



Pearl Harbor, seen through Japanese eyes, is a different story from the one Americans have been hearing.

Dec. 7, 1941, in this account, is not "a day that will live in infamy" because of Japan's treachery. The Japanese attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet is seen as a result of actions taken in Washington, not in Tokyo.

Here you get the story as it is being told to the people of Japan. Shigenori Togo, the author, was Foreign Minister of Japan in the critical days of late 1941. He wrote his book, "The Cause of Japan," while a convicted war criminal in a prison cell. The book now is being published in English for the first time.

As Mr. Togo recounts history from the Japanese viewpoint, it was President Roosevelt and the United States, not Japan, that wanted war. The U. S., Mr. Togo says, used the pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations in Washington to camouflage its own war preparations.

The U. S. State Department is accused of distorting inter-

cepted Japanese messages and misrepresenting Japan's position. President Roosevelt is charged with lying on occasion in order to "baby" the Japanese along until the U. S. was ready for war. The book undoubtedly will play a part in the formation of public opinion inside Japan.

It so happens that the U. S. Department of State is planning to disclose, this autumn, many unpublished documents giving the American version of what occurred in the negotiations prior to the outbreak of war.

Mr. Togo returned to the office of Foreign Minister in 1945 in time to direct Japan's negotiations for surrender.

Mr. Togo reveals that Japan was anxious for peace as early as April, 1945. He gives an inside glimpse of the official reaction to the atomic bomb.

Here, too, is the story of Japan's relations with Russia.

Mr. Togo completed the notes for this book in July, 1950, just a few days before he died in prison.



SHIGENORI TOGO



Why JAPAN ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR

**INSIDE STORY as related
by former FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO**

(The complete book, "The Cause of Japan," by Shigenori Togo, is being published by Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, on Sept. 28, 1956. U. S. News & World Report has obtained world first serial rights to the book prior to publication. Copyright on the book is held by Simon and Schuster, Inc.

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Excerpts from the book follow:

by Shigenori Togo

War-time Foreign Minister of Japan

CHAPTER I

Inside Tojo's Cabinet: Army vs. Diplomats

IN 1940 I HAD BEEN Ambassador in Moscow for about two years, years which had been fruitful in the settlement of a number of irritating disputes between the two countries. I was recalled as one of the incidents of the "Matsuoka Hurricane" which raged throughout the Japanese diplomatic service during the autumn of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan, and after my recall and return to Japan in November I was given no assignment, remaining an ambassador without post. . . .

Conditions in the country had changed a great deal in the three years since my departure for Europe. There was in some quarters a feeling of frustration that the China Affair, now three years old, showed no sign of coming to an end. Nevertheless, it was noticeable that popular enthusiasm for the Tripartite Alliance persisted, and respect and unbounded

admiration for Germany were everywhere evident; those not familiar with international politics were even saying that the Axis Alliance would be "eternal." Hard as it is now, after the war, to conceive of such a state of affairs, its existence in those days would be simple enough to demonstrate. I was astonished not only at the number but at the ascendancy of those who put their trust and reliance in the Tripartite Pact; they prevailed in political, in journalistic, even in intellectual, circles. That phenomenon of the times resulted in part perhaps from German propaganda, but mainly, I think, from the fear of "missing the bus" at a time when Germany was achieving dazzling war gains in Europe.

What caused me most concern at that period was that the government seemed to be basing its policies on the notion that Japan could easily solve her international difficulties by force of the Tripartite Pact alone. I expressed my

... 1941: "The growth of a spirit of bravado, of seizing this 'opportunity of a thousand years' for the glorification of Japan, without shrinking from a war against Britain and America, could be observed throughout the country"

views on this fallacy as occasion offered itself—to Premier [Fumimaro] Konoe and Foreign Minister [Yosuke] Matsuoka, in particular—but I soon realized that it was rather widely established. I felt also that many in Army and Navy circles, the younger officers especially, were fascinated by the increasingly formidable military strength of Japan. The Army, having devoted the major part of its appropriations since the beginning of the China Affair to mechanization, felt that its fighting power had been vastly enhanced; the Navy, confident of its fleet (which, since the abrogation of the Naval Limitation Treaty, had come to include types of vessels peculiar to Japan), believed itself invincible.

It was in these circumstances that the idea of restraining the United States by force of the Tripartite Pact, while concurrently by negotiation with her solving the China Affair, could be observed to be gaining support. But the concept underlying the Tripartite Pact was, as is clear from its text, that of dividing the world into three, each party dominating one part; and as it was in that sense hostile to the United States, negotiating with her for solution of the China Affair was incompatible with the spirit of the pact, and it was only to be expected that in any such negotiations she would raise objection to the pact. When I learned that since around the time of the appointment of Ambassador [Kichisaburo] Nomura high government, Army and Navy and other officials who advocated or favored the pact had been considering the opening of Japanese-American talks, I was therefore

amazed at the lack in Japan generally of understanding of international politics. My apprehension was that if such negotiations should be commenced without prospect of successful conclusion, and should ultimately fail, relations would be worse than at the beginning, and the end result would be a clash between the United States and Japan. . . .

[In 1941] I occasionally met the new Foreign Minister, Admiral [Teijiro] Toyoda, who had replaced Matsuoka, but I learned nothing concrete of the negotiations, he saying merely that they were not progressing satisfactorily. I gathered that in fact they were at an impasse, and that a proposal by Prince Konoe for a personal meeting with President Roosevelt had been rejected. A pessimistic outlook on the diplomatic scene had thus come to prevail. At the same time, the tone of the press toward Britain and America had turned increasingly intransigent. The propaganda of the armed forces seemed to be succeeding in beguiling the people to trust all to the power of their country; the growth of a spirit of bravado, of seizing this "opportunity of a thousand years" for the glorification of Japan, without shrinking from a war against Britain and America, could be observed throughout the country. I continued to preach the necessity of doing everything possible for success in the negotiations, with the result that it soon became routine for the representatives of the Kempeï ["thought control" police] to visit me two or three times a month to inquire into my views, they seemingly feeling it necessary to keep me under surveillance.



1941: THE AUTHOR (RIGHT) WAS JAPAN'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER
U. S. Ambassador Grew (left) was the first envoy received by Mr. Togo at a reception for diplomats

—Wide World

... 1941: "About the end of September, I heard from a high official of the Foreign Ministry of the existence of a 'deadline' . . . for conclusion of the negotiations"

About the end of September, I heard from a high official of the Foreign Ministry of the existence of a "deadline" agreed upon between the government and the high command, for conclusion of the negotiations. This news, which I heard for the first time, made it easy to conceive that conditions had become serious. By early October, it was rumored that on the ground of the "deadline" the military officials were insisting on abandonment of the negotiations, which were making no progress. After 12 October, I began to hear that the government's tenure on office had become very precarious; and on the 16th the Konoe Cabinet resigned en bloc, "on account of internal disunity."

After a conference with the Senior Statesmen [former Premiers], Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal [Koichi] Kido recommended to the Throne appointment of General [Hideki] Tojo, Minister of War in the Konoe Cabinet, as new Premier, and, on the 17th, Tojo received the Imperial mandate to form a cabinet. At half-past eleven on the night of the 17th, I was called on the telephone at my home by Tojo, who requested me to visit him immediately at the War Minister's Official Residence. Upon my arrival, after telling me that he had been designated Premier, he asked me to enter the Cabinet as Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister for Overseas Affairs.

I told Tojo that although I had no accurate knowledge of recent political conditions or of the development of the Japanese-American negotiations, I had heard that the previous Cabinet had ended in disunity brought about by the recalci-

trance of the Army over the negotiations; therefore, I told him, I must first be informed of those circumstances before deciding whether to accept his offer. Half an hour's discussion followed. Tojo at first said that it was quite true that the collapse of the Konoe Cabinet had resulted from the uncompromising attitude of the Army toward the stationing of Japanese troops in China, which was one of the main issues between Japan and the United States. He said that he felt moreover that since the Imperial command had fallen upon him, despite his having been the spokesman of the Army's views in the preceding Cabinet, he could continue to maintain a resolute stand in the negotiations. . . .

Tojo then explained that what he had said represented merely his "feeling"; but I answered him that even such a "feeling" of the Premier was obstacle enough to the negotiations. I added that if I were to become Foreign Minister I should do it with the determination to succeed in the negotiations; and therefore I could not accept the position unless the Army would agree to make genuine concessions in reconsidering the troop-stationing question, and also would consent to reviewing the other problems involved and to making the necessary abatement of its demands to enable us to reach a settlement on a reasonable basis. Tojo said that if there was a possibility of the negotiations succeeding, he would be in agreement with the desire to see them concluded; nor, he assured me, had he any objection to reviewing the problem of troop stationing, as well as the other issues—which others however were, according to the reports



—Wide World

1946: THE AUTHOR (LEFT) WAS A DEFENDANT AT WAR-CRIMES TRIAL WITH MATSUOKA AND SHIGEMITSU
Mr. Togo wrote his book while in prison

... "Some, outsiders, seem to have had the idea that the Tojo Cabinet was determined from the moment of its formation on waging a war; this, of course, is not true"

from Washington, virtually solved. He required that I give an immediate answer whether I would enter the Cabinet, because he wanted to submit the list of Ministers to the Throne early the next morning.

Having thus come to the conclusion that I would have scope for activities offering some vista of success in the negotiations, I told Tojo that I would accept the offer of the foreign and overseas portfolios. The investiture ceremony was held on the following day, 18 October, and the Tojo Cabinet was established.

Some, outsiders, seem to have had the idea that the Tojo Cabinet was determined from the moment of its formation

on waging a war; this, of course, is not true, as will be apparent from the following pages. So far as I myself am concerned, my conversation with General Tojo just related—even disregarding my later efforts—is proof that my purpose in entering the Cabinet was not to start a war, but to avert one. My mistake lay in believing that I could achieve a solution merely within the terms of my understanding with Tojo, when neither of us was aware that relations had so far deteriorated that the other party to the controversy had already determined on war—there was at that moment, indeed, no one on the Japanese side who had yet recognized the full gravity of conditions.

CHAPTER II

1941: Sizing Up U.S. Intentions

THE REVIEW of the development of the Japanese-American negotiations to which I devoted my first weeks in office left me with the distinct feeling that, conceding Japan's demands to have been excessive, the attitude of the United States had undergone a marked change in the course of the negotiations from the time of the original Draft-Understanding with which they had commenced in April. The United States had shown no sign of making concessions, merely reiterating after the latter part of June her position as taken at that time; and especially, after the freezing of Japanese assets at the end of July, she had become extremely uncompromising, and seemed only to be trying to prolong the discussions rather than to reach an agreement. I got the impression that the American attitude could indicate nothing but a resolution to risk a failure of diplomacy, and consequently war. I thus came to comprehend Matsuoka's calling for termination of the negotiations in anticipation of a possible breakdown, and I could not understand the preceding Cabinet's optimism for succeeding by diplomacy in the absence of relaxation of the demands on our side.

In Tokyo, the estimate of conditions in America around this time was based to a large extent on a long report sent by Ambassador Nomura on 8 May. According to the ambassador, President Roosevelt more and more had tended, since the passage of the National Defense Act, to be dictatorial, and was actually creating so-called public opinion; most Americans were determined on standing by England to the end, and the British-German war was likely to develop into an American-German one.

It was, he reported, possible that the United States would, even at the risk of war, start conveying to assist Britain, and opinion could be heard that the United States should immediately go to war to help recoup British losses in the Balkans and the Near East. It was conceivable, he concluded, that in the delicate international situation the United States would endeavor to . . . adjust relations with Japan—less dangerous than Germany—in order to avert a two-front war.

Meanwhile, unexpectedly—so far as the Japanese government was concerned—war broke out between Germany and

the U.S.S.R. Some in the Army urged that Japan should seize this opportunity to attack Russia from the east simultaneously with the German offensive from the west; the Navy, however, was reluctant from considerations of defense in the Pacific to concur in the idea. It was reported that Foreign Minister Matsuoka, upon learning of the outbreak of the Russo-German war, submitted to the Throne his opinion to the effect that Japan should attack the U.S.S.R. in co-operation with Germany, and that we would eventually fight Russia, America and Britain. Prince Konoe, dumfounded at Matsuoka's representations to the Emperor, tried to restrain the movement for a Russian war.

The movement would not so easily be stopped. The Army dispatched to Manchuria a large draft of troops, under the operational code name "Kwantung Army Special Maneuver." Discussions at the Liaison Conference of government and high command even resulted in agreement on an "Outline of National Policy Attendant upon the Changing Situation" as a program to be followed in consequence of the Russo-German war. . . .

The gist of the provisions for implementing these policies was that Japan should not for the time being go to war against the U.S.S.R., but should strive to gain victory over the Chiang Kai-shek regime by arms; that moves in the south should be carried out even at the risk of war with Britain and America; and that America's entry into the European War should be prevented by all possible means, diplomatic or otherwise, but that if America did involve herself Japan should act in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. It was expressly provided that Japan should continue "necessary diplomatic negotiations with nations concerned in the southern regions," and "for this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States." The general tone of the Outline of National Policy is one of virtual abandonment of the Japanese-American negotiations.

