related in any way to Senator Barkley or to Mrs. Barkley. Furthermore Mrs. Kimmel has never even met Senator Barkley. She met Mrs. Barkley on one occasion only and that about ten years ago.

I am not related in any way to either Senator or Mrs. Barkley.

Never, at any time, did Senator Barkley recommend me for any assignment.

General Walter C. Short's request for retirement

Shortly after the publication of the Roberts report General Short in a personal letter to General Marshall enclosed an undated request for retirement and requested Marshall to use it only as a last

resort. Marshall states that he does not know how this request got to the Secretary's desk, that he was in New York when the Secretary, Mr. Stimson, got possession of it. In any event Mr. Stimson had the request and this was the justification for his notification to Mr. Knox that Short had submitted a request for retirement. Whereupon Mr. Knox directed that I be informed that Short had submitted a request for retirement.

Roberts' report published 24 January 1942. On 27 January Admiral H. R. Stark's letter to me stated that he had been informed the day before by General Marshall that Short had submitted a request for retirement.

Japanese Note to the United States December 7, 1941

The Japanese note delivered to the U.S. Government on 7 December was transmitted in code by the Japanese prior to that date. A copy of this code despatch was in the hands of our Navy Department. It is believed that this despatch was decoded by our decoding section and a translation delivered to Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson U.S. N. Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at 10:00 p.m. on December 6. Washington time 4:30 p.m. December 6th Honolulu time. In the translation the Japanese Ambassador was directed to deliver this note at a time to be later specified in a separate despatch.

This separate despatch received later directed the delivery of this note at 1:00 p.m. Washington time on December 7 and was the basis for the despatch sent to the Comdg. General Hawaiian Department and received by him after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

What was done with the translation of the Japanese note after 10:00 p.m. December 6?

Who saw it besides Wilkinson and what action, if any, was taken?

Why was this despatch not made the basis of a warning message without waiting for the message which later specified the time of delivery?

Commitments of U.S. Government

Shortly before hostilities with Japan commenced Admiral T.C. Hart U.S. Navy Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet was informed by the British Commander-in-Chief in China that the United States Government had agreed and informed the British Government that the United States would furnish armed support to the British against Japan in the case of certain specific eventualities in the Far East. Neither the Comdr. in Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet nor the Comdr. in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet had been informed of such commitments by our government.

If Japan knew of these commitment, which is highly probable, we had a situation where our enemy was in possession of information originated by our own government which was denied to the two naval Commanders-in-Chiefs who were vitally interested.

Admiral Standley's Statement

*Omit
HAC* { ~~In a conversation with Rear Admiral J. O. Richardson on a train en route to California from Washington in February 1942 Admiral Standley was asked how Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor escaped censure in the Commission's report as he, by war plans and other orders, was responsible for the Navy's part in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base. Admiral Standley's reply was that the commission had been informed in Washington prior to their departure for Pearl Harbor that Admiral Kimmel was to be held responsible.~~

RESPONSIBILITY

When information, orders or instructions do not produce, in the minds of subordinates, the reactions desired, the issuing authority must accept a measure of responsibility for the results. When such information, orders or instructions produce in a number of highly intelligent subordinate minds the same reactions, the measure of responsibility that must be accepted by the issuing authority whose intentions have been misunderstood, is greatly increased. Indeed, there is a point where grave doubt is raised as to whether the issuing authority did intend, at the time the matter was issued, the meaning later attributed to it.

Rear Admiral C.C. Bloch, U.S. Navy Commandant 14th Naval District, Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and Naval Base Defense Officer for Pearl Harbor Base was thoroughly familiar with all the despatches and letters I received bearing on the Japanese situation. I discussed all matters in connection with the situation with him on many occasions. He was present at all the interviews I had with General Short in the days immediately preceding the attack. He knew the measures being taken and the reasons therefor.

Major-General F. L. Martin, U.S. Army Commander Hawaiian Air Force is thoroughly familiar with the aircraft situation in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. By joint agreement he commanded the fighting planes and others engaged in repelling air attack on Oahu.

Rear Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, U.S. Navy Commander Patrol Wing Two and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force under Admiral Bloch commanded the Naval Shore based aircraft and under agreement with the Army commanded all Naval and Army shore based Aircraft engaged in scouting and bombing missions over the sea. He with Major General F. L. Martin, U.S. Army Commander Hawaiian Air Force made a joint estimate of the employment of shore based air forces in Hawaii which was approved by Rear Admiral Bloch and the Commanding General. Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army.

