

# Admiral Kimmel's Own Story of

# Pearl Harbor



**EDITOR'S NOTE:** Here, for the first time, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (USN, Ret.) makes public his side of the Pearl Harbor controversy.

Admiral Kimmel was the commander of the U. S. Pacific Fleet at the time it was attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941—just 13 years ago this week. Because of his position, he drew much of the initial criticism for the surprise that the Japanese achieved and the disaster to American arms that resulted.

Now in his book, "Admiral Kimmel's Story," the Admiral openly answers those criticisms.

"Admiral Kimmel's Story" contains much that has never been revealed before—not even in the numerous official investigations that followed Pearl Harbor. It presents new explanations for many things that have puzzled Americans about the failure of U. S. forces to detect the approach of the Japanese attacking force or to be ready when it struck.

In this book, Admiral Kimmel describes the problem he faced in trying to guard a large area of the Pacific with inadequate forces, lacking ships or planes for constant reconnaissance over such an area.

Admiral Kimmel tells how little he knew, in Honolulu, about Japanese plans—and how much he did not know because the information, although available in Washington, was never relayed to him.

The Admiral discusses steps that he could have taken to prevent surprise if he had only known about all the secret Japanese messages intercepted and decoded in Washington.

Admiral Kimmel also points out some strange things that happened during the repeated Pearl Harbor investigations. In these investigations, much of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster was ascribed to him and to Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, who was the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of the U. S. Army at the time of the attack.

Last week, in the issue of *U. S. News & World Report* for Dec. 3, 1954, the General Marshall-Admiral Stark side of the controversy was presented by Capt. T. B. Kittredge (USNR, Ret.), naval historian. Although Admiral Kimmel's story is published a week after that of Captain Kittredge, it was received and set in type before last week's article appeared. Each was prepared independently and without knowledge of the contents of the other manuscript.

Another appraisal of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor was made by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald (USN, Ret.) in a book, "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor," which appeared in *U. S. News & World Report* on April 2, 1954.

All three of these presentations have expressed the views of the authors and not necessarily of this magazine.

(Although the complete book, "Admiral Kimmel's Story," will not be published until January, 1955, by the Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, U. S. News & World Report has obtained world-wide first serial rights to print excerpts in advance of regular publication.

(The entire contents of this magazine are protected by copyright. No part of the book "Admiral Kimmel's Story" in excess of 1,500 words may be reprinted or used in radio or television broadcasts without written permission of the copyright owners.

Copyright on the first serial rights is held by United States News Publishing Corporation, and copyright on the book is held by Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (USN, Ret.) and the Regnery Company.

(Quotations of less than 1,500 words are released for publication in morning newspapers of Dec. 7, 1954. Permission to reprint in excess of 1,500 words prior to book publication in January, 1955, must be obtained from United States News Publishing Corporation.)

Excerpts from the book follow:

## CHAPTER I

## Background to Pearl Harbor

*"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."*—Constitution of the United States

### Responsibility

It is now more than a decade since the tragic news from Pearl Harbor made millions of Americans aware that some people in high office had committed blunders of such magnitude that our national security was gravely imperiled.

The question immediately arose as to the best procedures to be followed in the matter of fixing responsibility for these blunders. Quite obviously, Congress bore no burden of responsibility for the disaster.

The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a fiery answer to Secretary of State Cordell Hull's ultimatum to Japan of November 26, which, in Hull's own words to Secretary of War Stimson, had "broken the whole matter off."

"I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and Navy," said Hull to Stimson.

As Captain Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, remarked on June 20, 1944, "America provoked Japan to such an extent that the Japanese were forced to attack Pearl Harbor." And as Stimson himself said, "The question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition."

The real story of that policy of pressure upon Japan was largely revealed in the hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Needless to say, neither General Short nor I had any clear

perception of the fact that the Roosevelt Administration was pursuing a course of action that made war with Japan inevitable. We did know that in the Atlantic a state of undeclared war existed. It seemed obvious to us that conflict in the Pacific was neither necessary nor desirable. War on two fronts would present a grave question that our best military minds would find difficult to answer.

At Pearl Harbor, General Short and I knew only a small part of the political story behind the Japanese attack. Care was taken not to send us the intercepted Japanese messages which told in great detail each step in the Japanese program. The revealing passage in the diary of Secretary Stimson, November 25, 1941, in which he outlines to Roosevelt the strategy of maneuvering the Japanese to strike the first blow at America, was, of course, unknown to us. But we did know after December 7 that someone in Washington in high office had either blundered badly or had consciously pursued a policy that led straight to Pearl Harbor.

Until this day I have kept silence on the subject of Pearl Harbor and the historical facts centered around Washington that made such a tragedy possible. When these facts were first brought out, I could not bring myself to the point of actually writing about them. Nor could I bring myself to set down the details of the abuse and maltreatment heaped upon me by what appeared to be an organized effort, at first quite successful, to place the entire blame on General Short and myself.

Now, however, I deem it my duty to speak out. What took place in Washington, must be so clearly placed on the public record that no group of persons in administrative power will ever dare again to invite another Pearl Harbor and then place the blame on the officers in the fleet and in the field.

The actions in Washington, which for a time so tragically impaired the national security, made our own officers and enlisted men a decoy for a desperate and resourceful nation. Those individuals in Washington charged with the duty of supplying orders and information to the Commanders at Pearl Harbor can not evade their responsibility for the complete success of the attack and its terrible consequences.

For three months prior to the attack on the Fleet a wealth of vital information received in Washington was withheld from the Commanders in Hawaii. The information received during the ten days preceding the attack clearly pointed to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor as the Japanese objective, yet not one word of warning and none of this information was given to the Hawaiian Commanders.

When Mr. Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, arrived in Pearl a few days after the attack, his first question to me was: "Did you receive my message on Saturday night?" He was convinced a warning message had been sent to me the night before the attack. Repeated efforts by various investigations failed to find any trace of such a message.

Secretary Knox's question is of great significance for it clearly shows that he had been aware of the seriousness of the situation and firmly believed that a warning message had been sent the night before the attack. Who or what stopped the Secretary's message has never been determined but certainly it must have been a result of action by someone in high authority.

In a succeeding chapter of this account I have set forth the substance of the tremendously significant Japanese intercepts received and decoded in Washington on December 6 and December 7, 1941, that were withheld from Pearl Harbor.

General George C. Marshall's warning, belatedly dispatched at 11:52 a.m. Washington time, 6:22 a.m. Pearl Harbor time, on Sunday, December 7, was sent in a non-

priority status by commercial circuit when he had on his desk a telephone with a direct connection to the headquarters of the Commanding General in Hawaii!

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, made no attempt to send information about the intercepts or a warning to me by the highly dependable and rapid Naval Communication Service, which could also have been used to transmit Marshall's message.

There were no delays in the transmission of messages between Washington and Pearl Harbor over the Naval Communication circuit. During the interval when Marshall's message was in transit a routine message was received at my headquarters, decoded and delivered within less than one hour after it was filed in the Navy Department in Washington. An urgent priority message would have been transmitted, decoded and delivered in less than half an hour.

This lack of action on the part of both the War and Navy Departments must have been in accordance with high political direction, because the officers in both these departments repeatedly demonstrated both before and after Pearl Harbor that they were not careless, inefficient or incompetent. One or two of them might have slipped up, but certainly not all of them concerted. The two prime agencies responsible for keeping the field commanders informed and giving them orders were the War Department and the Navy Department. These two agencies were responsible only to the President of the United States. It is impossible to believe that both these agencies of such proved reliability and competence should simultaneously and repeatedly fail in such a crisis.

### My Appointment to Command the Fleet

Near dusk on a Sunday afternoon in mid-January, 1941, I returned to the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor after a game of golf. At that time, as a Rear Admiral, I was in command of the cruisers of the Battle Force consisting of three divisions of light cruisers.

Back of that particular assignment stretched a forty-year period since I first left my native Kentucky to enter the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1900. As a junior officer I had served in destroyers, battleships and cruisers. I had been a turret officer and a gunnery officer of battleship and cruiser, a squadron and fleet gunnery officer, and production officer of the U. S. Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D. C.

I had sailed around the world in the "white fleet" of sixteen battleships sent forth by President T. R. Roosevelt in 1907, and I had been an aide to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt when the latter visited the Pacific coast to help commemorate the opening of the Panama Canal.

I had taken part in the pacification of Cuba campaign, and I had served off the west coast of Mexico during the troubled times when our forces were landing at Vera Cruz. I had demonstrated to the British Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow a photographic system for the analysis of gunnery scores which I had a major part in developing. Afterwards I served as squadron gunnery officer with the American battleships assigned to the British Grand Fleet in 1917 and 1918.

As executive officer of the U.S.S. *Arkansas*, I was present at the surrender of the German fleet at Rosyth in 1918. I had seen service in the Far East as Captain of the *Yard* at Cavite in the Philippines, and as a destroyer division commander in our Asiatic Fleet on patrol duty during the Chinese Revolution with a special detail to guard the flight of the round-the-world Army planes on their leg between Hong Kong and Calcutta. I commanded a squadron of destroyers, the battleship *New York*, and a heavy cruiser division in the Pacific Fleet. I served as Chief of Staff to the Commander battleships of the Battle Force.

My shore duty included the Naval War College at Newport, Assistant Director of Fleet Training, officer in charge of the Policy Section, and Director of Ship Movements in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, and a tour as Budget Officer of the Navy Department. In 1939 I had made a good-will trip around South America with three heavy cruisers, visiting Venezuela, Brazil, the Argentine, Chile and Peru.

With this background of long service, I was still totally in the dark as to what awaited me when I came in from the golf course in January, 1941, to be met at the Fleet landing by one of my staff with the word for me to report immediately aboard the Fleet flagship, then alongside one of the docks. When I came aboard I was escorted to the quarters of the Chief of Staff who showed me a dispatch from the Navy Department informing Admiral James O. Richardson that I was to relieve him as Commander-in-Chief about the first of February. My reactions at the time are stated in a letter to Chief of Naval Operations dated January 12, 1941:

"When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was perfectly stunned. I hadn't any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered; and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared to do everything I can when I take over on about the first of February."

Admiral Richardson was and is a friend of mine. I knew him to be a thoroughly capable officer. His summary removal was my first concern. I could see then and can see now no adequate reason for his removal from command in such a manner. I went immediately to his quarters in Honolulu to inform him that from my knowledge of his efficient command of the Fleet there was no justification for his being relieved. I assured him that I did not know his relief was even being contemplated and that I had made no effort whatsoever to get the appointment. I felt very badly about Richardson's dismissal.

Months later I was informed that Richardson had been removed from command because he hurt Mr. Roosevelt's feelings by some forceful recommendations presented personally to the President in October, 1940. At this time Richardson had urged that the Fleet be based on the West Coast where he believed it could be prepared for war much more efficiently and expeditiously than if it remained based on Pearl Harbor.

### At My Battle Station When Japs Attacked

My assigned living quarters at Pearl Harbor were on a hill overlooking the Fleet anchorage and about two hundred yards from the administrative headquarters of the Fleet.

I spent the forenoon of December 6, 1941, in my office at Fleet headquarters going over dispatches and reviewing the situation with Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the second in command of the Fleet. In the afternoon I worked with Captain C. H. McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and Captain Walter S. De Laney, the Operations Officer. In the evening I went to dinner with Rear Admiral H. F. Leary at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu. I returned to my quarters and went to bed about 9:30 p.m.

I was called to the telephone about 7:30 a.m. December 7, 1941, to receive a report that the destroyer *Ward* had contacted and bombed a strange submarine. The *Ward* action appeared to be in compliance with my order of November 27, 1941, but because we had had so many fake contact reports I was waiting for an amplifying report from the *Ward* when the Jap planes began their attack on the Fleet about 7:55 a.m. Honolulu time.

I came out of my quarters in time to see the Jap planes making their first attack on the battleships. I immediately

boarded my waiting car and arrived at the Fleet headquarters in less than ten minutes after the attack commenced. By this time all the antiaircraft guns in the Fleet were in action.

### General Short

General Walter C. Short arrived in Honolulu a few days after I relieved Admiral Richardson in command of the Fleet. I had never met General Short. Mindful of the necessity of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two services in a situation where their interests were so intertwined as they were at Hawaii, I called upon General Short in civilian clothes at the quarters in Honolulu he was temporarily occupying before he took over the duties of Commanding General. I found him then and later to be a man of sound judgment and a competent soldier. My liking and respect for him increased as I came to know him better.

In the next few months he and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Naval District, worked out and put into effect a plan to coordinate the efforts of the Army and Navy air forces operating from Hawaiian Air Stations. I was convinced General Short greatly improved the efficiency of his command. He, like myself, was handicapped by personnel and material shortages and the influx of large numbers of untrained officers and enlisted men.

General Short and I were not "opposite numbers" in the sense that our total concerns and duties were co-extensive. The responsibilities of the Fleet under War Plans were far flung and offensive. Those of the Hawaiian Department were local and defensive. Because I was interested in the security of the Fleet and the Hawaiian Islands, I gave General Short all the assistance I could, even in connection with local defensive measures which were exclusively under the Army's control.

The Aircraft Warning Service is a case in point. I took Army personnel to sea with the Fleet so that they could be trained as radar operators. I assigned to the Army a Naval Officer, who had had experience in Britain with radar, to give any advice and assistance he could in connection with the aircraft warning net in Hawaii. General Short informed me his radar was operating and could give a 100-mile coverage. In joint Army-Navy drills it did perform satisfactorily.

In the period before December 7, I was informed that the Army's radar was manned. It was so manned. It was only the day before the attack that a subordinate Army officer gave the permission to shut down at 7 a.m. on Sunday. Even despite this, one of the stations was operating after 7 a.m. on the morning of December 7, and obtained information about both the incoming and outgoing Japanese planes. This information was not passed on to the Navy because the subordinate Army Officer to whom it was reported did not deem it important.

### Relations With General Short

My relations with General Short, which were once the subject of considerable confusion in the public mind, have now been clarified by exhaustive investigations. I need not labor it. It has been established that our official and social relations were friendly, that we frequently conferred on official matters of common interest and invariably did so when either of us received messages which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on our several plans in preparing for war. As the Naval Court of Inquiry summarized the matter:

"Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of the measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes."

(Continued on next page)

## CHAPTER II

## Deficiencies in Pacific Fleet

"Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. The Fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base."—Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935

## Relation of the Fleet to the Base

A Naval Base exists primarily for the support of the Fleet. The Naval Court of Inquiry in paragraph VIII of its findings states:

"A Naval Base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirements that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent Naval Base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the Base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. . . . To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirement that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for security from hostile actions while within the limits of a permanent Naval Base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare."

This principle has long been recognized by both the Army and the Navy. In the "Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935" the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was vested in the Army. That specifically provided:

"Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. The Fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base."

When I took command of the Fleet, the exchange of letters between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy indicated that the provisions of the agreement would be carried out and that existing deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor would be corrected. However, it was never my disposition to assume that high echelon agreements or correspondence were panaceas. At all times in 1941 I was concerned with the security of the Fleet Base at Pearl Harbor. I did everything within my power to strengthen and improve the Base defense.

## Pearl Harbor as a Fleet Base

Pearl Harbor was the only refueling, revictualing, and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. There was no other point where fuel could be obtained. Our four tankers fitted for fueling at sea were completely inadequate. This was in marked contrast to the conditions under which our Asiatic Fleet was operating. In addition to the repair, supply and refueling facilities available in Manila Bay in the Philippines, our Asiatic Fleet had a number of refueling ports available to them in the British and Dutch East Indies where limited repair and supply facilities were likewise available. The Asiatic Fleet could base on Singapore even as the Japanese fleet did throughout the whole war, from 1942 to 1945.

Pearl Harbor had but one entrance. Because of the topography of the Island and the narrowness of the channel, the capital ships were obliged to move in and out in single file. We had frequent training in this maneuver even at night under war conditions without lights. To complete a sortie of the Fleet required at least three hours. The danger that the channel would be blocked was always present.

The defense of such a base before the outbreak of hostilities is quite different from its defense in war.

During hostilities, when the Fleet is not required to wait until the potential enemy commits the first overt act, our own offensive operations protect the base.

Pearl Harbor was included within an area defined as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in Annex 1, page 9, Joint Army and Navy War Plan Rainbow 5.

The defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, which included Oahu and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu, was entrusted by this plan to the Commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, who were designated as follows:

"Army—The Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

"Navy—The Commandant, 14th Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army."

## Local Naval Base Defense Forces

The local Naval Base Defense Forces under the Commandant of the 14th Naval District were negligible. On October 17, 1941, the Commandant wrote requesting the Navy Department to send a number of small fast craft, equipped with listening gear and depth charges, and two squadrons of patrol planes. He said:

"The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the USS SACRAMENTO which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run."

I forwarded the Commandant's letter with the following endorsement:

"There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea, is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can be possibly made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs."

