arrested Shintani and Mrs. Harada, and took Kanahele to the Waimea Hospital on Kauai, where he remained until December 31.

No formal charges were brought against Shintani and Mrs. Harada. The latter was released after a short time and went to live on Kauai. Shintani, who was interned on the Mainland during the war, is again on Niihau with his Hawaiian wife.

Nine months after the incident, two generals went to Niihau to present the American Legion heroism medal to Kanahele and Kaleohano. In August, 1945, the Army brought Kanahele to Fort Shafter in Honolulu where he was presented the Purple Heart and Medal for Merit. Such award of the Purple Heart to a civilian was possible only with special authorization from Washington. There was a formal ceremony, and the Army band played "They Couldn't Take Niihau Nohow." In May, 1946, there was another ceremony when Kaleohano was awarded the Medal of Freedom.

The Niihau incident gave support to those who contended that the Japanese in Hawaii could not be trusted. Others regarded the episode as a special situation, wherein ignorance played a large part. It appears certain that both Shintani and Harada acted more in fear of the aviator than in loyalty to Japan.

One Army investigation of the matter emphasized the Japanese tendency to follow authority, which would explain Shintani's and Harada's acceptance of the aviator's leadership. A Navy investigator commented:

> These facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no anti-American tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan.

CHAPTER THREE

Rumors Rampant

PERHAPS BECAUSE THE ALL TOO REAL Pearl Harbor attack itself was at first so unbelievable, Islanders were ready to accept an extraordinary crop of rumors which began to spring up within a few hours after the bombing. And the large number of Japanese in the Islands was also a major factor in lending credibility to seeds of doubt planted by rumor-mongers. Most of the rumors were based on actual events which were misinterpreted in the excitement of the times.

During the first week of the war, while commercial radio stations were off the air, many people who listened to the police radio accepted as facts the exaggerated reports which policemen were instructed to check. "Suspicious characters" and "prowlers" proved to be block wardens checking on lights; "burglars" breaking into a furniture store were the U. S. Engineers in search of mattresses for emergency use; "a man on an electric pole signaling with red, green and white lights" was a Hawaiian Electric Co. repairman; and Japanese "holding a meeting" at a store in Wailuku, Maui, were merely purchasing groceries.

Some of the rumors even had official credence early in the war. For example, on what seemed to be accurate information from the Army, the *Honolulu Advertiser* used its biggest headlines December 8 to report "Saboteurs Land Here." And Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, after a brief visit in Hawaii right after the Pearl Harbor attack, told a press conference that Hawaii had been subjected to "the most effective fifth column work that has come out of this war except in Norway."

Typical of the many rumors rampant were these:

That Japanese spies had murdered a Navy officer who discovered their prewar activities while he was on a hike.

An officer disappeared on a hike in July, 1941, and his body was never found. Similar rumors surrounded the disappearance of another Navy

Pearl Harbor Attack ALLEN
Hawaii's War Years
1950

officer in February, 1944. In neither case did searches by Navy, police, and the American Graves Registration Service uncover evidence to support any finding other than accidental death.

That Japanese in Hawaii were informed in advance of the raid. One story was that a Japanese victim of the raid told a Queen's Hospital nurse that she knew the attack was coming. Another was that Japanese came from other islands to Honolulu to assist in sabotage. Both the injured woman and the prospective saboteurs were supposed to have been informed that the raid was to take place on December 8, and they did not take into consideration the fact that December 7 in Hawaii was December 8, Japanese time. Still another story concerned Japanese maids who failed to go to work on the morning of December 7 because they knew the raid was coming.

No fact whatever seems to support the first two stories. It is true that many maids and other workers failed to reach their places of employment on December 7, but probably because the raid caught them at home or on the way. Army, Navy, and FBI investigators all reached the conclusion that no one in Hawaii knew of the raid in advance. Rather, says the Army:

> The attack was such a surprise to the Japanese residents themselves that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days. . . . There was no individual act, even fanatical, to indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of confusion or sabotage.

An Army report, after expressing doubt that the Japanese consul in Honolulu had advance information concerning the attack, commented:

> If such were the case, with the highest ranking and most confidential agent of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew nothing of all the facts involved.