Rear Admiral Bellinger organized the search after the attack. He is thoroughly familiar with the aircraft situation in Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

Rear Admiral William Ward Smith, U.S. Navy, Chief-of-Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Captain Walter S. DeLany, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Captain C. H. McMorris, U.S. Navy War Plans Officer, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Captain Lynde McCormick, U.S. Navy Assistant War Plans Officer U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Captain V. O. Murphy, U.S. Navy Assistant War Plans Officer U.S. Pacific Fleet.

These officers were thoroughly apprised of the situation and saw the despatches and letters bearing on the Japanese situation.

I went over the situation exhaustively with Smith, De Lany and McMorris almost daily.

Captain J.B. Earle, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff for the Commandant 14th Naval District. He had charge under Admiral Bloch of Offensive and Defensive measures in effect in the 14th District.

Captain A. C. Davis, U.S. Navy Aviation Officer U.S. Pacific Fleet was thoroughly familiar with all aircraft activities of the Pacific Fleet and the reasons therefor.

Commander Curts, U.S. Navy Communication Officer
U.S. Pacific Fleet. Has knowledge of communications sent and received.

Captain Williard A. Kitts, U.S. Navy Fleet Gunnery Officer U.S. Pacific Fleet is thoroughly familiar with all gunnery matters as they were prior to and on December 7, 1941.

Captain David Clark, U.S. Navy Fleet Material Officer U.S. Pacific Fleet is thoroughly familiar with all overhaul, repair, and alteration work in the Pacific Fleet prior to and on December 7, 1941.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, U.S. Navy Commander Destroyer Flotilla One Battle Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Rear Admiral Theobald assisted me in my presentation of the details of my presentation and the efforts I made to have the transcript of my testimony corrected.

Rear Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S. Navy, former Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet. He knows about his correspondence with the Navy Department on the subject of retaining the fleet in Hawaii. His recommendations in regard to preparation for a campaign in the Pacific. The warnings he received while Commander-in-Chief of the immense amount of hostilities in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

STATEMENTS BY PUBLIC MEN PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Prior to December 7, 1941 Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, and other public officials, made many extravagant statements. They indicated clearly to the American people that our Navy was in sufficient strength in the Pacific, to overcome easily any effort made by Japan.

They challenged Japan.

They knew their threats were empty ones.

They knew of the exposed position of the fleet in Hawaii and knew that our naval forces in the Pacific were inferior to those of Japan.

They knew of the geographic advantage held by Japan in the theatre of operations.

Neither the War or Navy Department, warned the commanders in the field, in simple, clear and unmistakable language, that war with Japan was imminent.

They believed that Japan would not attack the United States. They thought Japan would be bluffed by words.

When there were losses at Pearl Harbor it became necessary to make it appear that these losses were due to the inefficiency and ineptness of individuals. They must accept none of the blame for fear they would be confronted immediately with their extravagant claims whose echoes were still resounding in the ears of the American people.

The flood of abuse and misrepresentation in the press began immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor; it was augmented by Mr. Knox's report; it reached a crescendo when the Robert's report was published.

Before they knew what had happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and before any report had been submitted, members of Congress and newspapers were demanding the Court martial of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Secretary Knox's report gave impetus to this demand. The Roberts report, starting with the ground work already created, determined that the losses at Pearl Harbor were due to dereliction of duty on the part of the Admiral and General Commanding.

I do not know what steps, if any, the Navy Department or the Administration took to augment or reduce this flood. I do know that the whole responsibility for the losses at Pearl Harbor was placed upon the shoulders of of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

A careful study of the warnings despatched indicate beyond reasonable doubt that the Administration did not expect Japan to attack the United States.

The warnings received did not indicate to General Short that war with Japan was imminent. It was not indicated to the halfdozen members of my staff and principal commanders who read all the messages. It was not indicated to me.

General Short, my principal subordinate commanders, and my staff, were highly intelligent, capable officers specially selected for the duty they were performing. Their essential reactions to the messages received were identical.

SURPRISE AIR ATTACK

A surprise air attack is, under the most favorable conditions for the defending force, difficult to detect and frustrate.