## Fleet Patrol Planes and Local Air Defense

The Commander of the Hawaiian Department, General Short, and the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Bloch, had no means to conduct distant air reconnais-

sance from the Island of Oahu. The War Department had allocated on paper 180 "flying fortresses" to the Hawaiian Department. *General Short had only twelve of these planes in Hawaii prior to the attack; only six were in flying condition.*

*The Navy Department had allocated on paper 100-odd patrol planes to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. He never received a single patrol plane.*

As a consequence, the Base defense against air attack was predicated on borrowing Fleet patrol planes for distant searches. Under the war plans these Fleet patrol planes were earmarked for operations with the Fleet thousands of miles from Hawaii should war come. Their primary mission was always connected with Fleet operations. They were frequently based on the outlying islands—Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. They had to train with the Fleet and search areas in which the Fleet operated. Under these circumstances, they were available for distant search from Oahu only when and if the Fleet did not need them for its own operations, actual or impending. They were not at any time sufficient in number to cover in distant searches *more than one fourth of the area through which a hostile force could approach Pearl Harbor.* And this coverage could be maintained for a few days only.

Search was to be instituted only when there was information from other sources that a carrier strike against the islands was probable within narrow time limits. This was a make-shift plan, but none better was possible with the means at hand.

In the estimate prepared at Pearl Harbor and submitted to the Navy Department the type of air attack the Japs actually made was considered the most probable form such an attack would take. At this time the Department was informed that due to our limited forces we must know within narrow limits when to expect the attack if our defensive measures were to be effective.

The Commandant of the 14th Naval District wrote letters to the Chief of Naval Operations December 30, 1940, May 7th, 1941, and on October 17, 1941, pointing out that he had no planes and that he needed planes. Each of his letters was strongly and favorably endorsed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

On November 25, 1941, two weeks before the attack, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commandant:

"The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops."

Much has been made of the fact that Secretary Knox warned of an air attack on Pearl Harbor in a letter to the Secretary of War in January 1941. This was a timely letter instigated by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in an attempt to induce the War and Navy Departments to improve the totally inadequate defensive power against an air attack on the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor.

Largely as a result of Richardson's efforts the War Department allocated 180 B-17 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian Department and the Navy allocated more than 100 PBV patrol planes to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. These were the type of planes the local base defense forces had to rely upon to locate and destroy enemy aircraft carriers.

*On December 7, 1941, as we have seen, the Army Hawaiian Air Force had twelve B-17 "flying fortresses" out of the 180 promised in the Spring of 1941 and the Command of the 14th Naval District had not received a single patrol plane.*

The following table is a graphic illustration of the astounding but little realized patrol and bombing plane situation that existed in Oahu immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Planes capable of locating and destroying enemy aircraft carriers promised and supplied to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

	To Army Hawaiian Department	To Commandant 14th Naval District	Total to Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
Promised	180 B-17 bombers	100 Patrol Planes	280
Supplied	12 B-17 bombers	None	12
In operating condition	6 B-17 bombers	None	6
December 7, 1941			

No one has ever explained why the weaknesses so clearly described in the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January, 1941, were permitted to continue during all these months at this outlying station whose security was vital to the safety of the Fleet and of the United States.

## Security of Fleet in Port

Under my standing orders I placed the guns of the Fleet at the disposal of the local anti-aircraft defense. My Security Order 2 CL 41 prescribed a plan for berthing ships in sectors to develop in each sector the maximum anti-aircraft fire. I designated the Commandant of the 14th Naval District Naval Base Defense Officer *because he was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor and would always be familiar with local conditions.* I delegated to him the duty of advising the Senior Officer present Afloat (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief) just what condition of readiness to maintain in the ships in port. This was a flexible system designed to use the Fleet's resources in port in the Base defense.

In addition, I issued standing orders for all ships that ammunition for all anti-aircraft guns, 5", 3", 1.1 and 50 calibre, be kept available in the ready ammunition boxes at the guns at all times, day and night. These orders also required that there be on board at all times a sufficient number of trained personnel to man completely all the guns of the anti-aircraft battery. All double bottom and lower deck compartments of the ships in harbor were to be kept closed except when work required they be temporarily opened. No higher state of material readiness could long be continued without serious reduction in the morale and physical condition of men and the accomplishment of necessary work on the ships.

At the time of the attack, the orders in effect required that one-fourth to one-half of the anti-aircraft guns, depending upon the type of ships, be manned at all times in port. At the time of the attack, the guns were so manned. Admiral Inglis has testified that, on the morning of the attack, all the anti-aircraft batteries on all the ships were manned and firing within four to seven minutes. The men of the Fleet on December 7, 1941, made the transition from peace to war with speed and courage.

My Security Order 2 CL 41 of October 14, 1941, was a revision of an order of the same title issued shortly after I took command of the Fleet in February 1941. This order provided conditions of readiness to be constantly maintained and those which were to be placed in effect when ordered. With all measures prescribed in effect, the base was on a condition of complete alert. I have been informed that this order was retained by my successor without change for at least one year after the attack.

## Information Regarding Aircraft Torpedoes

In his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy listed an air torpedo plane attack as one of the possible forms of hostile action against Pearl

Harbor. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded to the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, detailed technical advice which practically eliminated from consideration an air torpedo plane attack as a serious danger to ships moored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor.

The depth of water in Pearl Harbor is 30 feet or less, except in the channels where it was generally 40 feet. On February 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to me on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks on Pearl Harbor, stating:

"Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T [anti-torpedo] baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attack. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of the water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles. . . .

"... A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150' of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered."

In the same letter the Chief of Naval Operations underlined the fact that the depths of water in which torpedoes were launched in the successful attacks at Taranto were between 14 and 15 fathoms; that is, 84 to 90 feet of water. A letter of similar tenor was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the 14th Naval District.

On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter on the same subject to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. A copy of this letter was sent to me. After reading it, my Staff and I, as well as the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, believed that the danger of a successful airplane torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was negligible.

The Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the torpedoes launched by the Japanese in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor constituted, in effect, a secret weapon in the category of the robot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opinion in Great Britain and the United States at the time. The Secretary, in his endorsement to that report, stated that the Navy Department had information from British sources that aircraft torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water in the year 1940. Such information was never supplied to me, and was apparently unknown to the Chief of Naval Operations.

In any event, the Navy Department apparently decided that torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor were not required and exhibited no concern at their absence.

In his letter to me of February 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations stated, in effect, that existing torpedo nets were so cumbersome that their installation in Pearl Harbor would interfere with the movement of ships and the ability of the fleet to get away on short notice. He said:

"There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed."

The Fleet did not have facilities in Hawaii to manufacture anti-torpedo nets or baffles. If the light efficient net described by the Chief of Naval Operations was ever developed by the

Navy Department in 1941, I never heard of it or received it. Admiral King [later Chief of Naval Operations], in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court, tersely stated:

"The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department."

#### Detachment of Ships From Pacific Fleet

On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote me that he had "an overall limit of thirty days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores." In connection with this proposed expedition in May and June of 1941, practically all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small transports, and some other small craft, were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. They were never returned.

In April and May of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic. In a letter to me on April 19, 1941, Admiral Stark advised me of this proposed transfer. He described the Fleet units to be detached as "the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic." He added: "I am telling you; not arguing with you." This transfer took away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet and resulted in a striking reduction in its power.

The details of the transfer must have been quickly known in Japan. When I was in Washington in June, 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made.

The war plans never contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to be devoted exclusively, or even primarily, to the defense of Hawaii. The control of the seas surrounding the Hawaiian Islands and the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean was its responsibility but the actual defense of the shore base at Pearl Harbor was the responsibility of the Army.

#### Comparison With Japanese Navy

It was recognized that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship. No one in authority expected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Japanese head on.

Admiral King's official report, "Our Navy at War," submitted to the Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1944, completely dispelled previous public misconceptions about the strength of the Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor. Said Admiral King:

"Had we not suffered those losses [at Pearl Harbor], however, our Fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous."

Japan at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriers in commission and operating. We had three carriers in the Pacific and those did not have their full quota of planes.

Although the battleships of the Fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons.

#### Tasks Assigned to the Pacific Fleet

The Joint Army-Navy War Plan formulated in Washington primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations

in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral [Thomas C.] Hart, correctly described the objectives of the War Plan in these words:

"The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was incumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic."

In accordance with this statement of principles, the Basic War Plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, provided in section 4, paragraph 13(a):

"Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."

Again, section 4, paragraph 13(d) of the plan provided:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth may be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."

The Navy Basic War Plan, W.P.L. 46, was issued by the Navy Department in Washington and prescribed the Pacific Fleet's tasks and theatre of operations. The Pacific Fleet's theatre of operations included the ocean area from the shore of North and South America to within a short distance from the coast of Australia, and north of the Equator to a line extending to the westward of the Marianas up to latitude 30° north, where the area was extended to the Asiatic Continent. It was in this vast expanse that the Pacific Fleet was to divert enemy strength from Malaya and the East Indian Archipelago (1) by the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, (2) by destroying Axis sea communications and (3) by protecting the territory and shipping of the Associated Powers.

It became apparent soon after I took command that the existing organization of the U. S. Fleet was not a proper one to meet the tasks which would be required in a Pacific war. Early in 1941, therefore, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet were reorganized into three Task Forces, including one fast carrier Task Force, one amphibious Task Force and one battleship Task Force. In their movements at sea, these Task Forces were operated as under wartime conditions. Fueling at sea, a requirement for long-range operations, was stressed.

The operating schedule was so arranged that there was

always at least one of these Task Forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet maneuvers, the entire Fleet was at sea. Periods in port were, of course, necessary for all ships. At no time during 1941 were all of the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

#### Fleet Personnel and Training

On February 1, 1941, when I took command of the Fleet, there was a serious shortage of both trained and untrained personnel. For the preceding eight months target practice had been practically suspended. Uncertainty as to whether the Fleet would be based at Pearl Harbor or on the West Coast had delayed the transfer of target rafts and other essential equipment from the West Coast to Hawaii. The transfer of these facilities, which had been started some time before I took command, was completed shortly thereafter.

Due to these circumstances and through no fault of my predecessor the Fleet was not ready for war. I set out to make it ready. This required an intensive training program. In carrying out this program we were handicapped by the constant detachment in large numbers of qualified officers and enlisted men to meet the demands of the expanding procurement and training agencies on shore, and to supply trained personnel to man new ships.

Competent officers and enlisted men were replaced by newly commissioned reserve officers and recruits from training stations. Although excellent material, they required training and indoctrination, which takes time and effort. In the meanwhile the ships they manned were not ready to fight. More than half the officers of the Fleet were newly commissioned reserve officers. There were times when three fourths of the men in a ship had never heard a gun fired.

Aviation expansion required the Fleet to supply large numbers of trained officer and enlisted aviation personnel to man the new ships and to provide instructors at aviation fields on the mainland. Specialists in ordnance, engineering, and aviation were required for inspection, design and supervisory duties in the procurement program of ships and planes. This personnel had to be supplied from the Fleet. There was no other source.

There were other factors that made the training activities of vital importance. In addition to individual ship training, I had to provide for coordinated training of ships, divisions and squadrons as part of the Fleet as a whole. New weapons and new techniques were an everyday product of the war in Europe. New methods had to be devised, tested, and perfected to meet new threats. For instance, the anti-aircraft defense of large formations had to be improved to meet possible Japanese air tactics in the event of war.

Our previous training, chiefly dictated by safety considerations, had been largely confined to individual ship practices in defense against individual attacks. It was now necessary to develop means and methods of countering mass attacks by coordinated fire, in maximum volume, from as many ships as could bring their guns to bear with reasonable prospect of hitting the target and allowing for acceptable hazards to other ships.

Again, the advent of radar with all of its implications, particularly the necessity for wide extension of existing communication channels required to take full advantage of its latent possibilities, posed an entirely new problem for which no solution was to be found in past experience. We had to visualize and set up new situations in order even to indicate a solution. It was only through wide experience, covering a period of months and crowding in as much work as possible, that new apparatus could be utilized to its fullest potential. We were handicapped by the fact that we had only a few ships equipped with radar, making it all the more important that advantage be taken of every opportunity that

could be stolen from the few days or weeks that might remain to us prior to actual hostilities.

Among other things, radar gave promise of completely revolutionizing the art of night warfare. This possibility was especially important, as it was known that the Japanese attached great importance to night action. Measures, such as steaming and maneuvering in complete darkness in large and complex formations, with abridged accent on safety, had to be perfected. Most of this program was, for us, entirely experimental because large scale and complicated maneuvering at night was new to our Navy.

In addition to all this, we needed all the time we could get to try out and perfect the operations we had set up for the opening phases of the war, if it came, against Japan. These operations too, were largely new and untried, and handicapped by lack of facilities and personnel, particularly for amphibious landings. These exercises gave birth to the Fast Carrier Task Force, later found so effective in the prosecution of the war.

Our training activities were not just "routine training" or "peacetime training." They were intensified training activities indispensable to the creation of fighting efficiency in the Fleet.

### The Fuel Problem in the Fleet

The fuel problem affected every decision. At this time both the reserve stocks in the Hawaiian area and the facilities for getting fuel from storage tanks into combatant ships were not adequate. The Pacific Fleet had only eleven tankers. Of these, only four had the speed and mixed cargo characteristics suitable for fueling other ships at sea. It required from 24 to 36 hours to refuel a task force in Pearl Harbor.

Shortly after I organized the Fleet in three major task forces, I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one in Pearl Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were falling behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, which made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in Pearl Harbor at certain periods. It was highly inadvisable, unless an attack on Pearl Harbor was known to be imminent, to keep the Fleet at sea and fuel it by sending detachments into Pearl Harbor at night even if there had been adequate fuel reserves in port. Operations at sea would have been then restricted to a small area, thereby unjustifiably increasing the risk of submarine attack.

A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel in 30 to 40 hours, at medium speed in four to six days. War experience has proven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every fifth day, to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire Fleet at sea for long periods would have required not 11 tankers but approximately 75, with at least twenty-five of them equipped for underway delivery instead of the four I had.

I did not have adequate fuel reserves. There were no facilities at Pearl Harbor for delivering stored reserves to the ships at a rate which would permit fueling more than about one-fourth of the Fleet in any one 24-hour day or one-eighth of it in any one period of darkness. To keep the Fleet at sea and exhaust our resources only to find that such expenditures were unnecessary, or still worse, to have the entire Fleet short of fuel when action was joined, were contingencies too grave to be accepted on indefinite information or conjecture. The fuel storage and the facilities for delivering the fuel to ships were in process of extensive improvement prior to the attack. All of these changes have long since been completed and existing facilities bear little resemblance to those of 1941.

We had one newly commissioned Navy troop transport in the Pacific and a handful of partially trained marines at San Diego. These, with the marines stationed at Pearl

Harbor and the outlying islands, constituted our landing force. We had no landing craft.

### Relations Between the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and His Staff and Task Force Commanders

My relations with my Staff, Task Force Commanders and Senior Flag Officers were excellent. My Staff was composed of superior officers whose records in the war have demonstrated their abilities. I was accessible to them. We had full and frank discussions about the various decisions which it was my responsibility to make. The so-called "war-warning" dispatch I also discussed with the Senior Task Force Commanders, Admiral W. S. Pye (Commander of Task Force One), Admiral Halsey (Commander of Task Force Two), Admiral Wilson Brown (Commander of Task Force Three), Admiral W. L. Calhoun (Commander, Naval Base Force), and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch or discuss it with Admiral J. H. Newton or Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger. The orders sending Admiral Newton to Midway were issued by me to Admiral Brown, Commander of Task Force 3, and under whom Newton served.

Admirals Newton and Brown conferred before the former set out for Midway. Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions. As for Admiral Bellinger, Commander of Patrol Wing Two Pacific Fleet, he served directly under Admirals Bloch and Brown, who were familiar with all important developments. I was fully aware of the conditions in Admiral Bellinger's patrol plane force, knew and had approved his schedule of operations. Had I seen any need for him to change his course of action, I would have issued orders to him to that effect directly.

### Security of the Fleet at Sea

A description of the measures I took for the security of Fleet units at sea remains to be given. The Naval Court of Inquiry has described them as follows:

"The task forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Watertight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, radio was restricted to a minimum."

The court concluded:

"It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective."

In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and maintained the highest degree of security measures at sea and in port consistent with our assigned mission of intensive preparation for war. We had our difficulties with shifting personnel and an exposed and inadequately defended base. We had much to do in preparing a Fleet then unready for war. We were proud of having a hard job to do. Admiral Hewitt, in his report to the Secretary, made this finding:

"Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. . . ."

We maintained as a regular procedure a high state of daily alertness which, within a very short time, could be intensified to deal with a particular hazard when and if

it developed. We needed one thing which our own resources could not make available to us. That vital need was the information available in Washington from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where Japan would probably strike. I did not get this information.