. . . That it was not mere verbiage quickly became evident when the measures vis-à-vis the south were effectuated by the movement of Japanese forces into southern Indochina. This advance cut the ground from under diplomacy, and ren-

... "The President said to the Japanese ambassador . . . that if Japan should invade the Netherlands Indies, Britain immediately, and then the United States, would go to their aid"

dered an eventual war between Japan and the United States inevitable.

It was disclosed at the IMTFE [International Military Tribunal for the Far East] trial that meanwhile, on the other side of the Pacific, an official in the State Department had divulged confidentially before 2 July that the Japanese-American negotiations would be terminated by the United States, and Japanese assets frozen. The plan for freezing of assets thus antedated the occupation of southern Indochina, having originated roughly at the time of the demands in Japan for cessation of the talks upon receipt of the American 21 June proposal. In any event, American designs for economic sanctions against Japan were no recent thing.

At the time of the Manchuria Incident, in 1931, Secretary of State Stimson had proposed application of sanctions jointly with the League of Nations. The plan was abandoned because of President Hoover's apprehension that such action would conduce to war; but when Roosevelt, as President-Elect, had his meeting with Secretary Stimson on 9 January 1933 he fully concurred in Stimson's ideas. And, as it turned out, Roosevelt as President gave notice of abrogation of the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce, in July 1939, and imposed an embargo after September 1940 on export to Japan of scrap iron and other materials, thereby seriously deranging Japan's international trade.

Why Oil Wasn't Embargoed

Resort to expedients such as these was only natural, there being many in the United States who were confident that Japan could ultimately be driven to submission by economic pressure, as well as many favoring a strong policy toward Japan in general. Some in the American government were already by this time calling for the imposition of an embargo on petroleum, but President Roosevelt had been unwilling to go this far, lest it should lead to war. This was explained by him in a speech on 24 July; if he had cut off the supply of petroleum to Japan, he said, "they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war." Therefore, he had let the petroleum supply flow to Japan "with the hope—and it had worked for two years—of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good, for the good of the defense of Great Britain and the freedom of the seas."

To the [U. S.] under secretary [Sumner Welles] the ambassador [Nomura] expressed his fear that a petroleum embargo would exacerbate the national feeling of Japan, and on the 24th he reiterated this opinion to the President, and reviewed the pending issues in the negotiations. In connection with Indochina, the President said to the ambassador that it had been for the sake of peace in the Pacific that he had resisted popular pressure for an embargo, but that if Japan should invade the Netherlands Indies, Britain immediately, and then the United States, would go to their aid. The President here made a suggestion of neutralization of French Indochina; if Japan would withdraw her troops, he said, he would spare no effort to obtain from the interested countries solemn guarantees of the neutrality of the area and of the right of acquisition by Japan of supplies and raw materials therefrom on a basis of equality.

On 26 July the President issued the executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States and embargoing exports of petroleum. The Japanese press expressed astonishment and indignation at the action, but most dismayed by it was the Navy. The Navy's alarm was by no means unreasonable, for once the supply of petroleum from the United States and the Indies was cut off, the stockpile which it had accumulated would gradually be used up, and the fleet which it had constructed at the cost of abrogation of the Naval Limitation Treaty would soon become worthless to it. Subsequent developments made it clear that this action was—as had been foreseen by the United States—the decisive factor in the coming about of war.

It is true that this American proposal of 24 July was a selfish one, which Japan could scarcely accept in its entirety. It aimed merely at forestalling Japan's southward advance by the suggested neutralization of Indochina, without offering any palliative for the freezing of Japanese assets and the embargo on petroleum—both intimately connected with the movement into southern Indochina. No more, however, was it to have been expected that the Japanese counterproposal, which dwelt only upon such issues among those pending in the Japanese-American negotiations as might be developed advantageously to Japan, would be acceptable to the United States. It is no wonder, therefore, that when Nomura presented the Japanese plan to Secretary Hull on 6 August the Secretary showed little interest in it, and that the ambassador should have concluded that the United States was prepared "for any eventuality"—that is to say, that she was prepared for war.

In this state of affairs, the Japanese government as an emergency measure fixed upon a scheme to which great importance was attached in Tokyo, and to which in coming weeks the government pinned its highest hopes for a settlement with the United States. This was the project of Prince Konoe's meeting in person with President Roosevelt—Honolulu was the locale thought of—to study possibilities for averting a crisis. . . . The meeting was duly proposed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on 8 August, but the Secretary vouchsafed no expression of opinion concerning it.

Atlantic-Conference Decisions

The United States considering the Japanese move into southern Indochina to represent a decisive turning point in Japan's policy, it was natural enough that she felt compelled to settle her own course of action. It chanced that President Roosevelt was just at that time to meet with Prime Minister Churchill, and for a week, beginning on 9 August, they held at sea the Atlantic Conference. Although the details of this meeting afloat have not yet been fully disclosed, the memorandum submitted to the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee by former Under Secretary Welles, who attended the meeting, makes known that one of the points agreed upon between the President and the Prime Minister concerned an arrangement for parallel ultimative action toward Japan. According to Welles' memorandum, the President exhibited to Churchill the Japanese draft agreement presented by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on the 6th, and various alternative strategies vis-à-vis Japan were considered.

It was in the end agreed that Japan's proposal should not

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be rejected outright, but that a strict warning would be administered to Japan, while talks were kept going; Roosevelt, as reported by Welles, stated on that occasion that he believed that the starting of a war by Japan could thereby be staved off for thirty days. Davis and Lindley [Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, in their book, "How War Came"] are more specific on this latter point; according to them, when Churchill expressed fear that no further respite could be hoped for, the President said, "I think I can baby them [the Japanese] along for three months" (the word "baby," according to these authors, was a favorite of the President's).

In view of this evidence, it is interesting that when President Roosevelt received Ambassador Nomura on 3 September, the ambassador reported him as saying categorically (and even giving the reasons therefor) that the contents of the Japanese-American negotiations had not been referred to at his meeting with Prime Minister Churchill. The making of this statement by the President can only be supposed to be true, as Ambassador Nomura could have had no reason so to report if it was untrue; the import of Mr. Roosevelt's having made such a false statement will not be overlooked. At any rate, the warning mentioned by Welles was read to Nomura by the President on 17 August. It was in very stiff terms, to the effect that the United States would resort immediately to any and all action which it might deem necessary if Japan should take any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination, by force or threat of force, of neighboring countries. According to Ambassador Nomura, the President remarked to him upon pronouncing the warning that he did not like to say those things, but said them because he thought it best for the two countries.

A second document handed to Nomura by the President on 17 August dealt with the suggestions by the ambassador of a meeting of chiefs of state and of resumption of negotiations. . . . Ambassador Nomura reported that the President observed, as he handed over his document, that he could not go to Honolulu, as proposed by Prince Konoe, for the tête-à-tête, but might be able to go to Juneau.

When Roosevelt "Babied" Japan

In response to these documents, the Japanese government sent to Ambassador Nomura on 26 August a message from Premier Konoe addressed to President Roosevelt, as well as a long exposition of the peaceful intent of Japan. When the ambassador saw the President on the 28th to present these communications, the latter, according to the ambassador, even dwelt on possible times and places for the meeting with the Premier—thus palpably "babying" Japan. (The way the President "babied" us was very affable, according to Nomura's report—just like a great actor's playing of Molière. The people in the Kremlin later in a similar manner cozened us, through our ambassador, in connection with the Teheran and Yalta Conferences; but the President remains to me the better actor.) . . .

The military services in Tokyo now began to consider that there was no future for the Japanese-American negotiations. The Navy, especially, perturbed since the placing of the embargo on petroleum, felt that if the negotiations were

destined to prove futile Japan should take her stand before her opportunity was lost. The growth of this feeling led to the calling, on 6 September, of another Imperial Conference, at which was adopted a resolution by which war became an imminent possibility. . . .

The gist of the decision at the Imperial Conference of 6 September was as follows:

"In view of the current grave state of affairs, and especially of the offensive against Japan precipitated by the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and other countries, the situation of the U.S.S.R., and the resilience of our national strength, Japan will carry out the action vis-à-vis the south" determined upon by the Imperial Conference of 2 July. "With the determination not to decline war" with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, Japan should have completed her preparations by the end of October; meanwhile, *pari passu* therewith, she should "endeavor to exhaust diplomatic measures to attain her demands vis-à-vis the United States and Britain," the minimum point of demand and the limits of Japan's concessions to be as stated in an appendix. If by the beginning of October there should appear no hope of fulfillment of Japan's demands through negotiation, war "shall be forthwith determined upon." Particular efforts would be made to prevent formation of a Russo-American front against Japan.

Plans for War "Accelerated"

It was understood that after adoption of this decision the Army and Navy high commands accelerated their war preparations in no small degree. At the same time—according to the reports from the Washington Embassy—the Gallup Poll showed the American public opinion favoring the stopping of Japan at the risk of war to have risen from 51 per cent in July to 70 per cent in September, and the prospect of a war with Japan to be more popular than that of one against Germany.

. . . The 2 July Imperial Conference decision had made the Pacific War inescapable; that of 6 September made it definite. Those who did not acquiesce in prolongation of the Japanese-American negotiations, therefore, after the latter part of September grew in their antagonism to it, urging that Japan should decide upon war at once, as it was necessary to commence hostilities by the end of October at latest. The government, however, contended that diplomacy was not entirely hopeless; and a series of "Ogikubo Conferences"—so called from their locale, Prince Konoe's villa in the Tokyo suburb of Ogikubo—was held, after 5 October, for exploration of the subject by Premier, Foreign Minister and War and Navy Ministers. . . .

The Ogikubo Conference of 12 October was practically the last debate on the question of war or peace. On the authority of the Konoe memoirs, on that occasion Navy Minister Oikawa first stated that, now Japan was faced with the alternative of war or no war, he would leave decision to the Premier. Prince Konoe at once responded that if it was to be decided there and then, he would vote for continuing the negotiations. Here War Minister Tojo interposed, saying that the Premier was too hasty, that it must first be settled whether

... "The high command did not divulge its secrets even to the full general who was Premier and Minister of War; it is easy to conceive how other ministers were treated"

there was any possibility of success through diplomacy, as it was vital that Japan should not let slip her opportunity for a war by devotion to palavering which arrived nowhere.

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that, the major obstacle to agreement being the recognition of the right to maintain troops in China, the negotiations were not beyond hope if the Army would consent to some concessions, however slight, on that head. To this, according to Konoe's memoirs, Tojo rejoined that the Army could make no concession in regard to the stationing of troops, a matter of life or death to it.

... On the 14th the Premier asked the War Minister's reconsideration. Tojo not only refused to comply with this request, but at the Cabinet meeting on that day exhorted

upon the ministers the necessity of breaking off the Japanese-American negotiations. It was this which drove Prince Konoe to submit the resignation of the Cabinet on the 16th. At a meeting of the Senior Statesmen the following morning it was decided to recommend Tojo as the new Premier, nominations of Prince Higashi-Kuni and General Ugaki having been opposed by Lord Keeper Kido.

Such was, as disclosed by my later study of the documents and by other sources of information, the tide of events from the inception of the Japanese-American negotiations to the establishment of the Tojo Cabinet and my assumption of the Foreign Ministership.

* * *

CHAPTER III

Japan's Grand Strategy for War

EVENTS DURING THE PERIOD of the Japanese-American negotiations well exemplify the military meddling in diplomatic affairs. The move into southern French Indochina, which led to the negotiations breaking down, had been planned by the military men. As war preparations were expedited and efforts were intensified to complete them, consequent upon the Imperial Conference decisions of July and September, the soldiers began to nurture an overweening confidence in victory, and . . . to press for abandonment of the negotiations and early decision for war.

The Navy particularly, after the American embargo on petroleum, became much exercised over the necessity of promptly deciding on war if there was no hope from diplomacy. At all times, the military services opposed the moderation of the terms in the negotiations, thereby to all intents and purposes precluding their consummation.

It is not difficult to conceive the extent of the tyranny of the military power from the fact that on the eve of the Pacific War such a fundamental datum as the total tonnage of Japanese naval vessels—not to speak of the displacement of the gigantic battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi*, or the plan to attack Pearl Harbor—was vigilantly withheld from the knowledge of the civilian cabinet ministers. General Tojo even told me in Sugamo Prison that it was only at the IMTFE that he had first learned that the Japanese task force which carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor had assembled at Hitokappu Bay on 10 November, and weighed anchor for Hawaii in the morning of the 26th! The high command did not divulge its secrets even to the full general who was Premier and Minister of War; it is easy to conceive how other ministers were treated.

* * *

With the meeting on 23 October the Liaison Conference embarked upon an over-all examination of our policy concerning the Japanese-American negotiations. I had found upon reviewing the documents of the Foreign Ministry from the day after I took office on 18 October, that diplomacy had reached a state of deadlock, and it was touch-and-go whether peace could be preserved between the two countries. It was therefore evident from the beginning that the negotiations were extremely unpromising; my own problem was a dual one—bargaining with the United States to obtain moderation

of its stand was but half the battle, for I had also to persuade our own military authorities that they must make concessions. If these objectives could be gained there was, I believed, still some room, however small, for saving the peace.