It should be noted that the American air force in the Philippines were practically destroyed some ten hours after the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. They knew we were at war with Japan when the destruction took place.

On 1 May it was reported that General MacArthur's air force in Australia had destroyed 30 Japanese planes on the ground in one of the occupied Islands in a surprise attack.

Indeed we read of surprise air attacks so often that it has now ceased to excite comment.

SUBMARINE CONTACTS IN OPERATING AREA AROUND HAWAII.

The orders issued by Admiral J. O. Richardson when he was Commander-in-Chief provided for depth bombing strange submerged submarine contacts within the Hawaiian defensive sea area. This area was confined to a distance of three miles from the shore line. Strange submarine contacts outside of the three mile limit were to be trailed in an effort to bring the submarine to the surface. These orders had the approval of the Navy Department.

Prior to the time I became Commander-in-Chief there were several strange submarine contacts reported.

During the first week of February, the first week after I took command of the U. S. Fleet, a submerged submarine contact was reported about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately forty eight hours after which contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a submarine. I was not fully convinced but made a complete report to Naval Operations stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in our operating area around Hawaii. I was informed that the orders in effect were to be followed and we were not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three mile limit.

Again about the middle of March a submerged submarine contact was made in approximately the same position as the one during the first week in February. This contact was trailed for approximately sixty hours before being lost. The destroyers engaged in trailing were confident that they had trailed a submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive. It could have been conclusive only had the submarine been actually sighted.

In the months that followed several reports of strange submerged submarine contacts were made by vessels in the Hawaiian operating area. These contacts were maintained for short periods only and the evidence was not as strong as was the evidence for the February and March contacts.

I felt keenly the danger of exposing the destroyer personnel to the threat of attack while engaged in these trailing operations. I was convinced that the morale of the destroyer personnel, in particular suffered from the orders in effect. I felt there was a tendency not to report contacts unless the evidence was most conclusive.

In my opinion, there was every justification to depth bomb strange submerged submarine contacts in the fleet operating areas

around Hawaii whenever encountered. Foreign submarine had no moral right to cruise submerged in Hawaiian waters which are at least two thousand miles from any alien territory. We however followed the strict legalistic interpretation that our defensive rights in peacetime extend to the three mile limit only.

When the warning of 27 November 1941 was received, I took that occasion to issue the order to depth bomb all strange submarine contacts in the fleet operating area. I informed the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch and letter of the action I had taken.

In justice to the fleet personnel and particularly to the destroyer personnel I had wanted, for a long time, to issue this order. I believed then and I now believe we had every moral right to take this action. Indeed, in this as in many other matters, we were far too fearful of hurting the sensibilities of the Japanese.

As late as 23 September 1941 a letter from Admiral Stark to me states in part, - "We have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. ----- The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step".

Such "conclusive evidence" was not obtained until the attack of 7 December.

During the period between November 27 and December 7 several reports were received from ships in the Hawaiian Fleet operating areas that they had depth bombed suspected submerged submarine contacts. No conclusive evidence was, however, forthcoming that any strange submarine was in fact present.

When the reports of the Ward and the bombing plane were first received on the morning of December 7, 1941 there was nothing to indicate that a strange submarine had in fact been sighted. The personnel under the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commandant himself were attempting to verify and obtain amplification of the first report when the aircraft raid commenced.

The Ward and the plane which attacked the submarine off the entrance to Pearl Harbor were among the forces assigned to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was also designated

as the Naval Base Defense Officer. It was his duty to evaluate the report and to give the alarm to alert all Army and Navy Forces.

It was reported to me in my quarter at the Submarine Base at about 7:30 a.m. that a destroyer had attacked a strange submarine off Pearl Harbor and while waiting for a further report the aircraft raid commenced.

THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, MR. KNOX, TO PEARL HARBOR
ON DECEMBER 12 AND 13, 1941.

From the morning of December 7 to the afternoon of December 17 when I was relieved as Commander-in-Chief by Vice-Admiral W. S. Pye, U.S.N., my time was fully occupied, in planning and ordering war operations, in disposing of the dead, in caring for the wounded, in reassigning men and officers from disabled ships and providing for their accommodations, in directing the repairs and salvage of wounded ships and in a score of minor activities. My staff was augmented by Admiral Pye's staff and there was full time work for each and every member.