With a fleet in the Pacific inferior in power to that of Japan, with detachments being made from that already in-

ferior fleet, with a great dearth of defensive and offensive aircraft, with insufficient tankers to keep the fleet at sea for any considerable length of time, and with serious shortages and rapidly changing personnel, I most certainly was entitled to and had every reason to expect that all the latest and best information of the situation that was available in the Navy Department would be promptly supplied to me.

## CHAPTER III

### Information, Orders and Actions Before December 7, 1941

"In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones, so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."—Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1940-1945

### Information and Dispatches, January-October 16, 1941

During the year 1941, I received many dispatches and letters from the Chief of Naval Operations which can best be described as "war warnings."

On *January 21, 1941*, he sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief which stated:

"The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW THREE with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm except early reinforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles Detachment. Pacific Fleet awaiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in Area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reinforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances."

On *February 3, 1941*, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch from the United States Naval Attaché in London, which stated:

"I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indo-China Malaya Peninsula of the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese merchant vessel sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state, that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo-China scene meeting aboard Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits."

On *July 3, 1941*, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch which stated:

"The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo-China. . . ."

The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by the first of August.

On *July 3, 1941*, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me another dispatch. This reported that the Japanese Government had issued orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under these orders all Nipponese merchant vessels would be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It related information from unusually reliable Chinese sources that within two weeks Japan would abrogate the neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows:

"The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20-August 1 is indicated by the foregoing." [Author's italics]

On *July 25*, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch in which the Chief of Staff joined. This advised that on July 25 the United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. It stated in part:

". . . The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the

Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Army and Naval subordinates. . . ."

In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Operations' letters to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 1941. His letters used such expressions as: "What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess." (Memorandum of May 14, 1941)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941.

"Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941)

". . . Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate." (August 21, 1941)

"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender." (August 28, 1941)

"P.S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that *conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.*" (September 23, 1941)

#### Ambassador Grew's Report

None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack in the Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was imminent or probable. None of these letters or dispatches directed an alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack.

On the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor." He said Mr. Grew [U. S. Ambassador to Japan], had telegraphed the State Department on January 27, 1941:

"The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added:

"The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, *no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.*" [Author's italics]

This estimate as to the improbability of a move against Pearl Harbor was never withdrawn.

Consider my situation as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these ominous predictions of Japanese aggression in the Far East.

I was carrying out an intensive training program to prepare the Fleet for war. I was under specific injunction to continue that program. In an official letter to me on April 3, 1941 (Serial 038612), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote:

In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called up to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe,

to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war."

On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, two weeks before the attack.

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in the Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the Fleet could not have been prepared for war.

During the time span covering the sending of these dispatches the Navy Department knew just what my program in Hawaii was. My Fleet operating schedules were filed with the Navy Department, where the location and movement of substantially every ship in the Fleet was known at all times. No dispatch or letter contained any order or suggestion for departure from my operating schedules.

#### The 1940 Alert

When the War and Navy Departments wished to put the forces in Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did use appropriate language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrates this. That dispatch stated:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communications direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

In compliance with this order an alert was placed in effect with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. To be sure, the overseas scouting was limited to such a small arc and range as to constitute no more than a token reconnaissance. This alert was continued for about a month when orders from Washington directed it be discontinued.

At any time prior to the attack which commenced at about 7:55 a.m. Hawaiian time on December 7, 1941, Washington could have ordered an alert which would have been effective immediately in Hawaii.

As has been said, the Chief of Staff of the Army had on his desk in Washington a telephone with direct connection to the Headquarters of the Commanding General in Hawaii. Conversations began over this circuit within twenty minutes after the attack commenced.

An urgent priority message by Naval Communications would have been received, decoded and delivered within less than half an hour after it was filed in Washington.

#### Courses of Action Open to Navy Department

Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several courses open. It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of Japanese intentions and plans, the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages. This would have given me an opportunity to judge for myself the gravity and intensity of the crisis as December 7, 1941, approached, and

the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Navy Department failed to do this. The Navy Department did not permit me to evaluate for myself the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages.

Another course of action then remained. That was to issue an order which would have directed disposition of the Fleet to guard against an attack in Hawaii. The message of June 17, 1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was such an order. It would have had the same effect in December of 1941 as it had in June of 1940. Such an order was not given. Further, the War and Navy Departments could have ordered the local Commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Bloch and General Short, to execute the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. This was not done.

The Navy Department could have given the order to mobilize under the War Plan. This order would have had a definite meaning. It would have placed the Fleet on an all-out war basis. The order to mobilize did not authorize acts of war. The dispatch of January 21, 1941, indicated that mobilization would be ordered when war was imminent. The order to mobilize was not given.

In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941, I was not given available information as to the actual status of Japanese-American negotiations and as to Japanese military plans; nor was I given orders for alert against an attack on Hawaii. These dispatches had the same tenor as the warnings which had previously been sent in February, June, and July, 1941, predicting probable Japanese action thousands of miles from the Hawaiian area.

#### Dispatches From October 16, 1941, to and Including November 27, 1941

On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, the following dispatch:

"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U. S.

"In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."

The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certain preparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume a war patrol off both Wake and Midway. I reinforced Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island. I ordered the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands. He did so and reported his action to me. I placed on twelve hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy Yard. I dispatched twelve patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the Island, and placed in effect additional security measures in the Fleet Operating Areas.

On October 22, I reported by letter all these dispositions to

the Chief of Naval Operations who specifically approved them. He wrote:

"OK on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet."

The Naval Court of Inquiry found:

"He [Admiral Kimmel] did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all experienced officers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand."

In the dispatch of October 16, 1941, I was advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. I did not know, what I learned for the first time from testimony before the congressional committee in 1946, that my government had promised armed support to the British if the Japanese attacked them. Furthermore the foregoing advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said:

"Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you *merely stated the possibility*; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably." [Author's italics]

This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark stated certain Japanese action to be "possible," he meant that it was not probable.

In his letter of October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from Captain R. E. Schuirmann, who was in charge of the Navy's liaison with the State Department. Admiral Stark stated in his letter that this memorandum by Captain Schuirmann "sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down."

The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memorandum were not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 began: "The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave crisis." The memorandum began: "I believe we are inclined to over-estimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese policy of thought or action."

The memorandum stated:

"Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen."

The memorandum was to the effect that the Japanese military would determine Japan's policy regardless of the Cabinet in power.

On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was addressed to me, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the Commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts. This dispatch read as follows:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philip-

(Continued on page 133)

## Have a little Brandy handy

for the holidays...



### FOR GIFTS...

Hennessy Cognac brandy makes a distinctive gift that is really appreciated. Go to your store and see all of the imported Hennessy gift packages ranging from \$3.50 to \$20. Give your friends a gift of good taste they are sure to enjoy.



### FOR ENTERTAINING...

Hennessy Cognac brandy will add to your reputation as a good host. For the perfect ending to a good dinner, serve it neat or as Flaming Cafe Hennessy. (Light a lump of sugar in a dessert spoon of Hennessy over hot coffee.) Serve Hennessy with soda or on-the-rocks through the evening.



# HENNESSY

THE WORLD'S PREFERRED COGNAC BRANDY  
84 PROOF • Schieffelin & Co., New York

**Moving soon?** Surely you do not want to miss even one copy of this up-to-the-minute news magazine. Help us to keep you well-informed about the fast-moving news events of the world by sending us your change of address at least two weeks prior to the time the change is to become effective. And please send your old address as well as the new address to which this useful news magazine should be sent. Help us to serve you promptly.

**U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT** Circulation Department  
435 PARKER AVE., DAYTON 1, OHIO

## How \$5 saved me from an investment blunder

From a Barron's reader

When a friend suggested I buy a certain stock, I thought it might be a good thing for me. That was some months ago.

But before risking my money, I decided I ought to look further. I asked myself, "How does this stock compare with others in value? How do its earnings and future prospects compare with other stocks?"

So I took a trial subscription to Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly. This cost me only \$5, and it has saved me hundreds.

In less than a month, I saw a number of attractive investment situations in Barron's. Any one of them looked better for me than my friend's suggestion—and I picked one.

I was right. My investment has gone up in value and pays me a good return—while my friend's stock has gone "sour." Thanks to Barron's I saved myself from a costly blunder.

No other business or investment publication is like Barron's. It is written for the man who makes up his own mind about his own money. It is the only weekly affiliated with Dow Jones,

and has full use of Dow Jones' vast, specialized information in serving you.

In Barron's you are shown *what, where and why* the intrinsic VALUES are, behind current security prices. You get clear, well-founded information each week on the condition and prospects (the changing fortunes) of individual corporations—and on industrial and market trends.

A trial subscription—17 weeks for only \$5—brings you: Everything you need to know to help you handle your business and investment affairs with greater understanding and foresight... the *investment implications* of current political and economic events... the *perspective* you must have to anticipate trends and grasp profitable investment opportunities.

See for yourself how important Barron's can be to you in the eventful weeks ahead. Try it for 17 weeks for \$5 (full year, \$15). Just tear out this ad and send it today with your check; or tell us to bill you. Address: Barron's, 40 New Street, New York 4, N. Y. USN-1210

## Finance Week

### ... Many bankers expect 10 years of high tax rates

"Once you taste inflation," says one banker, "and see the effect on votes, it's mighty hard to swear off."

Other factors, besides low costs, are seen as favoring borrowing for some time to come.

Most companies are soundly fixed, not yet overloaded with debt and debt payments. Earnings are counted on to hold high and keep debt costs manageable.

If stock prices rise much more, today's borrowers can take advantage of the rise; they can call in their debt securities and replace them with stocks, put on sale at the higher prices, which in turn will mean less cost, percentagewise, for management.

**Taxes as a long-term factor.** High taxes are the first reason given by virtually every investment banker for dependence on borrowing. With the federal tax on corporate income at 52 per cent, the Government, in effect, is paying half the cost of any borrowing.

Few investment bankers expect to see heavy financing through stocks while taxes remain at present levels.

When will taxes come down? The bankers wish they knew. The best they can say is this statement in a convention report: "With the expiration of the excess-profits tax and the hope that the present 52 per cent corporation tax will be lowered, it would seem that the strength in the industrial stock market might lead to more equity financing."

Actually, few of the investment bankers believe the 52 per cent rate will be permitted to drop to 47 per cent next April 1, as now called for by law. Most of them see "at least 10 to 15 years of high tax rates."

Will the dividend relief given to shareholders in the 1954 Tax Code help? "No," say the bankers, "it's just a drop in the bucket."

**A lot of ifs.** Will corporations ever again resort generally to stock issues for new capital? Most bankers answer, "Yes, some day." But they attach many ifs.

If individual savings continue to pour into institutions and the money is used by them to buy stocks, some issues will get scarcer and scarcer—and higher priced. That will encourage equity financing.

If business recovery continues, the Administration probably will make credit a little more expensive. That can discourage borrowing.

And if the "cold war" ever dies down to permit smaller outlays for defense, taxes will come down again, making tax deductions less impressive as an inducement to borrowing.

## ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S OWN STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

[Continued from page 77]

piners or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately."

Under the date of November 25, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me a letter which reached me on December 3. This letter contained a postscript added after a "meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today." The dates of the conference and the postscript are not known to me. In the postscript he wrote:

*"... From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely."*

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for: or we may do nothing—I think it more likely to be 'anything.'" [Author's italics]

On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the following dispatch:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions.

The first of these dispatches was as follows:

"Army has offered to make available some units of in-

fantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament."

The second of these dispatches was as follows:

*"In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats. essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable."* [Author's italics]

### Analysis of So-called "War Warning" Dispatch of November 27, 1941

The so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by the Navy Department that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained.

The dispatch warned of war—where? In the Far East. The dispatch stated:

"The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo."

Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula were stated to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to "possible" objectives, Borneo was the only one specified. Hawaii was not mentioned. As the Naval Court of Inquiry points out, "No reference was made to the possibility of an aggressive movement in any direction as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November." This indicated to us in the Fleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department had obtained later information, on the basis of which it could specify both probable and possible Japanese objectives.

Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received on November 27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" dispatch, were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.

One of these dispatches proposed that I send 25 Army pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to each of the Islands of Wake and Midway. The other dispatch proposed the re-

enforcement of Marine defense battalions on Midway and Wake with Army troops.

About the same time General Short received a dispatch from the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take over the defense of these islands from the Marines. Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and Navy Departments were in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project.

The proposed exchange of Army troops for Marines on the outlying island bases was not feasible. General Short and I had extensive conferences on the subject. I learned that the Army had no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft to equip any troops which might relieve or reenforce the Marines. Thus, if the Marines were withdrawn, their equipment and arms would have to be left for the Army. I did not have sufficient additional supplies to reequip and rearm the Marines removed. The Marines stationed on the Islands were trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards which could be immediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. The Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense battalion, so that the Army garrison would have required a new table of organization. The proposed relief of the Marine garrisons by Army troops would necessarily disrupt the defense of the Islands during the period that one garrison was preparing to depart and the other was being installed.

Furthermore, at Wake, the most westerly of the two islands, there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships under way in an open seaway. Ships had been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days due to bad weather. It was not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible.

I believed that responsible authorities in Washington would not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circumstances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying bases was imminent.

I promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the Marines should not be withdrawn from the outlying islands until the Army had received arms and equipment for its defense battalions and had adequately trained them.

The replacement of Marine planes on the Islands of Wake and Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Washington, was also impracticable. At conferences with the Army on this matter, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment stated that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness in the Island's defense. I so advised the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch and letter.

The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send to outlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted approximately 50 percent of the Army's pursuit strength on Oahu. The very fact that the War and Navy Department proposed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable.

In brief, on November 27, subsequent to what was a virtual ultimatum to Japan on November 26 the issuance of which I was not informed, the Navy Department suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriers of the Fleet which constituted the Fleet's main striking defense against air attack.

On November 27, the War and Navy Departments suggested that we send from the Island of Oahu, 50 per cent of the Army's resources in pursuit planes.

These proposals came to me on the very same day of the so-called "war warning."

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the "war warning" was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the information which I had from the Navy Department or from any other source, confirmed, and was consistent with, the Japanese movement in Southeast Asia described in the dispatch of November 27.

#### War Department Message of November 27, 1941, to General Short

On November 27, 1941, General Short received the following message from the Army Chief of Staff in Washington:

"No. 472 November 27, 1941:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

"Prior to hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. [Author's italics]

In reply to the order in the foregoing message to "Report measures taken," General Short sent this message:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty-seven."

The words, "reurad four seven two twenty-seven" are Army language meaning replying to your message number 472 of the 27th.

Recorded testimony shows this report was read by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of War Plans Army and the Chief of War Plans Navy. There can be no reasonable doubt this report was read and understood by the responsible officials in Washington. After receipt of this report, Washington not only failed to indicate disagreement but on November 28 sent two messages to the Hawaiian Command detailing the steps to be taken to prevent sabotage, espionage and subversive activity. For nine days the War Department failed to express any disapproval of this alert and likewise failed to give General Short any information which was calculated to make him change the alert, although a wealth of vital information obtained from decoded Japanese intercepts was received in Washington during these nine days, as well as in the preceding two months, all of which was withheld from General Short.

There is no doubt the alert prescribed by General Short met with the approval of the administration in Washington until clamor over the catastrophe of December 7 demanded a scapegoat. The administration provided two scapegoats.

On November 30, the Navy Department sent, for information, a dispatch addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. This stated there were indications that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by

overseas expedition. The Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was directed to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for information another dispatch which was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. Japan planned a landing at Kota Bharu in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malaya into Thailand. Thailand would then call Britain an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid. This would facilitate the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and give Japan air bases in the Kra Peninsula, and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya.

From the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the China Coast, and other sources, we had reports of the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed south. Movement of troops, tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft, transports, and Naval vessels had been sighted moving to the Kra Peninsula.

On December 6, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet reported various large Japanese forces apparently making for Kohtron. These consisted of one 25-ship convoy with an escort of 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers, and another 10-ship convoy with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indo-China.

In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese military and naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in the dispatch of 27 November that the Japanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in Southeast Asia.

The fortnightly "Summary of Current National Situations" issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941, stated on page 1: "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand." The same publication, on page 9, under the heading "The Japanese Naval Situation" stated definitely: "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."

On December 3, 1941, I received intelligence that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy most of their codes. This dispatch stated "most of their codes and ciphers"—not all—a point which was noted by me and my Staff at the time. This information appeared to fit in with the information we had received about a Japanese movement in Southeast Asia. Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communications system in the event that her action in Southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over her diplomatic residences.

