

THE MUDDLE BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

EDITOR'S NOTE: Here is the Marshall-Stark side of the Pearl Harbor controversy. Although neither Gen. George C. Marshall nor Adm. Harold R. Stark has participated in or sponsored this presentation, it is known to coincide with their views.

General Marshall was Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army and Admiral Stark was Chief of Naval Operations when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

Capt. T. B. Kittredge (USNR, Ret.), author of this presentation, is a naval historian who has been studying U. S. naval policy for 40 years. The views he expresses are those of the author and not necessarily of the Navy Department or this magazine.

The Kittredge story, which he has entitled "United States Defense Policy and Strategy; 1941," has never before been published. It appears here in full text. It tells of the perplexing orders and letters which went back and forth between Washington and the commanders at Pearl Harbor in the months before the attack.

What is revealed now to the outside world is the muddle of uncertainty and bewilderment in Washington as the military commanders strove to keep up with diplomatic policy in 1941. Admiral Stark,

for example, is quoted as writing on July 31, 1941: "Policy seems something never fixed, always fluid and changing." Again, on Nov. 25, 1941, the Admiral tells his commanders in the Pacific: "I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know."

Captain Kittredge takes issue with the thesis of the book published by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald (USN, Ret.), which appeared in *U. S. News & World Report* in its issue of April 2, 1954. The Theobald book charged President Roosevelt with deliberately inviting the Japanese attack in order to accelerate the victory over Hitler.

In the course of his narrative, based on official records of what happened in the months prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Captain Kittredge reveals that the War and Navy Departments learned only "accidentally" about Secretary of State Hull's stern note that resulted in breaking off negotiations just prior to Japan's attack.

Also shown are the difficulties the armed services had in seeking the necessary build-up to withstand an attack in the Pacific while U. S. forces there were being depleted to bolster the Atlantic.

—*Inside Story by*

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permission of the *U. S. News & World Report*. (Quotations totaling not more than 1,500 words from this article are released for morning newspapers of Nov. 30, 1954.)

United States Defense Policy and Strategy; 1941

FOREWORD

THE U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT published, 2 April, 1954, the text of "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" by Rear Admiral R.A. Theobald U.S.N. (Ret.). As was pointed out by Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times* (18 April, 1954), Admiral Theobald "summarizes and draws from the same material adduced in the eight Pearl Harbor investigations and makes personal deductions from it," including charges that President Roosevelt "wanted the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor," that he "planned to decoy the Japanese into such an attack," and that he had ordered or suggested that the heads of War and Navy Department staffs withhold from the Commanders in Hawaii "practically all of the vital information concerning the developing Japanese situation."

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1941, and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations at that time, both immediately replied to queries from editors concerning the truth of these charges. Both denied "emphatically" that they had ever received such orders or intimations from President Roosevelt or from anyone else in his administration, or that the President had ever planned to use the Fleet at Pearl Harbor "as a deliberate decoy in order to incite the Japanese to attack."

Neither General Marshall nor Admiral Stark chose to comment further on the personal deductions which Admiral Theobald had drawn from the record of the Pearl Harbor investigations. Both explained that they had given the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945-46 a full statement of the action taken by them in 1941, preceding the Japanese attack, and would, therefore "let the record speak for itself." Ad-

miral Stark added that he had already "disclosed every fact within my knowledge having any bearing on the subject" and that he had long been determined not to "participate in, or become a party to, directly or indirectly, any general controversy on this subject."

The present writer had spent much time, between 1945 and 1953, in the study and analysis of 1941 defense planning and preparations, as a basis for chapters then being written of histories of naval action and of the global strategy of World War II. In the course of this research and writing I was given free access to records of the War and Navy Departments as well as to the advice and counsel of many of the officers holding high commands or staff assignments in World War II. As successive chapters were prepared, these were submitted for comment to officers familiar with the events dealt with. The conclusions of these pre-1953 studies were approved by officers who had played a large part in the 1941 developments, including Admiral Stark, who had authorized the use of summaries and quotations from documents, including personal letters which they had originated. In general, these officers appeared to agree that the conclusions presented in these draft chapters were in conformity with their own interpretations of the events described.

The role played by General Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army, after August, 1939, and hence as the chief Army adviser to the President, has been adequately reviewed in Mark S. Watson's volume, "Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations." No similar study has yet been published of the action of Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations in this same pre-war period. The development of strategic planning

in cooperation with the British Chiefs of Staff, on Admiral Stark's initiative, has been described in the present writer's unpublished naval monograph, "United States-British Naval Cooperation; 1938-1941" (completed in 1947).

The record of defense planning and preparations in 1941, and of the action then taken in the War and Navy Departments under the direction of the President, is already extraordinarily voluminous. Seldom has the record of one event in war produced so quickly such a flood of official and personal documents and testimony as has been the case in the examination of all aspects of the Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941. The report of the Joint Congressional Committee on its investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, alone, is accompanied by 11 volumes of testimony, 19 volumes of exhibits with tens of thousands of documents and 9 volumes of proceedings of the previous seven Pearl Harbor investigations, representing a total of more than 10 million words. To this record has been added more than a hundred volumes published since 1941 dealing with the events of that year which culminated in the Japanese attack.

It is, therefore, obvious that very few, even of those most interested in the action of U. S. forces in World War II, have had the time, the patience or the opportunity to examine more than superficially that record to which General Marshall and Admiral Stark have referred. It must be the function and the duty of students of military history to examine this record critically in order to make available to the American people an adequate review and summary of the national policies and strategy which governed the action of the War and Navy Departments in 1941 in accomplishing their task of preparing the armed forces of the nation to meet the increasingly obvious totalitarian challenge to the security of the United States and of all other free countries.

The present text and the conclusions reached are drawn from my own pre-1953 studies, as it seemed appropriate at this time to prepare an objective review and summary of defense planning and preparations in 1941 from the material

contained in that record which General Marshall and Admiral Stark would expect "to speak for itself." The pages which follow present extensive quotations from messages and documents from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders in Hawaii, as interpreted by those officers in testimony presented to the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945-46. There has also been included an analysis of "Magic," intercepted Japanese messages, in view of the importance that has been attached to these documents.

None of the officers quoted or mentioned has been asked to approve this present review of earlier studies, nor to sponsor in any way the present text. The documents quoted in this text are, to the best of my knowledge and belief, unclassified and in the public domain. It is obvious that any opinions expressed, or conclusions reached, in this text are the author's own and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or of the Naval Service at large.

The conclusions stated at the end of this study are very different from the deductions of Admiral Theobald from much the same material, but appear to conform in general to the considered views expressed by the great majority of historians who have published volumes describing the troubled events and bold decisions of 1941. At that time the War and Navy Departments were struggling not only to increase the strength of the armed forces from the minimum cadres to maximum potentials but also to develop the defense policies and the global strategy necessary for a successful coalition effort to assure the defense of the free world. The basic defense policies and the strategic concepts then supported and followed by General Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army, and by Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, are still relevant to the defense programs now being developed and to the action now being taken to deal with the events and problems confronting the free world in this new 1954 "Time of Troubles."

T. B. K.

PART I

Strategic Planning in 1941; The Defense of Pearl Harbor

STRATEGIC PLANNING by Army and Navy staffs in 1941 reflected long-standing traditions and doctrines of the two services. In the interval between the two world wars conscious efforts were made by the Army and Navy War Colleges and by the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board to relate strategic concepts and defense policies to the national objectives of the United States, as a recognized world power with interests and commitments in many parts of the world.

The Joint Board and its planning agencies had been occupied since 1903 in developing defense and war plans of the various "Color" series. Like any higher military agency, the Joint Board and the Army and Navy planning staffs had necessarily to develop plans to meet any possible conflict in which the nation might become involved in any part of the world, however remote such a conflict might seem.

The major problem confronting such staffs in Washington, between 1931 and 1938, had been the increasing tension in relations with Japan reflecting the imperialist ambitions of Japanese leaders and American opposition to aggression against China or in other Pacific areas. Hence the major at-

tention of strategic planners was then being given to the development and revisions of the successive ORANGE plans to govern the action of U. S. forces in the event of war with Japan in the Pacific. Prior to 1922 such planning had included provision for operations in the Atlantic against Great Britain, then allied with Japan. The basic concept already existed that, in any two-ocean war, the United States should give priority to operations in Atlantic areas, even if simultaneously at war in the Pacific, until any trans-Atlantic threat had been successfully dealt with.

ORANGE and RAINBOW Plans, 1935-1940

Army and Navy planners had begun to envisage, after 1935, the possibility of such a two-ocean threat to the United States. When the ORANGE Plan was again revised in 1937-38, the Navy planners suggested that a series of alternative strategic plans be developed to meet the alternative phases of a world situation, in which Germany and Italy, as well as Japan, should join in action against the United States and, in particular, against the oldest recognized American policy, the Monroe Doctrine. After the Munich crisis, the President di-

rected the Chief of Staff of the Army (then General Malin Craig) and the Chief of Naval Operations (then Admiral William D. Leahy) to undertake, through the Joint Army and Navy Board and its planners, a re-examination of strategic plans to take into account a possible future concerted military threat by Japan, Germany and Italy against the Western Hemisphere. The planning studies then undertaken led to the development after May, 1939, of successive strategic plans of the RAINBOW series for defense of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere by the armed forces of the United States, acting with or without allies. The first plan of this series, RAINBOW No. 1, adopted by the Joint Board in July, 1939, was soon approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy and by the President. This first of the alternative RAINBOW plans to be adopted provided for joint action of the Army and Navy in defense of the Western Hemisphere, with the United States acting alone, except for support from the Latin-American states, after the Axis powers had established effective control of Europe and Asia.

The outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939, seemed to the President and his advisers to indicate that the assumptions of the RAINBOW plans might quickly be confirmed by a German victory in Europe and by Japanese action in Asia. The Chief of Staff of the Army (General George C. Marshall) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Harold R. Stark), and their immediate staffs in the War and Navy Departments, therefore, became increasingly concerned with problems of national foreign and defense policy, and of related strategic questions, created by world war developments. They recognized and strongly recommended to the President the urgent necessity of developing new defense policies and of greatly increasing the armed forces of the nation to meet the situation that would confront a still disarmed United States, should further aggression by the Axis Powers compel the country to use its military strength and national resources in the war against those powers.*

The objectives and assumptions of strategic planning in the War and Navy Departments were inevitably radically changed, and the need for speedy defense preparations was further emphasized by the fall of France in June, 1940. Army and Navy commands and staffs in Washington soon reached substantial agreement on recommendations then submitted to the President and to Congress for action to implement the agreed national objective of defense of the Western Hemisphere against any potential two-ocean threat. Special Army and Naval observers sent to England in August, 1940, had reported by the end of September that Great Britain could successfully resist any immediate German attack and that the British Cabinet, headed by Winston Churchill, intended to continue the war until the Axis challenge had been overcome.

At the end of 1940 the staffs in Washington were convinced that the European Axis Powers, already dominating most of the Continent of Europe, could not be defeated by Britain and her remaining Allies. They therefore were confronted with the problem of preventing a German victory in Europe and in the Atlantic, while restraining Japan from further aggression in the Far East and in the Pacific. Before the end of the 1940 Presidential campaign, in which candidates of both major parties were promising that they would not send American boys to fight in "foreign wars," the heads of the War and Navy Departments had reached substantial agreement on national-defense policies. They were convinced that the Axis two-ocean threat to the Americas could be averted only by American action to prevent a British de-

*Mark S. Watson, "Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations," Washington, 1950.

feat and a German-Italian victory in Europe and in the Atlantic.

The C. N. O. "Plan Dog" Memorandum, 12 November, 1940

Admiral Stark, acting in full agreement with General Marshall, within a week after the re-election of President Roosevelt, presented to him, on 12 November, 1940, a comprehensive analysis of the world political and military situation and its immediate and long-range implications for the United States. In the conclusion of this statement, prepared by Admiral Stark himself with aid of the naval planners, there were outlined and recommended new strategic objectives and policies to govern the future action of the United States, to be undertaken if possible in coalition with other friendly powers. In these conclusions, the advantages and disadvantages of four possible alternative courses of action were analyzed:

A. Direction of the U. S. military effort towards hemisphere defense, within the Western Hemisphere, in order to contribute by such a defensive strategy "to security against attack in either or both oceans."

B. Preparation for "a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remaining on the strict defensive in the Atlantic."

C. Planning "for sending the strongest possible military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch and Chinese in the Far East."

D. Direction of U. S. efforts "toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic, as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific."

Admiral Stark and General Marshall recommended to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and to the President, the adoption of the fourth of these alternatives, i.e. "Course of Action D." (Hence this proposal came to be described as "Plan D," or "Plan Dog.") This proposal was immediately informally approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and was referred to the Joint Army-Navy Board for study and development of new strategic plans. The President tacitly agreed to this procedure without formally approving "Plan D." The Joint Board adopted these proposals, in December, 1940, for submission to the President, through the Secretaries of War and the Navy, if possible with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. When Secretary Hull withheld formal approval of this recommendation, on the ground that the matters dealt with were primarily military in nature, Secretaries Stimson and Knox submitted these recommendations to the President, early in January, 1941. The President, having already agreed in November, 1940, that the War and Navy Departments could base future strategic planning and defense preparations on the conclusions of "Plan Dog," confirmed this approval in these January conversations with the heads of the War and Navy Departments, and in his note to Secretary Knox authorizing the submission of the "Plan Dog" proposals to representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff at the Staff Conference that began 29 January, 1941.

The basic objectives of "Plan Dog" were substantially those outlined by the Joint Board in June, 1939, as the basis for one of the five alternative plans of the RAINBOW series to be later developed. "Plan Dog" specified, however, that the offensive action against Germany and Italy, envisaged in the outline for the RAINBOW 5 plan, was not to be undertaken until attacks by those powers compelled the United States to enter the war against them. Until this happened, the basic objective of "Plan Dog" was to be the immediate maximum possible mobilization of American man-power and industrial resources together with an all-out effort to assure full cooperation of action by all the American Republics in defense of the

Western Hemisphere. When aggressive acts by the Axis powers led to American entry into the war, the United States would join Britain in the conduct of offensives against Germany and Italy in Europe and/or North Africa.

If and when that happened, strategic priority was to be given to preparations for offensive operations against Germany and Italy to assure their defeat. While such operations were under way a defensive strategy was to be followed in the Pacific. Every effort was to be made to avoid war with Japan in the Pacific, and even if Japan should join her Axis Partners by attacking the United States and the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, U. S. operations against Japan were to be strictly defensive until additional forces could be created, or released from operations in the Atlantic, for an all-out offensive against Japan.

The A.B.C.-1 U.S.-British Staff Agreements, March, 1941

The recommendations in the Chief of Naval Operations memorandum of 12 November, 1940, had included an urgent proposal for immediate staff conversations with representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. General Marshall and Secretaries Stimson and Knox fully agreed to this suggestion. It had in fact been under consideration since June, 1940, when technical naval staff talks had been proposed by Prime Minister Churchill. The President preferred not to act on this request from the Prime Minister. The very day that President Roosevelt left Washington for a Caribbean cruise, with Harry Hopkins and other advisers, on 30 November, Admiral Stark cabled invitations to the British Chiefs of Staff to send representatives informally and secretly to Washington for technical staff talks. The subjects to be discussed included not only increased munitions allocations to British forces, but also plans for possible ultimate military cooperation of the forces of the two countries against Axis aggression. The British Chiefs of Staff promptly accepted this invitation, but the death of the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, on 13 December, led to a month's delay in the convening of this American-British Staff Conference.

Prime Minister Churchill was being kept closely in touch with developments in Washington, both by the British Embassy and in personal exchanges of messages with President Roosevelt. Lord Lothian visited London early in November to discuss latest events in the United States. Churchill, as a "Former Naval Person" (as he signed his messages to the President), was particularly interested in plans for future United States-British naval cooperations. In a note to the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, 22 November, 1940, Churchill wrote:

"In my view, Admiral Stark is right and 'Plan D' is strategically sound, and also most highly adapted to our interests. We should, therefore, so far as opportunity serves, in every way contribute to strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark and should not use arguments inconsistent with it."^{*}

The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff reached Washington with Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador, in mid-January, 1941. In the two months of very secret but almost continuous staff conversations that followed, the main outlines of "Plan Dog" were accepted as the basis for comprehensive staff agreements submitted to the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries on 27 March, 1941. The main report of the Staff Conference, entitled "A.B.C.-1," was accompanied by five annexes, one of which was a proposed "United States-British Commonwealth Basic War Plan—Number One." The report and its annexes were promptly accepted by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and by the Chief of Naval Operations, as well as by the British Chiefs of Staff,

^{*}Winston Churchill, "Their Finest Hour," N. Y. 1949, pp. 690/1.

as a tentative basis for future strategic planning and defense preparations.

It had been definitely stated in the report of the staff conference that these A.B.C.-1 agreements would enter formally into effect only when approved by the two Governments. It had also been made clear to the British representatives that the combined United States-British operations suggested in the report would be participated in by U. S. forces only if, and when, the United States were "compelled to enter the war" (to use the words of the President, himself, in his note to Secretary Knox, 24 January, 1941, approving the program of the Staff Conference, based on the conclusions of "Plan Dog").

Formal approval of the A.B.C.-1 staff agreements, and of the Joint War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, based thereon, was not to be given by the President until 7 December, 1941. Until that date, no commitment had been made by the President, or by any representative of the United States Government, whether diplomatic, political or military in nature, that the United States would ever enter the war against the Axis Powers, on its own initiative.^{*}

Lend-Lease and Victory Programs, 1941

President Roosevelt had announced, in December, 1940, his concrete proposals for assisting nations already fighting against Axis aggression by providing them with "all aid short of war." This administration policy was then emphatically approved by Congress in the passage of the "Lend-Lease Act," early in March, 1941. In the months that followed more attention was given by the administration to the implementation of this act, through measures of defense aid to the Allies, than to the increase in the strength of the nation's armed forces.

Hitler's action in launching the attack on the Soviet Union, 22 June, 1941, changed the whole nature and course of the war. Pressure on Britain was greatly reduced and a British defeat seemed temporarily averted. The United States was granted a further period in which to complete the mobilization, equipment and training of the increased forces authorized by Congress in 1940. During the months between March and December, 1941, substantial progress was made by the War and Navy Departments in preparation of the forces that would be required to implement the RAINBOW plans for Hemisphere defense.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the President took formal action to accelerate munitions production. He directed the War and Navy Departments, 9 July, 1941, to develop a "Victory Program" of industrial mobilization to assure the production of sufficient quantities of arms and munitions to assure "the defeat of potential enemies of the United States." He also directed that the estimates of the quantities required should be based on strategic assumptions concerning the operations and forces that would be necessary to achieve this result. The strategic objectives, policies and concepts on which agreement had been reached between the War and Navy Departments in "Plan Dog" in December, 1940, in the A.B.C.-1 Report in March, 1941, and in the Joint Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, in May, 1941, were therefore restated in an "Army and Navy Strategic Estimate" signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, 11 September, 1941. This was to be one of the secret defense documents published by isolationist newspapers, 4 December, 1941.†

^{*}The full text of the Main Report of the Staff Conversations; "A.B.C.-1," and accompanying papers is included in J. C. Com. Pt. 15, pp. 1485-1550; while subsequent RAINBOW plans, based thereon, are included in Pts. 15, 16 and 18.

†The full text of this Marshall-Stark Strategic Estimate is in R. E. Sherwood's "Roosevelt and Hopkins"; Rev. Ed. N.Y., 1950, pp. 410-418.

Strategic Estimates of Danger of Japanese Surprise Attack

Throughout 1941, the heads of the Army and Navy commands and staffs in Washington had continuously urged that policies and measures adopted by the U. S. Government to restrain Japan from further aggression in Southeast Asia should not be of such a nature as to provoke Japan to attack the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's signature of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in Moscow, 13 April, 1941, seemed to indicate that Japan was seeking to win immunity on her northern flank to permit further military aggression in the resource-rich areas of Southeast Asia and the British and Dutch East Indies. This possibility was the basis for the strong protests made by Secretary Hull in April-May, 1941, against Japanese invasion of those areas.