When Mr. Know, Secretary of the Navy, arrived in Honolulu on December 12, 1941 he made a hurried survey of conditions and a brief investigation of the circumstances under which the attack took place.

I had had no time to devote to gathering data to present to the Secretary. I had approximately two hours all told talking to him on the subject. Part of the time alone and part of the time with Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, U.S. Navy Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U.S. Navy Commander Battle Force, and Lieut-General Walter C. Short, U.S. Army Commanding General Hawaiian Department present.

We answered all questions as fully as time permitted but in so short a visit it was not possible to answer all questions or to cover all matters.

Mr. Knox's knowledge when he left Hawaii was of necessity incomplete and in many respects inaccurate as evidenced by the statements credited to him in the newspapers.

I first contacted Mr. Knox at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel about an hour after he had landed at Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station. I invited him to stay at my quarters during his visit. He stated in effect that he was in Honolulu to fix the responsibility for what had occurred and he would not stay at the quarters of either Army or Navy personnel.

The staff accompanying the Secretary included Mr. Joseph Powell, Technical Assistant, Captain Frank E. Beatty, U.S.N. Aide, Lieut-Comdr. Hayes, U.S.N.R. Aide.

Mr. Knox stated to me in the presence of Captain Beatty and Admiral Bloch that in all the estimates of possible Japanese action he had heard in Washington, no one had once mentioned an attack on Pearl Harbor and it came as a complete surprise to every one in the Navy Department.

Mr. Knox asked me if I had received a message sent by the Navy Department on the morning of December seven to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet warning of the probability of immediate action by Japan. I told him I had received no such message. Subsequently a search of the files established the fact that no such message was addressed to me by the Navy Department and that no such message was received at my headquarters.

The fact that the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet was warned and I was not is an index of the state of mind in the Navy Department.

If the Navy Department thought that Japan would attack the United States and that such an attack was imminent why was this message not sent to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet? Does it not indicate that the Navy Department thought Japanese action would be confined to the Western Pacific and that Japan would not attack the United States?

It was reported to me by Captain V. O. Murphy, U.S.N. and Captain Gendreau (MC) U.S.N. of my staff that Mr. Powell was highly critical and, among other statements, said he had known for a year that Japan would make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. When Mr. Powell was asked, with his conviction that such an attack would take place at any time during the past year, what dispositions of the fleet he would have maintained, with the fleet based on Pearl Harbor, during this year to counter such attacks and at the same time conduct the drills and exercises necessary to train the fleet, he did not answer.

My impression of Mr. Knox's visit was that he had come to Hawaii to fix the blame, for what had occurred, on some individuals on the spot.

HEARINGS BEFORE THE ROBERTS COMMISSION

At this time all of my time and energy was devoted to the problems confront me.

My staff augmented by Vice Admiral Pye's staff were fully occupied with pressing and immediate problems.

The Roberts Commission held their first hearings in Hawaii at Fort Shafter where General Short and other Army personnel were examined. I was not present during the examination of Army personnel.

The Commission then met at the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor. I believe I was the first Naval Officer to be called before the Commission. Mr. Roberts informed me that the Commission was a fact finding body and that I was not on trial.

(A) → I requested that Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U.S. Commander Destroyer Flotilla One U.S. Fleet, be permitted to assist me in the presentation of the data which I had prepared for the Commission.

Rear Admiral Theobald had consented to assist me as the demands upon his time, during this period, made it practicable for him to do so.

Theobald was permitted by Mr. Roberts to assist me with the very definite proviso that he was not a counsel and that indeed I would not be permitted counsel as I was not on trial. I pointed out that events had put me on the defensive and that I had been further put on the defensive in the eyes of the American people by the action of the Navy Department in relieving me of my command.

During the course of my testimony, all of which was under oath, Theobald interjected some remarks. He was warned that he was not a counsel. Mr. Roberts finally administered the oath to him in order that such statements as he made would be under oath.

I presented the evidence I had to give as fully and completely as my knowledge of the subject at the time permitted.

I submitted a preliminary statement in which I explained that there were undoubtedly many discrepancies in the statement, that I had been unable to get reports from many ships but that we had done our best to give a chronological account of what had occurred as obtained from despatch and written reports and from our own knowledge. I tried to emphasize many times that the vast majority of these data

were not available to me until days after the attack took place. Also that at the time of my presentation the story was still incomplete.