#### Vagaries of Radio Traffic Analysis

In addition to actual observation, there was another way of obtaining some indications of Japanese Fleet movements. This was the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rests on an attempted identification of call signs of various enemy ships and of subdivision commanders in the enemy fleet. The call sign is a group of letters and numbers used by a ship to identify itself much as a radio station announces itself as "Station WABC." The location of the ships from whence the call signs emanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 we had direction finders at Manila, Guam and Pearl Harbor. We made a daily traffic analysis. I went over the material with care.

The charge has been made that the failure to identify and locate the Japanese carriers by traffic analysis should have been taken as evidence that they were on their way to attack the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. There is no basis for such a charge.

Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimates of enemy fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is open to serious doubts.

To illustrate: On December 8, 1941, after the attack, the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to me for information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysis made by the Communication Intelligence Unit in Manila. It stated:

"The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries since December first and are conservative: ". . . Radio bearings indicate that *Akagi* is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area."

This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier *Akagi* early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south from Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know that the carrier *Akagi* was in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor and could not possibly be moving south from Japan on December 8.

I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, which this dispatch illustrates. May I point out how these mistaken estimates arise.

Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and that direction finders locate in the China Sea the ship from which this call sign issues. The crucial question still remains: What ship is using the call sign "KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a carrier, or some auxiliary? The actual intelligence transmitted by the ship having the call sign "KAGA" affords the best clue to her identity. The analyst, however, does not have that intelligence unless he knows the text of the message which the ship is sending. Until then his estimate of the identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on assumptions which are open to question, and may be in error.

When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships in a fleet are changed, there is a considerable period during which the location of the fleet units, through traffic analysis, is practically impossible.

The Japanese Navy changed its call signs on May 1, 1941. It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs had been identified to make the location and identification of ships and subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to merit any real consideration.

Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were changed. About the end of November we had reached a point where the number of identified calls made the data as reliable as such data can be. Then on December 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were again changed. This second change within one month was entirely consistent with preparation for the anticipated movement to Southeast Asia by Japan.

From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequence of the change in call signs, the data which we obtained from traffic analysis was fragmentary. Out of 20,000 calls involved in the change, only 200 service calls had been partially identified. After December 1, practically all Japanese naval traffic was in a code which we were unable to read.

During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941, there was a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of the Japanese Fleet. The Japanese carrier calls were not identified, nor were the calls of the major part of the Japanese Fleet. The failure to identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failure to identify the calls on other major units of the Japanese Fleet, which did not come to Pearl Harbor. The failure to identify the carrier calls did not indicate that the carriers were not a part of the fleets which were known to be moving to Southeast Asia.

Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that the



carriers were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possible that the carriers were originating traffic and that their traffic was included within the great volume of unidentified traffic. Even on the assumption that the Japanese carriers were not originating radio traffic, it would not follow that the carriers were engaged on a secret mission. When ships are within the immediate location of shore stations, they do not ordinarily transmit over long distances, because their traffic is handled through shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may merely mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in home waters.

The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic on and after December first, when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of 8 to 14 days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of 10 to 20 days each, in which the location of the greater numbers of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of 134 days—in 12 separate periods—each ranging from 9 to 22 days—when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.

In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, I had no evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route to Oahu. Radio traffic analysis did not locate their positions. But this was not a new or unusual condition. It was inherent in the changes of call signs. It had existed on 12 other occasions over a six months period.

The dispatch of November 27, stated that Japanese-American negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ceased. The Navy Department did not let this statement stand without modification. On November 29, two days later, the Navy Department sent me a dispatch which quoted the War Department's message to General Short of November 27. This stated:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest possibility of resumption." [Author's italics]

This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next few days" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the period within which the Japanese action would come. Further, there was a public resumption of Japanese-American negotiations after November 27. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after November 29. In the absence of more authoritative information, I took account of this public information as to diplomatic developments. This suggested a lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called "war warning" dispatch.

The Navy Department did not inform me of the contents of the American note to Japan on November 26, or that the prevalent opinion in the Navy Department was that the proposals contained in that note were so drastic as to make Japanese acceptance of them impossible. In a letter of November 14, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall. This memorandum advised against direct United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing the negotiations after November 26 only as a device to cover up their war plans. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact. I was not informed that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26, the Japanese considered that

negotiations had not merely ceased but that relations with this country were ruptured. The Navy Department also knew this to be the fact.

The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to the effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 was a pale reflection of actual events; so partial a statement as to be misleading. The parties had not merely stopped talking. They were at swords points. So far as Japan was concerned, the talking which went on after November 26 was play-acting. It was a Japanese stratagem to conceal a blow which Japan was preparing to deliver. The stratagem did not fool the Navy Department. The Navy Department knew the scheme. The Pacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese stratagem because the Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of the Japanese trick.

In the November 29th dispatch after quoting the Army message, the Chief of Naval Operations added the following direction:

"W.P.L.-52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in W.P.L.-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

W.P.L.-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan which assigned tasks to the Pacific Fleet.

W.P.L.-52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders. It was charged with the task of destroying German and Italian Naval, Land, and Air Forces encountered in the area of the Western Atlantic. The Southeast Pacific Sub Area covered approximately 700 miles of the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of South America. Here the Southeast Pacific Naval Force had similar shooting orders and a similar task. In the dispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations informed me that W.P.L.-52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not have shooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act. Although this dispatch was sent me for information I was as much bound by these orders as though I had been an action addressee.

The same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16, 1941:

"You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan."

Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me by the Chief of Naval Operations in his message of November 29:

"The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. . . . Measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or disclose intent."

The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over 130,000 Japanese, any one of whom could watch its movements. You can appreciate the psychological handicaps orders of this kind placed upon us. In effect, I was told:

"Do take precautions."  
 "Do not alarm civilians."  
 "Do take a preparatory deployment."  
 "Do not disclose intent."  
 "Do take a defensive deployment."  
 "Do not commit the first overt act."

One last feature of the so-called "war warning" dispatch remains to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed:

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in W.P.L.-46."

Under W.P.L.-46 the first task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the forces of the Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malaya Barrier.

The Navy Department emphasized this instruction by repeating it on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed:

"Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in W.P.L.-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

Thus, in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy Department to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move against the Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East.

This was a determinative factor in the most difficult and vital decision I had to make thereafter. There was not a hint in these two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area nor of the United States ultimatum to Japan.

#### Action Taken and Decisions Made After November 27, 1941

The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W.P. Pac-46) prescribed a definite plan of operations to enable the Fleet to carry out its basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls. This plan was called the "Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan."

We planned to send all three task forces of the Fleet to commence the attacks on selected islands of the Marshall group and to start the movement one day after hostilities with Japan began. The plans for this operation were worked out in detail. We were conscious of the great value of speed in setting the operation in motion. Any delay would decrease its effect and its entire purpose would be frustrated if it were not undertaken promptly because its object was to divert Japanese strength away from the so called Malay Barrier, the British and Dutch East Indies.

The patrol planes of the Fleet were detailed to search out the areas in which the Fleet would operate in its raids on the Marshall Islands. Within five days after war commenced the maximum practicable number of patrol planes were to be based on Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands. Planes so based were to make a reconnaissance of Taongi and Bikar on the fifth day after hostilities commenced or as soon thereafter as practicable. Not less than two patrol plane squadrons were to operate from Oahu.

The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vital air reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force! Without it, the Task Force might be exposed to surprise attack if they entered the dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensable feature of the entire operation.

I made a daily revision of a memorandum entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next twenty-four hours." The last form of this memorandum I reviewed and approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. In it I attempted to keep the basic plan of the raid on the Marshall Islands up to date and in conformity with the existing dispositions of Fleet units. The last issue of this memorandum, dated December 6, 1941, is as follows:

"1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

"2. Send dispatch to task force commanders:

"(a) W.P.L.-46 effective (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The Submarine and Patrol Plane Plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

"(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

"(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

"(d) ComAirBatFor and units in company with him (TaskFor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of TaskFor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

"(e) *Lexington* land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (TaskFor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

"(f) ComTaskFor Three proceed to join *Lexington* group. Return DMS to Pearl.

"3. (a) Do not modify the movements of *Regulus* at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

"(b) Direct that *William Ward Burrows* continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that *Lexington* group send two destroyers to join *Burrows* prior to her arrival at Wake.

"(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

"(d) Provide two destroyers to escort *Saratoga* from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

"(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur."

The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated with the basic plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP Plans" which were to "become effective without special reference" were the plans for the operation of the patrol plane force. Paragraphs 2 (c), (d), and (e) had reference to the existing disposition of Fleet Units on December 5 and 6.

Admiral Halsey at that time was returning from an expedition to Wake Island with a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl Harbor to refuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to the Marshalls. The carrier *Lexington* on December 6 was en route to Midway. She was in a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 12. In the event of hostilities I planned to have the *Lexington* carry out the Midway expedition and proceed to Wake there to be joined by the Commander of Task Force 3, of which the *Lexington* was a regular component. Admiral Wilson Brown, the Commander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged in operations in the vicinity of Johnston Island. I planned to have him leave that area and join the *Lexington* group, thereby bringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 3 would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2. When these Task Forces joined, they would proceed with the reconnaissance features of the raiding plan as a preliminary to the actual raids on the Marshall Islands.

This initial expedition was to continue operating as long as we could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it would require continuous operation of maximum patrol plane strength from four to six weeks. Additional expeditions were to be undertaken as rapidly as events and forces permitted.

I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant reconnaissance from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27, 1941.

By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department had urged me to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake by aircraft carrier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28 I was sending a carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes, and that I expected thereafter to send other Marine planes to Midway.

I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planes be sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was desirable that the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strong as possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course, not enough to save that island. Together with its other defenses, they could make the capture of the island sufficiently costly to justify sending them there. The actual results in the defense of Wake after December 7 demonstrated that fact.

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than re-inforce the air defense of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.

On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier *Enterprise*, three heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles with his planes for any sign of hostile shipping.

On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consisting of the carrier *Lexington*, 3 heavy cruisers, and 5 destroyers. Newton, like Halsey, conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance.

On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises.

Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces of the Fleet each deployed in a different area. The *Lexington* and the *Enterprise* were each conducting air searches. It was a more intensive search in the areas covered than could have been made by patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, as they approached the outlying islands, these searches were conducted at a much greater distance from Oahu than any patrol plane based on Oahu could travel.

In addition to the operation of these task forces, other distant reconnaissance was conducted by the Fleet after November 27.

Upon receipt of the so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27, I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake on December 2, and 3, they searched to a distance of 525 miles.

I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way to Johnston, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way.

Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway-based patrol planes were searching the sector 120 to 170 degrees from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the *Lexington* at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of

the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on ten-minute notice as a ready striking force.

When the *Enterprise* completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route.

In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor, covered a total distance of nearly 5,000 miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area.

In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously.

At Oahu before the attack, there were 49 patrol planes which were in flying condition. Eight other planes were out of commission and undergoing repair. In addition, on December 5, a squadron of patrol planes returned to Pearl Harbor after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake. This squadron consisted of obsolete PBV-3 planes, approaching 18 months' service and overdue for overhaul. It was not available for distant searches.

The 49 flyable patrol planes on Oahu were part of the planes which had arrived during the preceding four weeks. (Eighteen on October 28, 24 on November 23, and 12 on November 28.) These planes were of the PBV-5 type. They were experiencing the shakedown difficulties of new planes. There was considerable difficulty due to the cracking of new engine sections, which required replacement. A program for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on these planes was under way. The leakproof tanks and armor were necessary to make these planes ready for war. That work had to be carried out in Hawaii. Under War Plans the planes were to operate from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra Islands. There, they would operate from aircraft tenders. There were no facilities at those advanced bases to complete important material installations. The planes had to be in the highest condition of fighting efficiency before they left Oahu.

There was a total absence of spare parts for these planes. There were no spare crews.

To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360-degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of sixteen hours. Of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make that sixteen-hour flight every day. For searches of this character over a protracted period, a pool of 250 planes would be required. These are fundamental principles. You will find them in the testimony of expert aviation officers before the Naval Court; and in the very comprehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz [then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet] wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942, on the subject: "Airplane Situation in Hawaiian Area."

It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planes to conduct each day a 360-degree distant search from the island of Oahu. That fact is beyond controversy. A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protection. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some other sector within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of

detecting the enemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his official letter on the subject. He said:

"It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known."

Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart of the problem which I faced.

The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry has stated:

"There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, available in Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles."

This statement assumes a 25-mile visibility for each patrol plane engaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of ships in and out of the harbor and in the operating area.

If I had instituted a distant search of any 128-degree sector around Oahu on and after November 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have deprived the Pacific Fleet of any efficient patrol plane force for its prescribed war missions.

In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, from which I was excluded, Vice Admiral Bellinger, who commanded my patrol plane force, testified:

"Q Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?"

"A It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. *Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.*" [Author's italics]

This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol plane squadrons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter.

Captain Ramsey, the Executive Officer of the Patrol Wing, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as follows:

"... As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBV-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have seen approximately a 75 per cent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period."

The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a definite program for their operation which was consistent

with creating and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and northwest of Oahu to a distance of 400 miles, after which the planes required maintenance and upkeep. This was not distant reconnaissance, as such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol out 300 miles to cover the areas where the Fleet operated.

It had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out the raids on the Marshalls under W.P.L.-46, which meant the extended use of the Fleet patrol planes from advance bases in war operations.

I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a matter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with their war tasks in front of me.

Had I directed their use for intensive distant searches from Oahu, I would have faced the peril of having those planes grounded when the Fleet needed them and when the war plan was executed.

I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basis of five days or ten days of distant searches.

I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointing to Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack.

I knew that any distant search I could make on an intensive basis, straining the planes to the breaking point, would be in its nature partial and ineffective.

I took account of my resources. They were slender. I took account of my probable future needs and of my orders from the Navy Department.

I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy of the name for the Fleet's expected movement into the Marshalls.

I considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and the patrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands.

I considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition.

I considered the need for patrols of the Fleet operating areas against the submarine menace and these I carried out.

I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emergency distant searches.

I considered the need for patrol planes in covering Fleet movements in and out of the harbor—which might have to be quickly and unexpectedly executed.

I considered the endurance of my patrol plane manpower—and the absence of any spare crews.

I decided I could not fritter away my patrol plane resources by pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector around Oahu—which within the predictable future would have to be discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.

The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of Inquiry (Admiral Orin G. Murfin, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, former Commander Battle Force, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, former Commander of the Scouting Force) scrutinized my decision after extensive testimony.

Each of the Admirals could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the field. They summarized the problem:

"The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent he did not know. The Fleet

planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.

"If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.

"The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance."

The Court concluded (Finding XIII):

"The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved."

I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships of the Pacific Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left for Wake with a carrier task force and on December 5, Admiral Newton left for Midway with another carrier task force. These missions were in pursuance of an explicit suggestion from the Navy Department. When Admiral Halsey left for Wake on November 28, the three battleships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl Harbor so as to avoid creating the impression that there was anything unusual about the movement of his task force. However, immediately on clearing the channel, Admiral Halsey diverted his battleships and instructed them to carry out exercises in the Hawaiian area. He then headed west with the remainder of his task force.

It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have taken along the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleships was 17 knots. The Fleet units which he took to Wake could make 30 knots. To take his battleships with him would have meant the loss of 13 knots of potential speed. He was bound for dangerous waters where curtailed speed might spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his force could attain. Three battleships did not furnish sufficient supporting strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed and mobility which their presence in the expedition to Wake would entail. Moreover, it was necessary to complete the Wake operation as quickly as possible so that the ships engaged might be ready for further eventualities.

Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific with the forces available to me had its cost. In sending the two carriers to Wake and Midway, I took from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the time being, the Fleet's air strength. We had no carrier left in the Hawaiian area. The *Saratoga*, the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, had been undergoing repair and overhaul on the West Coast. The advisability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighter planes from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28. The absence of the carriers from the Hawaiian area temporarily limited the mobility of the battleships which were left behind.

While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions to Midway and Wake, the battleship force was kept in Pearl Harbor. To send them to sea without air cover for any prolonged period would have been a dangerous course. The only effective defense for vessels at sea from air attack, whether it be a bombing attack or a torpedo plane attack, is an effective air cover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, are much less effective against an air attack. That

is so today. It was the more so prior to 7 December because of the existing inadequacies of anti-aircraft guns.

The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships at sea. The few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for use by catapult are not fighters. Their function is only scouting and reconnaissance. They are ineffective as a defense against enemy air attack. The battleships at sea without carriers had no protection from air bombing attack. In Pearl Harbor they had the protection of such anti-aircraft defenses as the Army had including shore based fighter planes. At sea, in deep waters, there were no physical barriers to the effectiveness of torpedo plane attack. In Pearl Harbor, where the depth of water was less than forty feet, a torpedo plane was considered a negligible danger. The battleships of the Fleet at sea, without carriers, sighted by a force of such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, appeared to be more subject to damage than in port.