The high command of U. S. Forces, after April, 1941, still hoped that agreements could be reached with Japan that would avoid involvement of the United States in war in the Pacific. They were fully aware, however, that Japan might decide at any time to achieve, by military action against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, its political, economic and military objectives in Greater East Asia and in the South Pacific. The planning staffs in Washington had long assumed that such a war might be initiated by Japan by a surprise attack on the U. S. Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base. This possibility had been demonstrated in Fleet maneuvers in 1932, and again in 1936, when planes from attacking U. S. carriers were able to get over Pearl Harbor without prior detection. Hence the probability of such a surprise air attack by Japan had been stressed in the assumptions of nearly all the strategic and defense plans prepared by Naval planners after 1931. The possibility and dangers of such a surprise Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor were repeatedly emphasized in 1941 in communications sent by General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Commanders in Hawaii.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 1 February, 1941, while Lieutenant General W. C. Short took over the command of the Hawaiian Department of the Army a week later. Instructions sent them by Admiral Stark and by General Marshall stressed the imperative necessity of completing plans and preparations for adequate joint Army and Navy action to meet such a surprise air attack. There are given below extracts from communications exchanged between Washington and Hawaii in the early months of 1941 when the theater commands in the Pacific were developing their own local joint defense plans.^{*}

13 January, 1941; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, on the occasion of the latter's appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Admiral Stark wrote as follows:

"... I realize fully the enormous responsibilities placed on your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and where the Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have to bear the brunt.

"... I am hoping J. O. [i.e., Adm. Richardson] will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, *we may wake up any day*

^{*}Full texts of the letters, messages and documents quoted below are included among the exhibits presented to the J. C. Com., published in the following parts of the J. C. Com. Report; C.N.O. (Adm. Stark) and C-in-C, U. S. Fleet (Adm. Richardson) in Pt. 14, pp. 923-1000; C.N.O. and C-in-C Pac (Adm. Kimmel) Pt. 16, pp. 2144-2257; Sec. Nav. and Sec. War, Pt. 14, pp. 1000-1006; C. of S. (Gen. Marshall) and Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. (Gen. Short) Pt. 15, pp. 1600-1626.

with some mines deposited on our front doorstep or with some of our ships bombed, or what not, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifications of which call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans. [Author's italics]

"I have told our Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and personally I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us, or our deliberately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks or of days. I would like to feel perfectly complacent if some day someone opens the door of my office and reports that the War is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

"My estimate of the situation—JOR can give you this—which I presented to the Secretary [i.e., the CNO Memorandum of 12 Nov. 1940] and RAINBOW 3 [i.e., the Navy plan intended to replace the 1938 ORANGE Plan for a war of the U. S., without allies, against Japan], both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course, I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals, but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and, to put it mildly, it will be one H— of a job, and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your 'guts' and your head at the sea-going end. And your CAN DO—rather than CANT."

25 January; letter, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Adm. J. O. Richardson) to C.N.O.; Subj.—"C.N.O. Plan Dog" (i.e., Chief of Naval Operations memo, 12 Nov., 1940). In this letter, "prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet" (Adm. H. E. Kimmel, who succeeded Richardson just as the command name was changed), the following comments and suggestions were made:

"3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of RAINBOW No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a 'waiting attitude' will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

"4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

"(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

"(b) War with Japan is imminent.

"(c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form . . .

"(d) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. *Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.*" [Author's italics]

"5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below . . .

"(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet Units, at sea and in port . . .

"At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

"(a) Expand patrol planes search to the maximum—

"(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with Naval and Marine planes as necessary.

"(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes, supplemented by available Navy and Marine planes.

"(d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet Units in Pearl Harbor.

"(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"(3) Assist in local defense of the 14th Naval District."

Army Responsibility for Defense of the Fleet Base

The above-quoted exchange of letters between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Fleet in Hawaii indicates how conscious these naval commands were, in January, 1941, of the possibility and danger of a surprise air attack on the Fleet at its Pearl Harbor Base, as the first offensive act in any war with Japan. Under long-standing agreements between the War and Navy Departments, restated in the 1935 edition of "Joint Action of the Army and Navy," the Army had primary responsibility for defense of all naval bases, including Pearl Harbor. The Naval commands therefore initiated, in January, 1941, new discussions with War Department staffs concerning the defense preparations that should be made by the Army in Hawaii to give adequate protection to the Fleet while at its base. The Secretary of the Navy therefore addressed the Secretary of War, to remind him once again of this problem. It was pointed out, in this letter of 24 January, that:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

. . . The inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the Fleet or Naval Base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

"The dangers envisaged, in their order of importance and probability, are considered to be:

- (1) Air Bombing Attack;
- (2) Air Torpedo Plane Attack;
- (3) Sabotage;
- (4) Submarine Attack;
- (5) Mining;
- (6) Bombardment by Gunfire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance."

General Marshall and his staff then discussed the many problems involved in planning and preparing the defenses of Pearl Harbor. In the War Department reply to the query from the Secretary of the Navy, on 7 February, the Secretary of War wrote:

"1. In replying to your letter of 24 January [quoted above] regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon

the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

"6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective."

7 February; letter, General Marshall to General Short:

" . . . I believe you take over command [i.e., of the Hawaiian Department] today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark. . . .

"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and anti-aircraft guns. . . . What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

"The fullest protection for the Fleet is *THE*, rather than A, major consideration for us. There can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands for commands, other than Hawaii, which makes it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. . . .

"My impression of the Hawaiian position has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazards of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

"Please keep closely in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties."

10 February; letter, Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Subject "C.N.O. Plan D" (Replying to letter of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 25 Jan. 1941—above quoted):

"3. The general concept, the assumptions and the tasks under a 'Plan D' situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, . . . are in accord with the views of C. N. O. . . .

"5. The Chief of Naval Operations is cognizant of the conditions of the defenses of Oahu, and in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon the Fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. . . . The War Department is taking steps to

remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to make all the improvements that lie in his power."

10 February; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, commenting on subjects dealt with in the Chief of Naval Operations letter of same date (quoted above):

"I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts, and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and, thank God, can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. Mr. Hull [Secretary of State] never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the n-th time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. But, thank God, to date at least, the President has (seen) and continues to see it my way.

"I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. . . . Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and, sometimes, contrary to his own advisers. . . .

"P. S. . . . I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them."

18 February; letter, Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark (in reply to Stark's letters of 29 Jan. and 10 Feb.):

"Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor. I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army re-inforcement of Oahu. . . .

"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay."

Naval Planning for Pacific Fleet Operations in Early 1941

25 February; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

" . . . It is most important . . . that, as soon as possible, you get your Operating Plan for RAINBOW 3 in the hands of Admiral Hart (C-in-C, U. S. Asiatic Fleet) and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of special importance to you in your advanced position.

"Even if we fight this war according to 'Plan Dog' (i.e., the RAINBOW 5 strategy), we have so designed RAINBOW 3 that a shift to 'Dog' . . . will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your Operating Plans. . . .

"SECRET. The difficulty is that the entire country is in a

dozen minds about the war;—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and Far East—I simply cannot predict the outcome. . . . [There is] a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This cannot be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement RAINBOW 3, and forget my dispatch concerning 'Plan Dog.' This might mean that any reinforcements to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just as much as we would send to the Asiatic [Fleet]. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain. . . .

"I am enclosing a copy of a memo which is self-explanatory, showing you our best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. . . . A re-estimate may have to be necessary at any time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, were sound. . . ."

Enclosure; copy of "Memorandum for the President," 11 February, 1941:

"There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major problem.

"The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. . . .

"If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should, at least at first, remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to spare support forces for the Atlantic.

"I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Dept. has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities." . . .

Army Planning for Defense of Pearl Harbor

19 February; letter, General Short to General Marshall:

"I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th . . .

"Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have

found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hairsplitting, but that one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. . . ."

5 March; letter, General Marshall to General Short, in reply to General Short's letter of 19 Feb., 1941:

" . . . I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

13 March; letter, General Marshall to General Short:

" . . . The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department is most gratifying."

15 March; letter, General Short to General Marshall:

" . . . In reply to your letter of March 5th [cited above] I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. . . . As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th, some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. . . ."

Warning Against a Sunday Morning Japanese Surprise Attack

1 April; Admiral Stark to Commandants all Naval Districts, including Naval District 14 in Hawaii:

"Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that *because of the fact that past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays of the countries concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.*" [Author's italics]

This warning, at a time when the Joint Defense Plans for Hawaii were under preparation, reflected an estimate of Japanese intentions that had been frequently emphasized by naval intelligence officers. Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, who had long been occupied with such intelligence activities, has written that he informed Admiral Kimmel, in March, 1941, of the same danger mentioned in this C.N.O. dispatch:

"I told the Admiral of my conviction that if Japan decided on war with us she would open hostilities with an air attack on our fleet without a declaration of war, on a week end, and probably on a Sunday morning, by launching planes from carriers so that they could fly down wind from a spot as far away as possible in order to facilitate the escape of ships of the attacking force. This spot, it was emphasized, was usually in the northern sector. He (i.e., Admiral Kimmel) was specific in his questions, which I tried to answer in the same detail. . . . Finally Admiral Kimmel asked how I thought this air attack could be pre-

vented. I told him, 'Admiral, you will have to have patrols out at least five hundred miles daily.'

"He replied without hesitation, 'Well, of course we have neither the personnel nor material to do that.'

"I pondered for a moment, then added: 'Admiral, you'd better get them, because that is what's coming.'

"Our conversation lasted about ninety minutes, and I left the Admiral's office in the belief that it was a fruitful one."*

Fleet Commanders Informed Of A. B. C.-1 Staff Agreements

3 April; letter, Admiral Stark to the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific, Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets, transmitting copies of the main report ("A.B.C.-1") of the United States-British Staff Conference, dated 27 March, 1941. The Fleet Commanders were informed that the "A.B.C.-1" agreements would soon be incorporated in Joint and Naval Plans—Rainbow No. 5. In commenting on this development, Admiral Stark wrote that:

"This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. . . ."

"3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

"4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.

"5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

"8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

"9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of the opinion that Japan will hesitate

*Zacharias, "Secret Missions"; N. Y. 1946, pp. 231-2.

to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for the British. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

"10. The question of our entry into the war now seems to be when, and not whether. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy within two months, but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we cannot at present act on that possibility." (Full text of letter, C.N.O. to Cs-in-C of the Fleets, 3 Apr. 1941, Serial 038612, in appendix to Chap. 14 of the author's naval monograph "United States-British Naval Cooperation, 1939-1942," cited above.)

4 April; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"It has been some time since I have dropped you a line, but . . . there has been nothing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart covering this subject. [Quoted above] . . ."

"I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence, . . . that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

"I realized that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter of 'timing.' Something may be forced on us at any moment which would precipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler in forcing us into the war, unless, of course, Matsuoka (i.e., the Japanese Foreign Minister then visiting Berlin) agrees to fight at the same time. On the surface, at least, the Japanese situation looks a trifle easier, but just what the Oriental really plans, none of us can be sure. . . ."

"The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sinkings with regard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is much worse than the average person has any idea. . . . I hope and I believe that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as I have it to date, without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottlenecks and the million other things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well from the press.

"RAINBOW 5 should be on its way to you all shortly."

Hawaiian Local Joint Defense Plans, April, 1941

14 April; letter, General Short to General Marshall, transmitting to the War Department the new Army-Navy Joint Defense Plans for Hawaii, and for Pearl Harbor, just agreed upon by the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii:

"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them;

- (1) Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.
- (2) Agreement signed by the Commander of the

Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above agreement.

(3) Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch [Commandant, 14th Naval District, Hawaii] very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires. . . ."

Enclosure 1, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Dept. and 14th Naval District, approved by General Short and by Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, 11 April, 1941. This plan was based on the following assumptions:

"(1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained, uncertain, and varying.

"(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

"(3) A successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

"(4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take strong offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

"(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service. . . ."

Enclosure 2, Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force (General Martin) and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Admiral Bellinger) for implementation of the Joint Defense Plan. This agreement had been based upon an estimate by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger, 31 March 1941, of probable enemy intentions and courses of action, in the event of a decision by Japan to attack the United States. This estimate had included the following statement:

"(a) A declaration of war (i.e., by Japan) might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas,

"(2) A surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor,

"(3) A combination of these two.

"(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

Problems of National Policy and Strategy, May 1941

19 April; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. In this letter, the Chief of Naval Operations discussed the sending of the detachment from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, of 3 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 light cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers. Admiral Stark explained that:

"This was the first echelon for the 'Battle of the Atlantic.' The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detachment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized, and directed in its detail by the President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific direction to bring only the C.V. [i.e., carrier] and 1 division of destroyers. . . . The reason for the change was that the President did not want, at this particular moment

[i.e., just after the signature in Moscow of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, 13 April, 1941], to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion that this will hold until there is some further clarification, incident to Matsuoka's return to Tokyo and this further illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right now as to our intentions. . . .

"For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the time seems not yet ripe for their adoption. . . .

"The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situation as has ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremendous issues at stake to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be of more help to him."

26 April; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic. . . . King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale. . . .

"Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an allout in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this, which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog, and which will shortly be covered by RAINBOW 5.

"Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time. No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House."

14 May, memorandum, Admiral Stark to Commandants of the 15 Naval Districts; copies to Admirals Kimmel, King and Hart:

"You will recall my previous letter of 3 October, 1940, in which I stressed readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing mines on our front doorstep, etc.

"I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only
WHEN?"

"The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all trend unceasingly this way.

"If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, in one way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable, whether from a material or a psychological standpoint.

"I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft program has lagged, and am doing what I can about it; but it never seems enough.

"This is just to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn.

"What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, as far as is humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt

air attack may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly pre-planned joint action. Russia is still a . . ."

Completion of Strategic and Defense Plans, May-October, 1941

The Chief of Naval Operations had informed the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific, Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets, 3 April, 1941, (in letter above quoted) of the contents and implications of the A.B.C.-1 Report for future planning of naval operations. He further communicated to them, 26 May, 1941, the Naval War Plan, W.P.L.-46, based on the A.B.C.-1 staff agreements and on the Joint Plan RAINBOW No. 5. The Fleet Commanders were directed to complete immediately their own operational plans to implement the strategic policies and objectives defined in the Joint and Naval Plans—RAINBOW No. 5.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, submitted his own Fleet Operations Plan—RAINBOW 5 to the Chief of Naval Operations, 21 July, 1941. This was formally approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, 9 September, 1941. The Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan, approved by the local Commanders, 11 April, 1941, had been deemed so satisfactory, in the provisions for defense of the Fleet and its Pearl Harbor Base against a surprise Japanese air attack, that the C.N.O. had sent it to all District Commanders as a model of defense planning. Admiral Stark and his staff were equally pleased with the Pacific Fleet Operations Plan—RAINBOW 5, feeling their further arrangements for implementation of these plans, should war with Japan become imminent, could be left to the Commanders in Hawaii, whose plans had been found so adequate. The major problem for the War and Navy Departments then became the supply of the forces and matériel that would be required for the implementation of these approved defense plans.

The satisfaction in the War and Navy Departments with the adequacy of plans for defense of the U. S. Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base was confirmed when Admiral Kimmel submitted, 14 October, 1941, the revised text of his "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, No. 2-CL-41," relative to the measures to be adopted to assure the security of vessels of the Pacific Fleet while in Operating Areas, or at the Pearl Harbor base, against surprise Japanese attacks. In this letter, Admiral Kimmel restated the accepted basic assumption of existing War and Defense Plans, including notably the following:

" . . . A declaration of war (i.e., by Japan) may be preceded by:

- "(1) A surprise attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor;
- "(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the Operating Area;
- "(3) A combination of these two."

Admiral Kimmel's Confidential Letter then "prescribed" the Security measures to be made effective at once, or "as may later be directed" by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present afloat in the Hawaiian Area. The measures so prescribed were summarized, under the following headings:

- "A. Continuous Patrol;
- "B. Intermittent Patrols;
 - "(1) Destroyer Off-Shore Patrol;
 - "(2) Air Patrols;
 - "(3) Daily Sweep for Magnetic and Anchored Mines—;

"C. Sorties and Entry (i.e., of vessels at the Pearl Harbor Base);

"D. Operating Areas;

"E. Ships at Sea;

"F. Ships in Port;

"G. Defense against Air Attack;

"H. Action to be taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area."

Responsibilities of Theater Commanders in Hawaii

The basic command doctrines of both the Army and Navy had long made Theater Commanders responsible for execution of all approved plans applicable to their Command Areas, particularly in giving effect to any local defense plans which they had themselves prepared. The preparation of Basic War Plans, defining strategic policies and objectives, and assignment of forces to the responsible commanders for executing such plans was the responsibility of the heads of the War and Navy Departments.

They were also responsible for informing Theater Commanders of the imminence of war, with appropriate general directives for execution of the applicable approved strategic war plans. They were to refrain, however, from giving detailed instructions, or specific operational orders, indicating the detailed action to be taken by the Theater Commander to achieve the defined objectives by carrying out his own tasks and missions.

The Joint Congressional Committee, in its report in 1946, made the following comments concerning awareness of Commanders in Hawaii of the danger of a surprise air attack, pointing out that they "not only appreciated the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared detailed arrangements to meet this threat." The War and Navy Department staffs felt that these defense arrangements were well conceived and adequate, provided the necessary forces and matériel could be provided for their implementation.

The supply of these defense requirements to the Army's Hawaiian Department became in early 1941 one of the major preoccupations of the Chief of Staff of the Army and of the Chief of Naval Operations. This was reflected in the correspondence exchanged between February and November, 1941, between the War and Navy Departments and the Com-

PART II

Information and Warnings Given to Pacific Commanders; June-December, 1941

BASIC STRATEGIC POLICIES to govern action of U. S. Forces, in the event that the United States entered the war against Germany and Italy, had been definitely outlined by June, 1941. The Joint Army and Navy Plan—RAINBOW 5—to implement these approved policies had been approved by the heads of the War and Navy Departments and tacitly accepted by the President as the basis for future operational planning, for defense preparations and for industrial mobilization.

These developments had been communicated to the Army and Navy Commanders in the Pacific, as in the Atlantic, as fully and as rapidly as circumstances had permitted. There

*This basic command doctrine of the U. S. Armed Forces was clearly restated by Secretary Stimson in his statement to the J. C. Com. concerning the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, quoted in the J. C. Com. Report, pp. 237-238.

mands in Hawaii. The shortage of equipment of all kinds in 1941 made it impossible to supply all that was required, but General Marshall was later to point out that the Hawaiian Department had become by the autumn of 1941 the best equipped of Army bases.

The Joint Congressional Committee noted in its report that these local joint defense plans and agreements for their implementation were never placed in effect by the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii, despite the successive urgent warning messages sent them from the War and Navy Departments. The Committee reached the conclusion that the Army and Navy officers concerned were "fully conscious" of the danger of a surprise air attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and "they were adequately informed" of the "imminence of war" with Japan. The Committee concluded as follows:

"8. Specifically, the Hawaiian Commands failed:

"(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of warnings received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual cooperation.

"(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period, November 27 to December 7, 1941.

"(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.

"(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their equipment.

"(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy Establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.

"(f) To employ the facilities, matériel, and personnel at their command, which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.

"(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them.

"9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty."

still remained, however, inevitable uncertainties both as to the future trends of national policy and relative to the developments in the global military and political situation. Hence it was frequently impossible for the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations to reply concretely and specifically to questions which the Commanders of U. S. Forces in outlying areas, and notably in Hawaii, addressed to them.

Admiral Kimmel's Request for Policy Guidance, May, 1941

This difficult problem of coordinating naval action with national policy was well illustrated by questions posed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, (Continued on page 110)

THE MUDDLE BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

[Continued from page 63]

in a long letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, on 26 May, 1941, which was the very same day that the Navy Basic Plan—RAINBOW 5 (WPL 46)—was issued by Admiral Stark in Washington. In this letter, Admiral Kimmel outlined in great detail the additional forces, equipment and personnel that the Pacific Fleet would need for a major offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. At a time when the Armed Forces of the United States were hardly even on an adequate peace-time footing, the harassed Army and Navy High Commands in Washington did not have at their disposal even minimum forces for defense against possible attacks by the Axis Powers, and much less the adequately trained and equipped forces essential for offensive action in either ocean. But Admiral Kimmel seemed as much concerned by apparent lack of adequate national policies as he was by the needs of the Pacific Fleet. This concern is illustrated by the following paragraphs of this official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations of 26 May, 1941:

“VI.—NATIONAL POLICY

“(a) Although uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

“The military branch of the Government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight . . .

“VII. INFORMATION

“(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. . . .

“It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible of marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even

though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities; moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives, rather than by categorical instructions.

“It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur, and by the quickest means possible.” [Author's italics]

Admiral Kimmel's letter reached the Navy Department at a moment when many broad questions of policy, and of the future development of national rearmament, seemed at last to have been resolved. Arrangements were therefore made for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, with key members of his planning staff, to visit Washington for a lengthy round of conferences with the heads of the State, War, and Navy Departments and with the President. He was then given all guidance possible and was furnished with all information available relative to current military, diplomatic and political situations.