Among other data I read to the Commission a seventeen page statement (typewritten double spaced) covering the action we took prior to the attack and our reasons therefor. It covered in general the efforts we had made to bring the various units of the fleet to a satisfactory state of efficiency and to maintain this state of efficiency in spite of constantly changing officer and enlisted personnel. It cited shortages and lack of equipment for ships and lack of carrier and land based planes. It set forth the low priority accorded the ships of the Pacific Fleet. It mentioned the shortage of Army equipments and planes and the recent depletion of Army bombers.

The principal warnings received were set forth together with our reactions to them. It went into the question of the use of patrol planes and the condition of our patrol planes just prior to the attack.

During my cross examination a member of the Commission read from a document which purported to be rules and regulations for the fighter command with which I was entirely unfamiliar. After the first day of my testimony I located the above mentioned document. It was headed, as nearly as I can remember, "Tentative Instructions for the Fighter Command" and had been mimeographed in October of 1941. It had not been promulgated by any authority and one passage which I discovered stated in effect, that this publication is a shot in the dark and subject to revision by a board of officers now working on this subject. I had never seen the publication in question and it had not been furnished to my headquarters, yet the Commission was attempting to use this to show I had not complied with requests for officers in the Radar Control Stations made by the Army, when in fact no requests had been made to me. Extracts from this document were placed in evidence before the Commission without its having been properly identified. I was later given an opportunity to point out to the Commission that this paper had no standing.

Upon the completion of my first presentation which took the better part of two days (December 27 and December 29) and which included cross examination by all five members as questions occurred to each, I expected to be permitted to verify the transcript of my testimony. After several days I noted Rear Admiral Furlong correcting his testimony in the anteroom, whereupon I requested that I be permitted to verify the transcript to my testimony. After some discussion I was permitted to come alone to a room in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel where I was furnished with the transcript which had been made of my testimony.

After working on it from 2:00 p.m. until dark I found it impossible to make corrections within any reasonable time without assistance.

The next morning I had an interview with Mr. Roberts and Admiral Standley during which I arranged to have a navy yeoman and Rear Admiral Theobald assist me in revising the transcript of the testimony. This assistance was granted only after some argument. Mr. Roberts again assured me that I was not on trial, that this was a fact finding commission, that the President had expressly told him I was relieved of my command merely to expedite the investigation and as an administrative matter. I ventured the statement at this time that I was in fact on trial and that no words could alter facts.

After going over the testimony and with the assistance of Rear Admiral Theobald and Drew, yeoman first class, I submitted a written statement to the commission in which I pointed out very serious errors and omissions in the transcript of my testimony. My opening statement was entirely omitted as was my prepared seventeen page statement with interpolations heretofore alluded to and which I had read to the Commission. I found many passages in the transcript which were obscure or misleading or entirely inaccurate as recorded. I requested that a new transcript of my testimony be made to include the corrections I indicated. I also requested that I be permitted to examine the corrected transcript.

Mr. Howe, Secretary to the Commission, and at least one of the stenographers admitted to me that the transcript of my testimony was inaccurate. Admiral Standley also stated that it was inaccurate and incomplete. In my presence he indicated that there were many inaccuracies in the testimony and mentioned specifically how some questions by Admiral Reeves as recorded were absurd.

I was not permitted to examine the transcript of my testimony again. I received a letter from Mr. Howe after his return to Washington in which he stated that the original transcript of my testimony is unchanged. That there is filed with the report, but separately, the corrections that I requested be made.

I suggested during my first hearing that certain officers be called as witnesses before the commission.

Later I gave some additional testimony before the commission and found, by chance, that Captain De Lany, U.S.N. of my former staff had not been permitted by the commission to present some essential

testimony which I had specifically requested he be permitted to present as he knew the details better than I did. This particular error was remedied and he did subsequently present the testimony to the commission in my presence. With this exception, I was not permitted to be present during the examination of any witness. I do not know what any other witness presented to the commission.

In a naval Board of Investigation or Court of Inquiry the precept, where appropriate, designates an officer or enlisted a defendant, or interested party. Furthermore when in the course of the investigation the testimony indicates that blame may attach to an individual he is called before the Board or Court, informed of the matter which reflects upon him and accorded the rights of a defendant, or interested party, which includes the right of counsel. the right to cross examine witnesses and the right to call witnesses to testify in his behalf.