* * *

On the basis of reports and opinions of the highest Japanese authorities concerned with the Japanese-American negotiations, I naturally harbored the hope that there was some possibility of arriving at an agreement; but at the same time I took for granted that it would be necessary that Japan make substantial concessions, my study of the documents having convinced me that the United States was ready to go to war if necessary. In these circumstances, before the Liaison Conference discussions began I worked out my own terms for a solution, in general, as follows:

First, that Japanese troops stationed in China, including those in the special areas of North China and elsewhere, should be withdrawn within five years. Second, that Japan should affirm that she had no intention of disturbing economic activities of third powers in China conducted on a fair basis, and had no objection to application of the principle of free trade throughout the world—nor, in applying it, to including China, thereby solving the basic issue over China between the United States and Japan. Further, in connection with the southern problem created by the movement of Japanese forces into southern French Indochina I intended by withdrawing our troops therefrom to demonstrate that Japan had no aggressive designs against those areas, thus manifesting our sincerity and promoting the success of the negotiations.

With regard to the Tripartite Pact, I believed that a meeting of minds had already been reached, and that if the other issues were settled this one would amount only to finding a form of expression, as Japan had conceded it in substance.

Provisionally, I instructed Ambassador Nomura on 21 October that the new Cabinet was no less earnest than its predecessor for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations on a fair basis, and that pending more detailed instructions he should try to obtain from the United States a response to our proposal of 25 September.

It was in this frame of mind that I attended my first meet-

... Japan's decision: "Diplomacy was to have primary emphasis and war preparations secondary during the month of September, with war preparations foremost and diplomacy subordinated after early October"

ing of the Liaison Conference, on 23 October. The session commenced with Premier Tojo's stating that, he having been made acquainted at the formation of his Cabinet with the Imperial wish that the Imperial Conference decision of 6 September be re-examined, now, with "the slate wiped clean," the Liaison Conference was to re-examine that decision in its entirety. The Chief of the Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, however, quickly reminded us of the fact that according to the 6 September decision diplomacy was to have primary emphasis and war preparations secondary during the month of September, with war preparations foremost and diplomacy subordinated after early October—with all which, he suggested, former Foreign Minister Toyoda had been familiar.

Allied "Encirclement" of Japan

Accordingly, he said, a prompt determination was essential if we were not to lose our opportunity, in view of the approach of the monsoon season and other circumstances. Army Vice-Chief of Staff Tsukada, even more pessimistic and more intransigent, then asserted that the Japanese-American negotiations had demonstrated the bankruptcy of diplomacy, that America and Britain had already severed their economic relations with Japan and were tightening their encirclement of us, and that Japan should therefore immediately resort to measures of self-defense. The Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Ito, also urged that Japan should quickly make her decision as to the outlook for the negotiations, as she could afford no loss of time.

I thus discovered at once that although the 6 September decision was to be re-examined, the war preparations which the high command had undertaken following the 2 July Imperial Conference remained, undisturbed, like a mine in the path of diplomatic activity, encouraging the military services to a bellicose attitude and constituting a formidable obstacle to any progress. Furthermore, as the only newcomers in the Liaison Conference were Navy Minister Shimada, Finance Minister Kaya and myself—all the best had been participants in the 6 September Conference—the "limits" set by the September decision tended to be taken as a point of departure for any renewed examination of the subject, and a resulting sort of psychological inertia made it very difficult to obtain relaxation of those limits.

Nevertheless, I questioned sharply the premises asserted by the high command, saying that all avenues offering any chance whatever should be explored, and that for Japan, contending that compromise was impossible, to plunge precipitately into military action was unwarrantable. The Premier, too, insisting that the position should be re-examined upon the launching of the new cabinet, it was in the end decided to have the secretaries prepare a concrete scheme of the items and the method of the re-examination. As I recall, the main items thus submitted by the secretaries were:

1. Is there a prospect of having the United States accept promptly the demands agreed upon on 6 September?
2. What would be the consequences to Japan of acceptance of the United States' Memorandum of 2 October?
3. To what extent can Japan recede from her 6 September decision?
4. What is the prospect of the European War?

5. Is it possible for Japan to fight either Britain or America only?

6. What are the United States' potential and ability for war?

7. How to build up Japan's war potential: increasing production of steel, petroleum, ships and other munitions, and financial strength.

Hours were spent in deliberation of these questions. . . .

. . . The military and other representatives introduced a detailed and concrete study of the war potential of the United States. There was no questioning of the size of her forces, that having been publicized; and as the conference took at face value the numerous published figures on American productive capacity, it was fully recognized that her potential was beyond comparison greater than that of Japan. Some doubted whether the United States could secure a sufficient supply of rubber, but the general opinion was that she could manage it by use of reclaimed and synthetic material and by imports from South America. Although it required a huge industrial plant to maintain the function of arsenal for the European War, most of the plant had been completed by the autumn of 1941; as this industrial capacity could at any moment be mobilized forthwith for the war against Japan, there was no means, it was unanimously agreed, of directly vanquishing the United States in case of war against her.

It was for this reason that Japan's grand strategy, as I understood it then, rather than consisting of unlimited offensive operations, was to be the occupation of the Southwestern Pacific area and preparation for a long war by maintenance and building up of our fighting strength through the supply of materials from the south. I was therefore amazed when Japan at the outset of the war attacked Hawaii, and subsequently struck at Midway and at areas as distant as Rabaul, contrary to the initial basic principles of our strategy. Looking back from today, when the war is over, I still do not think that our defeat was attributable so much to underestimation of the war potential of the United States as to violation of strategic principles.

Wrong Guess on Atom Bomb

On the other hand, there is no doubt that lack of foresight in mobilization of science for development of weapons greatly hampered us in many directions; with respect to the talk of atomic bombs, for instance, one of our authorities in that field asseverated a few months preceding the obliteration of Hiroshima that an atomic bomb could not be completed in time for use in this war. This condition I consider to have been a consequence of the general level of scientific knowledge in Japan, which could not be corrected overnight.

The last point for consideration by the Liaison Conference was the building up of Japan's potential for war—of what items, and by what means, production must be increased. I was astonished at our want of the statistical data required for a study of this sort, but even more I felt keenly the absurdity of our having to base our deliberations on assumptions, as the high command refused to divulge figures on the numbers of our forces, or any facts relating to operations.

In connection, for example, with shipping—one of the subjects more discussed—I argued that the loss of bottoms at sea would, contrary to the estimate in the plan presented to

... "In the negotiations we were at 'swords' points, and such an impasse had been reached that failure in them would in the circumstances almost inevitably bring about a war"

the conference, be greater in the second year of war than in the first, on account of the expedited construction and extended operations of American submarines. The Navy, however, simply asserted that it had plans for coping with the menace of submarines, and I—being without any way of pursuing the argument further—had perforce to leave it at that. Steel production promised to be insufficient, but it was argued that it would be expanded with the improvement, as the years went by, in the shipping position. The transportation of petroleum from the south also would, it was said, be increased. The problem of shipping, obviously, was one of the most vital; but the ministries concerned asserted that it could be solved.

Opinions were also given us, by those responsible for such things as wartime finance, securing of the food supply, and the national morale, that there need be no anxiety in those quarters. Many of the subjects before the conference required technical study, but all participants examined and discussed the whole position very earnestly. Tojo and the military—especially the Army—representatives took a firm stand from the beginning, but their attitude in these deliberations was very sincere, and I cannot subscribe to the opinion that Tojo and the others had premeditated war from the moment of formation of the Cabinet.

Japan's Two "Proposals"

It was in these circumstances that I submitted to the Liaison Conference my alternative Proposals "A" and "B" for the Japanese-American negotiations. In the negotiations we were at swords' points, and such an impasse had been reached that failure in them would in the circumstances almost inevitably bring about a war. I was determined to prevent this result, so calamitous for the two countries and for mankind at large, but it was my conviction that it could be prevented and the negotiations brought to success only through the making of mutual concessions. My task, therefore, was to work out a fresh proposal embodying our maximum possible concessions. My basic position has been explained a few pages earlier in connection with my preparation for attendance at the Liaison Conference; this position I embodied in Proposal "A". . . .

I encountered bitter opposition in the Liaison Conference to this proposal, as making too great concessions. . . .

The problem of stationing of troops in China having been the cause of the fall of the Third Kono Cabinet, I had expected that the military representatives would not prove tractable regarding it. I on my part had, however, been resolved from my entry into the Cabinet that I would not remain in office if my plan of setting a time limit should be defeated. I therefore contended tenaciously against the demand for keeping our troops in China with no fixed date for withdrawal, pointing out that it was not reasonable to station troops in territories of other countries indefinitely, and that accordingly the argument that placing a time limit on their retention there would impair the morale of the armed forces was fallacious.

The military occupation, I argued, would ultimately do more harm than good even from the point of view of protection of our residents; for Japan to impose military pressure upon her neighbor for a protracted period would not con-

tribute to the permanent peace of the Far East, and such enterprises as could not operate without military support had better be given up.

The discussion of this question generated much warmth, and seemed endless. Finally, however, one of the secretaries proposed that we should agree on stationing our troops in China for a period of ninety-nine years. The term of ninety-nine years, of course, I rejected, for it meant no limit; but the making of the proposal was evidence that the military representatives, who had been annoyed at my pressing the point so strongly, felt that they could not escape consenting to the setting of some time limit. After my refusing to accept a period of ninety-nine years, many argued that it must be one of not less than fifty years, but this too I rejected, saying that to set a term of as long as fifty years was meaningless, as nobody could tell what might happen in the course of half a century. I continued to contend for the five years which I had first suggested.

The general opinion of the conference conceded to twenty-five years, but there seemed no possibility of further shortening it; I proposed eight years, then ten, but all the others became obstinate at twenty-five years, and demanded that I in turn make a concession. I was not satisfied with such a long period, on the basis of which it was doubtful whether negotiations would succeed, but in the atmosphere of the conference nothing better could be gained. I considered, moreover, that once a time limit had been set, it might be possible to re-examine the length of time if the United States should raise the objection that it was too great. A reservation on this point was one of the understandings which, as I shall relate presently, I obtained from Premier Tojo on the morning of 2 November. I therefore acquiesced in the sense of the Liaison Conference.

It was by this process that for the first time in the course of the Japanese-American negotiations a term came to be set to the stationing of Japanese troops in China. Dissatisfied as I was with the period stated, of twenty-five years, it was my intention first to impress upon the United States that the military occupation was not to be indefinite, and then to find a compromise on the time provided, rather than antagonizing the United States by demanding from the beginning its agreement to the twenty-five years.

"Malicious" Translation by U. S.

My intention was in the end frustrated by the United States reception of Proposal "A." It may perhaps be that my instruction to Ambassador Nomura transmitting the proposal was not worded with sufficient care; but it remains regrettable that this telegram was intercepted by the United States authorities and translated by them in an extremely malicious way, which did much to complicate the subsequent development of things. I shall recur to this point. The United States would in any event have been cool to Proposal "A" because—as we learned when we heard Mr. Ballantine's testimony at the IMTFE—she had felt no confidence in Japan's professions, especially since the movement into southern French Indochina. Leaving aside the question of the nature of that Japanese move—whether aggressive or otherwise—so long as the United States did not trust the other party the negotiations could never arrive at a fruition unless Japan should accept unconditionally the demands of the United States, and no

... Nov. 1, 1941: "The Army high command—taking its usual strong tone—demanded that the negotiations be broken off now . . . as the United States was extending its encirclement of Japan and had imposed economic sanctions"

concession short of that would have sufficed. Some points in America's proposals, however, were not reasonable, and Japan at that time could not accept the American position *in toto* and unconditionally.

It had been far from easy to even get the Liaison Conference to agree to Proposal "A." I had, however, to be prepared for the possibility that Proposal "A" would not bring about a solution, it being evident that the United States was maintaining its stand at the risk of going to war. Against the eventuality of such a failure, I worked out a second plan, Proposal "B," as a *modus vivendi*, to be used as a last resort in arriving at agreement on a few items essential for averting the outbreak of a war. Proposal "B" was as follows:

1. The governments of Japan and the United States undertake to make no military advance into any of the regions, excepting French Indochina, of Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2. The governments of Japan and the United States shall co-operate with a view to acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries require from the Netherlands East Indies.

3. The governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The government of the United States shall supply to Japan a required quantity of oil.

4. The government of the United States undertakes to refrain from measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavor for restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The government of Japan undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indochina upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

The government of Japan declares that it is prepared upon conclusion of the present agreement to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indochina to the northern part thereof.

Notes:

1. It may if necessary be promised at conclusion of this agreement to withdraw the Japanese troops upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

2. The provisions of Proposal "A" concerning nondiscriminatory treatment in trade and the interpretation and implementation of the Tripartite Pact may if necessary be added to this agreement.