Vice Admiral Pye, Commander of the Battle Force, and I discussed these considerations in a conference after the receipt of the so-called "war warning" dispatch.

At the time of our discussion—at that time and later—we did not have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicating that the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked for attack. We had no information that an air attack upon Pearl Harbor was imminent or probable. The fact that the Navy Department proposed at this time that our carriers be sent to the outlying islands indicated to us that the Navy Department felt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected in the immediate future.

All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as the presence of the battleships in port, were known to the Navy Department. Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Roberts Commission as follows:

"What we expected him [Admiral Kimmel] to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway, and were expected to go on the fifth or sixth day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces, there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature."

Upon receipt of the so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27, 1941, I issued orders to the Fleet to exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the Fleet operating areas. My dispatch of November 28 to the Fleet containing this order was forwarded to the Navy Department on that day. On December 2, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations directing his personal attention to this order. The Navy Department, in the ten days prior to the attack, did not approve or disapprove my action.

For some time there had been reports of submarines in the operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week of February, 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reported about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours, after which the contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations, stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted

to bomb every suspected submarine contact in the operating area around Hawaii. I was directed by dispatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three-mile limit.

A similar contact at approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted.

On September 12, 1941, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and asked him "what to do about the submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity." I stated: "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive areas. Should we now bomb contacts without waiting to be attacked?"

On September 23, the Chief of Naval Operations replied to my question in a personal letter. He said:

"The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step."

No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7, 1941.

The files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records of at least three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor.

On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil-slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41. The patrol plane searched a fifteen-mile area. A sound search was made by the U. S. S. *Worden*, and an investigation was made by the U. S. S.

*Dale*, all of them producing negative results. On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. *Helena* reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts.

During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. *Gamble* reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.

On the morning of the attack, the U. S. S. *Ward* reported to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District that it had attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the defensive sea area.

The Commandant of the 14th Naval District directed a verification of this report with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen by the *Ward*. He also directed that the ready-duty destroyer assist the *Ward* in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact, the *Ward* also reported that it had intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier report of the submarine contact.

Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the *Ward's* report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the *Ward*, and the efforts then under way to obtain a verification of the *Ward's* report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified in the past.

## CHAPTER IV

### Information Withheld And Its Significance

"It is better to have useless knowledge than to know nothing."—Seneca

#### Attempts to Base the Fleet in California

Prior to my taking command my predecessor, Admiral J. O. Richardson, had recommended the Fleet be based on the West Coast where it could be more efficiently supplied, repaired, modernized and trained. So based, the 2,000-mile haul by sea of all supplies, personnel, and particularly fuel oil, would have been eliminated. Ample fuel oil was available at the Fleet base in California. With the complete lack of adequate tanker and supply ships, preparing the Fleet for war would have been greatly expedited by basing it in California.

The approach to the California base by sea is limited to an arc of 180 degrees, just one-half of that for the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor. This means that only one-half the sea area would have to be searched to detect the approach of a hostile force.

California is 2,000 miles more distant from Japan than is Pearl Harbor. The hazards to the Japanese in an attack on a California based Fleet, including the hazard of our Pearl Harbor force on their flank, were so great that the attack would never have been attempted.

It is interesting to note that in all pre-1941 Naval War Plans for a Pacific Campaign the Fleet was based on our West Coast until hostilities actually commenced.

The deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet base were well known in the Navy Department. In an interview with Mr. Roosevelt in June, 1941, in Washington, I outlined the weaknesses and concluded with the remark that the only answer was to have the Fleet at sea if the Japs ever attacked.

I accepted the decision to base the Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the firm belief that the Navy Department would supply me promptly with all pertinent information available and in particular with all information that indicated an attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. I knew in general, from my experience in the Navy, of the sources from which the Navy Department might derive such intelligence, including the decoded Japanese intercepted communications. The Pacific Fleet was dependent upon the Navy Department in Washington for information derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages.

Shortly after I took command, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, upon his arrival in Hawaii from Washington, informed me of some confusion in the Navy Department as to whether the

responsibility of furnishing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with secret information rested with Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence. I immediately added a postscript to a letter which I was writing to the Chief of Naval Operations, bringing this situation to his attention. I wrote Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941:

"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on the subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding."

He replied in a letter of March 22:

"With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and the responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibilities in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States."

On May 25, 1941, I wrote an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." In a separate paragraph entitled "Information," again I described my need for information of all important developments affecting our foreign relations:

"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,

be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available."

I brought this official letter to Washington with me in June of 1941, handed it to the Chief of Naval Operations personally, discussed it with him, and received his assurance that I would be informed of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available.

A study of Japanese radio intercepts extending over many years permitted the Navy to read many of the intercepted Japanese messages. Information obtained in this manner was referred to as "Magic" and was of the greatest value when properly used.

### Decoding Equipment

Although the Commanders at Hawaii were never supplied with the equipment and trained personnel to decode intercepted "Magic" Japanese dispatches, I learned during the investigations in Washington that the Commander-in-Chief of our Asiatic Fleet was fully equipped to decode the "Magic" intercepted Japanese dispatches as received; also that the Navy Department in Washington maintained a check system and supplied the Asiatic decoding unit with copies of important intercepts which the organization failed to obtain with their own facilities. I also learned that a fourth set of equipment destined for assignment to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, at Hawaii was diverted to the British in the summer of 1941. The Navy and War Departments in Washington were each supplied with equipment and personnel to decode their intercepts.

The care taken to keep the Commander-in-Chief of our Asiatic Fleet and the British in London informed of Japanese intentions while withholding this vital information from our Commanders at Pearl Harbor has never been explained.

In the month of July, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me at least seven dispatches which quoted intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington, Tokyo to Berlin, Berlin to Tokyo, Tokyo to Vichy, Canton to Tokyo. These dispatches identified by number the Japanese messages they quoted and gave their verbatim text.

I was never informed of any decision to the effect that intelligence from intercepted Japanese messages was not to be sent to me. In fact, dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department in the week before the attack contained intelligence from intercepted messages. On December 1, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, sent to me for information, quoted a report of November 29 from the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok to Tokyo which described a Japanese plan to entice the British to invade Thai, thereby permitting Japan to enter that country in the role of its defender.

On December 3, a dispatch to me from the Chief of Naval Operations set forth an order from Japan to diplomatic agents and expressly referred to this order as "Circular Twenty-Four Forty-Four from Tokyo." Another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on December 3 referred to certain "categorical and urgent instructions which were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts."

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation. I had asked for all vital information. I had been assured that I would have it. I appeared to be receiving

it. My current estimate of the situation was formed on this basis. Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was withheld from me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese Government had divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and was seeking minute information as to the berthing of ships of the Fleet in those areas, which was vitally significant.

On September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government instructed its Consul General in Honolulu as to the type of report it desired from him concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. These instructions divided Pearl Harbor into the five sub areas. Each area was given an alphabetical symbol. Area A was the term prescribed to describe the waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. Area B was the term prescribed to cover the waters south and west of Ford Island. Area C described East Loch; Area D, Middle Loch; Area E, West Loch and communication water routes. The dispatch stated:

"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (those are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)"

This dispatch was decoded and translated on October 9, 1941. This information was withheld from me.

On September 29, 1941, Kita, the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu, replied to his government's dispatch of September 24. He described an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor. The letters "KS" would describe the repair dock in the Navy Yard. The letters "KT" would describe the Navy docks in the Navy Yard. The letters "FV" would describe the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. The letters "FG" would describe vessels alongside Ford Island, the east and west sides to be designated by A and B, respectively. This dispatch of the Consul General was decoded and translated on October 10, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

In the critical period before the attack, the Japanese Government sent further significant instructions to Honolulu. On November 15, [Foreign Minister] Togo sent the following dispatch:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 3, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941, Togo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu:

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area N, Pearl Harbor, Mamala Bay (Honolulu), and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)"

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941, the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu reported to Tokyo in accordance with the system prescribed in the dispatch from Tokyo on September 24. He reported that in Area A there was a battleship of the *Okla-*

*homa* class; that in Area O there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as the carrier *Enterprise* or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers of the *Chicago* class were tied up at docks "KS." The symbol "KS" it will be recalled was established by the Consul General in his September dispatch to Tokyo to designate the repair dock in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. The Consul General described in great detail the course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and their distances apart. He reported that they changed course five times, each time roughly 30 degrees, from the entrance of the harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C at which they were moored. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 20, Togo in Tokyo dispatched instructions to Honolulu to investigate comprehensively Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation. This dispatch was decoded and translated on the 4th of December. This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, Tokyo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu:

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

In the volume of intercepted Japanese dispatches eliciting and securing information about American Military installations and Naval movements, the dispatches concerning Pearl Harbor, on and after September 24, 1941, stand out, apart from the others. No other harbor or base in American territory or possessions was divided into sub-areas by Japan. In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor, followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might expect this type of conventional espionage.

With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the Fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf.

In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor.

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor than its Commander-in-Chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into sub-areas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor of the ships of the Fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japa-

nese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was entitled to know when information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely, I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.

Knowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my staff. It would have suggested a re-orientation of our planned operations at the outset of hostilities. The war plans of the Navy Department, and of the Pacific Fleet, as well as our directives and information from Washington prior to the attack, indicated that the Pacific Fleet could be most effectively employed against Japan through diversionary raids on the Marshalls, when the Japanese struck at the Malay Barrier. Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would have afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii. It would have suggested the wisdom of concentrating our resources to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall Islands expedition.

Attempts were made during the Congressional investigation to indicate that the information demanded and supplied on the berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor appeared to be evidence of the Japanese passion for detail, that similar information was requested and supplied from other localities. Yet not one shred of evidence to support this contention was ever presented. Details of unimportant installations were demanded. But the details of the berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor which were useful only for an hour or a day were in an entirely different category.

It is interesting to note that General Willoughby on page 22 of his book, "MacArthur: 1941-1951," quotes a staff report from MacArthur's headquarters:

"... It was known that the Japanese consul in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reports on general ship movements. In October his instructions were 'sharpened.' Tokyo called for specific instead of general reports. In November, the daily reports were on a grid-system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war: this was no longer a case of diplomatic curiosity; coordinate grid is the classical method for pin-point target designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets.

"Spencer Akin was uneasy from the start. We drew our own conclusions and the Filipino-American troops took up beach positions long before the Japanese landings."

If MacArthur's headquarters which had no responsibility for Pearl Harbor were impressed by this information, it is impossible to understand how its significance escaped all the talent in the War and Navy Departments in Washington.

The intercepted dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other intercepted Japanese dispatches, decoded and translated by the Navy Department prior to the attack. I refer particularly to the intercepted dispatches which established a deadline date for agreement between Japan and the United States. When this date passed without agreement, these dispatches revealed that a Japanese plan automatically took effect.

#### Japanese Deadline-Date Messages Withheld

The deadline date was first established in a dispatch, No. 736, from Tokyo to Washington on November 5, 1941. In this dispatch the Japanese Government instructed its ambassador in Washington as follows:

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg you.

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone."

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on the date of its origin, November 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline date was reiterated in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 11, 1941. This dispatch stated:

"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceeding criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on the following day?) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short . . ."

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on November 12, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again emphasized in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941. This dispatch stated:

"... Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message No. 736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date."

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on the date of its origin, November 15, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again reiterated on November 16 with great emphasis upon its importance. A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of that date was as follows:

"For your Honor's own information.

"1. I have read your No. 1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"2. . . . In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my No. 736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 17, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was finally extended on November 22 for a period of four days. On that date a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington instructed [Japanese Ambassador] Nomura and Kurusu:

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my No. 736. You should know this, however; I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and, in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

This dispatch was decoded and translated on the date of its origin, November 22, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructed its ambassadors in Washington that the November 29th deadline was set in Tokyo time. This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 24, the date of its origin. This information was never supplied to me.

In at least six separate dispatches, on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22, and 24, Japan specifically established and extended the deadline of November 25, later advanced to November 29. The dispatches made it plain that after the deadline date a Japanese plan was automatically going into operation. The plan was of such importance that as the deadline approached, the Government of Japan declared: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days."

When the deadline date of November 29 was reached with no agreement between the United States and Japan, there was no further extension. The intercepted dispatches indicated that the crisis deepened in its intensity after that day passed. On the first of December, Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington:

"The date set in my message No. 812 has come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly critical."

This message was translated by the Navy on the first of December. This information was never supplied to me.

An intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of November 28, 1941, made it clear that the American proposal of November 26 was completely unsatisfactory to Japan and that an actual rupture of negotiations would occur upon the receipt of the Japanese reply. A dispatch on November 28, decoded and translated on the same day, stated:

"Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government, on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. . . ."

This information was never supplied to me.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor were not kept informed of the progress of negotiations with Japan. I was never supplied with the text of [Secretary of State] Hull's message of November 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government which has frequently been referred to as an ultimatum. This was a most important document. It stated the policy of the United States that would be carried out by force, if necessary. Mr. Stimson [Secretary of War] referred to this message as Mr. Hull's decision "to kick the whole thing over." Among other terms this note provided:

"The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo-China.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with Capital temporarily at Chungking.

"Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific Area."

The Japanese reply to this message was delivered in Washington within hours of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. Nor were the Commanders at Pearl Harbor supplied with the text of previous messages exchanged between the United States and Japanese Governments. Their information on this subject was obtained from the radio and newspapers. I now believe that the Washington newspaper correspondents and the editors of our leading newspapers were much more accurately informed of the seriousness of the situation than were the Commanders at Pearl Harbor.

After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches show that Japan attached great importance to the continuance of negotiations to conceal from the United States whatever plan automatically took effect on November 29. Thus, the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of November 28 cautions the Japanese ambassadors in Washington:

"... I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. . . ."

This information was denied to me.

Again the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941, advising the Japanese ambassador that the deadline date had come and gone and the situation continued to be critical, contains this further information:

"... to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)"

This information was never supplied to me.

Again in the trans-Pacific telephone conversation intercepted on November 27, and translated by the Navy Department on November 28, Yamamoto in Tokyo explicitly instructed Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off."

In another trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, intercepted and translated by the Navy on November 30, Kurusu noted the change in the Japanese attitude with respect to the duration of the American-Japanese negotiations. Before the deadline date Kurusu and Nomura had been urged by Tokyo to press for a conclusion of negotiations. Now they were instructed to stretch them out. Kurusu asked, "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" Yamamoto replied, "Yes." Kurusu then said: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

The information from these telephone conversations was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo contains cautious representations to be addressed to the United States. The following instruction accompanied them:

"... In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like breaking off of negotiations. . . ."

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on November 30, and never sent to me.

The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was of such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the unfolding of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.

Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo-China. Admiral Inglis testified that: ". . . No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy." The troop movements to southern Indo-China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the governments of Japan and the United States.

On December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles [Under Secretary of State] handed to Mr. Nomura and Mr. Kurusu a communication which the President of the United States wished to make to them. This communication was as follows:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China. . . . The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. . . . Please be good enough to request the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at

once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. . . ."

Thus it was apparent to the Japanese Government from this formal representation of the United States that our government was aware of the movement in Indo-China. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was, therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these objectives.

Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion of the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline date of November 29 had put into effect an operation which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to this government and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment in its initial phases.

The messages as to the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor would then have given the reader of these intercepted dispatches an insight as to one of the probable directions of the plan which went into effect automatically on November 29, and which Japan was so anxious to conceal. All these dispatches taken together would have pointed to Pearl Harbor as a probable objective of this plan. Yet, because I was not furnished with these intercepted dispatches, nor given in summary form any indication of the deadline date, the automatic execution of a plan by Japan on that date, and the continuance of negotiations thereafter as a pretext to hide that plan, I was deprived of the opportunity to make this deduction, which the dispatches as a whole would warrant, if not compel.

After November 27, there was a rising intensity in the crisis in Japanese-United States relations apparent in the intercepted dispatches. I was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased and two days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest possibilities of their resumption. Then I was left to read public accounts of further conversations between the State Department and the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had been resumed.

The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of Nomura and Kurusu to the American note of November 26—"Our failure and humiliation are complete."

The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of the Japanese Government to the American note of November 26. Japan termed it:

"A humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable."

The Navy Department knew that Nomura and Kurusu suggested to Japan on November 26 one way of saving the situation—a wire by the President to the Emperor.

The Navy Department knew that the Japanese Government advised Nomura and Kurusu on November 28 that the suggested wire from the President to the Emperor offered no hope: "What you suggest is entirely unsuitable."

The Navy Department knew that on November 30, Japan

gave Germany a detailed version of the negotiations with the United States. Japan stated that "a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause," and characterized certain features of the American proposal of November 26 as "insulting"—"clearly a trick." Japan concluded that the United States had decided to regard her as an enemy.