The July Crisis in the Far East; Warning to Pacific Commands

After Admiral Kimmel's return to Pearl Harbor, at the end of June, 1941, Admiral Stark and his immediate collaborators made an intensified effort to keep him informed by dispatch, by official and personal letters, and by periodic general reports, of all changes and developments in the world situation or in plans for United States action. Quotations from, and summaries of, the major items of information, and the specific guidance and warnings sent to the Commanders in Hawaii, from July to December, 1941, are given below:

3 July; Admiral Stark to Naval Commands including Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

“The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt. has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. *This policy probably involves war in the near future.* [Author's italics] . . . The C.N.O. holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, army and air bases in Indo-China. . . . They have ordered all Jap vessels in U.S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by 1 Aug. . . . Using utmost secrecy, inform principal Army commanders. . . .”

7-20 July; Chief of Naval Operations dispatches to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; for information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, containing texts of “Magic” intercepted Japanese messages relative to diplomatic and

*The full text of this message, with addressees, time-date numbers, etc., is included in J. C. Com., Pt. 14, which also includes (pp. 1396-1408) the texts of other messages from C.N.O. to C-in-C PAC which are quoted or mentioned below. Similarly the texts of all intercepted Japanese messages cited will be found in J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 1-316.

military action for the occupation of bases in southern Indo-China.

24 July; letter Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart, with copy to Admiral Kimmel:

Admiral Stark reported on his conversation that day with the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, on the Japanese move into southern Indo-China. He wrote that

“My guess is that, with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime Provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. . . .

“I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura. . . . I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. . . .”

25 July, Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to all Naval Commands:

“This is a joint dispatch from the C.N.O. and the CofS U.S. Army. . . . You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty-sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected that these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. . . . Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen. . . .

“C.N.O. and CofS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. [Author's italics] Action being initiated by the United States to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and army subordinates. . . .”

31 July; letter, Admiral Stark to Captain C. M. (“Savvy”) Cooke, Jr. (copy to Admiral Kimmel; Captain Cooke had been a member of the planning staff, Office of C.N.O., until Jan. 1941, and had then been assigned to duty on Admiral Kimmel's staff). In this letter, Admiral Stark reviewed the general strategic situation at the end of July, 1941:

“. . . Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that, on the assumption that the country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day's delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. . . . Whether or not we will get an ‘incident’ because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping we must send. . . . I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

“The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture. . . . We have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definite Japanese objectives. . . . My thought has been that, while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she has the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Of course, embargoes . . . may cause any . . . old kind of an upset and make a re-estimate of the situation necessary.

“To some of my very pointed questions [i.e., to the President] which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a ‘Betty, please don't ask me that.’ Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. . . .

“P.S.—I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel. . . . I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but . . . it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

“Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual. . . .”

Impasse in Negotiations with Japan; August-October, 1941

22 August; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel; written after the return of the Chief of Naval Operations from the Atlantic Conference, in reply to a series of letters from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, outlining needs of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Stark referred to these letters from Admiral Kimmel and said that:

“. . . The enclosed draft I have just inherited. . . . I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil marks. . . .

“There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times—but now I think we have something fairly definite—maybe.

“To your own situation, I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along. . . .”

Enclosure; reply to letter of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 28 July, 1941:

“I can readily understand your wish to [be] kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

“So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves, if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. . . . The conversations that took place at sea between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystallize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was announced as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as a result of the latter's attack on the Maritime Provinces. I have done my utmost to get a

decision;—it can't be had *now*, either here or in London. I make no forecast.

"If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense Plan with reference to the Pacific. I could get no plan from the British; they did not have one. ABC and Rainbow-5 still prevail."

31 August; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"... With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is [that] the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. . . . Some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do, I don't know.

"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender."

22 September; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart; with copy to Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Stark reviewed developments during the previous fortnight, writing that:

"Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you.

"So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually in it [i.e., the war]. The President's speech of September 11, 1941, put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued. . . .

"As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. . . . It looks like a deadlock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

"... While on the surface the Japanese appear to be making some effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I cannot disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. . . . If Russia can hold out, . . . I feel that there might be more hope of an agreement with Japan."

22 September; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, sent with P.S., 29 September. (Received by Adm. Kimmel 4 October.):

"... I have sent you a copy of my letter of 12 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I saw it up to that date. At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southern Pacific areas.

"The situation" in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. . . . The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in *status quo*, the better for all concerned.

"We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that provided in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

"The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. . . . We are now informed by the British that they plan to send [three] battleships to arrive on the East Indies station by late December; . . . and to send one or two modern capital ships . . . early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

"... I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

"P.S.—I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that *conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it, we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some arrangement between Japan and China;—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now is/or is not a good thing—I hesitate to state.

"P.S. No. 2. (29 September)—Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. . . . He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. . . . Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know. . . ."

14 October; Admiral Kimmel, after receiving the above letter, issued to the Pacific Fleet the Confidential Letter of Instructions (No. 2 CL-41) quoted above in Part I, again warning his subordinates that a Japanese declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet and outlining measures to be taken to assure "the security of the Fleet" at its Pearl Harbor Base and in the operating areas."

Tojo Replaces Konoye; Implications for U. S. Commands

16 October; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet:

"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains . . . it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situa-

tion there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. *In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.—Inform appropriate Army and Naval District authorities.*" [Author's italics]

16 October; Chief of Naval Operations dispatches directing re-routing of U. S. shipping in the Pacific, including convoys to the Philippines, to the South Pacific-Torres Strait route, in view of a "possibility of hostile action by Japan against U. S. shipping," and as provided for in the Navy Basic Plan-Rainbow 5, and in the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan-Rainbow 5.

17 October; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility.' In fact, I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong but I hope not. In any case, after long powwows at the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

"... In an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia, I said that my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

"With regard to merchant shipping, it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

"We shall continue to strive to maintain the *status quo* in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going, I do not know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it."

The German Threat in the Atlantic; Admiral Stark's Estimate

27 October; letter, Comdr. Charles Wellborn, Jr. (Aide to C.N.O.) to Admiral Kimmel, sending copy of memo from Admiral Stark to Secretary Hull, dated 8 October, 1941, with reference to the advantages and disadvantages "should Hitler declare war on the United States." Admiral Stark's conclusions were the following:

"3. It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted.

"I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall, that ultimately, in order to prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and, as noted above, I have long felt and have stated that the sooner we get in the better. . . .

"P.S.—I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely that I do not believe that Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on

Hitler's part, if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.

"He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a mind to. He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to invade the countries he has. When he is ready, he will do so, and not before."

"A Month May See, Literally, Almost Anything" (7 November, 1941)

4 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet:

"Japanese merchant vessels' complete withdrawal from western Hemisphere waters appears in progress. Ships in area have departed or are preparing to depart except *Naruto* presently completing run from West Coast of Mexico for South American ports. No ships presently reported en route from Japan."

7 November; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel (received 14 Nov.):

"This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. . . . O. K. on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—what next? [There follows discussion of C-in-C Pac's requests]

"Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets 'worse and worse.' *A MONTH MAY SEE, LITERALLY, ALMOST ANYTHING*. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good." [Author's italics]

Joint Stark-Marshall Estimate for the President; "Far Eastern Situation, 5 November, 1941"

14 November; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. . . .

"Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

"The next few days hold much for us. [Ambassador Saburu] Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number of points by the *Japan Times and Advertiser* upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the 'Solution of the Pacific Crises.' Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view."

Enclosure; Joint Memorandum for the President, from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 5 November, 1941, based on discussions, and conclusions reached at the Joint Board meeting on 3 November, 1941:

"Subject; Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation:

"[There is presented in Paragraphs 1 and 2, a review of

information received from China concerning a possible new Japanese offensive through Southwest China against the Burma Road. General Marshall and Admiral Stark concluded that] the question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken into consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. Forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well disguised, would lead to war.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

"4. (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will not have been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

"(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

"(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies.

"(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East, or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

"5. (c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e.—military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

"(e) All possible aid short of actual war with Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands East Indies.

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces. That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

* (Signed by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Text in J. C. Com. Pt. 16, pp. 2222/3.)

Warnings to Pacific Commands, After 20 November, 1941

Intercepted Japanese messages which become available in Washington after 15 November, 1941 (summarized and analyzed in Part III below), clearly indicated that a new Japanese aggressive movement southwards was being prepared. The higher officials of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and the President, had learned on 5 November that the final Japanese proposals "A" (for a definitive settlement of U. S.-Japanese relations) and "B" (for a brief truce or "modus vivendi," while negotiations continued) had been approved at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo in the first days of November. The texts of these proposals were also known, through "Magic" intercepted messages and had been adjudged unacceptable, by the Secretary of State and by the President, before the arrival in Washington on 15 November of the special Japanese envoy, Ambassador Saburu Kurusu. It still seemed possible, however, that an American "modus vivendi" counter-proposal might be discussed with the Japanese, as a substitute for their "Proposal B." The flood of intelligence information received after 15 November, as to movements of Japanese expeditionary amphibious forces also indicated that the new Japanese offensive might be launched in Southeast Asia at any time after 25 November, the deadline date for diplomatic negotiations fixed by the Japanese on 5 November (see Part III below).

The Chief of Naval Operations therefore arranged to keep the Commanders in the Pacific fully informed of any Japanese movements which became known to the Washington staffs. The major concentrations of Japanese forces seemed to confirm previous estimates that the main objective of the new Japanese southward movement would be Thailand and perhaps also Burma and Malaya. But there were also indications of Japanese movements toward the South Pacific and the Netherlands East Indies. These were reported to the Commanders of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets on 21 November and the following days, in such dispatches as the following:

21 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; information Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet:

"Reliable reports indicate the recent establishment by Japan of a combined air and surface craft patrol covering shipping routes from the U. S. to Australia. Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from base at Jaluit. Surface craft are believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands. Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations. . . . They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long-range radio sets."

21 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"Have been informed by Dutch Legation that they have received a dispatch as follows: QUOTE According to information received by the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies a Japanese Expeditionary force has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. Should this force, strong enough to form a threat for the Netherlands Indies or Portuguese Timor, move beyond a line between the following points—Davao, Waigea, Equator—the Governor General will regard this as an act of aggression and will under those circumstances consider the hostilities opened and act accordingly UNQUOTE

"Please inform Army authorities of foregoing. Request

any information you may have concerning development of this Japanese threat against the Dutch East Indies and your evaluation of foregoing information."

22 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatches to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; instructions for movement and escort of Army troop and supply ships to Manila, but stating that "Pacific situation unchanged."

Admirals Hart and Kimmel replied to these messages by reporting that they had no information concerning any large concentration of Japanese naval and air forces in the Mandated Islands that might confirm the information received from the Dutch. The Chief of Naval Operations was unable to give any assurance to the Netherlands authorities, at that time, that U. S. Forces might join the Dutch in opposing any Japanese movement toward the Netherlands East Indies.

Then, on 22 November, a further intercepted message from Tokyo to Washington gave further significance to previous information that some military moves would be made by Japan if the United States had not accepted the Japanese proposals before the "deadline" date. (See Part III, below, for summaries of Japanese messages concerning this "deadline" date for negotiations.) The Japanese Ambassadors in Washington were informed in this message of 22 November that Tokyo had decided to wait four further days, until 29 November, for an American acceptance of the Japanese proposals. This time, however, the deadline could not be changed. If an agreement had not been signed by this final date of 29 November, then "things are automatically going to happen."

This intercepted Japanese message was seen by Admiral Stark after he had learned from Mr. Hull that the Japanese notes of 20 November were entirely unacceptable, as they demanded complete acquiescence by the United States to the Japanese program in East Asia. Discussions were then under way between the White House and the heads of the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments of the terms of a possible American "modus vivendi" counterproposal to provide for maintenance of peace in the Pacific for at least another three months, while negotiations for a Japanese-American agreement were being continued.

Neither Admiral Stark, nor any other of the top officers and officials in Washington, could predict what "things are automatically going to happen," if the United States had not accepted the Japanese proposals by 28 November. It seemed probable that new offensive aggressive moves would then begin. Admiral Stark therefore decided to send a new warning to naval commanders in the Pacific. Admiral Stark later informed the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry that the message sent on 24 November "was based in part on the 'deadline' intercept."

24 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, etc.:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility*. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch, concurs, and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. . . ." [Author's italics]

* J. C. Com. Pt. 16, p. 2298, quoting Adm. Hewitt's Report, and citing Adm. Stark's testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, p. 775 of its report.

Japanese "Deadline" Messages; Reactions in Washington

The conflicting nature of reports of Japanese naval movements, and the imperative necessity of adequate coordination and appraisal of all such reports reaching American naval commands, led Admiral Stark to address another dispatch on 24 November to all U. S. Naval Commands and missions in the Far East and in the Pacific.

24 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, information other Naval Addressees in Far East and Pacific:

"Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature. Since Com 16 (i.e., Manila) intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to Com 16 for action OPNAV for information. After combining all incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to OPNAV, Info.-CinCPAC based on all information received, indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity. Request CinC AF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general objective."

25 November; letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel:

"This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't know your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

"We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two-ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

"I agree with you, for example, that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet, but neither ABC-1 or RAINBOW 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule." (There follows reference to the situation in the Atlantic and naval matériel and personnel problems.)

25 November; postscript, letter, Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, after meetings of Joint Board, and at the White House:

"P.S.—I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also, I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did.

"The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for;

or we may do nothing; I think it is more likely to be anything."

Secretary Hull's Ten Point Note to Japan

Secretary Hull delivered to the Japanese Ambassadors, late on 26 November, a Ten Point Note, restating the U. S. position in the Japanese-American Conversations under way since April, 1941. This note was given to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu as the United States reply to the Japanese "Proposal B," given to the Secretary of State on 20 November. It had been agreed at a meeting of the President's "War Council" at the White House on the previous afternoon that he should give to the Japanese the revised American "modus vivendi" counterproposal, as a substitute for the final Japanese note. Mr. Hull had, however, decided on 26 November, in the light of messages from Chiang Kai-shek and from Prime Minister Churchill, not to submit to the Japanese the American "modus vivendi" counterproposal. The President had approved this decision, but it was not immediately communicated to the heads of the War and Navy Departments who had collaborated in the formulation of the American "modus vivendi" counterproposal and who had hoped that Japanese consideration of such a proposal might further delay the "things" that might otherwise "automatically begin to happen."

The heads of the War and Navy Departments learned, rather accidentally, on the morning of 27 November, of the decision taken by Secretary Hull, with the approval of the President, on the previous day. None of them had seen the text of the "Ten Point Note" given by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors the previous afternoon. They did know, however, from messages sent by the Japanese Ambassadors to Tokyo the previous evening, which were included in the "Magic" book circulated on the morning of 27 November, that the Ambassadors had been "dumfounded" by Secretary Hull's note; that they had at first refused to send it to Tokyo; and that they had admitted that "Our failure and humiliation are complete."

Admiral Stark felt that the situation was so tense that, as the Japanese Ambassadors had reported to Tokyo, "the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so." He therefore directed the preparation of a "WAR WARNING" message to the Commanders in the Pacific, and of a new memorandum to the President. In the absence of General Marshall, who had gone to observe Army maneuvers in North Carolina, Admiral Stark discussed with General Leonard T. Gerow (director, Army War Plans Division) and with Secretary Stimson, the immediate action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments.

Secretary Stimson telephoned to the President and to Secretary Hull to find out what had been given to the Japanese Ambassadors and to obtain their views as to any urgent action to be taken by the Army and Navy. The Secretary of State then informed Stimson that he (Mr. Hull) had "broken the whole matter off"; that, with the President's approval, he had withheld the "modus vivendi" counterproposal; and that dealings with Japan are "now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and the Navy."[†]

The Naval "War Warning" Messages to Pacific Fleet Commands; 27 November, 1941

Admiral Stark, on being informed by Secretary Stimson of these conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roose-

*A summary of these developments, on 26 Nov. 1941, is given in the J. C. Com. Report, pp. 38-42, 198-200.

†The events of 27 November, 1941, are described in detail in the Diary Notes of Secretary Stimson, cited in the J. C. Com. Report, p. 199.

velt, immediately ordered the new warning message sent to the Naval Commanders in the Pacific. This message was the following:

27 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch for action to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; for information to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Special Naval Observer, London:

"This dispatch is to be considered a War Warning. [Author's italics] Negotiations with Japan toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly—Borneo.

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa, directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

27 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commandants Naval Districts:

"Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of ORANGE negotiations and imminent probability extension ORANGE operations. Publicity to be avoided."

War Department Messages to Army Commands, 27-28 November, 1941

The Army staff were preparing messages to warn Army Commanders in Pacific areas of possible Japanese action in the Far East and Pacific, while the Naval "war warning" message was being sent. Before approving these messages to commands at Manila, in Hawaii, at the Panama Canal, at San Francisco, etc., Secretary Stimson again consulted both Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt. In the light of their comment he modified the draft messages to give them a tone somewhat milder and less positive than the naval "war warning." He informed Army commands in Pacific areas that:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

28 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commanders, Pacific Naval Coastal Frontiers; for information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"... Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command [i.e., at San Francisco] ... [then follows the message quoted above] ...

"WPL 52 [providing for action against German forces

in Western Hemisphere waters] is not applicable to Pacific area, except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

The draft of this Army warning message, prepared in the War Plans Division, General Staff, had originally included a directive instructing the Commanders addressed to take special measures against sabotage and subversive action by Japanese agents or sympathizers. As Secretary Stimson had eliminated this passage from the message sent in the name of the Chief of Staff (absent attending maneuvers in North Carolina), a series of other messages were sent from the War Department on 27-28 November, specifically referring to the fact that, as hostilities with Japan might begin at any time, "subversive activities may be expected." The various Army commands were therefore to put into effect counter-measures already planned and, notably, to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishment, property and equipment against sabotage," etc.*

The Commanding Generals in the various Departments of the Army who had received these warning messages, notably the Commanding Generals at Manila, Panama and San Francisco replied between 27 and 29 November, acknowledging receipt of these warning directives and reporting in detail on the action that had been taken in their various commands to put their forces on an all-out alert against a possible Japanese surprise attack. Lieutenant General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, seems to have been particularly impressed by the warnings against subversive activities and sabotage. He replied briefly to the War Department, stating only that

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.

Liaison with Navy, Reurad 472 twenty-seventh"

The implications of this message from General Short, indicating that an all-out alert against a surprise Japanese attack in the Hawaiian area had not been ordered, appear to have escaped the attention of the officers of the War Plans Division, and of the Chief of Staff. No further message was sent to General Short, directing him to put into effect such an all-out alert, with all the precautionary measures provided for in the Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan which an all-out alert should have called for. This failure of the War Department to take General Short's message into account and to send him a further directive was to be much stressed in the Joint Congressional Committee hearings and in the report of the Committee. It seems to have been believed in the War Department that General Short's reference to "Liaison with the Navy" implied that the defensive measures provided for in the Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan were being put into effect.

A Final Stark-Marshall Joint Estimate for the President

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff had directed their staffs, and in particular the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board, on 25 November, to prepare a new Joint Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation for the President. No action had yet been taken on the recommendations submitted in the previous Joint Memorandum of 5 November (above quoted). It seemed imperative to Admiral Stark on 27 November, when the new warning messages were sent to commands in the Pacific, that the new joint estimate should be submitted immediately to the President. This text was

*Texts of War Department warning messages to Army commands in Pacific areas are included in J. C. Com. Pt. 14, pp. 1329-1332.

prepared that same day, and was taken to the President late on the evening of 27 November. General Marshall approved the text and signed the memorandum when he returned to the War Department, 28 November. The memorandum began with the following statement:

"If the current negotiations end without agreement Japan may attack;—the Burma Road, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the Russian Maritime Provinces. . . ."

After reviewing these various possibilities the conclusion was reached that the Japanese attack would in all probability be directed southwards but that "whether the offensive will be against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast." It was then pointed out that:

"The most essential thing now, from the United States' standpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of re-inforcement is being continued. . . . Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy."

"The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China."

"It is recommended that:

"Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British or Dutch territory, as above outlined;

"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

"Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and the Dutch for the issuance of such warning."

White House War Council Decisions, 28 November, 1941

The President presided at a meeting at noon, 28 November, of his chief advisers on the war situation. There were present Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. Secretary Hull opened the discussion by reporting on developments in negotiations with Japan since the previous meeting on 25 November. He emphasized his own belief that there was "practically no possibility of an agreement with Japan" and repeated his earlier statement that the Japanese might "break out at any time with new acts of conquest," seeking to achieve, by surprise, "a central point in their strategy," an early military advantage against the United States and Great Britain. For this reason, said Mr. Hull, he had informed Secretary Stimson the day before that the "safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy."