* * *

Aim of Second Proposal

The whole concept of Proposal "B" thus was—as I made clear in my telegram of 20 November instructing Ambassador Nomura to present it—to restore relations, then critical, to their condition prior to July, and to eliminate the United States' suspicions by demonstrating in deed that Japan had no design of southward advance, thus calming the atmosphere and averting war. Mr. Ballantine of the State Department

testified at the IMTFE that the reason for the United States' lack of interest in Proposal "B" was that she put no trust in our promises; the withdrawal from southern French Indochina, he said, was meaningless, because the troops even if withdrawn could again be dispatched thither within a matter of a day or two.

Evidently, the negotiations themselves were meaningless if one party took a position of mistrust of the other. That the United States was suspicious without reason is proved by the fact that Proposal "B" was furiously opposed by the military services at the Liaison Conference, altercation over it raging until the conference almost broke up, because the soldiers considered it to yield too much to the United States.

Proposals "A" and "B" being agreed to, the basis upon which the Tojo Cabinet was to go forward with the Japanese-American negotiations was thus settled. While, however, it would be most fortunate for the cause of peace if our proposals should result in conclusion of the negotiations, there was a clear possibility, considering the inflexible attitude of the United States, that they might not. In view of this possibility, the Liaison Conference had proceeded with other calculations, concurrently with discussion of Proposals "A" and "B," and the question finally presented itself inescapably for decision, what steps Japan should take in the event of the negotiations breaking down. The military representatives urged that we should contrive plans against such an eventuality, and submitted three alternative courses of action. These were, (1) to determine immediately to commence war; (2) to exercise patience, awaiting a change in circumstances; and (3) to continue negotiations, with the determination to go to war in case of their failure. . . .

"Great Decision": Peace or War

On 1 November the Liaison Conference met in the morning. The Army high command—taking its usual strong tone—demanded that the negotiations be broken off now in accordance with alternative (1), above, as the United States was extending its encirclement of Japan and had imposed economic sanctions, and moreover had no sincere intention to conclude the negotiations. In such circumstances, they said, Japan would be foolish to defer decision and lose the opportune time for war. I countered that we were not faithful to our trust to the nation if, while there remained even the smallest room for negotiation, we threw the country into war without having exhausted all possible efforts for peace. Premier Tojo supported me to an unusual extent. Thereupon, alternative (1) was dropped. The next stage was to make the great decision whether, in case of failure of the negotiations, Japan should with fortitude persevere through difficulties, or should decide immediately upon war.

At the conclusion of these discussions, the general consensus of the Liaison Conference was for war if the negotiations failed, and therefore that we should carry on the negotiations with the expectation of going to war in case of their failure. To this consensus I could but continue in opposition; I felt, and argued, that it was premature to decide on war in the event of failure of negotiations yet to be commenced, and

... "I argued that we should not be serving our people faithfully if we threw the nation into a war without any assurance of final victory"

that to set a time limit on the negotiations would further diminish the possibility of their succeeding. The majority of the participants, however, continued to harp on their arguments of "gradual exhaustion," increased pressure by the United States if the negotiations failed, and the inadmissibility of further procrastination, considering developments since the decision of 6 September.

At this point I demanded that the high command give its forecast of the outlook for a war. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano, said that the opportunity for war would be lost unless it was to be launched immediately if the negotiations were not consummated by the end of November; unless Japan fought Britain and America now, she would forever forfeit her opportunity, and would be driven to surrender to them. If, on the other hand, Japan fought now, the prospect for the initial stage of hostilities was certain; subsequent developments would be dependent largely on the national strength and international events, but—the Navy being confident in its strategy of "interception," or "ambushing," of the enemy—it was considered possible by occupying strategic points in the southern areas to establish an invulnerable position.

The Army high command was even more optimistic, and echoed the demand that the decision to fight should be made instant. I countered that a war against Britain and America would be a long one, and that Americans and Britons had inexhaustible tenaciousness, as well as commanding abundant

war potential, whereas Japan could count on no assistance from Germany or Italy, and the promised successes in the early stages should consequently not be too highly rated. It would be foolish, I pointed out, to decide on war on the strength merely of the prospects of its initial stage; after all, if one wins ninety-nine battles and loses the hundredth, one loses the war. I argued that we should not be serving our people faithfully if we threw the nation into a war without any assurance of final victory; and I pressed the soldiers for an avowal of their expectations for a war as a whole. The War Minister responded that victory was certain in the over-all view, and that I could put my fears at rest, trusting in the high command. The Navy Minister repeated that there was no need for pessimism. The Navy Chief of Staff reiterated his confidence in ambushing operations, and said that the Navy would sink the American fleet as it sailed north from the Central Pacific toward the area of the Mandates.

... The assurances of the military services did not appeal to me as quite reliable, but I was in no position to refute their assertions, having no information available to me concerning the size or condition of our armed forces or the state of our military science, all of which were cloaked in secrecy. On the other hand, argument based on the international situation had been exhausted. I came to the conclusion that I had no alternative to taking on trust the services' assurances relative to the outlook for a war.

CHAPTER IV

The U.S. Attitude Stiffens

IN VIEW of the lateness of the hour, I had transmitted Proposals "A" and "B" to Ambassador Nomura on 4 November, prior to the Imperial Conference. Immediately after the Imperial approval had been given them, he was instructed to proceed with negotiations on the basis of Proposal "A."

Before turning to consideration of the negotiations in Washington, it will perhaps be well to explain the purpose and manner of the dispatch to the United States of Ambassador [Saburo] Kurusu, which was my own idea. . . .

... The thought came to me partly because the activities of the Embassy in Washington were giving concern in Tokyo, partly because Ambassador Nomura had long before requested that Kurusu be sent to assist him.

On account of his going on this mission to Washington Mr. Kurusu was subjected to much unpleasantness in connection with the IMTFE, where he was threatened by the prosecution with "indictment." I, too, was no less annoyed as a result of Kurusu's trip, and—now that it has proved that all the effort in connection with it was wasted—I rather regret having arranged it. It was, for example, widely rumored that the dispatch of Kurusu was "camouflage."

I cabled Nomura at the time, telling him that Kurusu carried no new instructions, but was being sent simply to bring him to date on conditions in Tokyo and to assist him with the negotiations at their climactic stage. I explained this frankly to the

British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo, and so informed Nomura; instructing him to bear this in mind in his dealings with the press. The purpose of the sending of Kurusu, so far from being "camouflage," was to make the actual state of affairs known to the American government and to all those concerned. To refer to it as "camouflage" is the merest nonsense, despite whatever suspicion and malice may wish to believe.

In Washington, Ambassador Nomura recommenced negotiations, as instructed, by presenting Proposal "A" to Secretary Hull on 7 November. . . .

On 14 November Ambassador Nomura cabled a review of the outlook and his recommendations. America's war preparations were, he said, progressing, and her military operations in case of movement by Japan either north or south were being planned; now that the European War looked brighter for England, the United States was ready to fight Japan rather than compromise on fundamental principles. It being thus possible that the United States might go to war in the Pacific—to which there was less popular opposition than to entrance into the European War—he recommended that however critical relations and however wrought up the people of Japan, Japan should, if her domestic situation permitted, persevere to watch a little longer the line of development of the world war, rather than making the decision in a month or so.

On the 15th Secretary Hull, bringing up the Tripartite Pact question, told Ambassador Nomura that he wanted to see the

... "Ambassador Nomura was reporting that America's war planning had been accelerated since 1940, and that the military preparation against Japan was all but readied by the summer of 1941"

pact abrogated or made a dead letter upon conclusion of a peaceful agreement with the United States; this was the first revelation of his real intention. At the same meeting he rejected, in an Oral Statement, Japan's proposal on nondiscrimination in trade, and in a proposed joint declaration on economic policy reiterated the earlier demands of the United States. He repeated also that Japan should declare whether she intended to "adopt peaceful courses."

Ambassador Kurusu arrived at Washington on 16 November, and the two ambassadors were received by President Roosevelt on the 17th. At the interview Kurusu said to the President that Japan was striving earnestly for successful conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, but that her economic and military situation would deteriorate if diplomatic activities were protracted, and that she could not bear the total surrender to which she might be driven by longer delay. The President pointed out, in connection with the China problem, that the United States did not intend either to "intervene" or to "mediate," but only to "introduce."

Japan "Tied to Hitler"

On the 18th Secretary Hull took up new ground when he declared that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations was difficult so long as Japan remained tied to Hitler under the Tripartite Pact. Upon Ambassador Nomura's introducing the quite novel suggestion of withdrawal of troops from southern French Indochina and simultaneous rescission of the freezing of assets, the Secretary replied that such a makeshift was of no use when a disagreement over fundamentals was evident. As to the problem of nondiscriminatory treatment in trade, Mr. Hull said that it had been with the postwar state of affairs in mind that he had contended for the principle, and that Britain was coming to accept his views concerning Imperial preferences, to which he had long been opposed.

The attitude of the United States thus grew more uncompromising as the days went by. Contrary to the earlier reports of Ambassador Nomura that a meeting of minds had substantially been arrived at on points other than that of troop stationing, the United States was now requiring total acceptance by Japan of its position on all three of the major issues—its attitude concerning nondiscrimination in trade, for example, having stiffened in recent days. Agreement seemed remote; I saw no other possible course for the time being than to try to effect a *modus vivendi*, by arranging an accommodation on an essential minimum of items to remove the imminent threat of war. On 20 November I ordered the ambassadors in Washington to present Proposal "B."

The discussions based on Proposal "B" started, then, on the 20th. When the proposal was presented, Secretary Hull dwelt upon the difficulty of suspending aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and restated his previous position relative to the Tripartite Pact. . . .

On the 22d the two ambassadors were informed by Secretary Hull that he had consulted with the British Ambassador and the Australian and Dutch Ministers concerning our proposal, and that their opinions were that their governments would willingly co-operate with Japan in such ways as the

restoration of normal trade relations, if only Japan's intention was peaceable. However, he said, the tone of the Japanese press and of the speeches of her leaders was quite the reverse of peaceable. He said also that relaxation of the embargo should be brought about, if at all, only very gradually, in view of the remarkable increase in Japan's petroleum imports, owing to her Navy's stockpiling, prior to the freezing.

The Secretary added that he would communicate with our ambassadors upon receiving the replies of the other governments whom he had consulted. In response to inquiries by the ambassadors, he said that although "it is little enough that we are actually doing to help China," the United States could not assent to the Japanese request to cut off its aid. In any event, Hull said, the time was not yet ripe for the President's introduction between Japan and China.

Upon receipt of the report of this conversation, I instructed our representatives in Washington that there could be no solution unless all the items of Proposal "B" were worked out, and that they should therefore do all within their power to persuade the United States to conclude the agreement by 29 November. I made similar representations to Ambassador Grew, in Tokyo. . . .

Secretary Hull had asserted on the 22d that the American aid to Chiang Kai-shek was less significant than the reports had it. But according to publications of the United States government after the war, it had even up to 1941 provided to Chiang a considerable total of credits, many aircraft and pilots, and a large quantity of munitions. In those days the United States government scouted also the idea that any encirclement of Japan was forming; but Ambassador Nomura was reporting that America's war planning had been accelerated since 1940, and that the military preparation against Japan was all but readied by the summer of 1941.

1937: FDR Expected War

It was published in the press that Anglo-American or Anglo-American-Dutch military conferences had been held in Washington and Singapore since January of 1941, and it was no secret that these conferences were aimed at Japan. The Congressional Pearl Harbor investigation committee established the fact that President Roosevelt had already, by the time of his "quarantine" speech in Chicago on 1937, come to the conclusion that the United States would most probably, sooner or later, go to war against Japan; and it was proved that an overall strategic plan—worked out at the Anglo-American joint staff conferences held from January to March and in April 1941—in case of war against Japan, Germany and Italy was approved formally by the War and Navy Secretaries and informally by the President.

In particular, the memoranda of 5 and 27 November, submitted to the President by the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, showed the encirclement of Japan to have been substantially completed, and expounded various war plans vis-à-vis Japan. An open advertisement of the war preparations was the reconnaissance flight of an American plane over the southern part of Formosa on 20 November.

The government of the United States began around this time to complain that Japanese leaders and press were agitating the public through the expression of "strong" views, and that

... "I must refer to the mischief done by the intercepting and translating by the American authorities of the telegrams passing between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Washington"

this evidenced a lack of sincerity for peace. But at that same time, one of the American leaders, Secretary of the Navy Knox, went so far as to proclaim that the United States Navy was prepared to cope with any eventuality, and the American press was no less provocative. . . .

Before concluding this chapter, I must refer to the mischief done by the intercepting and translating by the American authorities of the telegrams passing between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Washington. The United States' discarding of Proposals "A" and "B" without according them serious consideration was, as attested by the evidence of Mr. Ballantine at the IMFTE, the result chiefly of the fact that, on the basis of knowledge of our diplomatic correspondence as intercepted by them, the American government had no confidence in the sincerity of Japan. I have already remarked that negotiation is meaningless if one party has no faith in the solemn promises of the other. Such a condition is particularly tragic when the lack of confidence is baseless.

By November 1941, with Japanese-American relations at the crisis in which they then stood, there was no room for technical maneuvering, and my endeavor in the negotiations was to realize a compromise between the two countries without resort to such tactics. All instructions sent by me being the forthright embodiment of our true intentions, the interception of our telegrams could not have embarrassed me so far as my actual language should have become known to the adversary. However, our messages intercepted by the American authorities were, for reasons beyond my comprehension, fantastically garbled in translation.