The Navy Department knew that Japan had instructed her ambassadors in Berlin on November 30 to inform Hitler:

"The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April . . . now stand ruptured—broken. Say very secretly to them [Hitler and Ribbentrop] that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

All this vital information came from intercepted dispatches, decoded and translated in Washington, either on the day they were sent or a day or two later. None of this information was supplied to me.

### Japan's "Winds" War Warning Suppressed

On November 19, 1941, the Japanese Government set up a system for informing its representatives throughout the world of the time when Japan was to sever diplomatic relations or go to war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia. This decision was to be made known through a false weather broadcast from Japan. The words "east wind rain" in the broadcast meant that Japan had decided to sever relations or go to war with the United States. The words "west wind clear" would denote such action against England. The words "north wind cloudy" would denote such action against Russia.

The interception of the false weather broadcast was considered by the Navy Department to be of supreme importance. Every facility of the Navy was invoked to learn as speedily as possible when the false weather broadcast from Japan was heard and which of the significant code words were used. Extraordinary measures were established in the Navy Department to transmit the words used in this broadcast to key officers as soon as they were known.

The Naval Court of Inquiry heard substantial evidence from various witnesses on the question of whether or not Japan gave the signal prescribed by the winds code. The Naval Court of Inquiry found the facts on this matter to be as follows:

"On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it.

This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department."

The findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry on this subject are confirmed by the evidence presented to the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee.

From various intercepted Japanese messages it was apparent that the high point in the crisis in Japanese-American affairs would be reached when the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was received. As the Naval Court of Inquiry put it:

"The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would be declared."

On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, there was intercepted, decoded, and translated in the Navy Department, a dispatch from Japan to her ambassadors in Washington, known as the "pilot message." This stated:

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message No. 902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being:

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

The first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3:00 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 p.m., Washington time on that date. These thirteen parts contained strong language. The following expressions are fairly typical of their tenor:

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war [Part 9] . . . it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure [Part 9] . . . It is a fact of history that the countries (of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice (themselves) to the prosperity of the two nations." [Part 10]

Mr. Hull described the whole document on December 7:

"In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The thirteen parts and the pilot message instructing the

Japanese envoys that a specific hour was later to be fixed for their delivery could mean only one thing, that war with the United States was imminent. An hour had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum and for the probable outbreak of hostilities. The hour fixed would be communicated to the Japanese emissaries in Washington in a separate message to be expected shortly.

Not a word of these supremely critical developments of Saturday, December 6, was sent to me. This vital information which was available at 9:00 p.m., Washington time, was distributed to the most important officers of the government in Washington by midnight, Washington time. The President of the United States had it. The Secretary of the Navy had it. The Chief of Military Intelligence had it. The Director of Naval Intelligence had it. Apparently, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State were appraised of these momentous events on the same evening. Nine p.m. in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At midnight in Washington it was early evening, 6:30 p.m. in Hawaii.

### "This Means War"

When thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese intercepted message were delivered to Mr. Roosevelt about 9:00 p.m. Washington time December 6, 1941, he turned to Harry Hopkins and remarked, "This means war." Yet the Chief of Naval Operations who probably had the information contained in these thirteen parts Saturday evening but who certainly had it, and also the fourteenth part and the 1:00 p.m. time of delivery message, by 9:00 a.m. Sunday December 7, 1941, more than four hours before the attack, made no move either to warn me or give me the information available.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark each states he cannot remember where he was on the evening of December 6, 1941. Each states he did not see the first thirteen parts of the fourteen part message on that date. General Marshall states he first learned of the thirteen parts when he arrived at his office in the forenoon of December 7, 1941, when the fourteenth part and the time of delivery message, which had been decoded before 9:00 a.m., were also available.

When Stark received these messages has never been definitely established. Captain Arthur N. McCollum, U. S. Navy, testified that about 9:00 a.m. December 7, 1941, or a little earlier, while he and Admiral Wilkinson were discussing these messages with Stark, one of his officers delivered the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply and also the "1:00 p.m. time of delivery message." The significance of the delivery hour was pointed out to Admiral Stark because 1:00 p.m. Washington time was 7:30 a.m. at Honolulu and 2:00 a.m. at Manila.

### Captain McCollum's Testimony

Captain McCollum, U. S. Navy, was the head of the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department in Washington from September 1939 until October 1942. He testified:

"**Captain McCollum:** That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thirteen of the parts. They were transmitted almost as soon as received to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the people over in the War Department.

"Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set since early November, the fourteenth part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier,

nearer 8:30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands. . . . In other words, it was pointed out that 1 p.m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time.

"**Admiral Hewitt:** 7:30.

"**Captain McCollum:** 7:30, yes, sir, and very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places; and that we did not know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the Ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.

"I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was taken over, with instructions to point that out to the Secretary of State."

Captain McCollum also testified:

1. On December 1, he prepared and submitted a warning message to be sent to the Fleet. It was not sent.

2. Again on four or five December he drafted another warning message and Admiral Turner emasculated it. The message was not sent.

3. There was a change in the situation between November 27, and December 4 which made him conclude that war was much more imminent on December 4 than it had been on November 27.

4. McCollum had an official report from Kramer between eleven and twelve Saturday night that proper deliveries of the thirteen parts had been made. Proper deliveries included the Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) and the War Department. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, then a Lieutenant Commander, was assigned from June, 1940, until June, 1943, to the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department in Washington under Captain McCollum, with a special assignment to the Communication Security Group under Captain Laurance F. Safford.

5. McCollum thought Japs would attack the Fleet wherever it might be.

6. If Japs were convinced we would come into the war if they attacked Kra (Malay States), then they would attack us.

7. On Friday May 18, 1945, Captain McCollum informed me that he had made a complete statement of all that he knew about the Japanese attack and this statement was filed in a safe in the Office of Naval Intelligence. That the sealed package in which he had placed his statement, together with certain documents in connection with it, had been broken open and the contents distributed among other files. He felt some of the documents were missing, or at least he had been unable to find them since his return to Washington. The documents which have disappeared include his statement and copies of the daily and weekly summaries which were presented to Admiral Stark, the Secretary, and the President.

When Senator Ferguson questioned Captain McCollum at the Congressional investigation, he noted the appreciation of the vital importance of the Japanese intercepts received and

decoded on December 6 and December 7, 1941, and the care and speed with which they were distributed to the various officials in Washington, but, said the Senator, no one thought anything was going to happen in Washington. It was in Hawaii and the Far East that action was expected. Why was immediate knowledge of these intercepts in Washington so important if no word of their content or significance was sent to the Commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines until too late to be of any use?

In May 1946 Stark appeared before a special session of the Congressional Investigating Committee, which had previously completed taking testimony, to testify that his aide had belatedly reminded him that he attended the theater on the night of December 6. This aide also reminded him that after he had returned to his quarters he, Stark, had had a conversation by phone with the President about conditions in the Pacific. Admiral Stark continued to maintain he had no independent recollection of this.

It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base of the probable outbreak of war in theaters thousands of miles away, knowing and expecting that they will continue their assigned tasks and missions after the receipt of such warning, and that the very nature of the warning emphasizes to them the necessity for continuing such tasks and missions.

It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particular base of an attack to be expected in their own locality.

In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack.

In the year 1941, the international situation was grave and, at times, tense. However, preparing the Fleet for war through an intensive training program had to go on. There was a vital element of timing involved in determining when the Fleet should curtail training for all-out war measures. Maximum security measures, consistent with the maintenance of the training program, were already in effect in the Fleet. When would Japanese-American relations reach the point that all training should cease and all-out war dispositions should be made? This was what we needed to know in the Pacific in the year 1941.

The dispatch fixing the hour for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States as 1:00 p.m., Washington time, was intercepted and decoded by the Navy Department by 7:00 on the morning of December 7—at 7:00 a.m., Washington time, 1:30 a.m., Hawaiian time—nearly six and a half hours before the attack. The translation of this short message from the Japanese was a two-minute job. Not later than 9:00 a.m., the Chief of Naval Operations was informed of it. This information was not supplied to me prior to the attack.

I cannot tell from the evidence that has been presented the precise hours on the morning of December 7, when various responsible officers of the Navy Department knew that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, was the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to this government. This much I know. There was ample time, at least an interval of approximately three and one-half hours, in which a message could have been dispatched to me. Regardless of what arguments there may be as to the evaluation of the dispatches that had been sent to me, I surely was entitled to know of the hour fixed by Japan for the probable outbreak of war against the United States. I cannot understand now—I have never understood—I may never understand—why I was deprived of the information available in the Navy Department in Washington on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

On November 28, 1941, the Navy Department could have informed me of the following vital facts:

(1) Japan had set November 29 as an immovable deadline date for agreement with the United States.

(2) The United States gave to Japan certain proposals for a solution of Japanese-American relations on November 26, which amounted to an ultimatum. I might remark parenthetically that an authoritative statement from my government as to the general nature of these proposals would have been most enlightening but it was not supplied.

(3) Japan considered the United States proposals of November 26 as unacceptable and planned to rupture negotiations with the United States when her reply to them was delivered to this government.

(4) Japan was keeping up a pretext of negotiations after November 26 to conceal a definite plan which went into effect on November 29th.

This was the type of information which I had stated in May I needed so urgently in making the difficult decisions with which I was confronted.

### What Should Have Been Done Had I Been Informed

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the *Saratoga*, back from the West Coast. I would have gone to sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirements of keeping the Fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet.

On December 4, ample time remained for the Navy Department to forward to me the information which I have outlined, and in addition the following significant facts, which the Navy Department learned between November 27 and that date:

(1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreams;

(2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using the words "east wind rain," meaning war or a rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Assuming that for the first time on December 5 I had all the important information then available in the Navy Department, it is my present conviction that I would have gone to sea with the Fleet, including the carrier *Lexington*, and arranged a rendezvous at sea with Halsey's carrier force, and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.

At some time prior to December 6, 1941, the Commanders of Hawaii could have been informed of the promise of armed support as detailed by the War Department in London to Air Marshal Brooke Popham in Singapore. This vital information was denied to them.

On December 6, fifteen hours before the attack, ample time still remained for the Navy Department to give me all the

significant facts which I have outlined and which were not available to me in Hawaii. In addition, the Navy Department could then have advised me that thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to the American proposals had been received, that the tone and temper of this message indicated a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States, and that the Japanese reply was to be formally presented to this government at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received this information on the afternoon of December 6, it is my present conviction that I would have ordered all Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from Wake, and been ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war.

Even on the morning of December 7, four or five hours before the attack, had the Navy Department for the first time seen fit to send me all this significant information, and the additional fact that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor, all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters,

## CHAPTER V

### Secret Political Commitments

"Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war."—Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production in 1944

#### Secret Promise of Armed Support to British

At Pearl Harbor, a few hours after the Japanese attack, a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations and for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, was delivered to me. This dispatch read:

"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

In 1944 I personally asked Admiral Hart about this message, particularly as to the nature of the eventualities referred to. He replied that the eventualities were inconsequential and had to do with the detail of destroyers to the British, that he had lost his files when the *Houston* sank, that he had no copy of the dispatch from Singapore.

When questioned in February 1946 by the Joint Congressional Committee on this subject, Admiral Hart stated that he did receive a dispatch in the early days of December 1941 from Captain John Creighton, U. S. Naval Observer at Singapore, to the effect that British Air Marshal Brooke Popham had been advised from London that in certain eventualities which he could not recall the British had been assured of our armed support. Admiral Hart also stated that his files were lost and the only source would be Captain Creighton himself.

Captain Creighton stated before the Joint Congressional Committee that after Admiral Hart had testified he, Creighton, called Hart and said he could not remember sending Hart the subject message and that Hart replied, "Well you sent it all right because I can produce a copy of it."

and all resources of the Fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack.

The Pacific Fleet deserved a fighting chance. It was entitled to receive from the Navy Department the best information available. Such information had been urgently requested. I had been assured that it would be furnished me. We faced our problems in the Pacific confident that such assurance would be faithfully carried out.

It has been established that some 360 Japanese planes launched from carriers to the north of Oahu participated in the attack. The Army pursuit planes available were entirely inadequate to stop the attack. Nevertheless, had we had as much as two hours' warning, a full alert of planes and guns would have greatly reduced the damage. We could possibly have been able to locate the Jap carriers, and our own carriers *Lexington* and *Enterprise*, already at sea to the westward of Oahu, might have been brought into the picture instead of expending their efforts to the southward as a result of faulty information. The great intangible, the element of surprise, would have been denied the Japs.

The next morning Creighton obtained from Hart's office a copy of the dispatch sent on December 6, 1941, which reads:

"Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote—We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: (Affirm) we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam. XX (Baker) if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense. XX (Cast) if Japs attack us the British. XX Therefore without reference to London put plan in action (first) if you have good info Japs expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra. (Second) if the Nips violate any part of Thailand (Para) If N.E.I. [Netherlands East Indies] are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch unquote."

This definite promise (knowledge which was withheld from the Commanders at Pearl Harbor) of armed support to Great Britain in the event of specific eventualities increased enormously the probability that United States would be attacked in the event of any hostile move by the Japs. The efficiency of the Japanese intelligence system practically insured that they would learn of the promise. Any hesitancy about attacking us simultaneously with the British or N.E.I. disappeared.

On the other hand, this commitment to supply armed support to Britain made it imperative that Japan be induced to fire the first shot in order to convince the American people that Japan was the aggressor and thereby unify the people in support of our entry into the war. It also becomes easy to understand Mr. Stimson's feeling of relief that the crisis had come in a way which united all our people.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor were placed in the impossible situation of being responsible for commitments and the consequences thereof of which they were kept in ignorance.

Mr. Stimson's various statements make interesting reading in this connection. He said: "If war did come, it was important both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor." And again: "In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in any one's mind as to who were the aggressors."

Once more Mr. Stimson's statement: "When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed."

In the evening of December 6, 1941, Mr. Stimson demanded and received from the Navy Department a list showing the location of each ship in the Pacific Fleet. Why the Secretary of War should interest himself in such details of Navy Department administration at this particular time has never been explained.

Mr. Stimson never appeared before the Joint Congressional Committee for questioning. In lieu thereof he submitted a written statement which purported to be replies to questions by the Democratic majority. Even with questions thus restricted his replies were far from complete. He was excused from testifying on the plea of ill health from October of 1945 to May of 1946.

That a commitment to the British existed and that Washington withheld vital information is further supported by Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons as set forth in the "Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg" page 27. Senator Vandenberg's reaction to the speech was recorded on January 27, 1942:

"Churchill spoke to the British Commons today. And we learned something of very great importance over here in the U.S.A. In discussing events leading up to the war in the Far Pacific he said:

"What was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by Japanese attacks? I will explain how delicately we walked and how painful it was at times—how very careful I was that every time we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught.

"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not been falsified by the events."

"In other words, Churchill said that when he met Roosevelt the first time—and wrote 'The Atlantic Charter'—he talked with the President about the fact that Britain must not fight alone in the Far East, and got some sort of an assurance, evidently satisfactory to him, that the U. S. would go to war with Japan regardless of whether Japan attacked us or not. In still other words, we were slated for this war by the President before Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor merely precipitated what was 'in the cards.' To whatever extent this is true, it indicated how both Congress

and the country were in total ignorance of the American war-commitments made by the President and never disclosed.

"I saw the full text of the Churchill speech only in the *New York Times*. . . Senator Danaher of Connecticut put this material in the *Congressional Record* for January 28. Not a paper mentioned it. Does this mean that censorship is now at work to complete the task of keeping the people in ignorance regarding what has happened to them?"

"And if the implications of Churchill's statement are valid, is there not very high responsibility for not ordering Hawaii to be on 'total alert' ahead of Pearl Harbor?" (Italics as in the book.)

Captain Russell Grenfell, Royal Navy, in his book, "Main Fleet to Singapore," published in 1952, says: "No reasonably informed person can now believe that Japan made a villainous, unexpected attack on the United States. An attack was not only fully expected—but was actually desired. It is beyond doubt that President Roosevelt wanted to get his country into the war, but for political reasons was most anxious to insure that the first act of hostility came from the other side; for which reason he caused increasing pressure to be put on the Japanese, to a point that no self-respecting nation could endure without resort to arms. Japan was meant by the American President to attack the United States. As Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then British Minister of Production, said in 1944, 'Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into war.'"

#### Faulty Assurances

During the time I was in command of the Pacific Fleet I received repeated assurances from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, that our government was trying to avoid a break with Japan, that Germany was the enemy to defeat and that our government would do our utmost to avoid a two-front war.

When the administration closed the [Panama] Canal to Japanese shipping, froze Japanese assets in the United States and placed other publicized restrictions on Japan, it appeared to me that by firm action we were avoiding any appearance of weakness as a deterrent to Japanese aggression.