Secretary Stimson then read a General Staff report on the assembly and movement southwards in the South China Sea

*The full text of this Joint Memo. of the C.N.O. and the C. of S. to the President, 27 November, 1941, is included in J. C. Com. Pt. 14, pp. 1083-1084.

of Japanese expeditionary forces, pointing out that this force might attack Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies. Stimson noted, in his report of the meeting that:

"The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram to the Emperor of Japan. . . . But, for many reasons this did not seem to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. . . . Consequently I said there ought to be a message by the President . . . to Congress, reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his letter to the Emperor . . . The President [finally] asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers."^o

The President left for a short rest at Warm Springs, Georgia, on the evening of Friday, 28 November. There then began a week of increasing anxiety during this period of what Winston Churchill was later to describe as "the deadly hush in the Pacific." There was no longer any doubt in Washington that the Japanese were about to strike somewhere but the only available evidence of Japanese intentions was the increasing volume of reports on movements of Japanese forces in the South China Sea. These reports came from Hawaii, as well as from Manila, Singapore and other Far Eastern points. Attention, thus concentrated on obvious aspects of the imminent Japanese action, may have diverted attention from the long accepted assumption that, whatever Japanese objectives in the Far East might be, the Japanese High Command might initiate hostilities by a blow at the U. S. Fleet to eliminate it as a possible obstacle to the success of their naval and amphibious operations in the Southwest Pacific. The following messages indicate this concentration on Japanese action in the Far East.†

28 November; dispatch from Commandant, 14th Naval District (Hawaii) to Chief of Naval Operations:

"Following received from British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese will attack Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla."

30 November; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; for information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines, desire you to cover by air the line Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing on receipt of this dispatch. Understand British air forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British Mission here informed."

Pacific Commander's Action on Warnings and Directives

The Joint Congressional Committee examined with particular care all evidence and testimony presented to it, and to

^oStimson's Diary Note for 28 Nov., 1941, giving a detailed summary of discussions at this White House meeting, is quoted in J. C. Com. Report, p. 395.

†Messages exchanged between C.N.O. and Pacific Naval Commands, relative to this "Kra Peninsula Alert," initiated by the dispatch from Hawaii, 28 Nov., 1941, are published in J. C. Com. Pt. 15, pp. 1768-1174.

the previous Naval Court of Inquiry on the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet after 24 November, 1941. It was noted that the "war warning" message had directed Admiral Kimmel "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46," but that Admiral Kimmel, after receiving this message "made the deliberate decision not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor."

Admiral C.H. McMorris, then head of the C-in-C Pac War Plans staff, later stated (in the Hewitt Inquiry) that:

"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time [i.e., after 27 Nov. 1941] other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft."

Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force #8 for Wake on 28 November, with planes on the carrier *Enterprise*. Before leaving, he was informed of the "war warning" dispatch and held a lengthy conference with Admiral Kimmel, who directed him to "use your common sense," should Japanese naval forces be encountered. When Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor, on 5 December, with T.F. #3, including the carrier *Lexington*, to deliver planes at Midway, "he was not even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October 16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch [quoted below]. . . . Except for what he had read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special orders and regarded the departure from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of flying off the *Lexington* a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of the Island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine."^o

The agreement between the Army and Navy Air Commanders in Hawaii for assuring air reconnaissance from Oahu, if and when war with Japan seemed imminent, could be put into operation only when so ordered by the Commander, Hawaiian Department of the Army and by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, the latter acting in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. This agreement, like the Joint Defense Plan, was never ordered into effect before 7 December, 1941. Admiral Hewitt, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy on the Pearl Harbor investigations, further noted that:

"Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified . . . that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations."

Admiral Kimmel later testified that he did not regard the CNO messages of 24 and 27 November as forecasting a possible Japanese surprise air attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, such as had been envisaged in the assumptions of the ORANGE and RAINBOW Joint War Plans. As these messages did not "state expressly, or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable," neither he nor General Short had felt that the situation necessitated the execution of the Joint Hawaiian Department Defense Plan, nor the supplementary agreements based thereon, and notably the air agreement for long-range reconnaissance, under unified command exercised by the Naval Air Commander.

"The summary in the J. C. Com. Report, of action taken by C-in-C Pac, on these warnings and directives is given in pp. 105-115.

^oThe summary in the J. C. Com. Report, of action taken by C-in-C Pac, on these warnings and directives is given in pp. 105-115.

Admiral Stark's Interpretation Of Directives to Fleet Commands

Admiral Stark has described his own interpretation in November 1941 of the significance of the warning despatches sent to Admiral Kimmel. He explained that the Naval High Command in Washington had examined and approved the Pacific Fleet plans for action to be taken, if and when war should appear imminent, to assure the security of vessels of the Fleet in operating areas or at the Pearl Harbor Base. Warnings were given that war with Japan was imminent. It was therefore assumed in Washington that the appropriate disposition, deployment of forces, and distant reconnaissance would be made in conformity with the approved plans. It had not been deemed necessary or appropriate to give detailed orders to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to implement the specific provisions of the local Hawaiian defense plans.

Admiral Stark explained "that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness measures, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures, and that the plans previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented."

Admiral Stark had previously told the Naval Court of Inquiry that, in sending the "war warning" message of 27 November:

"My thought, in that message, about the defensive deployment was clear, all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but, regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel [implied that] the natural thing—and perhaps he did it—was to take up with the Army right away, in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best as he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships he had decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected that he would use it. . . . A defensive deployment would be to spread and use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid surprise and, if he could, to hit the other fellow and, in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangements which had previously been made for just this sort of thing."

Admiral R.E. Ingersoll (Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in 1941), like Admirals Stark and Turner, had taken it for granted, after 27 November, 1941, that Admiral Kimmel would implement the directives given him, when informed of the imminence of war with Japan by the "war warning" message, by putting into effect the measures he had himself prescribed in his Confidential Letter to the Pacific Fleet of 14 October, 1941 (2-CL-41, above cited). Admiral Ingersoll had also expected that the reconnaissance specifically directed from Washington would include distant reconnaissance, at least of the northern, northwestern and western approaches to Oahu. He declared that:

"I had every reason to expect that he [i.e., Admiral Kimmel] would do that and I was surprised that he had not done it. As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected. . . . I expected that it would be done, not only because the planes

^oThe above-quoted extracts from testimony of Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and others, was cited in the J. C. Com. Report, pp. 113-118.

were there, but because this plan (WPL-46) inferred that it was to be done. It never occurred to me that it was not being done."^o

Intimations of Japanese Intentions, 1-7 December, 1941

The Chief of Naval Operations, in sending his warning message of 24 November to Commanders in the Pacific, had issued instructions in another message of the same date for the centralization of all information concerning Japanese movements of forces, through the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, then in Manila. He had also directed C-in-C Asiatic Fleet to send daily summaries of such reports to the Office of Naval Operations, and to C-in-C Pac in Hawaii. This order was immediately made effective, but great difficulties were encountered when the Japanese changed the call-signs of naval vessels, as well as their codes on 1 December. After that date, there was still ample information of Japanese fleet movements in the Far East, but no trace whatever of Japanese carrier forces and submarines.

This absence of information of the location of the fast Japanese carrier striking forces was noted in the reports submitted daily to Admiral Kimmel by his Radio Intelligence officer Captain Layton. When the report for 2 December was given to Admiral Kimmel he commented on this lack of information concerning the carrier divisions. Captain Layton later described the conversation that followed:

" . . . Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are,' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.'

"Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it,' or words to that effect. My reply was that 'I hope they would be sighted by now.'" (J. C. Com. Report, p. 135)

Japanese messages had been intercepted, after 5 November, 1941, giving instructions for procedures to be followed, if and when the Japanese missions abroad were ordered to destroy their codes and ciphers and secret papers. There were also a long series of messages as to procedures to be followed in assuring communications should it no longer be possible to use codes. After 1 December a new series of Japanese messages were intercepted giving specific orders for the destruction of codes and secret papers. The contents of these messages were promptly communicated to the Commands in the Pacific in messages such as the following:

3 December; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

3 December; Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, and Commandant, 16th Naval District (Philippines); for information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commandant, 14th Naval District (Hawaii):

"Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo, One December, ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Ma-

nila to destroy PURPLE [Code] machine. . . . December second Washington also directed destroy PURPLE; all but one copy of other systems; and all secret documents. British Admiralty London reports Embassy London has complied."

4 December; Chief of Naval Operations dispatches to Commands and Missions in the Far East, ordering destruction of U. S. codes and secret documents; for information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

6 December; Chief-of-Naval Operations dispatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"In view of the international situation and of the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents, now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment."

6 December; Commandant, 14th Naval District (Hawaii) to Office of Chief of Naval Operations:

"Believe local [i.e., Japanese] Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third."

Pacific Commander's Failure to Act After Code-Destruction Warnings

There had been much debate in Washington in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, after 27 November, 1941, over the question of whether further warnings should be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets.

PART III

Contents of Intercepted Japanese Messages Prior to 7 December, 1941

THE "MAGIC" OPERATION for the interception, decryption and translation of Japanese messages by the War and Navy Departments has been described in the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. (Pp. 178/9). By the end of 1940, the Army and Navy Communications Intelligence Services had broken Japanese diplomatic codes and were thus able to communicate daily to twenty-odd highest officers of the War and Navy Department, and of the State Department, as well as to the President, the translations of the more important diplomatic messages being exchanged between Tokyo and Japanese missions in other countries, notably in the United States, in Europe, and in the Far East.

This "Magic" operation was perhaps the most closely guarded secret in the War and Navy Departments in 1941. The Communications Intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was chiefly occupied with the interception and analysis of Japanese naval communications in the Pacific and was primarily concerned with the plans, dispositions and movements of Japanese naval forces.†

Admiral Hewitt also explained, in his 1945 report, that:

"It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed consider-

†Report, Adm. H. K. Hewitt to SecNav, 12 July, 1945, J. C. Com. Pt. 16 pp. 2294-7.

Several draft messages were prepared, but seemed to add nothing concrete to the information, warnings and directives already sent in earlier dispatches. When the intercepted Japanese messages concerning destruction of codes (above quoted) became available these were promptly transmitted to Commanders in the Pacific. This seemed an adequate further warning that the long anticipated new Japanese offensive action was about to begin, at least in Southeast Asia. There was no intelligence information of any kind available to indicate that Pearl Harbor, or even the Philippines were to be included among the Japanese new objectives.

It was later to be made evident that the Japanese instructions to their missions in areas under American or British control to destroy their codes and burn their secret papers had made little impression on the Command at Pearl Harbor. It is noted in the report of the Joint Congressional Committee that:

"Admiral Kimmel stated . . . that this information appeared to fit in with all the information we had received about a Japanese movement in Southeast Asia. Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers and secret documents. He testified, 'I didn't consider this of any vital importance when I received it.'"

"In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the most significant information received between November 27 and December 6 with respect to the imminence of war. . . . Orders to destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing—war within a very few days."*

able success in decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese naval traffic, was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis," and not upon the reading of the messages themselves. . . . The knowledge of C-in-C Pac as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly to the attention of C-in-C Pac daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer."

Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence in 1941, explained later that the increasing volume of the Japanese diplomatic messages which became available in 1941 made it difficult, if not impossible, to transmit copies of all messages intercepted to Commanders in the Pacific. There was seldom any information of direct military interest in these voluminous exchanges of messages between Tokyo and the Japanese diplomatic and consular missions abroad.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of

*This conclusion is given in the J. C. Com. Report, pp. 130-131, after a review of the testimony presented to the Committee concerning the significance of the code-destruction messages.

the Army and their Plans directors, Admiral R.K. Turner and General L.T. Gerow, sought "to inform Admirals Kimmel and Hart," and the Army Commanders in Pacific areas, "as to the major aspect of the international situation that might lead to war. . . ." This great volume of messages was read by the heads of Army and Navy Intelligence services in Washington and all significant information, with military or naval implications, was included in the periodical or special intelligence reports distributed secretly to all Army and Navy Commands.*

General Marshall explained to the Joint Congressional Committee the problems and difficulties encountered in 1941, in coping with the increasing volume of Japanese messages that were being intercepted. Only a small percentage of such messages were ever included in the "Magic" books which were daily submitted in locked pouches to the high officials on the very limited "Magic" distribution list. General Marshall was impressed with the ability shown by the services concerned "to turn out the critical messages in the manner that they did." Only messages that seemed of greatest importance could be quickly handled. With an increasing backlog of such diplomatic messages accumulating, said General Marshall, "there was always the hazard of . . . some particular message being overlooked." Moreover, there was always a possibility that the messages which might be most important might not reach him at all, as well as "the possibility that, in going through this mass of information—every day—I might not always absorb the true significance of such matters. . . ."

General Marshall added that, after the summer of 1940, "the minute the danger of war . . . became apparent, our intense concern was the secrecy of the source, because its value was very evident." There was increasing evidence in 1941 that Axis staffs, both in Berlin and in Tokyo, suspected that American cryptographic services had broken the Japanese codes. General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, informed Tokyo that the Germans believed it to be "almost certain that the U. S. Government is reading your code messages." When warned of this possibility Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, replied that "though I do not know which ones, I have discovered the United States is reading some of our codes." The Japanese then changed many of their codes but continued to believe that their PURPLE diplomatic code had not been broken. The communications services in Washington had indications in August, 1941, that the Japanese were beginning to suspect that even this code was being read in Washington. It was at this time that still greater restrictions were imposed on distribution of "Magic" intercepts in Washington and on their transmission to Commands in the Pacific. The fear that the Japanese might discover that the PURPLE code had been decrypted resulted, said Admiral Wilkinson, in "our tightening of security concerning intercepts . . . and care about broadcasting in any degree the texts, or knowledge derived from such messages."

Nature and Contents of Japanese Diplomatic Messages

The contents of these Japanese diplomatic messages, from early in 1940 until July 1941, had indicated that the Tokyo regime was continuously resisting German demands that Japan attack the Far Eastern possessions of Great Britain and her allies, notably Singapore and Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies. It seemed clear that Japan was not yet prepared to challenge the two greatest sea powers by attacking them in the Pacific. This conviction undoubtedly strengthened the determination in Washington

*Testimony of Admiral T. S. Wilkinson; J. C. Com. Pt. 4, pp. 1733-41, 1815, 1861.

†J. C. Com. Pt. 3, pp. 1100/1, 1146/7.

to maintain a show of naval strength in the Pacific and to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Japan. It was assumed that such policies would tend to deter Japan from becoming an active participant in a global war as an ally of Germany and Italy. It was not until Germany attacked the Soviet Union and brought great pressure on Japan to join in this attack that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages began to reveal, at least partially, the major Japanese objectives in Southeast Asia, and the plans and methods by which the Japanese Government and military High Command (the Imperial General Headquarters) were intending to achieve their major purpose of establishing their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Greater East Asia and in the South Pacific. The essential parts of the Japanese policies and decisions determined upon in Tokyo in the first part of July, 1941, were, however, not revealed by the "Magic" intercepts of that period. Those parts of the decisions then taken that had direct military implications were carefully omitted from the highly secret information and directives then transmitted to Japanese missions abroad.

The extent to which the Japanese sought to conceal plans and intentions for military implementation of their policies is well illustrated by the passages from the July 1941 decisions which were not included in the diplomatic messages. The same practice was to be continued, more or less systematically, from July to December, 1941.

Japanese Ambassadors abroad were informed by the Japanese Foreign Office on 2 July, 1941, of decisions just reached at an Imperial Conference of the Japanese Cabinet and the Imperial General Headquarters, presided over personally by the Emperor, to define "The Principal Points of the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation." The full text of these decisions was later included by Prince Konoye in his Memoirs. The parts of these decisions not included in the diplomatic messages are set in italics below:

"The Principal Points of the Imperial Policy"

"I.—The Policy.

"(1) Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity, regardless of how the World situation may change.

"(2) The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward, in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

"(3) *The Imperial Government will carry out the above program no matter what obstacles are encountered.*

"II.—The Principal Points (or Summary)

"(1) For the purposes of bringing the Chiang regime into submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda, and military plans for taking over the Concessions.

"(2) Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued and various other plans [i.e., for military operations] shall be speeded with regard to vital points in the South. Concomitantly, preparations for southward pressure shall be reinforced, and the policy already decided upon, with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand, shall be executed. *In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article, we will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America.*

"(3) As regards the Russo-German War, although the spirit of the THREE POWER AXIS (Pact) shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations [i.e., with the USSR and Germany] shall be carried out with extreme care. *In case*

the German-Soviet war should develop to our advantage, we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and guarantee the safety of our northern borders.

"(4) In carrying out the preceding article all plans, especially [for] the use of armed forces, will be carried out in such a way as to place no serious obstacle in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America.

"(5) Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the [European] war, if need be Japan shall act in accordance with the THREE POWER PACT and shall decide when and how force will be employed.

"(6) We will immediately turn our attention to placing the nation on a war basis and will take special measures to strengthen the defenses of the nation.

"(7) Concrete [Military] plans covering this program will be drawn up separately."

The Japanese Ambassadors were thus informed of the main objectives of imperial policy, but they were not informed of the means, particularly military, by which the policy would be implemented. It became known only after 1945 that this Imperial Conference had approved outline plans to govern future operational planning by the Imperial General Headquarters for a possible Greater East Asia war "against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in addition to China, and, if necessary, or appropriate, the Soviet Union." The details of this master plan became known in 1945-1946 and have now been published.*

Messages intercepted in the first days of July, 1941, led the Chief of Naval Operations to inform the Commanders of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, on 3 July, 1941, (in a message quoted above) that the policy decisions just made at the Tokyo Imperial Conference implied an imminent threat of war in the Pacific. Other messages also transmitted to the Commanders in the Pacific, indicated that the date set for the next Japanese offensive operations was about 20 July. There was no definite information concerning the objectives of such an offensive. It was first assumed that it might be directed against the Soviet Maritime Provinces, but later messages indicated that bases were about to be seized in southern Indo-China.

Revelation of Japanese Military Plans in Southeast Asia

While the staffs in Washington were seeking to interpret Japanese diplomatic messages of early July, 1941, and to learn the next Japanese aggressive objectives a very significant message from the Japanese mission in Canton, China, to Tokyo was intercepted. In this message was a summary of the information just given to Japanese missions in China and in Southeast Asia concerning the military plans for the next southward move, as well as plans for later military action in that region. In this message, sent on 14 July, and available in the "Magic" book five days later, it was stated that:

"(1) The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expan-

*J. C. Com. Report, pp. 53-6; also S. E. Morison, Naval Division, Vol. III "The Rising Sun in the Pacific," and the Str. Bombing Survey Rpt. "Campaigns of the Pacific War." The full text of the more important intercepted Japanese messages, circulated in the "Magic" books from July to December, 1941, are published in chronological order in J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 1-316. In July, 1941, such messages concerning the decisions of the Imperial Conference and the plans to occupy bases in Southern Indo-China were transmitted by C.N.O. to the Pacific Naval Command, as has been indicated above.

sion, and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible with the backing of the Axis, but if necessary alone. . . .

"(2) The immediate object will be to attempt peaceful French Indo-China occupation, but we will crush resistance if offered and set up martial law. Secondly, our purpose is to launch therefrom a rapid attack when the international situation is suitable. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. . . . In the main, through the activities of our air arm . . . and of our submarine fleet . . . we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us. . . ."

Crisis in Japanese-American Relations; July-September, 1941

The Japanese-American conversations in Washington had been suspended, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, partly because of Secretary Hull's distrust of Foreign Minister Matsuoka. At the very moment when the decision was reached in Tokyo to occupy bases in Southern Indo-China, Prince Konoye's Cabinet resigned and was immediately replaced by another Konoye government with Admiral Toyoda replacing Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. Konoye explained to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and Admiral Nomura to Admiral Turner in Washington, that Matsuoka had been dropped because of Mr. Hull's antipathy to him and also because Admiral Toyoda shared Konoye's own desire to reach an early agreement with the United States Government. Admiral Nomura added that he had received urgent instructions from the new Foreign Minister "to press for an understanding along the lines he had been discussing with Secretary Hull."

The President, in an interview with Admiral Nomura on 24 July, attended also by Under-Secretary Welles and Admiral Stark, listened sympathetically to the Japanese Ambassador's explanation of the desire of the new Konoye Cabinet to resume the conversations in order to reach an early agreement along lines suggested by Secretary Hull in June. The President then asked Nomura to transmit a new suggestion to Tokyo, which Mr. Roosevelt defined in the following terms.