The subject of these mistranslations was gone into thoroughly at the IMTFE, by my defense counsel, who exposed the errors contained in them and confuted the contentions of the prosecution and the testimony of Ballantine based on them. Those interested in the subject should refer to the record of the proceedings of the IMTFE, in which it is fully covered.

I shall quote only one example of the mistranslation—that

of my instruction of 4 November explaining Proposal "A," which was of a peculiar importance in that it conveyed the basic idea of the negotiations to be conducted. Here are parallel excerpts from the two versions, the original and the intercepted:

<i>Original</i>	<i>Intercept</i>
This is our proposal setting forth what are virtually our final concessions	This proposal is our revised ultimatum
We make the following relaxation	We have toned down our insistence as follows
(Note: In case the United States inquires into the length of the "necessary period," reply is to be made to the effect that the approximate goal is 25 years)	(Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period," answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years)
In view of the strong American opposition to the stationing for an indefinite period, it is proposed to dismiss her suspicion by defining the area and duration of the stationing	In view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions
You are directed to abide, at this moment, by the abstract term "necessary period," and to make efforts to impress the United States with the fact that the troops are not to be stationed either permanently or for an indefinite period	We have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them to the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation

It is obvious at a glance that the "translation" of the intercepted telegram is no translation, but might well have been a malicious distortion of the message aimed at creating an impression of perfidy.

CHAPTER V Japan Is "Forced to Fight"

SECRETARY HULL'S NOTE which proved to signalize the end of the Japanese-American negotiations was handed to our Ambassadors, in Washington, on 26 November (an Oral Statement simultaneously delivered contained nothing new, merely summarizing previous developments). . . .

Our Ambassadors reported that they told Secretary Hull, when his note was handed to them, that they found it unacceptable as discrepant with the tenor of the discussions thitherto, and that they could hardly bring themselves to transmit it to their government.

In considering the nature of the Hull Note, the sequence of events in Washington from 20 November to the delivery of the note, as I learned it later, is of interest. As I have mentioned, a *modus vivendi* had been under contemplation. According to Dr. Charles A. Beard (who made a detailed study, on the basis of American sources, of the days lead-

ing to the outbreak of the Pacific War), Secretary Hull, in co-operation with the President and the highest military officials, had worked out a plan for adjusting relations, with the Japanese proposal as its groundwork. This was on 21 November and the days following.

Secretary of War Stimson approved the plan in its final form, declaring that it would adequately safeguard the interests of the United States. Conferences were held also with the ambassadors or ministers of the other countries interested; but the Chinese registered passionate protests against any form of *modus vivendi*—Ambassador Hu Shih was very active in urging China's opposition, and Chiang Kai-shek sent numerous "hysterical" cables direct to several American leaders. Even Prime Minister Churchill intervened in support of the Chinese position, apparently causing no small embarrassment to Secretary Hull. Suddenly—for reasons which as Dr. Beard says are nowhere made explicit—after

... "President Roosevelt had promised Prime Minister Churchill in August that he would try to delay war with Japan by one to three months. The three months had now run out"

consultation with President Roosevelt, Hull discarded his proposed *modus vivendi*, and on the 26th handed to the Japanese Ambassadors the note.

President Roosevelt, it will be remembered, had promised Prime Minister Churchill in August that he would try to delay war with Japan by one to three months. The three months had now run out. In the entry for 25 November in the diary of Secretary Stimson, he records that there was held at the White House, from twelve to one thirty of that day, a meeting of the "War Cabinet"—the President, Hull, Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Staff Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Stark. The President, saying that a Japanese attack appeared imminent, posed the question what should be done. The dilemma thereby suggested was a serious one, since the problem as stated was to minimize the damage which would be inflicted by the attack which Japan was to be maneuvered into initiating. In the discussion which followed, Stimson said that since the President had served on Japan as early as August a caveat against her military aggrandizement, it was necessary now only to point out to the Japanese that an advance by them into Thailand would constitute a transgression.

It was decided that the Secretary of State should draft such a communication. In his testimony at the Congressional hearings, Secretary Stimson admitted with reference to the decision reached on that day that, while it is not wise ordinarily when one knows that an enemy is going to strike to wait "until he gets the jump on you," they realized that by making Japan commit the first overt act—attended though that course was by some hazard—the government could gain the full support of the American people. The primary concern at this conference, it is obvious, was how it might be possible to jockey Japan into the position of firing the first shot; there was no atmosphere of working for consummation of the negotiations with Japan by means of the note to be handed to her the following day.

"Diplomatic Phase Was Over"

The evidence concerning activities in Washington following delivery to the Japanese Ambassadors of the Hull Note may also profitably be examined. The day after the handing over of his note, Hull, in telling Stimson (according to Stimson's record) that he had "broken off the whole matter," and that it was now "in the hands of the Army and the Navy," affirmed that war was certain. On the 27th also, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff alerted their Pacific outposts, informing them—after consulting with Hull—that negotiations with Japan were at or virtually at an end. Secretary Hull during those days told the British Ambassador that diplomatic relations with Japan were in effect ruptured, and to the Australian Minister, who on the 28th advanced the suggestion of Australia's essaying mediation between the United States and Japan, he said that he had no objection, but that the diplomatic phase was over and nothing could come of such a move.

An abundance of evidence in the record of the Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee, and analyzed by Dr. Beard, establishes these facts. And these facts speak beyond peradventure of mistake that the Hull Note was handed to Japan in the calculated expectation that it would by no possibility be accepted by her, and that the negotiations

would be ruptured and the rupture followed by war—that the note had been studiously prepared, judging from the timing, with a view to forcing Japan to commit the first overt act. Of course, these data were not available to us in those days of the negotiations; but, having realized from the utterances of the American leaders and their increased war preparations as reported in the press the hardening of their determination to go to war, I could read their intention distinctly in the Hull Note itself. When I received the ambassadors' cabled report of the gist of the note, and then the full text which followed on its heels, I was utterly disheartened, and felt like one groping in darkness. The uncompromising tone was no more than I had looked for; but I was greatly astonished at the extreme nature of the contents.

Concerning this point, it is instructive to compare the Hull Note with the earlier proposals of the United States. . . . We can make an illuminating comparison with even the American proposal of 21 June, to which the United States had clung throughout and on which Secretary Hull stated his Note to be based:

Hull Note	21 June Proposal
1. Multilateral nonaggression pact	No equivalent
2. Multilateral agreement concerning French Indochina	No equivalent
3. Unconditional withdrawal of all Japanese military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina	Timing and conditions of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China to be studied in future (no reference to French Indochina)
4. Disapproval of regimes in China other than the Chiang regime	Friendly negotiations concerning Manchoukuo
5. Abrogation of the Tripartite Pact	Japan's commitment, in connection with the Tripartite Pact, that she would not act upon it in case of an act of self-defense on the part of the United States
6. Giving up of all extraterritorial rights and all rights and interests concerning international settlements and concessions and those under the Boxer Protocol	No equivalent

As this comparison clearly shows, the Hull Note injected into the negotiations demands which had not previously been raised. It was Mr. Hull's plea that these were but applications of the principles which the United States had consistently contended for; but there can be no doubt that the Hull Note in many ways went beyond what the United States had stood for in the negotiations. It required no great perspicacity to deduce that the United States had deliberately made proposals of content known to be unacceptable to Japan, and in a form moreover rendering them impossible of acceptance.

By the time the ambassadors' résumé of the Hull Note was received in the Foreign Ministry, the Army and Navy had received their reports from their attachés in Washington,

... "The economic blockade and military encirclement of Japan, growing daily tighter under the management of the United States, were threatening Japan's existence"

and a meeting of the Liaison Conference was held without delay, on 27 November. All the participants expressed stupefaction at the attitude of the United States as revealed by the note. Some proponents of war among the military men seemed to experience a sense of relief at this development, but it was evident that to most the feeling was one of discouragement.

Japan Sees No Alternative

Upon receipt of the full text of the note, I had consulted specially with the Premier, the Navy Minister and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and all agreed that there was nothing further that we could do. The consensus was that the United States had advanced such demands—in disregard of the anterior development of the negotiations and the understandings thus far reached in them, going beyond the most extreme position which she had ever taken theretofore—because she had no sincere desire to make a peaceful settlement and was bent on forcing a complete surrender upon Japan, and that what the United States intended was to coerce Japan into abandoning her place as the strong power in the Far East, indifferent to Japanese sacrifices in the preceding long years. On the one hand, to capitulate to such a demand was for Japan tantamount to suicide; on the other, the economic blockade and military encirclement of Japan, growing daily tighter under the management of the United States, were threatening Japan's existence. Japan therefore was driven to the conclusion that there was no alternative to making a stand at this point.

Japan at that time naturally could not prolong the negotiations out of mere hope of a solution, without concrete prospects—this at a time when the military men were insisting that even a month or two could not be let pass by, since the United States' policy, in anticipation of a turning of the European War in favor of the Allies, was based on the assumption that Japan would gradually come to suffer economic distress. It was equally obvious that Japan's position vis-à-vis the United States could not have been improved by deferring a solution; that diverse proposals looking to delay at the last moment were rejected in Tokyo is, therefore, not to be wondered at.

An objective and precise study of the negotiations will bring conviction that their success depended not on resolution of one or two issues, not on the exceptionable character of speeches by Japanese leaders, or the like, but fundamentally on one thing and one thing only—whether Japan would truckle under to the United States. To do so would have entailed not only seeing all sacrifices made since before the Manchuria Incident suffered in vain, but submitting to expulsion from the continent; it would have been, in fine, to resign ourselves to Japan's being reduced to a state comparable to that of the present, after the defeat.

I must advert to a few more points for clarification of the contemporaneous situation. It is evident that the Hull Note was an implementation of the concept underlying the Nine Power Treaty and the Stimson Doctrine, with the addition of exactions of assurances concerning the Tripartite Pact and economic affairs. . . .

The primary objective of the Nine Power Treaty was to

guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China, for the ostensible sake of which objective the Pacific War came about. But did Britain, the United States and their allies conclude this treaty and wage the Pacific War purely for the sake of peace, or for the sake of the integrity of China? If so, how to explain Britain's and America's consenting at Yalta on 11 February 1945 to an exclusive control of Manchuria by the U.S.S.R., in negation of the whole concept of the Nine Power Treaty? And why could they not have admitted for Japan what they were thus willing to approve for Russia?

As I pointed out to the American Ambassador during the negotiations, it was inequitable that the United States should censure Japan's stationing of troops in China, the while offering no protest against that of the U.S.S.R. in Outer Mongolia; such is not the way of fidelity to a principle. If a nation acts upon a given principle differently as its convenience of the moment may dictate, it cannot be heard to assert that it is motivated by attachment to justice or the passion for peace; it is then acting only on caprice. Is it strange that Japan could not yield so submissively to a demand of such a nature?

It was the force of such circumstances as I have here set out which assured even the American leaders that Japan could not submit to their demands as formulated in the Hull Note. The contemporaneous recognition by President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and other authorities in Washington, of that fact is confirmed by every objective opinion formed at the time or afterward. We may sample those opinions. Ambassador Grew, then in Tokyo, later said that when the note of 26 November was sent the button which set off the war had been pushed.

Reaction of Press in U. S.

On the 26th and 27th Secretary Hull held special press conferences at which he gave a full account of the Japanese-American negotiations; the American press responded by reporting almost unanimously that it was Japan's choice whether to accept the Hull Note or go to war. Later—in wartime—an American chronicler wrote that even a Monaco or a Luxemburg would have taken up arms against the United States if it had been handed such a memorandum as that which the State Department presented to the Japanese government. In June 1944, Captain Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production and a leading member of the British War Cabinet, created a celebrated incident when he declared in an address to the American Chamber of Commerce in London that it was a distortion of history to say that the United States had been driven into war with Japan, the truth being that the United States had challenged Japan to the point that Japan was finally compelled to stand and fight. It is, lastly, even recorded in the written report of my then secretary, Kase, on his call on Ambassador Craigie at the latter's departure for home on 29 July 1942, that the ambassador told Kase that he had first read the Hull Note in the press after the war had begun, and had then realized that the rupture of the negotiations had been inescapable, the note having wholly disregarded the national feeling of Japan.

It is therefore no longer arguable at this time of day

... "I pointed out that naturally we should give notice of the commencement of hostilities through usual procedures. . . . Admiral Nagano retorted, 'We're going to make a surprise attack' "

that the American authorities, having made all necessary preparations in the expectation that the negotiations would break down and a war ensue, delivered the Hull Note anticipating that Japan would reject it, thus compelling her to elect between total surrender and war. . . .

So far as concerns my own state of mind upon receipt of the Hull Note, I can never forget the despair which overpowered me. I had fought and worked unflaggingly until

that moment; but I could feel no enthusiasm for the fight thereafter. I tried as it were to close my eyes and swallow the Hull Note whole, as the alternative to war, but it stuck in the craw. In contrast to my dejection, many of the military men were elated at the uncompromising attitude of the United States, as if to say, "Didn't we tell you so?"—they were by no means easy to be patient with.