Had I known, as the record plainly shows, that from August until December 7, 1941, the administration's policy was to enter the war through an incident in the Pacific or, as Secretary Stimson put it, to induce Japan to fire the first shot without too much injury to ourselves, my whole concept of the situation would have been considerably altered. The intercepted Japanese messages which were withheld from me also contradicted Admiral Stark's assurances.

Here are some of the assurances which appear in Admiral Stark's letters to me:

February 10, 1941:

"I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East."

February 25, 1941:

"Gallup polls, editorials, talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East, if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide."

Extract from a copy of "A Memorandum for the Presi-



dent," from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, enclosed with his letter of February 25, 1941:

"There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem. . . .

"If we are forced into the war, our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East."

April 3, 1941:

"For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East. . . .

"What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can as yet be only surmised. . . .

"The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when* and not *whether*. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy in about two months, but there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether."

August 19, 1941:

"If England declares war on Japan but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral."

August 23, 1941:

"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender."

September 22, 1941. Extract from a copy of a letter to Admiral Hart sent to me by Admiral Stark:

"Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight."

## CHAPTER VI

### Suppression of Evidence

*" . . . every suppressed or expunged word reverberates through the earth from side to side."*—Ralph Waldo Emerson

#### Japanese Intercepts

In the findings of the Roberts Commission published in January 1942 and in the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission of which I received a copy in January 1944, there were vague references which indicated that valuable if not vital information in the Navy Department had never been supplied to me.

When I obtained a copy of the Hart investigation I found that Captain Laurance F. Safford, U. S. Navy, had testified at length in regard to these intercepts. His testimony here and subsequently before the court of inquiry and before the Joint Congressional Committee is the most courageous, un-

September 23, 1941:

"The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. . . . The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned."

October 17, 1941:

"We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it."

November 5, 1941. Extract from a copy of a "Memorandum for the President" from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff supplied to me by Admiral Stark:

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a)—"The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany.

(b)—"War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.

"Specifically they recommend:

"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

It should be noted that on November 26, 1941, our government did deliver a note to Japan which has frequently been referred to as an ultimatum, and which Mr. Stimson referred to as, "Mr. Hull's decision to kick the whole thing over." The essentials of this note are set forth on page 145 of this account. The fourteen part Japanese message decoded on December 6 and December 7, 1941, frequently referred to as Japan's declaration of war, was a reply to Mr. Hull's ultimatum of November 26, 1941.

The provisions of this ultimatum were withheld from me although testimony given in the investigations indicates responsible officials in the Navy Department believed our note of November 26, 1941, would be the cause of immediate war with Japan. The Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation concurred in this opinion.

selfish, honest, clear testimony I have ever seen recorded or heard presented. The most brutal cross-examination failed to daunt him. The fact that his actions were dictated solely by his sense of justice and his personal integrity appeared incomprehensible to certain minds.

In the summer of 1944 when the Naval Court of Inquiry was conducting its investigation, Admiral King, who was then Acting Secretary of the Navy, authorized Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, one of my legal staff, to inspect the secret files containing the translated Japanese intercepts.

Captain Lavender made his inspection the afternoon of the same day the permission was granted and selected some 43

messages which he had copied and authenticated that same afternoon.

The next day General McNarney, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, telephoned to the Director of Naval Communications protesting Lavender's inspection and stating that orders forbade such inspection. The Director of Naval Communications said he had received no such order, whereupon McNarney said he meant that orders should forbid such inspection.

The copies of the messages were not delivered to Captain Lavender but kept in the custody of the Chief of Naval Communications.

Our next step was to request officially the President of the Naval Court of Inquiry to have these messages placed in evidence before the court.

The Navy Department refused to permit these messages to be placed in evidence. At each session of the court we renewed our demand. I then wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy and after an interval of several days we inquired again and again as to when we would receive an answer. I was then told that my letter had been misplaced and would I kindly supply the Secretary's Office with a copy. I then wrote another request, the first three paragraphs of which were a duplicate of my original and added a fourth paragraph which stated in substance that (a) ten days ago I had delivered personally to Vice Admiral Edwards, Deputy Commander in Chief, the original request and (b) I was now submitting this same request again as I had been informed that the original letter was lost. I delivered this second letter personally to Admiral Edwards with the statement that it would do no good to lose my letters because from now on I would write the same letter daily to the Secretary of the Navy until I received an answer. While I was still talking to Admiral Edwards a clerk brought my original letter and presented it to Admiral Edwards, saying he had just found it.

From various indications we concluded that some one in attendance at the Court sessions was reporting the daily proceedings to the Secretary. Our only hope to place the selected dispatches in evidence was that I make a statement to Lavender in the presence of all those attending the court sessions (but not during the proceedings) to the effect that if we were not permitted to introduce this evidence, I proposed to hold a press conference and advise the press that vital information essential to a determination of the full responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster was being withheld from the Naval Court of Inquiry.

The day after this statement was made, we were permitted to have the evidence before the Court.

Meanwhile the Army called me as the last witness to testify before the Army Board of Investigation. At the close of my testimony I was asked the routine question of whether I had any further statement to make. I then read the Board a memorandum which set forth the salient facts about the intercepted messages. It was immediately evident to me that no evidence on this subject had been placed before this Board. Subsequently I learned that after I testified the Army Board started their investigation all over again, to cover the phases in connection with the Japanese intercepts. *Prior to this reinvestigation Army witnesses had not mentioned the Japanese intercepts when testifying before the Board.*

During the Congressional investigation it was disclosed that the agency responsible for suppressing the testimony of all Army witnesses in regard to the Japanese intercepts was the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and that this suppression was ordered either by General Marshall himself or by his Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney.

The affidavit of Major General [Sherman] Miles [Assistant

Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division in 1941] stated that in his earlier testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

"I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called 'Magic,' or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2 transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction."

Witnesses are sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The injunction laid upon General Miles denied to the Board information without which it would have been impossible to arrive at a just and honest allocation of responsibility for the disaster. Whether this could be construed as instruction to commit perjury, I leave to the lawyers.

#### The "White House File"

In November of 1945 during the Congressional investigation, Captain Lavender remarked to the lieutenant in charge of the secret file room that he had been searching Navy Department files for two years and had just discovered the one he was examining. He inquired:

"Is there any other file bearing on the Pearl Harbor attack that we have not seen?"

The lieutenant replied, "Well, there is the 'White House File'."

He explained the "White House File" contained messages transmitted and received in Navy code for the President, principally messages to and from Mr. Churchill.

Lavender promptly reported this to me, adding that we could have access to the file only by permission of the Secretary of the Navy. He had scarcely completed his report when Ensign John J. Phelan, U.S.N., a member of my legal staff, came in and reported that while in the office of Captain John F. Walsh, U. S. Navy, in charge of the Security Control Section, Security Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, a lieutenant dashed in and excitedly exclaimed, "There is hell to pay. Kimmel has found out about the 'White House File'."

Walsh quickly silenced him by pointing to Phelan and saying, "Here is one of Kimmel's men."

My requests to the Secretary and to the President to examine this file were disapproved. We never found out what the file contained.

In testimony before the Congressional Committee a Navy Department representative testified that there were only a few unimportant papers in the file. If this be true the anxiety of the lieutenant over my discovery of its existence is difficult to understand.

It is possible that documents from the "White House File" that would have been of vital interest to investigators of Pearl Harbor were safely concealed in a box of documents and papers from the Navy Department stored at the White House from July 1943 to April 1947; also this might have been the resting place of the "Winds Execute" message missing from the files of the Navy Department.

#### Senator Thomas's Bill

On March 31, 1945, I read in the New York *Herald Tribune* a five-line dispatch which indicated a bill had been introduced in the Senate to prevent the disclosure of any

coded matter except by permission of the head of a government department or by the President. I wrote that day to Mr. Rugg, my chief counsel, and asked that he investigate. It took several days for him to obtain a copy of the bill and to notify Senator Ferguson that its passage would close the door to any investigation of Pearl Harbor.

While I was in Washington on April 12, 1945, I received a message from Rugg in Boston stating this bill had been introduced by the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Senator Elbert Thomas, of Utah, on March 30, 1945, reported to the Senate on March 31 and passed by the Senate on April 5.

When Senator Ferguson returned from a Caribbean trip he found the passage by the Senate an accomplished fact. I was desperate because, if the House passed the bill, that was the end of all disclosures about Pearl Harbor.

So I gave all the facts about the bill to the *Washington Post* together with my views of the effects of such a law. I also telephoned several members of the House of Representatives.

The next morning the *Post* and the *Times Herald* gave the matter such publicity that when the bill came before the House Committee they delayed action sufficiently to make a thorough investigation. When through administrative pressure a couple of months later it was brought to the floor of the House it was defeated by a vote of that body.

Had this bill been made a law, this account and Admiral Theobald's recent book would never have been written. Had I not read the obscure paragraph in the *Herald Tribune* the House would have passed the bill as the Senate did.

This bill and the unprecedented haste with which it was passed by the Senate is another indication of the administration's determination to suppress all knowledge of the Washington background to Pearl Harbor.

### Important Communications

When I was on duty in the Navy Department prior to the war, there was in effect a system whereby each individual to whom a secret message or other important communication was shown, was required to sign some form of receipt showing that he had seen the communication. I had such a system in effect at my headquarters in Hawaii. The report of the Hewitt Board notes that my receipts were still on file at those headquarters in 1945. Such a system is essential to insure delivery and to protect the communication personnel who are responsible for the routing and delivery to the officials whose duty requires them to see the communication. However, the various investigations failed to discover receipts signed by officers on duty in the Navy Department.

Many times naval officers who had occupied highly responsible positions in the Navy Department in the months before and until Pearl Harbor, when confronted with a secret message from the files of the Navy Department stated they had no recollection of ever having seen the message. One example among many such claims is that of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was in charge of Navy War Plans and responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for preparing orders such as the so-called "war warning" message of November 27, 1941. Admiral Turner testified that he had no recollection of ever having seen the "ships in harbor" Japanese intercept message which has been referred to as the "bomb plot message." Other testimony indicates this message was discussed among the communication personnel of the War and Navy Departments. The young naval officers assured their Army counterparts that the Fleet would be far from Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked.

Here is a message which demanded positive action by the head of Naval War Plans but Admiral Turner in his testimony disclaimed all knowledge of and responsibility for the

message. He stated it was the duty of Naval Intelligence to furnish such information to the Naval Commander in Hawaii.

The "bomb plot message" was distributed on October 9, 1941, to the President, to the Secretary of the Navy, to Admiral Stark as the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Director of Naval Communications, to Admiral Turner as the Director of War Plans, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

### Three Incidents: a Summary

There were three incidents which disclosed the existence and made possible the publication of the vital Japanese intercepted dispatches which clearly revealed Japanese intentions to attack the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Had any one of these three incidents not occurred, the investigations of Pearl Harbor would have been conducted without benefit of the information contained in these dispatches and buried in secret file rooms in Washington.

The first of these incidents was the visit of Captain Laurance F. Safford to my office in New York when he told me of the existence of the Japanese intercepts and gave me a verbal summary of their contents.

The second was the purely fortuitous circumstance that Admiral King was Acting Secretary of the Navy on the particular day in the summer of 1944 when my request to examine these files was presented and that he freely permitted this inspection.

The third was that, by the purest chance, I found that five-line item buried on an inside page of the *New York Herald Tribune* on March 31, 1945, reporting the introduction of a bill in the Senate to prevent the publication of any matter that had been placed in code except by permission of the President or a Cabinet officer. As I have already stated, this bill passed the Senate but was defeated in the House of Representatives when Mr. Charles B. Rugg, my chief counsel, convinced the membership of the true purpose of the bill. Had this bill been enacted none of the intercepted Japanese messages would have been made public.

I am convinced that the guiding hand which determines the fate of each and all of us intended that the responsibility for Pearl Harbor should be placed where it rightfully belongs.

### Captain Safford and Admiral Pye

In February 1944 Captain Laurance F. Safford, U.S. Navy, came to my office in New York. In a three-hour conference he told me that in the previous fall he judged I would soon be brought to trial by General Court Martial and he would be called as a witness. He therefore proceeded to collect the data under his cognizance as Chief of the Decoding and Decrypting Section of the Office of Naval Communications. For the first time he then discovered that the most vital information contained in the decrypted Japanese intercepts had never been supplied to me.

When he realized the full extent of the vital information that had been withheld from me his sense of justice compelled him to come to me. He then outlined to me verbally the essence of the information available in the Navy Department in the weeks prior to Pearl Harbor and which had never been supplied to me.

Even though the findings of the Roberts Commission published in January, 1942, and the record of its proceedings, an abbreviated copy of which was supplied to me in December 1943, guardedly intimated the Navy Department had certain information which had been denied me, I was appalled at Safford's disclosures.

In early December, 1941, even though Safford then believed the withheld information was being supplied to me,

he became so concerned over the situation that he seriously contemplated sending me a personal warning which would have placed his whole career in jeopardy.

Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U.S. Navy, was the second in command of the Pacific Fleet when I was the Commander-in-Chief. I had known Pye since Naval Academy days. We had served together many times.

When I told Pye of the information available in the Navy Department which had been withheld from the Pacific Fleet, he listened intently but made no comment.

When Pye completed his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry he came to my office where I gave him a copy of the Hart Investigation open at Safford's testimony.

Pye has a calm, even disposition, but as he read he became excited, exclaiming, "Here it is; here it is!" I said, "What do you mean?" He replied, "Why, here is what you told me last April. I thought you were crazy. I believed this thing had preyed on your mind so much that you had gone nuts."

That this information had been received in the War and Navy Departments in Washington over a period of months and withheld from the Commanders of our armed forces in Hawaii was so incredible to Pye that he simply could not believe it. Here was a man whom I had known during all my adult life who concluded I was crazy when I told him of the evidence I had discovered. What chance had I to convince the public of these incredible facts except by indisputable evidence?

### Why the Fleet Was Not Kept Indefinitely at Sea

During the various investigations and particularly during the Congressional investigation there was much talk of how I should have kept the Fleet at sea for an indefinite period after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27. Such talk ignores the rigid limit imposed on Fleet operations by the number of tankers and the facilities for fueling the ships from the reserves on shore at Pearl Harbor. It was out of the question to fuel all the ships of the Fleet at sea from the only four tankers we had fitted for this purpose. With the fueling facilities in Pearl Harbor it would have taken 96 hours to refuel the fleet. To immobilize the Fleet or any considerable portion of it for four days or even two days was a risk that could not be accepted. The Fleet had not been kept at sea during previous times of tension and the Navy Department knew it was not at sea this time. The Pacific Fleet had no place to replenish fuel except at Pearl Harbor. Our Asiatic Fleet had a multiplicity of fueling ports in the British and Dutch East Indies.

Had the information which indicated a Japanese attack on the Fleet within a short time been given to me, I would have disposed the Fleet as described in another section of this account.

## CHAPTER VIII

## Investigations

"It takes a good many shovelfuls to bury the truth."—Danish proverb

### Proceedings of the Roberts Commission

The Roberts Commission was appointed December 16, 1941. It was headed by Associate Justice Owen D. Roberts of the U. S. Supreme Court. Its members were Admiral Wil-

### Some Strange Testimony

Admiral Turner contends, in testimony before the Congressional Committee, that the Pacific Fleet was not ordered to permit Japan to commit the first overt act. In another part of his testimony he states:

"The decision as to when and where to consider that they had committed an attack or were about to commit an attack on us was felt to be within the province of the Commander-in-Chief and that we should avoid any details . . . and if they had brought a task force within 500 miles of Hawaii, under the circumstances that most assuredly would have been an overt act."

The wording of the orders leaves no doubt that the Pacific Fleet was required to permit Japan to commit the first overt act. Turner's testimony is the first and only intimation I have had that the contrary was the case.

The statement that a Japanese task force within 500 miles of Hawaii would have been an overt act is completely at variance with the interpretation placed upon the orders by myself and the competent officers who were advising me. I had strict orders not to bomb submarines in the operating areas outside the three-mile limit. On November 28, 1941, I violated these orders by issuing instructions to the Fleet to bomb strange submarines in all the operating areas. At the same time I notified the Chief of Naval Operations of my action.

If the Navy Department intended the Pacific Fleet to attack any Japanese task force within 500 miles of Hawaii, what prevented them from so informing the Fleet command?

Testimony such as that just described, expressed for the first time after the tragic events leading to Pearl Harbor, further confirms the failure to alert the Pacific Fleet to the mounting crisis.

In this connection the instructions in a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel dated September 23, 1941, were never changed. These instructions were:

"In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Article 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the present time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another *Robin Moore* incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future."

liam H. Standley, a former Fleet Commander and Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral J. M. Reeves, a former Commander of the U. S. Fleet, Major General Frank R. McCoy, U.S.A., Retired, President of the Foreign Policy Association, and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, U. S. Army, of

the Army Air Corps, an officer on duty in the War Department and years junior to General Short and me.