"If the Japanese would withdraw their forces from French Indo-China, he would seek to obtain a solemn declaration by the United States, Britain, China and the Netherlands to regard Indo-China as a 'neutralized' country, provided Japan gave a similar commitment. . . . A week later the President extended his proposal to include Thailand."†

There had long been developing in the Cabinet, in Congress and in the country an increasing demand for further economic sanctions against Japan, in the event of any new Japanese aggressive military action in the Far East.

Among measures proposed had been an embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan. This action had been strongly opposed by naval leaders, who pointed out that such an oil embargo might lead Japan to seize oil-producing areas in the Netherlands East Indies. These views were strongly restated in a memorandum prepared by Admiral Turner, 21 July, 1941, which was given by Admiral Stark to the President.

*Message, Canton to Tokyo #255, 14 July, 1941; Tr. in Washington, 19 July; text in J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 2/3; Sent by C.N.C. to C-in-C AF, Info C-in-C PAC in CPNAV dispatch 192330 July '41—J. C. Com. Pt. 14, p. 1399. Cf. also Hull Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1012/3.

†Hull Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1013/4.

While this question was under consideration by the Cabinet, and before the President's proposal for "neutralization" of Indo-China had reached Tokyo, the news of the entry of Japanese forces into Southern Indo-China precipitated the approval by the President, on 25 July, 1941, of a series of Executive Orders, freezing Japanese assets in the United States (as German and Italian assets had been frozen a month before), forbidding further trade with Japan except by special license for each transaction, and also bringing the Philippine Army into active service with the U. S. Far Eastern forces.

In the light of the earlier intimations of Japanese military plans and intentions, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army agreed that a dispatch should be sent to Commanders in the Pacific, warning them of the imminent threat of war with Japan. In this message (quoted in Part II above), Admiral Stark and General Marshall sent a formal warning to Army and Navy Commanders in the Pacific, informing them of the President's action and emphasizing possible Japanese reactions.

Admiral Nomura was greatly alarmed by the action taken by the President. While his orders did not specifically proclaim an "oil embargo," and left open the possibility of licensing further shipments of oil products to Japan, no such licenses were in fact to be issued in the weeks that followed. Moreover, the Panama Canal had been closed to Japanese ships in mid-July. All of these measures, and the announced intention of reinforcing air and ground forces in the Philippines, led the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to turn to his acquaintances in the U. S. Navy, notably Admirals Stark and Turner, and Admiral W. V. Pratt (a former C.N.O.) for advice.

Admiral Turner outlined for Nomura in July (while Admiral Stark was absent from Washington) the basic American policy and strategy objectives. He made it clear to the Japanese Ambassador that "the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany." He pointed out that those responsible for formulation of the policy of the United States had long recognized that, if British power in the Atlantic collapsed, "German military power might very well be directed against South America." As Admiral Nomura promptly informed Admiral Toyoda, the new Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo, the American authorities were very desirous of avoiding a conflict with Japan in the Pacific. Admiral Turner had made it clear to him, however, that it would be contrary to "the military interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany."

It seemed apparent to the American military and naval High Command that "anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom in any part of the world also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint." It seemed clear to Admiral Turner, as to Admiral Stark, that any direct threat to "the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies," such as the Japanese occupation of bases in Indo-China, would so weaken "the integrity of the defense of the British Isles" that the United States inevitably had "a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, in sustaining the *status quo* in the southern portion of the Far East."

Admiral Nomura, in reply to the instructions and proposals of the new Cabinet, sought to make clear to Tokyo the basic objectives of U. S. policy. He reported that the U. S. Government and High Command were committed to giving

*Memo. Admiral R. K. Turner to C.N.O., 22 July, 1941; text in For. Rel. U.S.-Japan, II, pp. 516-520; summarized in Messages, Washington to Tokyo, July-Aug. 1941; J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 3-15. All other intercepted messages quoted below are to be found in this same Exhibit in Pt. 12.

active all-out support, short of war, to all opponents of the Axis Powers. They assumed that "the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world." Hence the Japanese Ambassador in Washington increasingly found that the American leaders felt that "talking with [those] who harbor such policies is out of the question."

Admiral Nomura also pointed out that the higher American officials, including the heads of the War and Navy Departments, were convinced that the existing agreements between Japan and her Axis partners in Europe were closer than they appeared to be on paper, or were in reality. He warned Tokyo that this conviction had led the heads of the U. S. Government and military forces to decide that it would be necessary to take such action as might be necessary "to counteract certain steps by Japan," and notably "Japanese Southward or Northward expansion attempts." He therefore warned that:

"There is no doubt whatever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation."

Rumors of a meeting between the President and the British Prime Minister were current in the Axis capitals in the first week of August, 1941. Ambassador Nomura, in his message to Tokyo of 7 August (above cited), explained that relations of the United States and Great Britain with Japan were being continuously discussed between the Washington and London Governments, adding that:

"It is reported that the President accompanied by high Army and Navy officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.

"3. It must be noted that the Government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. . . . Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future. Our country is standing at a most critical crossroads. . . ."

These warnings from Nomura to Tokyo were repeated and greatly accentuated in his message of the next three months. He thus again cabled on 9 August;

"I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that the occupation of South French Indo-China indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. . . ."

"In view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister [i.e., Prince Konoye], to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. . . ."

"Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can feel only pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation. . . ."

The Atlantic Conference and Konoye's Proposal for a Pacific Meeting

The Japanese Ambassador in Washington had reported to his Government the conviction of American leaders that the Axis Alliance was much closer and more binding on Japan than was in fact the case. But he expressed his own mistaken view that the British-American Alliance already existed,

both for diplomatic and military cooperation. Had he been present at the Atlantic meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, his opinion would inevitably have been very different.

Prime Minister Churchill did in fact propose to President Roosevelt in these meetings that the United States and the British Commonwealth should take a common stand in opposing a further Japanese southward advance. He suggested that such common action be initiated by a strongly worded joint warning to Japan against any new military aggressive move in Southeast Asia.

Such a program of common action would necessarily have implied commitments for both governments not only to concert their diplomatic action in dealing with Japan, but also to use their available military forces in the Southeast Pacific in concerted "combined" operations against any Japanese advance beyond the lines suggested by the Singapore Staff Conference of April, 1941.

The conclusions of the report of this conference had already been rejected by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, in their memorandum for the British Chiefs of Staff of 3 July, 1941.

The President shared the views of his chief military advisers and was as conscious as were Admiral Stark and General Marshall of the relative strategic weakness of American and British positions and forces in the Far East. He therefore refused to agree to Mr. Churchill's proposal that the United States and the British Commonwealth commit themselves to a joint program of diplomatic and military action in the Far East that might result in war with Japan.*

President Roosevelt agreed that the United States and Great Britain should concert their diplomatic and economic pressure on Japan, in an effort to deter the Japanese from further advances southward. But he insisted that even such action should be by parallel measure of the Governments concerned, rather than by joint action. The President and his chief military advisers discussed with the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff the increase in military supplies to Britain rather than plans for "combined" military operations to assure the defeat of Germany and to cope with Japanese aggression in the Far East. As Mr. Churchill later wrote to Field-Marshal Smuts:

"At the Atlantic meeting I told [the President's] circle that I would rather have an American declaration of war now and no supplies for six months than double the supplies and no declaration. When this was repeated to him, he thought it a hard saying. We must not underrate his constitutional difficulties. He may take action as Chief Executive, but only Congress can declare war. He went so far as to say to me: 'I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months.' . . . Naturally, if I saw my way of helping to lift this situation to a higher plane I would do so. In the meanwhile we must have patience and trust to the tide which is flowing our way and to events."†

When the official communiqué on the Atlantic Conference was issued from Washington, with the text of the "Atlantic Charter" declaration of the President and the Prime Minister, Admiral Nomura reported to Tokyo his own estimate of probable future American-British plans and intentions. He again warned that American-Japanese relations had reached "a stage in which anything might happen at any moment." He was convinced that the existing tension "would grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move," such as an

*Matloff and Snell, "Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare," pp. 68/9.
†Churchill, Vol. III; "The Grand Alliance," pp. 593/4.

occupation of Thailand. In his opinion, American views were still widely divided as to participation in the war against Germany, but that the American people seemed "unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East."

Nomura felt that "this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire." He also reported that the President was still hesitant about adopting such a course of action, "inasmuch as he and the [American] naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be."

Admiral Nomura also felt that the American people shared the basic conviction of their leaders that "the war has already passed the stage of being a short and decisive one and has entered the stage of being [a war] of attrition" and that in such a situation the World War, as in 1917, "is turning in favor of Britain and the United States." Americans seemed generally convinced that their superior resources would enable the United States and Great Britain to attain their basic objective, "the defeat of Nazi aggression."

President Roosevelt sent for the Japanese Ambassador on 17 August to discuss with him and with the Secretary of State the Japanese proposal "for a resumption of the informal conversations . . . directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area." Roosevelt summarized the discussion at this meeting in a message to Prime Minister Churchill in the following terms:

"I made to him [i.e., Ambassador Nomura] a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than, and was substantially similar to, the statement we had discussed.

"The Ambassador renewed the request . . . in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest . . . I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized, and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to readjust its position and enter upon a peaceful program, this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversation; and that, before undertaking the resumption of these conversations, we felt it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans."*

Leaders in both Tokyo and Washington were keenly aware, after July 1941, of increasing tension between the two countries which might terminate in armed conflict. The Imperial Conference of July 2 had outlined a program for military as well as for diplomatic action. The Imperial General Headquarters hastened the completion of operation plans for the new southward advance.

Messages exchanged between Tokyo and Japanese missions on the mainland of Asia made it clear that the next Japanese military aggressive move from the new bases in Indo-China would inevitably include the occupation of Thailand, and perhaps also moves against the Burma Road, into Malaya and into the Netherlands Indies. The fact that the planned "Greater East Asia War" included the United States among the powers to be attacked, notably by the occupation of the Philippines, could not be gleaned from messages then intercepted.

Prince Konoye's major objective from mid-August to mid-

*Msg. Dept. of State to Amembassy, London, #3208, 18 Aug. '41, triple priority. Secret, From the President to Churchill; text in J. C. Com. Pt. 15, pp. 1717/8.

October became increasingly that of winning agreement to his proposal for a meeting with the President, somewhere in the Pacific. The President was inclined to favor such a meeting. Secretary Hull insisted, however, that no such meeting be held until agreement should be reached not only "in principle" on the major issues, but also on practical methods of giving effect to these principles. As time passed, the Japanese diplomatic messages revealed not only the increasing urgency of Prince Konoye's desperate but vain effort to arrange for the "Leaders' Meeting," but also the conviction that the negotiations were rapidly approaching an ominous "deadline" date.

Cordell Hull has described in the following terms the status of diplomatic relations with Japan, after July 1941:

"This first act of the drama of our dialogue with Japan ended in failure, just as the second act was destined to end. It showed us, however, what we had to face. Japan would readily and instantly have signed a straight non-aggression pact with the United States. She would as readily have signed a general agreement with us, on the basis of her own proposals. But neither pact would have given us peace for more than a short time. And either one would have meant a betrayal of China, Great Britain, Russia and the Netherlands, and of our own future security.

"From now on, our major objective with regard to Japan was to give ourselves more time to prepare our defenses. We were still ready, and eager, to do everything possible toward keeping the United States out of war; but it was our concurrent duty to concentrate on trying to make the country ready to defend itself effectively in the event of war being thrust upon us."*

Japanese Policy Decisions September, 1941

The basic "Imperial Policy," as well as the diplomatic and military action to be undertaken to implement this policy, and to achieve its objectives, was repeatedly reaffirmed after July, 1941. Only the diplomatic aspects of these decisions were apparent in intercepted messages. Military plans and intentions could only be inferred from these messages and from intelligence on movements and dispositions of Japanese forces. It was difficult enough for the high officers on the "Magic" distribution lists in Washington to reach any adequate estimate of Japanese courses of military action. Had the whole body of this data been available in Hawaii, it could only have increased the confusion and uncertainties that prevailed there in judgments reached as to when and where the Japanese might strike with the full weight of their army, air and naval forces.

The fact that "Magic" gave no adequate intimation of Japanese military plans and decisions is illustrated even more emphatically by absence of information of the decisions of a new Imperial Conference, 6 September, 1941, than it had been by the heavily censored reports on the decisions of 2 July. When it became evident in Tokyo that Konoye's effort to arrange for the "Leaders' Meeting" in September had failed, the Imperial General Headquarters, and particularly the Army High Command, insisted that the whole problem of Japanese-American relations be considered at an Imperial Conference. Konoye was forced to yield to this demand.

The Imperial Conference, marked by many dramatic developments fully described in Konoye's Memoirs, met on 6 September. Final decisions were reached on proposals of the Army High Command submitted in an "Outline of Measures to Be Taken for the Execution of the Policy of the Imperial

*Hull Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1014/5.

Government," as it had been defined on 2 July, 1941. These decisions were reached only after the Emperor had personally rejected the Army demand for an immediate rupture of diplomatic conversations with the United States and an early beginning of the planned military operations. The Emperor fully supported Prince Konoye's request that priority be given to diplomatic efforts for at least another two months.

No hint of the content of the decisions thus reached in Tokyo, on 6 September 1941, appeared in the diplomatic messages intercepted by U. S. Services. After the surrender of Japan in August, 1945, the full text of this "Outline of Measures to Be Taken" became known. The Imperial Conference had then solemnly ratified a statement of

"PLANS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT."

"(1) Japan, in order to assure its independent national existence and self-defense, and determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with America, England and the Netherlands, would proceed with her war preparations which were to be completed by the end of October [1941].

"(2) Japan would still continue its effort, by every possible diplomatic means, to have her demands [as defined in an annex] agreed to by America and England.

"(3) Should satisfactory results not be obtained by the end of October, and if it then appeared that there was no reasonable hope of having the Japanese demands accepted, the Japanese Government and High Command should then make up their minds to undertake a war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, while making a special effort to prevent America and the Soviet Union from joining in united action against Japan."*

A Deadline For Diplomatic Negotiations

The Imperial Conference had decided in July, 1941, that negotiations should be continued for about another three months while the Imperial General Headquarters were preparing plans for a "Greater East Asia War." At the September meeting the deadline was fixed for the end of October. There was no mention of this date in the diplomatic messages, except in relation to the time for the "Leaders' Meeting." The major objective then being sought by the Konoye Cabinet was to obtain American agreement to such a meeting.

Tokyo repeatedly pointed out to Admiral Nomura that any agreement between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan, negotiated at meetings attended by influential Generals and Admirals, would have such prestige in Japan as to assure its success, even if it included measures for the gradual withdrawal of Japanese forces from China as well as from Indo-China. The indications of Japanese policy and plans obtained from these intercepted messages was communicated by Admiral Stark to Admirals Kimmel and Hart, in the long series of personal letters sent them during this period, which have been cited in Part II, above.

It became apparent from these same messages, as the weeks passed with no progress being made in arranging the "Leaders' Meeting," that the time for diplomatic negotiations was rapidly running out. This fact was strongly stressed by Prince Konoye to Ambassador Grew, when they met secretly for dinner on the evening of 6 September, 1941, only a few hours after the final session of the Imperial Conference.

Although Grew knew nothing of the secret holding of this

*Konoye Memoirs; Annex summarizing decisions of the Imperial Conference, 6 Sept., 1941, in J. C. Com. Pt. 20, p. 4022; Cf. also Hull, Memoirs, II, p. 1102.

conference, he was so impressed with the gravity of the situation, as described by Prince Konoye, that he reported at length to the State Department on the Premier's statements. Konoye had frankly admitted his own responsibility both for Japanese action in China and for Japan's participation in the Tripartite Axis Pact. Konoye also maintained that he alone might lead the Japanese Government to seek and to obtain the "rehabilitation of relations between the United States and Japan." He again reminded the Ambassador that he, as Premier, "and consequently the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly agree with the four principles enunciated by the Secretary of State." There only remained the task of finding measures by which these principles could be applied which would be acceptable both to the United States and to Japan. Konoye insisted that this could best be done in a personal meeting between himself and the President. But he also increasingly insisted that "time is of the essence."⁶

This theme of the importance of time, in reaching a diplomatic agreement, was to be the *leitmotiv* in the Tokyo messages from August through November, 1941. It was repeated in increasingly urgent terms in scores of the messages sent to Admiral Nomura in Washington. Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyoda repeatedly insisted that "in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever" (27 September). Tokyo complained that "the United States Government does not comprehend the fact that . . . no delays can be countenanced" (4 October). Ambassador Nomura sought desperately to persuade all American officials with whom he spoke of the urgency of reaching agreement.

In mid-October, the Konoye Cabinet was under great pressure from the Army High Command to break off the Washington conversations. Admiral Nomura was then informed that "circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay" (13 October). General Tojo replaced Prince Konoye as Prime Minister on 16 October. Admiral Nomura was then informed that "the new Cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations," but that Japan could take no other action "except to urge the United States to reconsider her views." It should therefore be made clear to the Americans "that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter" (21 October).

Japanese "Final" Proposals And War Plans

The original "deadline" date for obtaining Japanese objectives by diplomatic agreement with the United States—the end of October—came in the midst of conferences between the Japanese Cabinet and the Imperial General Headquarters. Japanese army leaders accepted Hitler's version of German successes against Soviet forces and were impatient to seize the resource-rich areas of Southeast Asia. This pressure on the Cabinet to break off negotiations and begin the "Greater East Asia War" was reflected in intercepted diplomatic messages. Ambassador Nomura was informed on 25 October that the Government was going ahead with its plans to achieve the objectives of national policy that had been previously defined. In so doing the Cabinet was "particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposals." The new decisions about to be taken would "embody the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations."

Foreign Minister Togo expressed regrets to Ambassador

⁶Joseph C. Grew, "My Ten Years in Tokyo," p. 369; Cf. also Grew's Memoirs, "Turbulent Era," II, pp. 1324-1331, for full account of discussions with Prince Konoye, concerning the proposed "Leaders' Meeting."

Grew on 31 October that relations between the two countries had been getting "worse and worse." He feared that "unfortunate results will ensue." Togo made similar remarks to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, suggesting British intervention to facilitate a speedy American-Japanese agreement "in order to establish and maintain the peace of the world." Unless this happened the Japanese Foreign Minister could not tell "what a lamentable situation will occur."

An intercepted message addressed by Tokyo to Washington on 4 November forecast the decisions about to be taken by the Imperial Conference. Ambassador Nomura was informed that:

" . . . Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. . . . The Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days . . . and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. . . .

"Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible; yet, in our [sincere desire] to maintain Pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided . . . to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If, through it, we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two countries be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussion will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of the die."

Other messages from Tokyo to Washington on 4 and 5 November transmitted to Nomura texts of the proposals "A" and "B" that were being submitted to the Imperial Conference for ratification. Nomura was also informed that Ambassador Saburo Kurusu was being sent to Washington to assist in the final negotiations. The two envoys were to do their utmost "to have them accept . . . 'Proposal A' in the shortest possible time." Should this prove impossible, "and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal." Absolutely no delays could be tolerated, but the Ambassador was "to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum," but he was also to make it clear "that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal."

Ambassador Nomura was further informed most secretly that:

"Because of certain circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances, it is an unavoidable one. . . ."

Last Stage of the Washington Conversations, November, 1941

The receipt in Washington of the "final" Japanese proposals by the Japanese Ambassador and by the higher American officials on the "Magic" distribution list, on 5 November, 1941, initiated the last stages of the Washington conversations. Ambassador Nomura in the next week had submitted "Proposal A" to Secretary Hull and had discussed it with President Roosevelt. State Department studies of this proposal had convinced Secretary Hull that it represented complete American acquiescence in the Japanese program of

imperial expansion in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, a kind of diplomatic "unconditional surrender to Japan." The President had concurred in this view and had then asked Nomura whether some kind of "modus vivendi" might not still be worked out, while further talks were being held.

When Ambassador Kurusu arrived in Washington on 15 November, he joined Nomura in a final effort to persuade the Secretary of State and the President to accept "Proposal A," perhaps with modifications of points not acceptable to the United States. When the failure of this effort was reported to Tokyo, the Envoys in Washington were instructed to submit "Proposal B," for maintenance of peace in the Pacific by a reversion to conditions existing before July, 1941, while negotiations for a definitive Japanese-American agreement continued. Literally hundreds of diplomatic messages were exchanged during this period between Tokyo and Washington. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, the Imperial General Headquarters was completing the final operational plans for launching the "Greater East Asia War," including the super-secret plan for the surprise air attack on the U.S. Fleet at its Pearl Harbor Base.