CHAPTER VI

Surprise Attack on Pearl Harbor

THE DECISION FOR WAR WAS made at the Liaison Conference held on the 30th, when it was decided also to hold an Imperial Conference on 1 December, and the agenda therefor was deliberated on. . . .

The agenda of the Imperial Conference consisted of two propositions:

The negotiations with the United States have finally failed of consummation.

Japan will commence hostilities against Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands.

. . . The Premier opened the conference. . . .

Following the Premier, I narrated the development of the negotiations and how the United States' latest proposal rendered their continuation impossible. The Agriculture and Forestry and Finance Ministers and, in his capacity as Home Minister, Tojo again, also made statements, as did the Chief of the Naval General Staff. President Hara asked a few questions, after which he said, "It having come to this, I think that there is no alternative to resorting to arms." The propositions of the agenda were unanimously approved, and the decision made. Tojo informed me later that the Imperial sanction was subsequently given.

The war decision was thus made, and various problems which would arise with the opening of the war were submitted to meetings of the Liaison Conference. One thing which—needless to say—was not discussed in the Liaison Conference was operational aspects of the impending hostilities. It was disclosed at the IMTFE that the naval task force under Admiral Nagumo had sailed from Hitokappu Bay on 26 November under orders to strike Pearl Harbor, and in its judgment the tribunal made the absurd finding that the scheduled attack was freely discussed at the meeting of the Liaison Conference on 30 November.

We had, of course, no knowledge of the plan; it was the invariable practice of the high command not to divulge to civilian officials, such as us, any scrap of information bearing on these highly secret operations, and anyone familiar with the system will readily understand our total lack of knowledge of them. (This condition is sufficiently well illustrated by the fact, which I have mentioned elsewhere, that Tojo told me that it was only at the IMTFE trial itself that he first learned any operational details of the Pearl Harbor attack; a mass of additional evidence was adduced at the trial showing that

the civilian members of the Cabinet had no prior knowledge even of the existence of the plan to attack Hawaii.)

The Imperial Rescript of declaration of war was submitted to the meeting of the Liaison Conference immediately following the Imperial Conference. At this meeting I had the feeling that the members from the high command were unwontedly carefree in attitude, by contrast with their previous intense-ness concerning an early commencement of the war. Finding this attitude strange—and also because there remained to be settled the matter of notification of the declaration of war—I inquired of them when the hostilities were to begin.

Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama replied vaguely that it would be "around next Sunday." This deepened the suspicion which I already felt of the high command, and I therefore pointed out that naturally we should give notice of the commencement of hostilities through usual procedures. To this, however, the Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Nagano, retorted, "We're going to make a surprise attack," and the Vice-Chief, Admiral Ito, followed by saying that the Navy wanted to leave the negotiations unterminated until hostilities should have begun, in order to achieve the maximum possible effect with the initial attack.

I then understood what the carefreeness in the attitude of the high command had meant. I was equally astonished at the proposal of a surprise attack by a Navy which had professed such confidence in its interceptive operations, and discouraged over the future of the war, as the proposal amounted to an admission that the Navy had no expectation of success, even in the initial phase of the war, unless it could achieve surprise. At any rate, I stressed that notification of a declaration of war was absolutely necessary from the point of view of international good faith. . . . I was so disgusted with the high command over these tactics of starting to insist, after the decision for war had been made, on their surprise attack and to try to lure me into consenting to it, that I took the initiative in adjourning the meeting, quitting my seat on the plea of a previous engagement.

At the beginning of the following meeting of the Liaison Conference, Admiral Ito spontaneously stated that the Navy had no objection to delivery in Washington of notification of termination of the negotiations. It should be served, he said, at 12:30 P.M., 7 December, Washington time. All the other participants in the meeting approved the proposal. When I demanded of Ito, "Will there be a proper interval between notification and attack?", he assured me that there would be;

... "The Third Hague Convention prescribes no minimum period of time which shall elapse between prior notification and attack. . . . I thought that . . . one hour's allowance would amply fulfill the requirement"

and I accordingly assented to his request, and it was so decided. I considered that I had succeeded through this controversy in confining the Navy's demand within the ultimate limits of legitimacy as recognized by international law.

This notification, after setting forth the views of the Japanese government on the maintenance of peace, summarized the negotiations of the past months. The United States' assertions were adverted to, and it was pointed out that the final American note, constituting a threat to the existence of Japan and flouting her prestige as a Great Power, was unacceptable to her. It was noted that Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands stood in the same case as the United States, and were at one with it in ignoring Japan's position. The hope "to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation" of Japan and the United States, therefore, was declared finally to have been lost, and it was concluded that the negotiations could now only be terminated. . . .

Roosevelt: "This Means War!"

This notification is in form different from a declaration of war—it became in form a notice merely of termination of negotiations, as contrasted with the declaration of war which I had originally suggested, but in conformity with the decision of the Liaison Conference. That it was, at all events, tantamount in the circumstances to a declaration of war is sufficiently betokened by the fact that the President of the United States upon first reading it (even lacking the last part) declared, "This means war!" and that General Marshall, interpreting it as an announcement of the taking of hostile action by Japan, immediately issued war warnings to American outposts in the Pacific.

I must now recount the subsequent history of the note which constituted our declaration of war. It had been decided in the Liaison Conference, as I have mentioned, to make delivery to the United States government at 12:30 P.M., 7 December, Washington time. On 5 December, however, Tanabe and Ito, the Vice-Chiefs of Staff of Army and Navy, called on me at the Foreign Ministry, and Ito told me that the high command had found it necessary to postpone presentation of the document thirty minutes beyond the time previously agreed upon, and that they wanted my consent thereto. I asked the reason for the delay, and Ito said that it was because he had miscalculated; Tanabe added that the Army also was an interested party, as its operations would commence after the Navy's had begun. I inquired further what period of time would be allowed between notification and attack; but Ito declined to answer this, on the plea of operational secrecy.

I persisted, demanding assurance that even with the hour of delivery changed from twelve thirty to one there would remain a sufficient time thereafter before the attack occurred; this assurance Ito gave. With this—being able to learn no more—I assented to his request. In leaving, Ito said, "We want you not to cable the notification to the Embassy in Washington too early." I replied that I must cable it so that it would without fail be communicated to the United States at the designated time.

The change in the time for delivery was reported to the Liaison Conference by Vice-Chief Ito, at the meeting of 6 December; nobody objecting, it was approved. At this meeting Chief of Staff Nagano suggested that our ambassador should be instructed to hand the note to the Secretary of State personally, in view of its extreme importance. I pointed out that, it being a matter of Sunday noon, the Secretary might have a luncheon engagement which would render it impossible for the ambassadors to make personal delivery to him, but promised that I would instruct them to do so if possible. The ambassadors were so instructed.

The Third Hague Convention prescribes no minimum period of time which shall elapse between prior notification and attack. Being aware that some authorities of international law had therefore held that even one minute's notice would suffice, I thought that in modern times, with our highly developed communications, one hour's allowance certainly would amply fulfill the requirement of the convention. It was therefore with satisfaction at the correctness of my reasoning that I later learned that the American authorities estimated the time required for telecommunication to their Pacific installations at thirty to forty minutes. It is worth noting that even the IMTFE chose in its verdict, despite the emphasis placed by the prosecution on the problems raised by the Third Hague Convention, not to go deeply into them, but rather conceded the defectiveness of the convention.

December 6: A Note to Washington

The time of presentation having been decided at the Liaison Conference, I instructed the bureau director in charge, and the chief of the cable section, to use the utmost care to take measures such that our ambassadors in Washington might without fail have the notification for delivery at the designated time. That those measures were in fact taken pursuant to my instructions is clear if we retrace the steps in the process. The sequence of events was as follows. The Foreign Ministry transmitted to the Embassy in the afternoon of 6 December the instruction that as soon as it should have received the long note which would follow, it should make all necessary preparations, documentary and otherwise, so that it could serve the note on the United States government at any time upon receipt of further instructions.

The text of the note was divided for transmission into fourteen parts, of which all with the exception of the fourteenth, consisting of the last several lines of the note, were dispatched from the Tokyo Central Telegraph Office between 6:30 A.M. and 10:20 A.M., 6 December (this and all following times are for convenience stated as Washington time). The fourteenth part was cabled between 3:00 A.M. and 4:00 A.M. on 7 December; to insure safe receipt, it was sent by two routes. Finally, the instruction to make delivery of the note at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th was dispatched at 3:30 A.M. of that day, also by two routes.

All these telegrams duly arrived in Washington and were received by the Japanese Embassy there. That there was a sufficiency of time for deciphering and typing was established by the investigation later conducted in the Foreign Ministry, and by a plentitude of evidence presented to the IMTFE. Notwithstanding this, the typing was not completed until

... "I felt the conviction that our course, taken only when it had become a certainty that there could be no alternative, must find approval in the ultimate judgment of Heaven"

after the designated hour of delivery, by reason of the negligence of the staff of the Embassy—negligence in delaying to decipher the cables which arrived in the early hours of the 7th, and in having failed earlier to type immediately those parts of the text which had arrived during the preceding evening.

The ambassadors made an appointment with the Secretary of State for 1:00 P.M., as directed. As it proved, however, by the time the note was finally typed and they arrived at the State Department it was after two o'clock, and they met with Secretary Hull only at 2:20 P.M., which was an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The culpability of the Embassy staff for this result is not open to doubt. In accordance with our training of many years in the Foreign Ministry, it was standing procedure that in a period of such emergency a few of the staff remained on duty throughout the night, and all telegrams were immediately deciphered and submitted to the chief of the mission, even in the dead of night.

Meanwhile—while our Embassy was taking its responsibilities thus lightly—each part of the text of our final note was being intercepted, deciphered and delivered to the American military authorities, the Secretary of State and even the President. The President had already, upon reading as far as the thirteenth part, declared that "This means war!"; did not the Japanese Ambassadors read during the 6th the major part of the note, which is known to have been deciphered in their Embassy by the late evening of that day? Or can they have failed to realize its gravity, what it imported, even after reading it?

Before closing this chapter I must say something of my feelings in that night of the war's beginning. Retiring from my audience, deeply moved by looking upon the countenance of the Emperor and there reading his noble feeling of brotherhood with all peoples, but seeing also his unflinching attitude even when receiving me on the very brink of war, I passed solemnly, guided by a court official, down several hundred yards of corridors, stretching serene and tranquil, of the midnight palace. Emerging at the carriage entrance of the Sakashita Gate, I gazed up at the brightly shining stars, and felt bathed in a sacred spirit. Through the palace plaza in utter silence, hearing no sound of the sleeping capital but only the crunching of the gravel beneath the wheels of my car, I pondered that in a few short hours would dawn one

of the eventful days of the history of the world; and various thoughts moved me. Having labored with heart and soul through the preceding month and a half for the sake of mankind and my country, I felt the conviction that our course, taken only when it had become a certainty that there could be no alternative, must find approval in the ultimate judgment of Heaven.

In my public life I have experienced many memorable moments. As fields of combat by disputation, there were the violent controversy with Litvinov, from the winter of 1939 to the following spring, over renewal of the fisheries-concessions in Russian waters; heated conflicts with the militarists in the prewar days, especially that continuing from the night of 1 November 1941 into the small hours of the 2d; and my three hours' altercation with Tojo, after the commencement of the war, at the cabinet meeting of 1 September 1942.

Among other scenes of profound interest, there come to mind my conversation with Hitler at the mountain villa at Berchtesgaden, and the toast to the New Year of 1940 which I drank in the Kremlin at the close of an all-night conference. But on two occasions—on my return home from the Imperial Palace on the verge of war, and again at the close of the Imperial Conference of 14 August at the end of the war—was I filled with the assurance that, having participated in a momentous event, I had exhausted all my powers and my abilities in the conviction that Heaven knows a heart true to country and to mankind. Even now, thinking of those times, I feel the tears come to my eyes.

After resigning from the Tojo Cabinet in September, 1942, Shigenori Togo spent most of the remaining war years in seclusion.

In April, 1945, when Japan was near defeat, 77-year-old Adm. Kantaro Suzuki was named Premier. No one, not even the Japanese, knew whether his was to be a government of peace or one of war to the last gasp.

Admiral Suzuki invited Mr. Togo to be his Foreign Minister. Mr. Togo declined when the new Premier said he thought Japan could fight for two or three years longer. But, with backing from the Imperial Court and the Japanese Navy, which knew defeat was certain, Mr. Togo finally agreed to become Foreign Minister on condition he would have a free hand in diplomatic affairs.

In the chapters that follow, Mr. Togo tells of the events leading to Japan's surrender.

CHAPTER VII

April, 1945: Japan Faces Defeat

BY THE TIME of my becoming Foreign Minister for the second time, the Philippines had already fallen into the hands of the enemy, as had Iojima [Iwo Jima]; enemy landings had been made on Okinawa and heavy fighting was in progress there. The immediate task facing the Suzuki Cabinet was to increase production of munitions, and at daily meetings of the Cabinet or of groups of ministers this and the related problems of food, transportation, public finance

and welfare were exhaustively reviewed. The position in Okinawa, however, grew worse; air raids on Japan proper were stepped up; shipping wasted away; and each fresh report of the ministers concerned made it more certain that a debacle was approaching.