Regulations of the Navy governing the conduct of courts of inquiry and boards of investigation in force at the time of Pearl Harbor provided that when any one might be held responsible for any casualty or disaster, he be called before the investigating body, informed of the substance of the evidence implicating him and made an interested party or a defendant. This gave him the right to have counsel, to be present during the testimony of witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses, also to introduce evidence before the investigating body. The very nature of the disaster at Pearl Harbor made me an interested party.

The Roberts Commission was not conducted in accordance with the rules governing Naval investigations. Indeed it was conducted with complete disregard of all rules of fair play and justice.

I was denied any knowledge of what any witness testified. It was not until 1944, when I was supplied a copy of the proceedings, that I learned what testimony the Commission had recorded. I will never know what testimony was not recorded.

I had no opportunity to confront witnesses or to submit evidence on subjects they discussed. Each witness was enjoined by the Commission that his testimony was secret.

When I came before the Commission I was informed that I was not permitted to have counsel, also that I was not on trial. Rear Admiral [Robert A.] Theobald was permitted to assist me in handling my papers. When Admiral Theobald interposed to correct misunderstandings that are bound to arise when five persons are questioning one, Mr. Roberts reprimanded Theobald reminding him that he was not my counsel as I was not permitted to have counsel. When Theobald refused to be suppressed, Mr. Roberts insisted that Theobald be sworn as a witness. The copy of the record of proceedings supplied to me contains no record of these statements of Mr. Roberts.

Several days after I had completed my testimony I asked when I would be permitted to read and verify the record of my testimony. After considerable argument I was permitted to come alone to see the record of my testimony.

I found the transcript of my testimony incomplete, inaccurate and misleading. The transcript was so badly garbled and there were such glaring omissions that I requested authority to return the next day with a stenographer (yeoman) and Theobald to assist me to reconstruct the testimony as nearly as possible as it had been presented. An example of what I found was the omission from the transcript of a 16-page statement which I had read to the Commission and supplied them with a copy.

Late that evening I was informed that Mr. Roberts had ruled that I could return with a stenographer but that I would not be permitted to have Theobald assist me. Next morning I had an interview with Mr. Roberts (Admiral Standley was present) in which I renewed my request. In the course of his reply, Mr. Roberts again assured me that I was not on trial, that the President had expressly told him this was not a trial. My reply was that his statement was just so many words and words do not alter facts. In the eyes of the American people I was on trial and no words of his could alter that fact.

Mr. Roberts was not stupid enough to believe what he told me. At least he used the term "trial" in its strictly legalistic sense.

As a result of this interview, Theobald, the stenographer, and I revised the transcript to present the substance of what I actually testified to before the Commission. Subsequently I was informed that the original transcript would remain un-

changed and my revision would be attached as an addendum. When I was supplied with a copy of the proceedings in 1944 I found the original transcript considerably revised and the 16-page statement added. The remainder of my corrections were placed in an addendum attached to the so-called original.

In 1944 I found in the Navy Department a copy of a letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations by the chief of Naval Intelligence which detailed the testimony he had given to the Roberts Commission. No record of this testimony is included in the copy of the proceedings supplied to me.

The proceedings, strangely enough, relate that the part of the findings which record that General Marshall and Admiral Stark had performed their duties relating to the attack on Pearl Harbor in an exemplary manner, had first been submitted to them and revised to their satisfaction before being adopted by the Commission.

The treatment accorded General Marshall and Admiral Stark is in sharp contrast to that accorded to General Short and to me. While I was testifying before the Commission, Mr. Roberts' attitude was that of a prosecutor, not a judge. In retrospect it is clear that when he had received what he believed to be damaging admissions he carefully refrained from further questions which would have clarified the statements made.

The conduct of the Commission's investigation was without precedent. It was conducted without regard to rules, law or justice. Scapegoats had to be provided to save the administration. Apparently Short and I were elected before the Commission left Washington. How a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, two Generals and two Admirals could lend themselves to such an undertaking is past understanding.

Without affording me the opportunity to defend myself, the Roberts Commission convicted me without trial on secret evidence withheld from me and the public and published the findings to the world.

The conflicting and confusing orders sent to General Short and to me is best illustrated by the indictment in the findings of the Commission which states that General Short and I did not consult as to the meaning of the warning messages received. Aside from the fact that we did confer both before and after the receipt of the messages, it is a strange doctrine that would require the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet to consult with the Commanding General at Hawaii to determine the meaning of a message from the Chief of Naval Operations and equally ridiculous to require the Commanding General at Hawaii to consult with the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to determine the meaning of a message sent to him by the Army Chief of Staff. Yet this was the principal indictment used by the Roberts Commission in their attempt to fasten the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster upon General Short and me. The mere statement that such consultation was necessary to determine the meaning of an order is an indictment of the agency which originated it.

The Roberts Commission may well have been confused as their findings indicate they were.

I do not know whether the members of the Commission had access to the "Magic" messages. General McNarney's concern, when he was Deputy Chief of Staff in 1944, because of the inspection by my counsel of the secret translated Japanese intercepts would indicate that McNarney, who was a member of the Roberts Commission, knew what they contained. However, Mr. Justice Roberts in his testimony before the Congressional Committee indicated that he would not have read them even had they been presented to him.

It is impossible to imagine how a just and honest allocation of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster can be made without a thorough knowledge of the Japanese intercepts and of their distribution prior to the attack.

The confusion in handling papers and testimony given to the Commission is evidenced by requests for copies of the Security Order, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. When I appeared for the last time before the Commission, conversation within the Commission indicated the five members could not find a copy. They thereupon requested five additional copies of this order. When I gave this request to Lieutenant Commander Paul Crosley, the Flag Secretary, he informed me that this would make a total of 17 copies supplied to the Commission.

### The Hart Investigation

Early in 1944 I was invited by the Navy Department to collaborate in an investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster to be undertaken by Admiral T.C. Hart. Admiral Hart intimated to me that Secretary Knox was favorably disposed toward me and the investigation would benefit me. An exchange of letters with Mr. Knox developed certain stipulations I must agree to before my assistance would be acceptable. These stipulations placed my fate completely at the mercy of the Secretary. I therefore declined to take any part in the Hart investigation. Admiral Hart took the testimony of numerous naval personnel and gathered much valuable data, the most interesting of which was the testimony of Captain Safford who outlined the information received in the Navy Department through the translation of the intercepted Japanese messages.

When I came to Washington for the Naval Court of Inquiry in the summer of 1944, a copy of the Hart investigation was supplied to me. Safford's testimony provided me with my first authoritative information on this subject. Admiral Hart submitted no conclusions, findings or recommendations.

### The Naval Court of Inquiry

In June of 1944 the Congress by resolution demanded that the executive branch of the Government investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. To comply with this resolution the Navy convened a Court of Inquiry and the Army a Board of Investigation.

The Naval Court of Inquiry was convened by precept dated 13 July 1944. The President of this court was Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. The other members were Admiral E.C. Kalbfus, U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly Commander of the Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly Commander of the Scouting Force, U.S. Fleet, when it was based on Pearl Harbor, with Commander Harold Biesmaier, an experienced naval lawyer, as judge advocate. These officers were selected by the Secretary of the Navy to conduct this investigation. They were experienced officers of great ability who had a comprehensive grasp of the capacities and limitations imposed by logistic and operational difficulties under which the Pacific Fleet was forced to operate.

When I came before the Naval Court of Inquiry in the summer of 1944, I was made a defendant, which gave me the right to be present during all proceedings of the court, to cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, and to present evidence to the court. In short, it gave me the right to defend myself.

After a thorough investigation, the Naval Court CLEARED ME COMPLETELY AND MADE IN EFFECT A POSI-

TIVE FINDING OF NO BLAME OR MISTAKES IN JUDGMENT ON MY PART AND THAT I DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Their findings were contrary to those of the Roberts Commission. They placed the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster largely on the shoulders of the Secretary of the Navy and his principal subordinates.

The court assembled the record of proceedings in two separate parts and the findings also in two parts. One part of each was marked secret and the other part was unclassified. The court expected the unclassified part to be published. The parts marked secret included all reference to the "Magic" intercepted Japanese messages and some other matter.

Shortly after the proceedings and findings were submitted to the Secretary, a letter from the Secretary to Admiral Orin G. Murfin, the President of the Court, was published in the press. The letter stated that the Court of Inquiry had marked the proceedings and findings secret so nothing could be published.

At an interview which followed quickly, Admiral Murfin told the Secretary certain parts of the proceedings and findings had not been marked secret because the court expected those parts to be published. The Secretary replied he had meant to tell Murfin to mark these parts secret. Admiral Murfin then stated the court would not mark the unclassified parts secret—the Secretary could do so if he wished but the Secretary had no right to tell the press or anyone else that the court had marked all the proceedings and findings secret. During this interview the counsellor of the department, who was present, remarked to the effect that publication of the record at that time would be disastrous.

The parts of the report marked non-confidential by the Court of Inquiry were not released to the press until 29 August 1945.

Admiral King's endorsement reversing the findings of the Court of Inquiry was dated November 6, 1944. I had an interview with King on December 7, 1944, during which he admitted he had never read the proceedings upon which the Court had based their findings. Yet I found when the records were published in September 1945 that, for reasons of his own, on November 6, 1944, King had not hesitated to reverse the findings which cleared me and to brand me with the lack of superior judgment required of an officer of my rank.

At this time Admiral King had many duties and heavy responsibilities; however I believe every dictate of justice demanded that before he repudiated the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry composed of outstanding officers who had devoted many weeks to collecting, evaluating, and judging the evidence, he should have read the record of proceedings and read it carefully. The American people were entitled to his best judgment regardless of the desires of the Secretary of the Navy and the administration.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated July 14, 1948, he reversed the finding he had made in November 1944.

The Naval Court of Inquiry found that Admiral Stark failed to transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period of 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, that he did not on the morning of December 7, 1941, transmit immediately the information that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent and *an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.* [Author's italics] This was in effect a direct criticism of Mr. Roosevelt although direct criticism of the President was not authorized by their precept.

### The Army Board of Investigation

While the Navy was conducting the Naval Court of Inquiry, a similar inquiry was being conducted by an Army Board of Investigation. Their findings held that the War Department in Washington bore much of the responsibility for the disaster. Mr. Stimson elected to bypass the Judge Advocate General of the Army and to review the findings of the Board himself. He produced a review which exonerated General Marshall and himself.

The findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation include:

"The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) "To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little."

(b) "To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war."

(c) "To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this."

(d) "To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war."

The findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation also include the following statement:

"The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war.

"If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was the responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.

"As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of the situation, standing operating

procedure should have required the delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He himself was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office.

"This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally this same information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division.

"The responsibility of the War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.

"Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7.

"Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting these defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it."

Like the Navy Court of Inquiry, the Army Board of Investigation was not authorized to criticize Mr. Roosevelt. Nevertheless the criticisms of General Marshall and the War Department include the President because he was kept fully informed of all phases of the Japanese situation including instructions and information sent to the Commanders in Hawaii.

### The Hewitt Investigation

The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, displeased with the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry, requested Admiral J. O. Richardson, my predecessor as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, to conduct a further investigation of the disaster. Admiral Richardson declined, stating in effect that he was not available for that duty because the primary qualification for such an investigator was to have no preconceived ideas as to where the responsibility lay and no fixed ideas upon the subject; that he, Richardson, was disqualified because he was firmly convinced that much of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster rested upon the occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and the members of his Cabinet and that no testimony that might be adduced would change that opinion.

How many Admirals were approached before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt was designated to conduct the investigation I do not know. Lieutenant Commander John F. Sonnett, a lawyer in civilian life and serving as *special assistant to Secretary*

Forrestal, was appointed counsel. Most of the examination of witnesses was conducted by Mr. Sonnett.

The precept for this investigation specifically provided:

"Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, *you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal requirements.*" [Author's italics]

The proceedings and findings of the Naval Court were submitted to the Secretary in October 1944. In June 1945 the public press carried the announcement that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt would make Forrestal's further investigation.

I wrote immediately to the Secretary and requested that I be permitted to be present with counsel during the investigation and be given the rights of a defendant. The Secretary's reply denied me this right on the plea that time did not permit—which reason I did not accept. I wrote a second letter protesting this decision in strong language. I never received a reply.

Thus once more an Admiral was found who was willing to conduct a star chamber investigation from which I was excluded and to arrive at findings on my official conduct without permitting me to defend myself or to know what evidence he had received. Like the Roberts Commission everything was secret. I gathered that Mr. Sonnett in effect conducted the investigation. Captain Safford testified that Mr. Sonnett had attempted to intimidate him and finally to convince Safford that he, Safford, suffered hallucinations. Some witnesses who testified before the Hewitt board changed the testimony they had previously sworn to.

Meanwhile the Secretary of War, displeased by the findings of the Army Board, had Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, a lawyer in civil life, conduct a similar investigation.

In justice to Admiral King I must record that he told me he had protested the appointment of Hewitt or any other individual to conduct such an investigation. In King's opinion, such an appointment delegated too much power and responsibility to a single individual.

### The Congressional Investigation

I welcomed the Congressional investigation. It was largely through the efforts of my counsel, Mr. Charles B. Rugg of Boston, that this investigation was held. This was the only method by which correspondence and dispatches marked secret could be made public. Until the translations of the Japanese intercepts and other material marked secret were released for publication, I had no chance to present my case to the public. If I had done so I would have made myself liable to penalties prescribed for such an offense. Also no one would have believed my unsupported statement of such a fantastic story. The public would have concluded, as Admiral Pye did, that I had lost my mind.

The administration, by a series of Presidential orders, the majority vote of the committee, and a committee staff friendly to the administration, decided what papers and evidence could be presented to the Committee. In spite of these and other difficulties, much pertinent and valuable evidence was recorded. There is no doubt that vital information has not yet been disclosed.

The general attitude of the managers of this investigation is illustrated by the action of the Committee counsel, Mr. William D. Mitchell, who attempted to exclude from the Committee all knowledge of the offensive tasks assigned by the War Plans to the Pacific Fleet. He attempted to give to the Committee the impression that the sole duty of the Pacific Fleet was to defend Pearl Harbor when

exactly the reverse was true. Pearl Harbor existed for the supply of the Fleet; defense of the Fleet, while in Pearl Harbor, was an Army responsibility. My counsel's protest at this distortion of the evidence was ignored. It was only when the investigation was far advanced that the Republican members succeeded in obtaining the suppressed documents.

The Committee selected the witnesses to be called. In several instances the Committee did not call the witnesses I requested. One of these was Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey. Halsey was the commander of the aircraft of the Battle Force and the senior naval aviator under my command while I was Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He was in command of the Carrier Group returning from the reinforcement of Wake Island on December 7, 1941, when the attack came. He had firsthand knowledge of the attack and the information and orders supplied by the Navy Department. His testimony would have been of the greatest value to the Committee. The Committee did not call him and did not take his evidence.

Perhaps the convictions he expressed to me in a letter of July 20, 1953, may be the reason. I quote Admiral Halsey's letter to me:

"As you know I have always thought, and have not hesitated to say on any and all occasions, that I believe you and Short were the greatest military martyrs this country has ever produced, and that your treatment was outrageous. In the course of time I have not changed my opinion one iota. I have always felt that you were left holding the bag for something you did not know and could not control. I always felt you kept me fully informed and that I knew all the important and pertinent secret information. Certainly we did not discard the possibility of an attack on Pearl, but with evidence we had the most logical inference was that the attack would be against the Philippines and to the southward. Knowing what I did, I felt I was just as responsible as you or anyone else in the higher command position.

"Had we been in possession of the 'Magic' messages with clear implication from the Japs, by their anxiety to be constantly informed of ships berthing, that an attack on Pearl was intended, and the further pointed fact that the date was Dec. 7th, the *Enterprise* and *Lexington* would never have gone on their missions to Wake and Midway. And further the Fleet would not have been in Pearl Harbor on that date. It is probable that we should have been able to locate the Jap fleet by air scouting before they could reach their take off position. Again all good luck and God bless you.

"My love to you both,

As ever—  
Bill Halsey"

The Congressional investigation was governed by the majority party, the Democrats. The huge volumes of testimony in that inquiry served to confuse the public mind as to the significance of the facts and to smother testimony damaging to the administration.

In the main, the views of the administration prevailed. The public was fed up with the inquiry. Millions of words had concealed the salient facts about Pearl Harbor. We were unready at Pearl Harbor for reasons set forth in this record. I cannot excuse those in authority in Washington for what they did. And I do not believe that thousands of mothers and fathers whose sons perished on that tragic seventh day of December, 1941, will excuse them. They will be judged at the bar of history. In my book they must answer on the Day of Judgment like any other criminal.