The intercepted diplomatic messages that were available through "Magic" between November 1 and early December gave no hint of these military plans. After 15 November movements of Japanese forces toward Formosa, Hainan and Indo-China gave proof that a new Japanese southward offensive was about to begin, perhaps immediately after 25 November, the deadline date fixed for the negotiations. There was not as yet, however, any exact information in Washington concerning the exact significance of this date.

On 22 November, while the terms of the latest Tokyo notes were being discussed in the State Department, the following message from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted:

"To both you Ambassadors: It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736 [i.e., of 5 Nov., 1941]. You should know this, however; I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if, within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth-added [i.e., Tokyo time or 28th Washington time]); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and, in short, if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that [i.e., after 29 November, Tokyo time, or 28

November Washington time] *things are automatically going to happen*. Please take this into careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."⁷ [Author's italics]

The action taken in the War and Navy Departments, after receipt of this intercepted message has been summarized above (in Part II). A new warning was addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing information available in Washington concerning Japanese intentions. It was pointed out that Japan might attack at any time and "in any direction." Meantime, the flood of Japanese diplomatic messages continued to arrive through "Magic." Negotiations continued in Washington.

When Ambassador Nomura formally presented "Proposal A," for a definitive settlement of U.S.-Japanese conflicts, to the President and to Secretary Hull, on 10 November, they had already decided that the terms of this proposal could not be accepted by the United States Government. They had also decided that the terms of "Proposal B," for a provisional agreement or temporary truce, were equally unacceptable, but that an American "modus vivendi" counter-proposal might be formulated which the Japanese Government might be persuaded to accept.

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu had submitted to Secretary Hull on 20 November, the revised text of "Proposal B," demanding an immediate American reply. By 25 November, the terms of the American "modus vivendi" counter-proposal had been approved at the White House meeting of the President's "War Council," to be given to the Japanese, with a State Department note restating the principles which would govern American participation in further negotiation to achieve a definitive Japanese-American agreement. When Secretary Hull met the Japanese Ambassadors late on 26 November he gave them, after agreement with the President, not the American "modus vivendi" counter-proposal approved the day before, but only the State Department's "Ten Point Note."

It became known in Washington two days later, through "Magic" intercepted messages from Tokyo, that the Japanese Government would reject the American reply given them on 26 November. It was also known in Washington, on that "deadline" date of 28 November, 1941, that if this date came before a diplomatic agreement had been reached between the two Governments, Tokyo had announced that "things are automatically going to happen." But neither the Japanese nor the American participants in the Washington Conversations yet knew exactly what these "things" might be which could be expected "automatically to happen" in the next few days.

PART IV

The Japanese Attack; Last Preparations, 26 November-6 December

SECRETARY HULL HAD TOLD Secretaries Stimson and Knox at the White House meeting of the President's War Council, on 25 November, 1941, that the time for negotiations had ended. National Security and dealings with Japan were henceforth to be the responsibility of the Army and Navy. He repeated this statement to Secretary Stimson on the morning of 27 November. As indicated above (in Part

II), the War and Navy Departments had then sent final warnings to commanders in Pacific areas, directing them to take appropriate defensive dispositions and to be prepared at any moment to begin the execution of their tasks and

⁷J. C. Com. Pt. 12, p. 165; this message was decoded and translated by the Army staff concerned, 22 November, 1941, and was immediately circulated to those who saw the "Magic" books.

missions under the RAINBOW 5 War Plan. But they were also informed that this plan, and the ABC-1 staff agreements for combined operations with British forces, would enter into effect only after Japan had committed an overt act of war against United States positions or forces.

Winston Churchill has described the period which followed in these terms:

"For the following week a deadly hush settled in the Pacific. The possibilities of a diplomatic settlement had been exhausted. No act of military aggression had yet occurred. My deepest fear was that the Japanese would attack us or the Dutch and that constitutional difficulties would prevent the United States from declaring war."⁸

The British Prime Minister, like the authorities in Washington, did not know "that the die had already been cast by Japan or how far the President's resolves had gone." Mr. Churchill therefore sent to President Roosevelt, 30 November, 1941, one of his "Former Naval Person" messages, explaining that:

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties, but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right, which may be very near, you should not say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress,' or words to that effect. We should of course make a similar declaration, or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me . . . for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war."

The Prime Minister was later to comment, quite correctly, that both the President "and Tojo were already far ahead of this. So were events."

Agreement had in fact been reached at the White House meeting of the President's "War Council," on 28 November, that the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy should draft solemn warnings to Japan in messages to be sent by the President to the Emperor of Japan and to the Congress. The President so informed the Prime Minister, on 1 December, 1941, and again declined, as he had done at the Atlantic Conference in August, to accept Churchill's suggestion that there should be a joint United States-British warning to Japan, or joint action in meeting a new Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia.

The situation characterized by Mr. Churchill as the "deadly hush in the Pacific" had in fact existed since the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on 6 September had fixed the end of October as the "time limit" for negotiations. This limit had been passed when the Imperial Conference of 5 November had decided that 25 November should be the absolutely final "deadline" date for diplomatic efforts to reach agreement with the United States. It was only when the message from Tokyo announcing this decision reached Washington on 5 November that the existence of such a "deadline" date became definitely known.

But there was no indication, then or later, of the action

⁸Churchill, "The Grand Alliance," pp. 598-601.

the Japanese might take if no diplomatic agreement had been reached by that date, other than the warning that came to Washington, 22 November, that these "things," whatever they were, would automatically happen.

The numerous and lengthy diplomatic messages exchanged between Tokyo and Washington, 5-28 November, 1941, seemed to indicate that Japanese leaders both in Tokyo and in Washington still preferred to reach even a provisional agreement, or a temporary truce, with the United States, rather than risk the hazards of adventurous diplomatic or military action in the Far East. If such a diplomatic agreement were not reached by the "deadline" date, it was clear that the Washington conversations would be ended. It seemed possible that this might mean a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There were also intimations that the Japanese might begin a new military advance southward, at least into Thailand, perhaps into Burma, possibly also, immediately or later, into British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. There were no indications that the military objectives of such a new military aggression would include the Philippines or other U. S. possessions or forces.⁹

The Ambassadors in Washington reported to Tokyo, on 26 November, their disappointment over the terms of the American "Ten Point Note." They added, however, that if Japan "let the situation remain as tense as it is now, . . . the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so." They went on to suggest an exchange of messages between the President and the Prime Minister of Japan, agreeing to continue negotiations, "for the sake of posterity," in order to cooperate "for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific."

The Ambassadors thought Japan should accept the suggestion made by the President, 24 July, 1941, and "propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands Indies and Thailand."

The Tokyo Government replied on 28 November (the "deadline" date) that the time for negotiations had passed. The Imperial Government could not use as a basis of further discussions "the quite unexpected and extremely humiliating proposal" of the U. S. Government. Therefore,

"with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on the American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, . . . the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific."

The increasing indications of an early Japanese aggression in the Southwest Pacific, received after the President's departure from Washington on 28 November, convinced his chief advisers that decisive action might be necessary at any moment. Warnings of the imminence of war with Japan had been sent on 27 November to the commands in the Pacific. No further information was yet available concerning the possible time and place of any Japanese attacks, beyond the increasing flood of reports of the movement southward of Japanese amphibious forces in the South China Sea.

Messages exchanged between Japanese missions in Hanoi, Indo-China, and in Bangkok, Thailand, with Tokyo merely confirmed the estimates in Washington that a movement of Japanese forces into Thailand, perhaps also into Burma and Malaya, might begin at any time. The imminence of this

⁹See texts of Tokyo-Washington messages, 5-28 Nov. '41, in J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 98-185; also diplomatic documents in State Dept. Publ. "Foreign Relations, U. S.-Japan, Vol. II."

threat seemed such that Secretary Hull, after consulting the heads of the War and Navy Departments, telephoned the President at Warm Springs, Georgia, suggesting that Mr. Roosevelt return immediately to Washington.

The President's Return to Washington; Decisions Taken

Secretary Hull and Admiral Stark met with the President at noon on 1 December, 1941, to review the situation and to consider what diplomatic or military action might be taken to meet the obvious threat presented by the southward movement of Japanese forces toward the Gulf of Siam and the shores of Malaya. A series of messages from the British Prime Minister, as well as from U. S. and British Commands in the Far East stressed the imminence of this danger. Press reports of this White House meeting quoted Admiral Nomura as saying that "there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation," and also stated that

"Japan is massing troops in Southern Indo-China for a possible military move into Thailand, which an authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States would not tolerate. In Manila, the leaves of U. S. naval and military forces have been cancelled and London reports said military and air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies." (Washington Post, 2 Dec. '41)

Admiral Stark again invited the attention of the President to the conclusions of the joint memorandum given him, 27 November, in which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army had recommended that any Japanese movement across a specified line should be opposed by force. (See text in Part II above.) The British had already indicated their intention of so doing and had asked what the United States would do "if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus." Prime Minister Churchill had recommended new and solemn joint or parallel warnings to Japan against any such new aggression. The President took a series of decisions, after this discussion, including the following:

1. Admiral Stark was directed to order the C-in-C Asiatic Fleet to establish air and surface patrols between Manila and Camranh Bay (Indo-China) to discover and report movements of Japanese convoys toward the Gulf of Siam, and to exchange information with the British forces making similar reconnaissance from Malaya.

2. Messages were to be sent to the British Prime Minister declining his proposal for joint warnings to Japan, or for joint action against a Japanese movement beyond the specified lines, but indicating the President's intention to make such a protest, and if this proved unavailing, to send messages to the Emperor of Japan, and, if necessary, to Congress.

3. The Japanese Ambassadors were to be asked to transmit an inquiry from the President to the Japanese Government, asking the significance of the southward movement of Japanese forces, while repeating former warnings against any new military aggression.

4. The Secretaries of State, War and the Navy were to redraft the texts of messages to the Emperor and to Congress which had been sent to the President, 29 November, in conformity with the decisions reached at the White House meeting on 28 November.

5. General MacArthur, and, more specifically, Admiral Hart, were to be authorized to proceed with new staff talks with British and Dutch Far East Commands, and notably with Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, who had just

reached Singapore with naval reinforcements to assume command of the British Far Eastern Fleet; these latter talks to be held immediately in Manila.

These decisions were immediately implemented by the State, War and Navy Departments. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles (the Secretary being ill) was instructed by the President, 2 December, 1941, to give to Lord Halifax the messages to Prime Minister Churchill and to the Japanese Ambassadors a note from the President inquiring the intentions of Japan in sending large reinforcements toward Indo-China.

In this note, the President drew the same conclusions as those presented to him by Admiral Stark and General Marshall in their joint memoranda of 5 and 27 November, 1941. He declared that the "very rapid and material increase in the forces of all arms stationed by Japan in Indo-China . . . would seem to imply the utilization of 'these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands in the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya; or, either through coercion or through the actual use of force, for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well-known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. . . . It is . . . because of the broad problem of defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.'"

This note was, in effect, the preliminary warning to Japan against any further southward military aggression. A reply from Tokyo on 3 December, merely said that the rumors of increase of Japanese forces in Indo-China could be based only on dispositions made to meet a possible threat from the increased Chinese forces "in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border."

The Ambassadors in Washington felt this explanation so inadequate that they declined to present it to the Secretary of State, until they could get new instructions giving "a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions." Tokyo then ordered them to deliver the original reply, declaring that "unfortunate results" might follow any other explanation. The Ambassadors were also to explain, in delivering this reply to the President's inquiry, that the Japanese, on their side, were alarmed at the increasing military preparations of the A.B.C.D. [American, British, Chinese, Dutch] Powers in the Far East.

Revelation of the "Victory Program" Strategy, 4 December, 1941

In the meantime, there had been a disclosure in Washington which seems to have influenced the discussions in Berlin as to whether or not war should be declared on the United States. Hitler had long avoided provoking the United States into all-out participation in the war against Germany in the Atlantic and in Europe. Some of the reasons for his decision to abandon this policy and to declare war on the United States were to be revealed in 1945 when German staff papers were seized by the Allies. Among these papers were studies of the Anglo-American grand strategy for a combined war against Germany which had become known on 4 December, 1941, when American newspapers published documents from files of the defense departments, which Secretary Knox at once declared to be the "most secret" papers then in the possession of the U. S. Government.

¹⁰For. Rel. U. S.-Japan, op. cit., II, p. 779; this note was transmitted to Tokyo in Msg. #1232, 2 Dec. '41, trans. 3 Dec. J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 221-223.

Investigations into the source of this revelation of strategic war plans were interrupted by Presidential order, on 8 December, 1941, when it became apparent that the leak may have occurred from isolationist sources in Congress.

The documents then released by newspaper publication included a joint strategic estimate by Admiral Stark and General Marshall of the action to be taken by the United States in a war with the Axis Powers. It has been correctly pointed out that the documents thus made available to potential enemies of the United States "charted the policy to be followed by the United States throughout the remaining years of a global war in which she was still legally neutral. . . . This Joint Board Estimate was the result of two years of war-time deliberation by Marshall, Stark, and their staffs, and of over a year of exchanges of information and opinion by the British and American staffs working together in secret but highly effective cooperation."^o

The significance of this disclosure has recently been emphasized in a volume published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, pointing out that:

"Surely, the most striking evidence of the extreme hostility of the extreme isolationists to the Administration's policies was offered by the surprise publication in the *Chicago Tribune* on December 4 of the nation's estimated production requirements in the event of global war, the so-called Victory Program. This reckless revelation of vital military secrets astounded and dismayed all who had any comprehension of the value of such intelligence to potential enemies."[†]

Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Reichstag, 11 December, 1941, in announcing the German-Italian declaration of war upon the United States, that these governments "had always endeavored to prevent a breach with the United States," in spite of President Roosevelt's "policy of world dictatorship," which had resulted in many hostile actions by the United States toward the Axis Powers. He went on to explain, in terms almost identical with those of a report presented to him by Admiral Raeder, that his final decision had been provoked by American newspaper revelations, a week before, of the basic strategy to be adopted by the United States in any war against the Axis Powers. Hitler declared that "a plan prepared by President Roosevelt has been revealed in the United States, according to which his intention was to attack Germany in 1943 with all the resources of the United States. Thus our patience has come to the breaking point."[‡]

It now seems possible that only Hitler's refusal to follow the advice of his chief military and naval advisers, and to adopt immediately measures to counter the "Victory Program" strategy of the United States, prevented the revelation of this plan from having the most disastrous consequences.

The Japanese Expeditionary Forces in the Gulf of Siam, 6 December, 1941

The publication of American strategic war plans came at the most critical moment of discussions under way between Tokyo and Berlin and may have influenced decisions taken in both capitals in the days immediately following. The German staff studies, on which the German High Command based recommendations to the Fuehrer that Germany join Japan in a war against the United States, were naturally not known

^oR. E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins," p. 418.

[†]W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, "The Undeclared War," p. 923.

[‡]Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, 11 Dec., 1941, in "Documents on Foreign Affairs, 1941-1942."

either in Washington or in Tokyo. The possible consequences of this revelation of vital military strategic plans were fully realized both by the United States and Japanese Governments.

Further urgent messages reached the White House and the State, War and Navy Departments, during the night of 5/6 December, and on the following morning, reporting that the Japanese expeditionary forces that had been moving southward since 20 November had entered the Gulf of Siam. Hence amphibious landings near Bangkok, on the Isthmus of Kra, or in Malaya were to be expected within the next day or two. The President and the heads of the State, War and Navy Departments, therefore proceeded to carry out various parts of the action program on which agreement had been reached during the preceding week. This activity was accentuated when the first parts of the Japanese reply to the American "Ten Point Note" of 26 November were intercepted. The President's personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan, pleading for maintenance of peace in the Pacific was sent to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo.

The British Prime Minister, informed of this action, consulted the Dominion Governments concerning the term of a British Commonwealth warning to Japan, to be issued simultaneously with a message from the President to Congress, perhaps on 9 December. The Secretaries of State, War and the Navy arranged to meet at the State Department on the morning of Sunday, 7 December, to complete the revised draft of parts of the message to be delivered by the President to Congress.

In view of the possibility that the Japanese aggression in the Gulf of Siam might begin at any moment, the President arranged for General Marshall and Admiral Stark to call upon him at three p. m. on this same Sunday afternoon to review the military situation in the Far East. They would then consider the possibilities of cooperation by forces of the A.B.D.A. [i.e., American, British, Dutch, Australian] Powers, in the light of messages just coming in from General MacArthur and Admiral Hart reporting on staff talks in the Far East, especially with Admiral Sir Tom Phillips in Manila, 5-6 December.

Events in Washington, Sunday Morning, 7 December

So much has been written of the incidents that occurred in Washington on the morning of 7 December that it seems unnecessary to review these events in detail. The text of a "pilot message" from Tokyo, announcing the sending of the Japanese 14-part reply, became available late on 6 December. The first thirteen parts were shown to the President and to high officers of the War and Navy Departments before midnight that same evening. By ten a. m. 7 December, the 14th part was also distributed to those on the "Magic" distribution list, together with a message directing the Ambassadors to deliver the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull at one p. m., Washington time.

The language of these messages was so similar to a long series of earlier such diplomatic communications, that there seemed nothing in the first thirteen parts requiring any immediate military action. Even the 14th part, when it became available to heads of the War and Navy Departments on Sunday morning, seemed to indicate nothing more definite than the end of the Washington conversations, or, possibly, the rupture of diplomatic relations. The Japanese Government, having reviewed their own version of the previous negotiations in the first thirteen parts of this reply, concludes as follows:

"14. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of

peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American interests and rights by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."^o

The Joint Congressional Committee, after examining in 1945-46 all available testimony and evidence relative to the events of 6-7 December, 1941, reached the following conclusions concerning the significance which might have been attached to the Japanese 14-point reply:

"From a review of the fourteenth part [i.e., of the Japanese reply] it is clear that nothing is added to what was already known with respect to Japan's reaction to Secretary Hull's note. To be sure, it is observed that the 'hope to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost,' and 'in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.' But these facts had already been known for several days and the only paramount considerations at this time were when and where Japan would strike. A thorough consideration of the fourteen part message, when viewed in the light of all other intelligence already available in Washington, reflects no added information, particularly of a military character, which would serve further to alert outpost commanders who had already been supplied a 'war warning' and informed that 'hostile action possible at any moment.'" J.C. Com. Report, p. 222.)

"Ships in Harbor" Reports; the "Bomb Plot" Messages

Much importance had been attached, since 1946, to half a dozen of the thousands of messages exchanged between Tokyo and Japanese Consulates in all Pacific areas, during 1941, dealing with the espionage activities of Japanese agents attached to these consulates. Among these agents, in many of the Pacific regions, notably on the West Coast of the United States and in Southeast Asia, were Japanese naval intelligence officers, although this seems not to have been true in Hawaii. Information collected by the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was obtained by civilian agents who seem to have required more specific instructions and directives than was deemed necessary in other areas where Japanese naval intelligence officers were seeking to complete the encyclopedic reports demanded from Tokyo. These reports were submitted not only from Honolulu, but from San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Panama (or from Mexico on Panama) as well as from Manila, Hongkong, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, and from all other Japanese consulates in Pacific regions. The volume of messages from Tokyo for guidance of this espionage activity, and of reports from the consulates, was so great that only a small percentage of the messages intercepted by "Magic" were considered of sufficient significance to warrant

^oMsg. Tokyo to Washington, #902, in 14 parts, 7 December, 1941, trans. 7 Dec. J. C. Com. Pt. 12, pp. 239-245; cf. also J. C. Com. Report, pp. 209-226, 424-444, for detailed analysis of events of 7 Dec.

inclusion in the selection circulated to those on the "Magic" distribution lists.