Communication with the continent became daily more difficult, and it appeared that the complete cessation of supply of materials therefrom was but a question of time—a short time. The currency in circulation in Japan expanded daily,

... "The Russian victory over Germany was owed in no small measure to Japan's maintenance of neutral relations with the U.S.S.R., whose hands were thereby freed in the East"

and the growth of inflation could not be ignored. I had high appreciation for the earnestness with which the ministers concerned, especially those in charge of economic affairs, struggled with these difficulties; but there was no means of turning the tide, and with the increase in destructivity of the air raids and the general paralysis of production, the continuation of the war was obviously becoming impossible.

On the last day of the life of the Koiso Cabinet—5 April—notification had been given by the U.S.S.R. that it would not be able to renew the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The pact had another year of validity, and we had been assured, in response to a previous inquiry (made in February by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu through Ambassador Sato), that there had been no consultation concerning Japan at the Yalta Conference of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. Suspicion of the U.S.S.R. was, however, irrepressible in view of Stalin's having referred to Japan as an aggressor in November 1944, and especially of the statement, in the communication refusing to renew the Neutrality Pact, that the reason for that step was that Japan had been assisting Germany, the enemy of the U.S.S.R., and fighting America and Britain, its allies.

I felt impelled to do what I could about Russian relations. As an initial step, on the occasion of my first reception of the Diplomatic Corps soon after becoming Foreign Minister, I pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that the U.S.S.R.'s obligation of neutrality remained effective. I also instructed Ambassador Sato in Moscow to obtain an assurance from the U.S.S.R. concerning her intentions, and the ambassador subsequently reported that, on 27 April, Foreign Commissar Molotov had given him the assurance that the attitude of the U.S.S.R. in connection with maintenance of neutrality had not altered. Nevertheless, after late March it was being observed that the eastward movement of Soviet forces was on the increase.

Our opportunity to perform Russo-German mediation, between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943, had long since been lost. Subsequent attempts to improve relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. had borne no fruit by reason of the government's shilly-shallying over coming to a decision on the compensation to be paid to her; and meanwhile the United States had been unremittingly wooing the U.S.S.R., and meetings of the three chiefs of the enemy states had been held at Teheran and Yalta. The time for

employment by us of artifices designed to win the U.S.S.R. to our side patently had passed.

Nevertheless, it would be fatal for Japan if the Soviet Union threw herself unreservedly into the enemy's camp, and it was imperative to prevent her from entering the war against us; even more, now that the further prosecution of the war had become so awkward, the Russian problem had to be attacked from the point of view of ending the war rather than of merely achieving maintenance of the Soviet status of nonbelligerent. I was intending to move for an early peace, and I determined for that purpose to make use of the desires of the military services. Many, who did not comprehend that our opportunity to take positive Russian measures had been lost, demanded that we approach the U.S.S.R. with the object of obtaining aid in coping with the United States and Great Britain; the Navy, for example, expressed the desire to offer to purchase petroleum and aircraft, in return for which it was ready to transfer some of its cruisers. I silenced the Navy's request, convincing them that for the Russians to supply Japan with munitions would constitute a breach of neutrality such as could not be committed by the U.S.S.R. without the determination to fight on Japan's side, which was out of the question in the current international climate.

The Russian victory over Germany was owed in no small measure to Japan's maintenance of neutral relations with the U.S.S.R., whose hands were thereby freed in the East. Despite this, the attitude of Japan—and especially of the Japanese Army—had caused the Russians over a long course of years to be extremely suspicious of Japan and firmly determined to neutralize her. Not only, therefore, could Japan not realistically expect any benevolence to be shown her by the U.S.S.R.; she had to realize that when it should have become apparent in the course of the war that Japanese national strength had been exhausted, the U.S.S.R. might, instead of negotiating with Japan, make common cause with the United States and Great Britain to the end of sharing in the fruits of victory.

Now that the U.S.S.R. was bound by strong ties to America and Britain, it was too late for us to be making plans in the endeavor to induce her to act to our advantage; efforts even to persuade her to maintain neutrality could be expected to meet with reward only if made while Japan retained some quantum of power, and only if with the determination to offer a generous *quid pro quo* in return for any favors. What was essential now was to unify opinion within the country on these aspects of the problem.

CHAPTER VIII

Wooing the Russians

FROM THE MOMENT of the outbreak of the war I had had in mind the ending of it, and that had been the almost exclusive purpose of my taking the foreign portfolio in the Suzuki Cabinet. The proposals which the Army and the Navy had made to me, that I act to prevent Russian entry into the war, appeared to me to offer a God-sent opportunity to lead the entire nation in the direction I had in mind—the direction of peace.

As it was the function of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War to decide the fundamental policies concerning the war, I thought it most convenient to work through that body. . . .

At meetings of the council members from 11 to 14 May the Russian problem was discussed. As I have mentioned, while the Army viewed the task as being the keeping of the U.S.S.R.

... May, 1945: "I contended that there was no longer any room for utilizing the U.S.S.R. militarily or economically, that it was too late for Japan to . . . persuade her to play the friend to us. . . ."

out of the war, the Navy went beyond this, and expressed the desire to induce her to adopt a friendly attitude, in order that we could purchase from her petroleum and other supplies. I contended that there was no longer any room for utilizing the U.S.S.R. militarily or economically, that it was too late for Japan to obtain any significant supply of munitions from her or persuade her to play the friend to us. . . .

Japan's Views on Russia

Of course, it was desirable that we prevent Russia from attacking us, and I was entirely agreed that we should try to do this. I warned, however, that to achieve this purpose we must be prepared to pay a price, now that our power to fight had diminished—and, naturally, to pay all the more if we had any hope of persuading the U.S.S.R. to act to our advantage. But it was now too late for us to waste the precious time left to us in endeavors to obtain assistance from the U.S.S.R.; it was no longer realistic to think in such terms, and mediation at most could now be hoped for as possible.

I therefore proposed that we should first of all examine the whole field of international relations, including those with the U.S.S.R., from that point of view. The Premier, however, stated that he could see no reason that we should not feel out whether there was a friendly attitude on the part of the Russians. It was then settled that the points to be considered at the moment should be (1) the prevention of Russian entry into the war; (2) inducing the U.S.S.R. so far as might be possible to adopt an attitude favorable for us; and (3) opening a way to peace.

As possible means for attainment of point 3, mediation by China, Switzerland, Sweden or the Vatican was studied, but all members of the Supreme Council agreed that such efforts would but end in the Allies' demanding Japan's unconditional surrender. General Umezu thereupon voiced the conclusion, that it was the U.S.S.R. only which would be able to mediate for peace with the United States and Great Britain on terms at all favorable to us. War Minister Anami added that, as the U.S.S.R. would find itself in confrontation with the United States after the war, and therefore would not desire to see Japan too much weakened, the Soviet attitude toward us need not be severe.

My response to this was that we could not be optimistic about the U.S.S.R., as she acted always realistically and ruthlessly. Premier Suzuki remarked that there seemed to be something in Premier Stalin's personality like that of Saigo Nanshu [a nineteenth-century military hero] and that he felt that Stalin would act fairly and that we should request the rendition of good offices by the U.S.S.R. I pointed out the danger of setting a course on the basis merely of the Japanese way of thinking; nevertheless, I too was of the opinion that if there was any country which could promote a peace more acceptable than unconditional surrender, it was the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Army's desire for peace had originated in the idea of acting through the U.S.S.R., a fact which would facilitate utilization of it as the intermediary.

I therefore repeated that while I was in accord with the Premier's suggestion of initiating negotiations with the U.S.S.R. aimed at the three points agreed upon, we would certainly have to pay a high price for the achieving of any one of these three objectives, and this problem had to be con-

sidered from the viewpoint of postwar Far Eastern policy as well. We thereupon went to consideration of the question of payment. This, it was tentatively agreed, might include abrogation of the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese Basic Treaty, and the restoration in general of the status prior to the Russo-Japanese War; provided, that autonomy for Korea should not be included—that question being reserved to Japan's arbitration—and that South Manchuria should be neutralized.

This decision being a momentous one, the gist of it was put into writing at the time, and signed by the participants; the document was lost when the Foreign Minister's Official Residence was burned down in the air raid of 25 May, but I had another copy made and signed by the Premier and myself.

Our measure vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. being settled upon, I informed the Supreme Council that it was my intention to entrust to former Premier Hirota the conduct of preliminary negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador. . . .

I called at once on Mr. Hirota to ask him to carry on the negotiations with the Russians. As is well known, Hirota was one of our top-ranking Russian experts at the time. . . . Now, after explaining how things stood—that, considering prevailing world conditions, Japan should endeavor promptly to make peace—I said to Hirota that in furtherance of the idea of requesting mediation by the U.S.S.R. it was necessary to ascertain the extent to which we could make use of her, and that we were asking him to hold conversations with Soviet Ambassador [Jacob] Malik. In view of the disastrous state of the war, the cost of inducing the Russians to work in favor of Japan would, I told Hirota, be high, but he could if necessary offer a substantial consideration; I wanted him, bearing these things in mind, to work to prevent the Soviet weight from being thrown into the war against us, and if possible to persuade the U.S.S.R. to act to our advantage.

"Friendly Talks" With Reds

Hirota assented to my appeal, and it was arranged that the discussions with Malik should be held confidentially at the resort of Gora, in Hakone, which was most convenient for both parties. The preparations for the meetings were delayed, the 25 May air raid intervened, and it was only on 3 June that the conversations got under way at Gora; a second meeting followed, the next day. Hirota reported to me that opinions were exchanged on the fundamental problems involved in relations between the two countries; he said that the atmosphere of the talks was friendly, that the Russian side responded satisfactorily and the conversations looked hopeful, and that arrangements had been made for subsequent meetings. I urged him to do everything possible to expedite his negotiations.

The outlook for the war had already appeared sufficiently gloomy at the time the Suzuki Cabinet took office, despite our concentration since spring on defense of Okinawa. When the high command approached me with the request that I try to restrain the U.S.S.R. from becoming belligerent, I asked for their forecast of future operations, pointing out to them that if we could destroy the enemy at Okinawa, we could perhaps re-establish a basis for diplomatic activities, which had then arrived at a dead end. If we could win this battle, the U.S.S.R. and other countries would have to recognize that

... June 12, 1945: "I said to Navy Minister Yonai that our position had daily become weaker, until it was now necessary to . . . open a way to peace. Yonai agreed"

Japan had still a considerable reserve of strength; moreover, the enemy would be faced with the necessity of devoting some amount of time to mounting a new offensive. If, on the other hand, we suffered another defeat in Okinawa, Japan would have no basis for diplomacy. Wartime diplomacy being thus dependent on the development of military operations, it was vital that our forces do all within their power to expel the enemy from Okinawa, and I urged the high command to strive resolutely to do so, and stressed the point at every opportunity—I spoke to this effect to the War and Navy Ministers, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Vice-Chief of Staff, individually, also repeatedly at meetings of the members of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War, and at an Imperial Conference in early June.

Nevertheless, the high command, who at first were talking in confident terms of the Okinawa campaign, gradually became less dogmatic; they admitted the existence of discrepancies between the operational policies of Army and Navy; they were evidently losing confidence in the campaign, and the fear was general that the loss of the island was but a question of time. Meanwhile, the air raid on Tokyo of 25 May was a blow no less devastating than that of 10 March. Air attacks on central and southern Japan became more severe.

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Morale Problem in Japan

The Diet convened, and adopted sundry wartime enactments, but the raising of the people's morale was scarcely to be hoped for. Immediately after the session adjourned on the 12th, therefore, I said to Navy Minister Yonai that our position had daily become weaker, until it was now necessary to implement point 3 of the council members' agreement, hitherto uninvoked, and open a way to peace. Yonai agreed, and promised to talk with the Premier and the War Minister.

I had had occasion earlier to discuss with Lord Keeper Kido the problem of Russian relations and the hastening of the ending of the war. On 15 June, Kido said to me that since, as reported at the Imperial Conference of the 8th, the decline in our national strength was marked and would continue, it would be most appropriate (though no doubt difficult in the circumstances) to get the military leaders to admit that the war could not go on. The Emperor, he said, having recognized after the Imperial Conference that the condition was more serious than had been thought from the reports to him of the Army Chief of Staff and others, and that the recent statements of the Army Vice-Chief and the Navy Chief of Staff were not in accord with the actualities, was of opinion that we should endeavor to make peace now.

Kido therefore thought that while it was necessary that we take this momentous step, in accordance with the words of the Emperor, the only way to go about it was to request mediation by the U.S.S.R., making sufficient concessions for the sake of peace with honor and thereby bringing the hostilities to an end.

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At a meeting of members of the Supreme Council on 18 June, I reported on the wish of court circles for an end to the war, and proposed the carrying out at once of the May decision, still unexecuted. There was general agreement that we must inevitably continue resistance so long as the United States and Great Britain persisted in exacting from us an un-

conditional surrender. It was also agreed that nevertheless, while we still retained a modicum of fighting strength we should enter into peace negotiations through the mediation of a third Power, the U.S.S.R. preferably, to try to conclude with the enemy nations a peace which would include at least the preservation of our national polity.