These conclusions were strengthened when postwar investigations in Japan indicated that no Japanese officials in the United States—including ambassadors, embassy officials, and the consul in Honolulu—knew of the raid in advance and that the only informed persons in Japan were those connected with the Japanese Navy.

That newspaper advertisements carried veiled warnings and instructions to Japanese in Hawaii. Most frequently cited was the advertisement of the Hawaii Importing Company, which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin *on December 3 and in the* Honolulu Advertiser *on December 4. Interpretations were innumerable: its odd illustration was a cloud of smoke from flaming ships, or, turned upside down, it "looked like something"; its heading,*

"Fashions by the Yard," referred to the Navy Yard; its odd names of silks each referred to a ship. Another advertisement cited appeared in the Star-Bulletin *January 30 and the* Advertiser *February 1. Featuring the Packard-Bell radio, it had an illustration of ships being attacked by planes; one of the dive bombers had a "rising sun" on its wing; one of the destroyers was numbered 211, which meant that Pearl Harbor would be bombed again on February 11. A full-page notice in the* Hilo Tribune-Herald *reportedly calling a mass meeting of alien Japanese for the afternoon of December 7, a furniture advertisement which supposedly appeared in the* Star-Bulletin *about the middle of December, the classified advertising columns, and radio announcements provided fertile grounds for rumors.*

Naval Intelligence, after careful study of the Hawaii Importing Company advertisement, dropped its suspicions with the discovery that a similar ad had appeared each December for several years previously. On December 2, 1940, the same illustration, same heading, and many of the same items had appeared. The gravely questioned names of silk turned out to be bona fide materials.

The *Star-Bulletin* furniture advertisement and the *Tribune-Herald* full-page ad existed only in imagination. A study of the several classified advertisements and radio announcements which reportedly carried information revealed nothing subversive. The Packard-Bell illustration was made on the Mainland many months before the outbreak of war.



FIGURE V. "INTERPRETED" AD FROM *HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN*

(Reduced from three columns by 10 inches)

That a number of Japanese establishments held open house on Saturday evening, December 6, serving a great deal of liquor, with the purpose of incapacitating Army and Navy personnel for duty on December 7; specifically that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and many other high Army and Navy officials were at such parties until early on the morning of December 7.

This story received especially wide circulation because of charges by the Temperance League of Hawaii. It was brought up at least 60 times in the various Pearl Harbor investigations.

However, there was no more drinking by service personnel on the night of December 6 than on any other Saturday night, and none of it could be attributed to special Japanese plotting. The usual military personnel was present and ready for duty on December 7. Some officials testified they saw no one on December 7 who showed the effects of a hard night; perhaps more accurate was an ensign who said, "The few that were under the influence of liquor . . . never sobered up so fast in their lives."

As for top officers, General Short and Admiral Kimmel spent all afternoon Saturday at their respective headquarters and then went to dinner parties, the general to a benefit party at Schofield Barracks, and the admiral to the Halekulani Hotel at Waikiki. Both returned home about 10:00 P.M. Several of the air officers were at an Air Corps party, but two of the three Air Corps generals in the Islands were known never to take a drink. The Army chief of staff was still at his headquarters at midnight because of the expected arrival of B-17s from the Mainland.

The open house at a new Japanese fish market stand, which figured most conspicuously in the rumors, was held December 5, not December 6; and few, if any, service personnel attended it.

This kind of story cropped up in a new version just a year later, when the OCD Rumor Clinic heard the tale that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, successors to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, had been seen intoxicated at parties from time to time, along with Brigadier General Thomas H. Green, executive to the military governor.

That General Short and Admiral Kimmel, still in bed at the time of the attack, could not or would not be aroused; that Admiral Kimmel refused to interrupt a golf game to return to Pearl Harbor; that Admiral Kimmel was hunting on Kauai.

General Short says:

I heard the first bomb and thought it was perhaps a naval exercise that I had forgotten about. Then when the second one dropped I ran out on an upstairs porch of my quarters where I could see Pearl Harbor and I could see some smoke. About that time my chief of staff, who lived next door, ran into my quarters and called to me that it was the real thing, that he just had a phone message from Hickam and Weaver Field. That was anywhere from 1 minute to 3 minutes after 8 o'clock.