Fewer such messages were exchanged between Tokyo and Honolulu than was the case in many other areas. Even these messages dealing with the Hawaiian area indicated very little Japanese interest in Hawaiian defenses, airfields, air strength, anti-aircraft posts, "as compared with the avid interest . . . in the defense facilities in the Philippines, Panama, Singapore, Batavia and on the West Coast."^o

The intelligence officers in the War and Navy Departments in 1941 therefore concluded, as have nearly all those who have since examined these messages, that this apparent lack of interest by Tokyo in Hawaiian defenses "seemed to indicate that Hawaii was a much less likely point of attack than these other places." In contrast, it seemed then and now that:

"Tokyo's detailed interest in our ship locations and movements was subject to the reasonable construction that Japan desired to be warned in advance of any contemplated action by our Fleet and was not seeking information with a view to an attack upon it or, otherwise stated, that she desired information with a view to the fleet's availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target. Further, that Pearl Harbor was the base of the Pacific Fleet, the only substantial deterrent to complete freedom of action by the Japanese Navy in Pacific waters and that in consequence thereof an unusual interest by Japan in the location of our Fleet units would appear quite understandable. . . ."[†]

Admiral Kimmel and General Short explained to the Joint Congressional Committee in January, 1946, that one small group of messages exchanged between Tokyo and Honolulu, after September, 1941, clearly indicated the Japanese intention to make a surprise air bombing attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base. The Foreign Office in Tokyo, which had been for more than a year asking for reports of all ship movements and locations in all ports of the Pacific area, sent to the Honolulu Consulate, 24 September, 1941, the following new directive:

"Strictly Secret.

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

"1. The waters [of Pearl Harbor] are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. . . .

"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

"Area C. East Loch.

"Area D. Middle Loch.

"Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

"2. With regard to warships [i.e., battleships] and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)"

The Japanese Consulate in Honolulu replied on 29 Sep-

^oJ. C. Com. Report, p. 189; Texts of the messages selected for circulation in the "Magic" books, in 1941, relative to this espionage activity, are given in J.C.C. Pt. 12, pp. 254-316.

[†]J. C. Com. Report, p. 189.

tember, indicating code designations for docks and moorings in Pearl Harbor that would be used in the reports on ship locations. Tokyo further directed on 15 November that "as relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor' report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week." Tokyo also enquired on 18 November as to vessels anchored in Pearl Harbor and in Honolulu harbor "and the Areas adjacent thereto." On November 20, Honolulu was instructed to report on fleet air bases "in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation," and, on November 29, to submit reports even "when there are no ship movements."

These messages, when intercepted and translated in Washington, were marked with one asterisk (meaning "interesting"), rather than with two, assigned to messages deemed "important" or "urgent" by the specialist intelligence officers who selected the messages to be included in the daily "Magic" books circulated. Nor was high priority given to these messages for decoding and translation. Hence, with the increasing volume of other diplomatic messages then being handled, there were long delays in getting out texts of such messages on Japanese consular intelligence activities. The contents of such messages were not sent to the Commands in Hawaii, just as similar reports on other areas were not considered to be of sufficient importance to be sent to the other commands in the areas concerned. Information thus obtained by Army and Navy intelligence services in Washington was included in the periodic intelligence reports sent to all commands.

Admiral Kimmel included these messages in the statement he presented to the Joint Congressional Committee, 15 January, 1946, to support his claim that vital information concerning Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor had not been sent him, even though it was available in the Navy Department. In the light of what actually happened, on 7 December, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was convinced in 1946 that:

"These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor."^{*}

General Short was equally convinced, in his testimony before the Committee, on 22 January, 1946, that the War Department should have let him know "that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor." Like Admiral Kimmel, he was of the opinion, in 1946, that such details of berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor "would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii." To him, the message of 24 September, 1941, "analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor."[†]

Such interpretations of the meticulous detail with which Japanese consular agents reported to Tokyo on location and berthing of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor would be valid only if the information thus obtained was in fact used by the Japanese naval staff in the instructions given to the officers of the Carrier Task Force that made the attack on Pearl Harbor. Careful interrogation of such officers after 1945, and examination of all pertinent Japanese naval records that became available after V-J day, indicates that if such a "bombing plan" for Pearl Harbor ever existed, based on these "ships in Harbor" reports from the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii to the Japanese

Foreign Office, the Japanese naval staffs and officers concerned knew nothing of it.

This point was carefully reviewed in many interrogations of Japanese officials and officers in 1945 and later. It then became evident that the Japanese Army and Navy staffs had regarded with scorn the laborious and encyclopedic reports from consular staffs on naval and military matters. As the Report of the Joint Congressional Committee indicated in 1946, "intelligence obtained from the Consulates was regarded as of little importance." Hence, the naval staffs responsible for planning the Pearl Harbor attack "did not include the intelligence under discussion [i.e., the Honolulu 'Ships in Harbor' reports] in listing the information which the Task Force employed in planning and executing the attack on December 7."

Similar conclusions were reached in 1947, in reports on the "Naval Analysis Division, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific)." Moreover, reports from Honolulu to Tokyo, after 1 December, 1941, on vessels in Pearl Harbor did not use the "berthing" plan previously employed in reporting on ship movements and locations in the Pearl Harbor base.

The leader of the Japanese air attack force over Pearl Harbor, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (Commanding Officer of the Carrier *Akaga*), has since described in some detail, in statements to American naval officers and in articles published in Japanese and American periodicals, the planning and conduct of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He claimed to have known nothing of the "Ships in Harbor" reports from Honolulu.

General Sherman Miles, head of the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of the General Staff of the Army, and Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) at the end of 1941, both pointed out to the Joint Congressional Committee that, in the light of hindsight, this small group of "Ships in Harbor" messages exchanged between Tokyo and Honolulu might be interpreted as pointing toward the Japanese plan for the attack that took place on 7 December, 1941. General Miles added that no one in the War and Navy Departments so interpreted these messages in 1941, as there was an even greater volume of information about ship movements and locations then being exchanged between Tokyo and consulates in Panama, at Manila and on the West Coast. Hence, in his opinion, the message of 24 September, 1941, (above quoted) "taken alone would have been of great military significance but it was not taken alone unless you look at it by hindsight . . . It was one of a great number of messages being sent by the Japanese to various parts of the world in their attempts to follow the movements of naval vessels, a matter which we knew perfectly well they were doing, and which we ourselves were doing in regard to the Japanese."^{*}

Far more significant indications of a possible "bomb plot" were contained in messages exchanged between Tokyo and Honolulu after 1 December, 1941, which were not decoded and translated until after 7 December. These would appear to indicate that members of the Hawaiian Consulate espionage staff were very busy trying to invent such a bomb plot and to sell it to the High Command in Tokyo, in spite of the fact that none of the Japanese agents in Hawaii would appear to have had any information that any surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was about to be made. A despatch from Tokyo, of 2 December, may have led the Japanese in Hawaii to guess what might happen. In a message sent by Foreign Minister Togo, it was explained that "in view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships [i.e., battleships], airplane carriers and cruisers is of utmost importance." Honolulu was therefore to send in reports every day, and was asked to re-

^{*}J. C. Com., Pt. 2, pp. 795/7.

^{*}J. C. Com. Pt. 6, pp. 2541-2543.
[†]J. C. Com. Pt. 7, pp. 2956/7.

port whether any observation balloons were kept over Pearl Harbor, or might be sent up.

The daily ship reports sent from Honolulu after 2 December no longer included the berthing of ships, but merely their movements. In a message on 6 December, Tokyo was informed that there were no observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and no apparent arrangements for their installation. Moreover, there was no indication that the battleships were protected by torpedo nets. The message concluded: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places [i.e., Pearl Harbor and the airports at Hickam, Ford Island and Ewa]."

Honolulu further reported to Tokyo on 6 December that all the carriers and heavy cruisers had left Pearl Harbor, but that the 9 battleships, 7 light cruisers and 19 destroyers were still in Pearl Harbor, mostly at anchor. It was also reported that "no air reconnaissance is being conducted, by the Fleet Air Arm."

In this period after 1 December, as in the previous months, almost identical reports on ships in port were submitted to Tokyo from West Coast ports, Panama, Manila, Hongkong, Singapore and Batavia. Reports from these other consulates also gave information on dispositions of ground and air forces, on fixed defenses, anti-aircraft batteries, etc., which were not included in the Honolulu reports. The information given in the last above quoted message from Honolulu, announcing the departure of all carriers and heavy cruisers, may have been used in Tokyo in sending the final instructions to the carrier force then approaching its destination north of Oahu, as reported by Captain Fuchida.

There had been no indication in the circular messages sent by the Japanese Foreign Office to diplomatic and consular missions abroad, prior to 6 December, that the end of the Washington talks would be followed not only by a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States but also by Japanese attacks upon the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies. Just as in the case of the "Ships in Harbor" messages between Honolulu and Tokyo, circular messages sent by the Japanese Foreign Office on 6 December clearly forecast the immediate beginning of the "Greater East Asia War," but still gave no indication of the attack about to be made on Pearl Harbor. These messages, like the later "Ships in Harbor" reports were not decoded and translated in the War and Navy Departments until after 7 December.

In the eight years that have passed since 1946 no new evidence has come to light which invalidates the conclusions reached in the Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, on the significance of the Tokyo-Honolulu messages on the "Ships in Harbor" reports. The Committee, after examining the material then available concluded that:

" . . . none of the intercepted messages translated before the attack, between Tokyo and Honolulu, for over a year prior to December 7 [1941], contain any reference to the defenses of the Army and Navy in Hawaii as distinguished from location of fleet units . . . a careful comparison and evaluation of messages relating to espionage activities by Japan's diplomatic establishment [i.e., inclusive of the Honolulu Consulate] would not have reasonably indicated in the days before December 7 any greater likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor than was warned against in the dispatches sent the Hawaiian Commanders on November 27.

"We are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a

'bomb plot' in view of the evidence indicating that it was not such. We are of the opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate of the situation."

The Committee further noted that "no one in Washington interpreted the harbor berthing plan of September 24 and related dispatches as indicative of an attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor or was in any way conscious of the significance of the messages which it is now possible to read into them." Hence there could be no question of "conscious or deliberate withholding of this intelligence from the Hawaiian Commanders. General Marshall, and Admirals Stark, Turner and Ingersoll, testified they had no recollection of having seen these dispatches."

Deliberations in Washington, 7 December, 1941

The Secretaries of State, War and the Navy met, as arranged, at ten a. m., on 7 December, at the State Department to complete drafting of parts of the message to be delivered by the President to Congress on Tuesday, 9 December, if a satisfactory reply had not been received to the President's appeal to the Emperor of Japan. The staffs of the War and Navy Departments were assembling the documents and preparing the reports that General Marshall and Admiral Stark would take to the President at three p. m. Admiral Stark was at his desk shortly after nine a. m., while General Marshall reached the War Department towards eleven a. m. After reviewing the intercepted messages, and other dispatches that had arrived during the night, General Marshall agreed to a staff recommendation that a message to be sent to commands in the Pacific, informing them that the Japanese reply was to be handed to Secretary Hull at one p. m. Admiral Stark, consulted by telephone, at first hesitated as he felt that the Theater Commanders in the Pacific had already been alerted by the previous messages warning them of the imminence of war, and of a possible surprise attack "in any direction." He feared that any new warning might further confuse them. When General Marshall decided to send the message, Admiral Stark concurred. The message then transmitted to Army Commands in the Pacific, at 12:01 p. m., 7 December, 1941, read as follows:

"The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The Japanese Ambassadors had asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State for one p. m., but this time had later been delayed, at their request until 1:45 p. m. They did not actually reach Secretary Hull's office until some minutes later. In the meantime, a message from Admiral Kimmel was delivered to Secretary Knox's office, just after 1:50 p. m. reporting:

"AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL."

Secretary Knox, then in conversation with Admirals Stark

and Turner, at once exclaimed: "My God, this can't be true; this must mean the Philippines." When assured by the Admirals that it could only mean Pearl Harbor, Knox hastily telephoned the report to the President. Mr. Roosevelt promptly telephoned the news to Secretaries Hull and Stimson. The latter noted, in his diary, that "the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, 'Have you heard the news?' I said, 'Well, I have heard the telegram which came in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam.' He said: 'Oh no, I don't mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Pearl Harbor!'"

CONCLUSIONS

An attempt has been made in the preceding pages to indicate the role played by the heads of the War and Navy Departments in 1941 in the implementation and maintenance of accepted national policies. The conclusions to be drawn can still be only tentative, insofar as the larger issues involved are concerned. The action then taken by President Roosevelt and his closest political and military advisers made it possible to defeat the coalition of Axis Powers in World War II. It may also have contributed to what seems to have been the loss of the peace which should have followed. There still remains to be appraised the question of whether war with Japan was inevitable in December, 1941, and of the responsibilities for the Japanese attack.

One set of hypotheses concerning responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor attack, and for the losses then suffered by the U. S. forces involved, first set forth by Admiral Kimmel and General Short in their statement to the Joint Congressional Committee in January, 1946, and by isolationist critics of the Roosevelt Administration, has recently again been formulated in extreme form in Admiral Theobald's text. The substance of the charges included in this text involved higher questions of national policy, as well as the events of 7 December, 1941.

The substance of Admiral Theobald's "personal deductions" from the record of Pearl Harbor investigations is indicated by the sub-title of his book, "The Washington Contributions to the Japanese Attack." These hypotheses are restated in Admiral Kimmel's Foreword in the following terms:

"Rear Admiral Theobald's studies have caused him to conclude that we were unready at Pearl Harbor because President Roosevelt's plans required that no word be sent to alert the fleet at Hawaii. . . . In my philosophy I can find no reasons which justify the formulation and execution of such a plan. The individuals in high positions in Washington who willfully refrained from alerting our forces at Pearl Harbor should never be excused."

Admiral Theobald's Personal Deductions

Admiral Theobald has outlined, in the first chapter of his text, his "personal deductions" from the record of the Pearl Harbor investigations, in the following terms:

"... the fact that war with Japan meant war with Germany and Italy played an important part in President Roosevelt's diplomatic strategy. Throughout the approach

Secretary Hull had had this report before seeing the Japanese Ambassadors. After they had handed the 14-point reply to him, he denounced their government by saying:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. . . . In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions . . . on a scale so huge that I never dreamed until today that any Government on earth was capable of uttering them."*

National Foreign and Defense Policies; 1941

to war and during the fighting, the primary U. S. objective was the defeat of Germany.

"To implement the solution of his problem, the President

(1) "instituted a successful campaign to correct the nation's military unpreparedness;

(2) "offered Germany repeated provocations, by violations of neutrality and diplomatic usage;

(3) "applied ever increasing diplomatic-economic pressure upon Japan, which reached its sustained climax on 25 July, 1941, when the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands stopped their trade with Japan and subjected her to almost complete economic encirclement;

(4) "made mutual commitments with the British Prime Minister at Newfoundland in August, 1941, which promised mutual support in the event that the United States, Great Britain, or a third country not then at war were attacked by Japan in the Pacific;

(5) "terminated the Washington Conference with the note of November 26, 1941, which gave Japan no choice but surrender or war;

(6) "retained a weak Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters, despite contrary naval advice, where it served only our diplomatic purpose, an invitation to a Japanese surprise attack;

(7) "furthered that surprise by causing the Hawaiian commanders to be denied valuable information from decoded Japanese diplomatic messages concerning the rapid approach of the war and the strong probability that the attack would be directed at Pearl Harbor."

Admiral Theobald has devoted the greater part of his text to an effort to find evidence to support the last of these seven personal deductions. He maintains that "the denial of information was a vital feature of enticing a Japanese surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor." To those familiar with the now voluminous record of defense planning and preparations in 1941, Admiral Theobald's deductions so fantastically misrepresent what actually happened in the year preceding 7 December, 1941, as to seem almost farcical.

This impression is only increased when one seeks the origin of the charges made against President Roosevelt and his principal military and naval advisers. Much the same charges were made, in fact, at the time of the hearings of the

*The above extracts from testimony before the J. C. Com. are quoted in the Report, pp. 439-440.

Joint Congressional Committee in 1945-46 and have been subsequently restated in volumes by isolationist, or "neo-revisionist" critics of President Roosevelt's policies. These charges were examined in the Report of the Joint Congressional Committee and were dismissed as unfounded, and have later been reviewed and rejected in volumes by eminent historians.

Admiral Theobald's major thesis, in these charges, and even the title of his book, is taken from a pamphlet written by John T. Flynn in 1945, also entitled "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor." It is even more curious to note that the charge that President Roosevelt desired and incited Japan to attack the United States seems first to have appeared in a diary note written on 3 December, 1941, by Count Galeazzo Ciano, the son-in-law and Foreign Minister of Mussolini.

Ciano was recording the conversation that same day with the Japanese Ambassador, during which the Ambassador had read the message from Tokyo declaring that war between Japan and the United States would come sooner than anyone dreamed. Ciano added this comment:

"What does this new event mean? Now that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver, not being able to enter the war [i.e., against Germany and Italy] directly, he has succeeded in an indirect route—forcing the Japanese to attack him.

"Now that every possibility of peace is receding farther and farther into the distance, to speak of a long war is an easy, a very easy prophecy to make. Who will have the longest wind? That is the way the question should be put."*

The documentary record of the action taken by the War and Navy Departments in 1941 has been reviewed and summarized in the preceding pages. Concrete, though often still tentative, conclusions to be drawn from this record would seem to be very different from those of Admiral Theobald. The present writer is convinced that the conclusions stated below are dictated by the record of 1941 developments.

1.—The "Great Debate" between "Isolationists" and "Interventionists"

It is obviously impossible, in a review of 1941 defense measures, to make more than passing reference to the "Great Debate" between exponents of contradictory convictions concerning the objectives and methods of American foreign and defense policies. This debate has been under way not merely since 1917, but, in different terms, since the Founding Fathers declared the independence of the United States in 1776, and then proceeded to discuss the future policies and objectives of the new nation.

This "Great Debate" in 1941, as on many earlier and later occasions, was between "isolationists" and "interventionists" (or "internationalists"). There are still, today, many informed and patriotic American leaders who sincerely believe that the United States could, and should, have refused to participate in the two World Wars of this last half century. At least some of them oppose the present effort of supporters of the present bi-partisan foreign policy to organize a global coalition of free states and peoples to prevent the domination of Europe, Asia and Africa by Kremlin leaders of the global Communist conspiracy.

Throughout the 19th century, statesmen and strategists alike looked forward to the role which the United States must play when the Pax Britannica and the supremacy of the Royal Navy had disappeared and the United States should be called upon to exercise that leadership as a world power, which was

*Author's italics. Text in "The Ciano Diaries," p. 414.

in fact to be thrust upon the United States after 1900. Many of this group contend that the United States might have prevented both world wars of this century, if it had adopted a more aggressive foreign policy, backed by effective military power, in leadership of the free and peace-loving peoples of the world in seeking an effective and sanctioned method to "outlaw" war and to create a just, stable, and peaceful world order.

Those who hold this concept of the role of the United States as a world power now maintain that the present bipolar division of the world, in the "cold war" between followers of Moscow and of Washington, could have been avoided if the United States had adopted such a world-power role even as late as 1941, and had followed a policy which might have assured the organization of world peace through military victory in World War II.

American national administrations since that of Theodore Roosevelt have sought to reconcile these long-standing divergences in their formulation of national foreign and defense policies. Each administration faced the dilemma of formulating and implementing national foreign and defense policies which it believed necessary and appropriate, within the constitutional framework, and by democratic processes, against strong and vociferous opposition of leaders in Congress and in the country holding contrary opinions.

This inherent dilemma in the exercise of the world-power role thrust upon an unwilling United States is admirably illustrated by policy and strategy developments after 1939. The country almost unanimously condemned the successive acts of aggression by the Axis Powers against other free peoples but was utterly, and perhaps evenly, divided as to the action that the United States should take to give expression to its moral indignation and to prevent the repetition of such aggressions on a global scale. There thus developed, after the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the bitter struggle between "isolationists" and "interventionists" which made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to announce openly and to carry out overtly measures of foreign and military policy which the heads of the State, War, and Navy Departments believed to be necessary and imperative to safeguard the security of the United States and to maintain the basic objectives of long-established national foreign policies. It was against this background, and in the face of clearly apparent global threats from the militarist programs of the Axis Powers that new measures of national policy and new concepts of global strategy were developed in the State, War and Navy Departments in the year preceding the Japanese attack.

2.—Hemisphere Defense and Global Resistance to Aggression

President Roosevelt had made increasing, though still relatively limited and timid efforts, from 1938 to 1941, to obtain popular support and Congressional approval for increases in the strength of the national armed forces, but only to a point which would enable the Army and, more particularly, the Navy, with their respective air forces, to make at least a minimum contribution to the defense of the Americas and of the overseas possessions of the United States. This program was definitely, and explicitly, designed to implement the oldest existing and generally accepted foreign policy, that Monroe Doctrine to which reference has been made above.