My testimony, as originally transcribed by the commission, was inaccurate and incomplete. Mr. Roberts and the other members of the commission were so informed officially and in writing. At least two members of the commission Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves admitted freely to me that the transcription was inaccurate. Mr. Howe and at least one of the commission stenographers knew the transcription was inaccurate and incomplete.

I was not made a defendant. I was denied this right when I was by the very force of events manifestly a defendant from the beginning of the hearings.

I had no opportunity to confirm or refute statements made before the commission.

My testimony as transcribed and on file in the ^{88 PROCEEDINGS} ~~War and~~ Navy Departments is known by members of the commission and by the secretarial staff of the commission to be inaccurate and incomplete. Mr. Howe's letter states that the corrections I requested have been filed together with but separate from the original transcript.

If these errors were permitted in my testimony it throws grave doubt as to the accuracy of the transcription of other testimony given before the commission.

I was tried by the Roberts Commission and found guilty of dereliction of duty.

I was given no opportunity to defend myself.

It has been publicly stated that I will be brought to trial by General Court Martial at some indefinite future date probably after the war is over.

The confusion in handling papers and testimony given to the commission is evidenced by requests for copies of the so-called Security Order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in February 1941 and revised in October 1941.

When I appeared for the last time before the commission they requested five additional copies of this order. The flag secretary, Lieut-Comdr. Grosley, U.S.Navy, informed me that this five would make a total of seventeen copies of this order supplied to the commission. Conversation indicated that the five members of the commission could not find the copies.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE SUBMISSION OF MY REQUEST FOR RETIREMENT

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U.S.N. Commandant 12th Naval District San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U.S.N. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation Navy Department, Washington, D.C., had telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated that Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for retirement.

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me, that it was merely informative and that I could withdraw the request I had already submitted.

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

I submitted this request in order to give the Navy Department complete freedom of action in so far as it lay in my power to do so. I knew of the demands for a Congressional investigation and the embarrassment such an investigation would cause the Administration. I knew the difficulties of holding a General Court Martial with the consequent diversion of the efforts of Navy Department officials and Fleet officers from the far more urgent matter of prosecuting the war.

dele
(Briefly) I submitted my request for retirement solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country.)

→ I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment. (I submitted it because I did not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war.) *dele*

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts.

I feel that, under the circumstances, the Administration did General Short and me a great injustice when they permitted the press of the country, and through them the American people, to draw the conclusion that our requests for retirement were submitted in an effort to escape punishment.

I had much conflicting information from the Navy Department

as to when and what action the Navy Department would take. Finally it was announced that General Short would be retired on 28 February and I on 1 March. I was therefore placed on the retired list on 1 March 1942 and it was then announced that General Short and I would be tried by General Court Martial presumably when the war is over.

Prior to the attack of December 7, 1941, and exclusive of harbor craft, there were 200 ships of all types attached to the Pacific Fleet. Of these 69 were in Pearl Harbor plus 19 undergoing overhaul at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor or alongside tenders, 70 were at sea, 23 were being overhauled at West Coast Navy yard, 19 were in West Coast ports.

Of the 200 ships of all types 153 were combatant types. Of these 153 ships 53 were in Pearl Harbor plus 18 undergoing overhaul at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor or alongside tenders, 57 were at sea, 15 were under overhaul in West Coast Navy Yards, and 10 were in West Coast ports. Included in this 153 are the mine layers and mine sweepers and the aircraft tenders.

Of the 200 ships of all types attached to the Pacific Fleet 47 were non-combatant types. Of these 16 were in Pearl Harbor, 1 was under overhaul at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, 13 were at sea, 8 were under overhaul in West Coast Navy Yards, and 9 were in West Coast ports.

The disposition of our forces at sea in the Hawaiian area on 7 December, 1941 when the attack occurred, was such that had we been able to locate promptly the enemy carriers by long range land based aircraft, we would have had an excellent chance to intercept them. One of our carrier groups, task force eight, was 200 miles west of Oahu and another carrier group was 700 miles northwest of Oahu.

From a technical standpoint and ignoring the treachery involved, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, was bold in conception, thorough in planning and brilliant in execution.

H.S. Kimmel