Admiral Kimmel had been aroused at his Pearl Harbor residence with word of the attack on the Japanese submarine off Pearl Harbor and was waiting for a reply to his request for further information when he was telephoned about the air raid. "I went out of my quarters, saw the attack, the first attack made by the planes . . . I got into the car and went directly to my headquarters."

That arrows had been cut in the cane fields by Japanese plantation men to guide the attackers to Pearl Harbor.

At 1:00 P.M. on December 8, plantation managers near Pearl Harbor were asked to conduct a thorough search of their fields for such arrows. None was found. However, an experimental HSPA plot harvested in October, 1941, in the midst of many acres of cane left a bare spot, one diagonal of which pointed roughly toward "a particular installation in West Loch of Pearl Harbor" and the other diagonal toward the entrance of Pearl Harbor. A few days after the attack, Army authorities had adjoining areas cut in order to change the direction of the diagonals, despite the fact that planes would spot Pearl Harbor before they could find the tiny field. Another version of this rumor cropped up January 18 when an aviator reported that a bulldozer had made a large oriental character while grading Sand Island.

That Japanese drivers deliberately created blockades December 7 on the then narrow Pearl Harbor road.

No such attempts were made. Traffic naturally was congested on this road the morning of December 7 as service personnel and civilian workers rushing to Pearl Harbor met evacuees from military areas struggling to reach Honolulu. Traffic came to a halt about 9:00 A.M., when a great number of military vehicles from Fort Shafter plunged into the melee, but after 9:30 cars were kept moving bumper to bumper. The only accident reported on the highway throughout the day was a minor scraping of fenders between two vehicles. However, other accidents might well have occurred which were not reported in the excitement of the day.

On the night of December 7 there was heavy congestion again, with thousands of workers attempting to drive home in the blackout. Many finally parked along the side of the road until daylight came.

That a milk truck on December 7 suddenly opened fire with machine guns on the Hickam Field defenders.

This story, later widely told on the West Coast by the first evacuees arriving there, and printed some months later in *Collier's*, was one of the few rumors that had no basis whatsoever in observed fact.

That Japanese plantation workers and others fired on soldiers from ambush.

An investigation revealed no evidence, and it was believed that sporadic firing by military detachments was the cause of complaints. The commanding officer on the island of Hawaii reported that "several engagements were fought by sentries at lonely posts during the darkness against wandering porkers and stray mongrels."

That paratroops had landed. The Honolulu OCD office received at least 20 such reports December 7 and 8, and the police switchboard received even more. The Maui police recorded parachute troops over Makawao, Maalaea, Kihei, Kula, and Wailuku. On both Maui and Oahu, police were ordered to watch for parachutists in blue uniforms and to shoot them on sight. On Oahu, civilians were warned not to wear blue clothes near any Army post. Kauai and Hawaii also had parachute scares.

To explain only a few of these stories: "Parachutists" in back of Saint Louis Heights proved to be six or seven children out for a Sunday hike, ignorant of the war. "Parachutists" on Tantalus were dry broken branches of a eucalyptus tree hanging in the air. Those on Kapalama Heights were Kamehameha School students and faculty, police, OCD wardens, and soldiers all attempting to track one another down. The "captured paratroops" seen in the FBI office "still carrying their white parachutes" were some Japanese injured on December 7 who were taken to FBI headquarters for questioning, dressed in their white hospital robes.

One of the most persistent reports was that an enemy parachute trooper had landed near Barber's Point. In reality, an American Navy flier parachuted to earth there, hitch-hiked to Pearl Harbor, and took up another plane before reporting to anyone. Amazingly enough, as late as October, 1942, in an article for a national magazine, he told of the Barber's Point landing of Japanese parachutists as a fact, evidently still unaware that he himself was the parachutist witnesses saw descending.

A month after the attack, the Army in Hilo rushed troops to repel a reported invasion of parachutists. However, no sign of any enemy was found.

That commando troops had landed at various points on all the islands.

These stories seem to have been manufactured out of whole cloth, although troops were actually ordered out in a few cases to repel invasion.

That enemy ships were offshore.

Maui, particularly, seems to have had its full share of these stories on December 7 and 8, but all the islands were alerted at intervals by the sight of strange ships. The larger vessels proved to be American; the "submarines" were usually whales; the "heavy naval engagements" in the distance were just thunder and lightning.