In programs adopted after 1938 to shield the American continents from external aggression, or even internal subversion, from across the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, the President and his military and naval advisers gave increasing em-

phasis to the organization of coalition action, first with the other American Republics (and, perhaps, Canada), but later also with other friendly countries in Europe and in Asia who were confronted with a common threat of aggression by the Axis Powers and might therefore be disposed to cooperate with the United States in preventing any possible hostile control of the ocean approaches to the Americas, such as then seemed implicit in the aggressive, militarist, expansionist programs of Germany, Italy and Japan. The President gave expression to this coalition program in an address in Chicago, in October, 1937, suggesting action by a great concert of free countries to "quarantine" aggressor powers. Action would be taken, perhaps under the leadership of the United States, through measures of political, diplomatic and economic cooperation to restrain aggressor powers and to oppose any new acts of aggression. Any such measures would be taken, however, by "parallel," rather than "joint" action of the states agreeing to such a coalition effort. Although this first proposal for such an informal coalition of peace-minded states to oppose aggression on a global scale aroused great opposition, both at home and abroad, it continued to inspire the policy of the Roosevelt Administration.

One aspect of this effort to develop a coalition policy and strategy for defense of the free world must be strongly emphasized. The President and the heads of the State, War and Navy Departments, in all their efforts after 1938 to promote a *de facto* coalition of free states and peoples to oppose totalitarian aggression, carefully avoided, until 7 December, 1941, the making of any formal diplomatic or military commitments which might involve, or even imply, the use of the armed forces of the United States, except in defense of the Western Hemisphere against attack. Thus, even after the outbreak of the war in Europe, in September, 1939, the Administration continuously refused to make any commitment that the United States would ever enter the war, on its own initiative, except to meet attack by the armed forces of the Axis Powers. This was definitely the case at the Atlantic Conference meeting of the President and his chief military advisers with the British Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff (as has been pointed out above). This was also true during all of the 1940-41 staff talks and conferences in which tentative plans were being made for possible later "combined" action of forces of the United States and of the British Commonwealth and its Allies, when and if the United States might be compelled to enter the war as a belligerent by attacks by the armed forces of one or more of the Axis Powers.

3.—Strategic Concepts Governing 1941 Defense Plans and Preparations

The basic strategic doctrines and policies which guided defense planning and preparations in 1941 were developed by heads of the professional Army and Navy staffs, under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark. The defense plans and programs then adopted, with Presidential approval, reflected the best strategic thinking of the previous half century, as it had developed under the leadership of the Army and Navy War Colleges.

The President approved recommendations of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, after 1938, for development of a new RAINBOW series of war plans, all of which envisaged joint action of the Army and Navy in defense of the Western Hemisphere against possible concerted attacks by the Axis powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, under the chief alternative global political and military situations that might exist at the time of such an attack. All of the RAINBOW plans were also to include pro-

visions for coalition action by forces of the United States and of such other friendly powers as might be prepared to join the United States in common action against the common enemy.

The only plans of this RAINBOW series which had been completed and approved before 1941 were those providing for joint action of U. S. forces, possibly in cooperation with the forces of other American Republics, to resist an Axis attack from across the Atlantic, and in the Pacific, after Axis victories in Europe and in the Far East. RAINBOW No. 1, approved in August 1939, provided for a strategic defensive in the Pacific against Japan, while U. S. and possible allied forces were being concentrated in the Atlantic to defend that part of the Western Hemisphere north of the "Hump" of Brazil. RAINBOW No. 4, approved June, 1940, was almost identical with the first plan but provided for operations for the defense of all of both American continents.

After the fall of France, in June, 1940, Admiral Stark and General Marshall took the initiative in the development of a further plan of the RAINBOW series (i.e., No. 5) which provided that the United States, in the event of involvement in a war with Germany while Great Britain was still fighting the European Axis Powers, should give priority to operations in Atlantic areas, notably in Europe and in North Africa, in cooperation with the forces of Britain and her Allies.

None of these plans and programs were approved by the President before 7 December, 1941, but they were used as a guide for defense planning and preparations in 1941 to govern action to be taken by the Army and Navy, in the event that Axis attacks compelled the United States to enter the war before the hostile Axis powers had succeeded in overwhelming other countries in Europe and in Asia which might otherwise have welcomed cooperation with the United States in implementing a "combined" global strategy for the defense of the whole of the free world.

These tentative plans and staff agreements developed in 1941 were in fact to be confirmed and adopted in January, 1942, as the basis for the "combined" war action of the United Nations "Grand Coalition" (to use Winston Churchill's term). This decision was reached, within a month after the Pearl Harbor attack, at the Washington Conference.

4.—Maintenance of Peace in the Pacific: A Major Objective of National Policy and Strategy in 1941

The basic strategic policies, plans, and staff agreements thus developed in 1941 conformed to strategic doctrines outlined by Admiral Mahan in 1903 and accepted since that time as the basis for joint Army and Navy planning for operations in a two-ocean war. This strategic concept was based on the assumption that the gravest danger to the United States, and to the Americas, would result from the domination of Europe by any one militarist power, or coalition of powers, which would seek to project its domination across the Atlantic.

It was assumed that this would be true, even though the most immediate threat of war to the United States would probably come from Japan in the Pacific, perhaps acting in coalition with the dominant power in Europe. This situation had seemed possible even in 1903. It served as the basis for staff plans and agreements in 1941. The conclusion was, therefore, reached in 1941 that every effort must be made to avoid war with Japan in the Pacific, as long as there existed a danger of war with the European Axis Powers in Atlantic Areas.

The objective of avoiding war in the Pacific was, therefore, a guiding consideration in plans and recommendations formulated in the State, War and Navy Departments in 1941. The

President and the Secretary of State continuously sought this same objective in the negotiations with Japan in Washington and in Tokyo in 1941. As the months passed, however, it became increasingly clear that Japan had embarked upon a course of imperial expansion in the Far East and in the Western Pacific which might result at any time in war, unless the United States was disposed to surrender unconditionally American interests and long-range policy objectives, including that of the "Open Door" in China which had been for 40 years the basis of the Far Eastern Policy of the United States.

5.—Japanese Plans and Intentions; The Washington Talks

It would appear unnecessary to review in detail the increasing tension in relations between Japan and the United States, after the Manchurian episode of 1931, followed by Japanese invasion of China. The final stage in the Japanese imperialist program for bringing all of East Asia and the Southwest Pacific into a Japanese sphere of influence, euphemistically described as "The Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and the South Pacific," was reached in July, 1941.

The Tokyo authorities therefore decided that one final diplomatic effort should be made to obtain American acquiescence to the Japanese program, before the undertaking of military action.

The Washington talks, resumed in August, dragged on until 6 December, 1941. Prince Konoye proposed a "Leaders' Meeting," between himself and the President, each accompanied by political and military advisers, to be held somewhere in the Pacific. The President was favorably disposed to such a meeting, but yielded to Secretary Hull's urgent insistence that some measure of agreement on major issues be reached before such a meeting. Prince Konoye urged with increasing emphasis the importance of time.

When no agreement had been reached in October, the Cabinet of Prince Konoye was replaced by that of General Tojo. The decisions of July had been reaffirmed, with new secret military dispositions, at a dramatic meeting of an Imperial Conference, 6 September, 1941. These decisions were again re-affirmed by an Imperial Conference on 5 November which approved final proposals to be submitted to the United States. If these had not been accepted by the "deadline" date, first set for 25 November, later postponed to 29 November, "things were automatically going to happen."

There was no indication in intercepted messages of what these "things" might be. It was learned, after 1945, that the Imperial Conference had also approved, on 5 November, 1941, the plans of the Imperial General Headquarters for the "Greater East Asia War," including plans for attacks on the United States, as well as on British and Dutch positions in South-East Asia. These attacks were to be made immediately after the "deadline" date, if Japanese demands had not been accepted by the United States.

6.—Information and Warnings Sent to Pacific Commands; July to November, 1941

The heads of the War and Navy Departments kept Army and Navy Commands in the Pacific as fully informed as possible, throughout 1941, of developments in the rapidly changing world political and military situation, and of action being planned or taken by the Administration in Washington. No definite information available in Washington concerning German and Japanese (as well as Soviet and British) action, intentions, and capabilities was ever withheld from the Commands in the Pacific. Samples of communications from the War and Navy Departments to these commands have been given above (in Part II). As the volume of the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and of Washington-Tokyo

diplomatic exchanges increased, after July, 1941, full texts of such messages and communications were not transmitted to Army and Navy commands, but their substance, and any military implications to be drawn therefrom were included in messages, letters and reports from the War and Navy Departments.

It is quite possible, and perhaps inevitable, that some errors occurred and that some omissions were made of items which later, in the light of hindsight, would seem to have alarming and sinister significance, not apparent at the time in 1941 when Japan's possible future action seemed a puzzling enigma. This hardly justifies any charge that the President had ordered, and the heads of Army and Navy staffs had engaged in, a deliberate conspiracy to withhold information from the commands, so as to facilitate the success of a surprise Japanese attack desired and planned by the President himself.

Had the full texts of the great volume of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages been transmitted to the commands in Hawaii, it would seem improbable that the limited staffs then available there would have been able to diagnose the situation any more accurately than the larger and specialist staffs in the War and Navy Departments. On the contrary, these messages stressing Japanese objectives and moves in Southeast Asia would have merely strengthened the growing conviction of the Hawaiian staffs and commands that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor and might not even attack the Philippines.

7.—Responsibilities of Theater and Outpost Commands

Responsibilities of staffs in the War and Navy Departments were necessarily global and generalized, while the functions and duties of Theater and Outpost commands and staffs were local, specific and immediate. In accordance with the terms of formal and long-standing agreements between the War and Navy Departments, consolidated in the 1935 revision of such agreements in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy," the Army was charged with primary responsibility for defense of U. S. Naval stations and shore establishments, including those at Pearl Harbor.

This responsibility had been emphatically stressed in letters exchanged between the Secretaries of War and the Navy in January-February, 1941, and in instructions sent by the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Commanding General of the Army's Hawaiian Department, throughout 1941. The Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, drawn up by the Hawaiian Army and Navy Commands in April, 1941, and later approved by the War and Navy Departments, was based on this same understanding. It was also provided that the Fleet, or any of its units, when at a naval base, would act in their own defense and would cooperate with Army Forces in the execution of the existing joint defense plans.

The Commanders in Hawaii were charged with the carrying out of the defensive measures provided for in their own joint defense plans, whenever warned of the imminence of war, by the War and Navy Departments. Such warnings to prepare defense deployments had been sent from Washington in July and again in October, 1941. The Hawaiian Commands were informed on 24 November, 1941, that diplomatic negotiations with Japan for maintenance of peace in the Pacific had failed and that Japan might strike at any time and "in any direction." This was followed three days later by the "war warning" dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations, and by the somewhat less strongly worded warnings from the War Department. These messages directed the Hawaiian commands to make appropriate "defensive deployments," preparatory to carrying out their tasks and missions, defined in the RAINBOW-5 war plans.

Such defensive measures were in fact taken by Army and Navy commands at Panama, on the West Coast, in the Philippines, and even in the Atlantic Coastal Frontiers, but the measures specified in the Hawaiian joint defense plans were not ordered placed in effect by the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii.

Colonel Stimson clearly defined in statements to the joint Congressional Committee in 1946 the responsibility of the Army for defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, with the cooperation of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, then at this base. He also pointed out that "the outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at the time and place in which it would be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied."^o

8.—Preoccupations of Hawaiian Commands, December, 1941

The "war warning" dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 27 November, 1941, like comparable warning messages from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, not only stressed the imminence of a new Japanese attack, but indicated that such an attack might be directed against the United States.

Hence these commanders were directed to execute appropriate "defensive deployments" preparatory to carrying out their tasks and missions under the War Plan-Rainbow No. 5. This plan would enter into effect only if Japan attacked the United States, but the commanders in Hawaii could proceed immediately to implement their own defense plans. These provided for long-range naval and air reconnaissance of the approaches to Oahu, for sending the major units of the fleet to sea, for all-out alerts to air forces and air raid warning installations.

It seems to have been assumed in Washington that the commands in Hawaii, on receiving the warning messages of 27 November, would immediately take such dispositions, in accordance with the defense plans prepared by the Hawaiian commands and approved by the War and Navy Departments.

Although Admiral Kimmel and General Short held several conferences between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, neither seems to have been aware of exactly what defensive dispositions the other had ordered put into effect. They appeared to agree that no attack on Pearl Harbor was probable and that they need not undertake the joint long-range air reconnaissance, under naval command.

General Short seems to have assumed that the Fleet was carrying out distant reconnaissance, just as Admiral Kimmel assumed that General Short had ordered the all-out alert rather than the limited alert against sabotage alone. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was later to write that "an unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor, both Army and Navy."

Professor Morison has commented on the situation and atmosphere in Hawaii at this time, when Admiral Kimmel and his staff were intensifying training and preparations for the reconnaissance to be made in the Marshall Islands area in the three months immediately following an outbreak of war with Japan. Hence the atmosphere at Pearl Harbor was then "tense and energetic." Admiral Kimmel, "an energetic,

capable and hard-working officer, was obsessed with the urgent problem of training." Morison adds that:

"Kimmel was caught on the horns of a dilemma; he might keep his command in a state of constant alert, which would expend precious material, exhaust his men, and undermine their morale; or he might concentrate on training at the expense of alertness. . . . Since Washington believed and the intelligence officers in Hawaii advised them that there was only a remote possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, Kimmel and Short concentrated on training at the expense of alertness. That was a tragic mistake but an honest one."^o

Admiral Kimmel explained to the Joint Congressional Committee, 17 January, 1946, the opinions and strategic estimates of the Commands and staffs in Hawaii in December, 1941. He did not feel that anything in the messages and information he had received in November indicated "the probability of an attack on Hawaii." Admiral Kimmel had recognized that "war with Japan was highly probable" but at no time thought "that war was inevitable." Admiral Kimmel explained that "I did not consider an attack on Hawaii any more than a remote possibility at the time that it came."[†]

The viewpoint then shared by many of the higher officers of the naval staffs, both in Washington and in Hawaii during this first week in December, 1941, was later explained to the Naval Court of Inquiry by Rear Admiral Vincent R. Murphy, who served as a plans officer of the Pacific Fleet in 1941, in the following terms:

" . . . I thought it would be utterly stupid for the Japanese to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor . . . because I did not think it was necessary for them to do so. . . . We could not have materially affected their control of the waters they wanted to control, whether or not the battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. . . ."[‡]

9.—Incidents in Hawaii, 7 December, 1941

Officers in the War and Navy Departments were discussing early on the morning of Sunday, 7 December, 1941, the implications of the last batch of "Magic" intercepted messages which had just been brought to their attention. These included the 14-part Japanese reply to the Secretary of State's "Ten Point Note" of 26 November, 1941, a message instructing the Japanese Ambassadors to present this reply to the Secretary of State at one p. m. Washington time, and other messages ordering the destruction of the last code machines.

It was clear from these messages, as it had been obvious for ten days, that the Washington talks would be broken off, but there was no indication that this would be followed either by a breach of diplomatic relations or by a Japanese attack upon the United States. Nevertheless higher officers in both the War and Navy Departments felt that some further warning might be sent to commands in the Pacific suggesting that the Japanese might commit some "deviltry" (as Mr. Hull put it) at one p. m. Washington time (which would be at 7:30 a. m. Hawaiian time and about 3:00 a. m. 8 December Manila time).

General Marshall finally decided to send such a message, and Admiral Stark asked that it be communicated to the naval commands. It has since been suggested that this information, if available in Hawaii even a few minutes before the attack, might have permitted that all-out alert which the

^oS. E. Morison, "The Rising Sun in the Pacific," pp. 133/4.

[†]J. C. Com., Pt. 6, pp. 2630-2640.

[‡]J. C. Com., Pt. 26, p. 207; Proceedings Naval Court of Inquiry.

staffs in Washington appear to have believed was already in effect.

It may be pertinent to refer to actual sightings of Japanese submarines and aircraft at Hawaii, prior to the air attack, which failed to provoke such a belated ordering of an all-out alert against such an attack.

It had been assumed in the defense plans that any air attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor would probably be accompanied by a submarine concentration off the entrance to the naval base. In fact, an advance expeditionary force of some twenty submarines had taken their stations to the south and west of Oahu in the night of 6/7 December. Five midget submarines had then been released from their "mother" ships to seek an entrance into Pearl Harbor. One of these was detected by a naval patrol craft some four hours before the air attack. Destroyers were informed of the sighting and began an intensive search which resulted in further discovery of these submarines and attacks upon them in which at least one was sunk. For reasons not explicable reports of these encounters did not reach the naval command post at Pearl Harbor until the air attack was about to begin.

Similar episodes marked the actual approach of Japanese planes from the carrier attack force some 300 miles north of Oahu. Observation "Zero" planes were sent over Oahu at least an hour before the waves of bombers appeared. The approach of these observation flights was noted on the Army radar screen but no alert followed as it was suggested that these were perhaps planes from the U. S. Navy carriers returning to Pearl Harbor.

When I personally visited Honolulu in 1947 one of my University of California classmates (Royal A. Vitousek, class of 1912) told me of his own experience that same Sunday morning. He had gone out early in his own private plane to give a lesson in flying to his son. Suddenly, at about 7:00 a. m., he found himself in the path of two fighter planes with Japanese markings. He promptly dove under them and returned to his airfield. When he telephoned to Army and Air Force duty officers (perhaps at 7:15 a. m.) to report Japanese planes over Oahu, they refused to believe him. No action was taken, nor any alert sent to the Army air force commands.

At almost the same time, trainees at an Army radar post, who had remained after the official shut-down hour of the post (i. e., 7:00 a. m.), observed blips on the radar screens indicating that a large number of planes were approaching from north of the Island. When this report was telephoned through to the air warning center no regular officer was still on duty. A substitute who was present knew that a flight of Flying Fortresses was due to arrive from California that same morning. So, again, no notice was taken of this report and no alert was sounded.

If the actual presence and sighting of Japanese submarines and planes in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor failed to warn the Hawaiian commands and staffs of immediate danger, in the early morning hours of 7 December, one is entitled to wonder whether a new verbal warning message from the War or Navy Departments between 4:00 and 7:00 a. m. would have had any greater effect. The Hawaiian commands could have been told only that Japan was rejecting the American reply to their demands of 20 November, and that the note announcing this diplomatic gesture was to be delivered to the Secretary of State at one p. m., or seven-thirty a. m. Hawaiian time.

10.—Responsibilities for The Japanese Attack

There still remains a remote possibility that different diplomatic attitudes and methods might have facilitated at least a further period of truce with Japan. In that event, with the

later successful Soviet resistance and the declining fortunes of Germany and Italy, first in the Mediterranean and later in Italy, it is possible that moderate opinion might have prevailed in Tokyo and that Japan would have refrained from an attack upon the United States. Ambassador Crew still believes that a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Prince Konoye, in September or October, 1941, might have permitted a compromise solution of outstanding issues acceptable to the United States which Prince Konoye, with the Emperor's backing, could have forced the Army command to accept.

But these are among the "ifs" of history. As Morison points out:

" . . . the Japanese could have conquered everything they wanted in the Philippines and Malaya by leaving Pearl Harbor alone and relying on submarines and aircraft in the Mandates to deal with our Pacific Fleet. United States naval officers assumed that the Japanese high command had enough strategic sense to appreciate this; and the Department of State supposed that there was sufficient wisdom in the Japanese Government to avoid an act of unqualified aggression that would bring America, angry and united, into the war.

"Thus, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, far from being a strategic necessity, as the Japanese have claimed, even after the war, was a strategic imbecility. One can search military history in vain for an operation more fatal to the aggressor. On the tactical level, the Pearl Harbor attack was wrongly concentrated on ships rather than permanent installations and oil-tanks. On the strategic level, it was idiotic. On the high political level, it was disastrous."^o

No new evidence has come to light since 1946 which invalidates the conclusions then reached by a non-partisan majority of the Joint Congressional Committee. All of the evidence, and the record from which Admiral Theobald has drawn his personal deductions, was available to those who examined this same record critically in 1946. The Congressional Committee then concluded that "the ultimate responsibility for the attack and its results rests upon Japan."

After examining many of the same charges now again directed against President Roosevelt and his immediate collaborators, the Committee concluded that it could find no evidence "to support the charges made before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy tricked, provoked, incited, cajoled or coerced Japan into attacking this nation in order that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from Congress."

The Committee concluded, on the contrary, that "all evidence conclusively points to the fact that they discharged their responsibilities with distinction, ability, and foresight and in keeping with the highest traditions of our fundamental foreign policy. It was also concluded that:

"5.—The President, the Secretary of State and high government officials made every possible effort, without affecting our national honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan.

"6.—The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses, of the Army and Navy to institute measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese."

^oMorison, op. cit. p. 132.

^oJ. C. Com. Pt. 11, p. 5428.