That the Japanese carriers involved in the attack had been found south of Oahu and bombed.

The ships "found" were the American cruisers *Minneapolis* and *Portland*, and the latter was narrowly missed by two bombs from an American plane.

That Japanese fliers who were shot down were former Island residents and that some were wearing McKinley High School and University of Hawaii rings.

Army, Navy, and FBI checked this rumor carefully soon after December 7 and found it had no basis in fact. It was pointed out that Japanese military custom and discipline, even in peacetime, forbade the wearing of rings by servicemen. Also, as early as 1939, Japanese were urged to donate gold and other ornaments to their country and it was considered unpatriotic to wear jewelry. (After the war, investigation at General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo failed to reveal any evidence that American-born or -educated men were among the raiders.)

That the water supply had been poisoned.

This report was based on the fact that a woman fell down in a fit after drinking at a public fountain. The story of poisoning received such credence that the police at 3:56 P.M. on December 7 warned Oahu residents to boil drinking water.

That an epidemic had broken out among evacuees.

This was based on true reports of emotionally upset stomachs.

That large amounts of ammunition were found hidden on property owned by Japanese.

The only hidden ammunition discovered was some small caliber ammunition and shotgun shells which had been buried in the old Oahu Junk Yard because of hope of commercial gain.

That radio sending sets were used on December 7 to "jam" the air with confusing messages, thus preventing organization of the American defense.

These stories flourished and even caught the ear of Secretary of the Navy Knox. As late as 1944 the Army board investigating the Pearl Harbor attack asserted that illegal radio stations had interfered with the radio operations of the Army on December 7. The board undoubtedly based its conclusion on the testimony of the general in command of the Hawaiian Air Force on December 7, who said:

> They started in as soon as the attack began. And those stations which had not been in operation at all were extremely active as soon as the attack began. You were getting spurious messages that parachutes were dropping on certain parts of the island, that there were carriers off-shore in every direction except those where we feel now they were. . . . As soon as this attack took place and got under way, the air was full of Japanese conversation and our own language to the point where it was very difficult to carry on operations using the radio for that purpose.

The general added that the instruments were located and confiscated and their personnel captured within ten days or two weeks. Investigations revealed, however, that most of the Japanese voices being heard over the radio were coming from a commercial station in Argentina, whose beam to Japan passed almost through Oahu. The chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet testified: "We found out later that the confusion originated . . . in false reports being made by excited people reporting things which did not occur." General Short thought the reports "an exaggeration."

Because of the persistence and seeming authenticity of the stories of illegal radio sets, this writer in 1948 queried the regional manager of the Federal Communications Commission. In his reply, he said:

> During the war, the FCC worked very closely with the Army, the Navy and the FBI on all reports of radio interference. . . . According to the records of the FCC, there were no illegal radio stations operating in Hawaii on December 7 or afterward throughout the war and neither was there any seizure of illicit radio operators. In all of my contacts with Army and Navy personnel who would have known the facts, I have never uncovered any information which does not bear out the evidence of our FCC records.

The records show no subversive stations in Hawaii and only one unlicensed station during all the war and late prewar years. The latter, found a few months before Pearl Harbor, was near Hawi, on the island of Hawaii, and was merely a so-called "wireless record player," connected to an outside antenna and used to broadcast phonograph records and voice to listeners within a narrow radius, probably not more than one mile.

That military police on December 7 shot the owner of a beer garden near Schofield when they found that he had been transmitting by short-wave radio to Tokyo military information obtained from servicemen customers.

Neither this man nor any other was shot under such circumstances by the military. He was not arrested or even under suspicion on December 7. More than a year later, he was investigated by the Army, interned for a short while, and then paroled.

That cane fires were set as signals on the night of December 7 and later.

The several cane fires at Ewa plantation, two at Waipahu, and one at Aiea on December 7 were caused by bombs, anti-aircraft shells, a falling plane, and a broken power line. All later fires were similarly accidental.

That Tokyo Rose and other Tokyo broadcasters got daily reports from Hawaii; specifically, that they disclosed the presence of radar stations on Haleakala and the 1942 eruption of Mauna Kea before they were announced in Hawaii.

A careful check maintained after December 7 on broadcasts from Tokyo revealed no leaks of information from Hawaii. The eruption story was repeated on Tokyo stations six hours after Japan had the opportunity of hearing the report from American stations.

That signal lights were flashed to planes or ships.

There were dozens of these reports on all the islands, and they continued, at intervals, throughout the war. They came in most frequently on moonlight nights, when the reflection of the moon on skylights or windows was temporarily obscured by passing clouds. Maui and Hawaii police found that many of their reports of lights at sea were due to clouds passing over the evening star low on the horizon. A sundial on Wilhelmina Rise started one report which was particularly hard to trace.

A "signal light" on the top of the Theo. H. Davies building in downtown Honolulu was traced to the sparking of the elevator mechanism reflected through the skylight. Other lights blinked illegally because of loose window shades or the opening of doors. To keep a constant check on lights in Honolulu after nightfall, several observation posts were established on high ground which afforded coverage of the entire Honolulu area. Lights were reported to a central office where they were spotted on a large map, the results of which proved conclusively that there was no systematic repetition or other suspicious activity.

That Japanese-owned stores were selling to Japanese only.

Defense Act Rule 3 required stores to sell food only to their regular customers, and police investigating reports of discrimination on December 8 found merely that Japanese-owned stores had refused to sell to certain Caucasians who had not traded with them under normal conditions. This complaint against the Japanese persisted throughout the war, and it is undoubtedly true that Japanese store owners saved scarce goods for their friends and customers, predominantly Japanese, just as Caucasian store owners favored their steady customers.

That the enemy would attack again.

The rumor of an attack set for December 20 was started by a man who claimed to have predicted the December 7 attack. The predictions of attacks on December 25 and January 1 had no more foundation than the idea that "perhaps" the enemy would attack on holidays. An attack was rumored for January 7, 1942, because of some mystic relation between the Japanese and the number 7. Probably most widespread of all these rumors was that the Japanese would attack on February 11, a Japanese holiday in honor of the imperial family. Island morale had sunk to its lowest about that time; when the attack was not forthcoming, rumors themselves became less frequent and less widely circulated.

Gradually, nearly all the rumors were officially denied, although some stories persisted to be told in books on the war and at the 1946 and 1947 Congressional hearings on statehood for Hawaii. Many Islanders discount official denials and still believe such stories as the one about the prominent Honolulu Japanese who, kimono-clad, waved a Japanese flag to the attacking planes, and the equally fantastic tale about the owner of a uniform of "the Japanese military governor of the Islands," who was prepared on December 7 to assume control under direction of Hirohito.

CHAPTER FOUR

Tension-Ridden Days

THE SUNDAY BOMBS DID MORE than start a war; they changed a way of life. Islanders were particularly tense during the first week after the attack, beset with constant and shapeless fears. More bombings and a landing attempt were generally expected; Japan was considered capable of launching a major overseas expeditionary force to capture the Islands. Tension rose and fell in waves, but as the months passed, the peaks of strain became lower and further apart.

Christmas, 1941, was a somber day. Christmas lights in the shopping districts had been torn down, and the tinkle of bells on Salvation Army Christmas kettles was the only comforting reality in a world of camouflage, gas masks, barbed wire, and bomb shelters. Christmas trees, usually obtained from the Mainland, did not arrive, and Islanders were forced to improvise with all types of bushes and shrubs. The strange Yuletide dragged on, with delayed packages arriving far into January and February. For most people Christmas was a work day—a forerunner of many holidays when orders decreed business as usual.

The sense of isolation from the Mainland was heightened because of the irregularity of the mails, even airmail letters sometimes taking weeks to arrive. The situation handicapped business; it meant worry for separated families; and it caused financial embarrassment for persons dependent on funds from the Mainland.

Though many of the prevalent fears were rooted in imagination, Islanders were brought face to face with actual wartime perils on at least a score of occasions. Several ships were sunk near Hawaii, and the Islands were shelled by enemy submarines; other submarines were reported offshore and planes overhead; air raid sirens screamed warnings at intervals; and in June of 1942 the battle of Midway raged to the west, uncomfortably close. Even when the threat of danger was not imminent, full-scale maneuvers constantly reminded Islanders that there was a war on.