The conclusion was that it would be very satisfactory if the war could be stopped by late September, and that the U.S.S.R. should accordingly be sounded out by early July and steps taken to that end as soon as possible. On this occasion also I learned that the Premier had in fact failed to report to the Emperor the council members' agreement of mid-May; when I inquired, he confessed, "I have not reported it yet. Please do it."

The day after the council members' meeting, the 19th, I called on Hirota in Kugenuma. After bringing him up to date on developments, I pointed out the necessity that any Russian mediation materialize in advance of the recently rumored meeting of the chiefs of state of the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. It was planned that Hirota should do all possible to speed up his conversations with Malik.

On the 20th I was received in audience and reported to the Emperor—in accordance with the arrangement made with Premier Suzuki—on the purpose of initiating the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., why we had considered the U.S.S.R. the proper mediator, and our recognition that Japan would have to be ready to pay liberally to the Russians for any services rendered. I explained also how it had come about that Hirota had been entrusted with the negotiations, and the development of the Hirota-Malik conversations.

The Emperor approved the steps taken as entirely satisfactory. He said also that from recent reports of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff it had come to light that operational preparations in China and even in Japan were deficient, which made it imperative that the war stop as soon as possible, and that he desired that, difficult though it might be to end it, every effort be devoted to that purpose. I replied that since, needless to say, wartime diplomacy depended predominantly on the course of the war, it would be impossible to make peace on terms favorable to us, but that I would do my utmost to comply with his wishes.

"The War Was Ominous"

On the 22d, the members of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War were called into audience. . . . The Emperor stated to the council members that both domestically and internationally a critical stage had been reached, the war was extremely ominous, and our difficulties would become all the greater with increased air attacks. It was therefore his desire that, even though the recent decision of the Imperial Conference might be left unchanged, the members exert every effort to make an end to the war with the greatest expedition. The Navy Minister replied that the six council members had been carrying on consultations with objects which would conform to the Emperor's wishes, and that the Foreign Minister should relate the results of them.

. . . Following my explanation, the Chief of the Army General Staff said that the proposal to make peace, being one which would have a profound impact at home and abroad, should be advanced only after thorough deliberation, and should be treated with the utmost caution. The Emperor in-

... "Japan maintained to the end, up to the ultimate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the position that she accepted the declaration unconditionally, but that that was not to surrender unconditionally"

quired of him if "treating the proposal with the utmost caution" did not imply acting only after having struck another blow at the enemy, but the chief of staff denied this. No further discussion occurred, the Emperor retiring after confirming that no one else desired to voice an opinion.

Meanwhile, Hirota was keeping contact, either directly or through friends, with Malik, but the conversations had to be speeded up. In response to my urging to Hirota to do this, he reported that the Soviet Ambassador wanted to know Japan's intentions in concrete terms. I accordingly arranged with him that he should communicate to Malik that Japan's basic desire was to enter into an agreement of mutual assistance and non-aggression aimed at maintenance of peace in the Far East; that in this connection Japan stood ready to neutralize Manchuria and to surrender its fishery rights in Soviet waters, and moreover left the door open for discussion of any other issue which the U.S.S.R. might wish to bring up.

Hirota met with Malik on 29 June, and reported to me that the ambassador had promised to convey our proposal to his government and to resume the conversations upon receipt of instructions. In order to promote a solution, I informed Ambassador Sato of the Gora conversations, and instructed him to endeavor in Moscow also to expedite them. Sato reported to me that he made requests to that effect in interviews with Foreign Commissar Molotov and his deputy Lozovsky.

"Peace Movement" Hampered

Already, from before this time, the United States had frequently broadcast reports that Japan would sue for unconditional surrender. Japan, however, was in no state to surrender unconditionally—indeed, Japan maintained to the end, up to the ultimate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the position that she accepted the declaration unconditionally, but that that was not to surrender unconditionally. The unconditional surrender applied to the armed forces only (as was clearly stated in the declaration itself), not to the nation. This American propaganda and insistence on "unconditional surrender," therefore, hampered to no small extent the progress of the movement in Japan for peace.

At one time another possible avenue of approach to peace seemed to be opening up. One day shortly after the events just mentioned, Navy Minister Yonai told me that one Dulles,* an American official stationed in Switzerland, had suggested to the Japanese naval attaché in Bern through Kitamura, our representative in the Bank for International Settlements, that Japan had better surrender unconditionally. Yonai asked me who this Dulles was, and what to tell the naval attaché to answer to him. . . . I thought the present a good opportunity to plumb the intentions of the United States, and I suggested to Yonai that the Navy instruct its attaché in Bern to have Kitamura reply to Dulles that Japan could not consider acceptance of an unconditional surrender and any surrender must be on terms, and to see what the response would be. It was arranged that the Navy should so instruct its attaché; two or three weeks later, however, Yonai told me that the instruction had not yet been sent, and as it was by then too late for such an attempt, the plan was dropped.

*Allen W. Dulles, now Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was then in the Office of Strategic Services.

By late June the war in every aspect had become critical. Production decreased drastically, on account of the air attacks and the breakdown of transportation facilities—not only did the production of aircraft dwindle, but even (for example) salt, essential to the manufacture of explosives, become scarce. The food shortage grew acute, and serious unrest of the populace by winter could be predicted. It seemed that informed quarters everywhere, official and private alike, were realizing the impossibility of going on with the struggle, and from every side the pressure to make peace mounted. . . .

The ties among the Allies, on the other hand, were meanwhile drawing closer—T.V. Soong was in Moscow conferring with the Russians, and another meeting, at Potsdam, of the chiefs of American, British and Soviet governments was being talked of. It was plain that Japan's position would become increasingly untenable, and I wanted to place a steppingstone on the path to peace before the tripartite meeting. However, the Hirota-Malik conversations, despite all efforts, did not progress; and when I invited Ambassador Malik to call on me, that I might directly ascertain his feelings, he did not do so, declining on the plea of illness.

When the report came to me that the Soviet Embassy staff had told our officials in charge that our proposal of terms had been sent to Moscow by courier, instead of by telegram, I recognized that there was no further hope of those negotiations. I therefore discussed with the Premier, as we entered July, the dispatching to Moscow immediately of a special envoy to take steps toward peace. I had in mind for the mission Prince Konoe. Normally the envoy-designate would be informed of the appointment by the Emperor himself, and he would of course feel honored by being so informed; in view, however, of the vicissitudes which this mission might undergo, it appeared appropriate to notify Prince Konoe informally beforehand. After having conferred with the Premier, therefore, I broached the question with the prince at Karuizawa on the 8th. He consented to go if designated, but pointed out that he would be embarrassed if he was to be bound by too rigid instructions laid down before he went.

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The Air Raids Increase

While we had been planning it, enemy task forces were operating close off our shores, and air raids were destroying not only the large cities, but medium and small towns throughout Kanto, Tohoku, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Chugoku—almost the whole of Japan proper. To this there was no appreciable defense from land or sea; rather, it was almost as if we sat with arms folded while attacked. I said to the high command that there could hardly be any thought of diplomatic activities with the war at such a pass; in particular, if the enemy and the U.S.S.R. entertained the view, on the eve of the tripartite conference, that Japan's fighting power had been exhausted, they would assuredly establish their policy toward us on the basis of that estimate.

Even if we should then, after the conference, achieve substantial victories, they would come too late to serve our purposes in the diplomatic aspect. I accordingly urged the high command to grapple with the American task forces and deliver a heavy blow to them prior to the conference. I explained this necessity also to the Emperor; and I asked the War and Navy Ministers to convince the high command. War Minister

... July, 1945: "General Anami concurred in my opinion that from the time of the establishment by the Americans of a beachhead on our mainland . . . defeat would be but a question of time"

Anami agreed with me fully, and told me confidentially that he had spoken earnestly to the high command in this sense.

So far as concerned the prospects of the Greater East Asia War, General Anami concurred in my opinion that from the time of the establishment by the Americans of a beachhead on our mainland, there would remain for Japan only to carry on guerrilla activities, and defeat would be but a question of time. We discussed this often. The strategy of the War Minister was, on the supposition that the enemy would make landings first in July and thereafter during August, to deal the landing forces the heaviest blow possible, then to make peace.

Sato reported from Moscow that although on the 13th he had requested an interview with Molotov, he had been unable to obtain an appointment by reason of Molotov's being busy preparing for his departure for Berlin, and that he had therefore asked to see Deputy Commissar Lozovsky at 5:00 P.M. of that day. Later in the day, there was another report from Sato; he had conveyed our request to Lozovsky, but later the chief of the Japanese Section, he said, had informed him that the reply would be delayed, inasmuch as Stalin and Molotov were busy on the eve of their trip to Berlin.

I thought it very strange that, on the ground of being occupied with preparations for a trip, the high Russian authorities should refuse to receive our ambassador and should delay their reply to an address so portentous. Stupidly, I failed to imagine the truth: now that three months had elapsed since the defeat of Germany, the Russians were due, in accordance with their promise given at Yalta, to attack Japan; hence, they had no intention of seeing our ambassador or of receiving Prince Konoe in their country.

Truman, Churchill and Stalin commenced their Potsdam Conference on 17 July. I was received in audience on the 18th, and reported to the Emperor in detail the views of the government concerning this tripartite conference and our measures vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. In response to the Emperor's inquiry whether our communications had reached the Soviet leaders, I told him that since his wishes for peace had been made known by Ambassador Sato at 5:00 P.M. on the 13th, while Stalin and Molotov had left Moscow only in the afternoon of the 14th, it seemed certain that our requests had reached them.

The Emperor said simply that the fate of our proposal was

now beyond our control, it depended on the response of the other party not only, but on the destiny itself of Japan; and he expressed himself as satisfied that we had been able to get it delivered to the Soviet leaders in time. From American sources which became available after the war I learned that the United States Department of State had sent to Potsdam a draft of a declaration, worked out by former Ambassador Grew and others, in preparation for peace with Japan; and that, upon learning there from the Russians that Japan wished peace, they promulgated the draft—which turned out to be the Potsdam Declaration. If those are indeed the facts, the Emperor's wishes reached not only the Russian but the other Allied leaders as well, thereby inducing a peace on terms—the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Considering the outcome, therefore, it can be said that our proposal did in general serve our purpose.

On the 19th I had a telegram from Ambassador Sato reporting that the Soviet authorities had informed him that they could give no definite reply to our request, because it made no concrete proposal and left the purpose of the Konoe mission obscure. (Although cables from Moscow had theretofore come through in good time, from this point on important communications between Moscow and Tokyo were noticeably delayed.) Shortly afterward, another telegram arrived from Ambassador Sato recommending that, there seeming to be no prospect for a negotiated peace, Japan should without delay surrender unconditionally.

The government, however, could not decide on unconditional surrender, for it had to consider the state of mind of the armed forces as well as of the people, who had endured much hardship, and of course had to take into account the prior developments. In any event, there was no need of asking Soviet mediation if Japan was to surrender unconditionally. I therefore instructed Ambassador Sato on the 21st to give the Russians to understand that the purpose of our communication was to request the good offices of the Soviet government to bring the war promptly to an end, and that Prince Konoe was to be sent to conduct negotiations for adjustment of Russo-Japanese relations and simultaneously to convey Japan's concrete offer of terms for peace.

The delivery of this telegram of the 21st being delayed, Ambassador Sato carried out my instructions on the 25th. He reported that Lozovsky heard him attentively and politely, and promised to transmit the explanation to his government and give a reply as soon as possible.

CHAPTER IX

A-Bomb . . . Russian Attack . . . Surrender

DURING THE EARLY MORNING of 26 July, the day after Prime Minister Churchill's return to London for announcement of the result of the British general election, a joint declaration in the names of President Truman, Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was issued at Potsdam.

My first reaction to the declaration upon reading through the text as broadcast by the American radio was that, in view

of the language, "Following are our terms," it was evidently not a dictate of unconditional surrender. I got the impression that the Emperor's wishes had reached the United States and Great Britain, and had had the result of this moderation of their attitude.

It appeared also that a measure of consideration had been given to Japan's economic position; at a time when such Draconian retribution upon Germany as the "Morgenthau Plan" for her reduction to a "pastoral state" was being pro-

... "To my amazement, the newspapers . . . reported that the government had decided to ignore the Potsdam Declaration. I protested without delay to the Cabinet"

posed, I felt special relief upon seeing the economic provisions of the declaration—the gist of them being that the function of Japan as a processing nation, as contemplated by Secretary Hull during the Japanese-American negotiations, would be recognized, and that to this end severe reparations would not be imposed.

The territorial provisions of the declaration I did not deem in the light of the Atlantic Charter to be fitting, for—putting aside the question of the independence of Korea—Formosa and our other territories would have to be surrendered in conformity with the edict of the Cairo Declaration, and our sovereignty would in effect be limited to the four main islands of Japan. As to the occupation, also, there were some



—Combine.

PREMIER TOJO—"Neither of us," writes Togo, "was aware relations had so far deteriorated"

doubts. The occupation seemed, it is true, to have applicability to designated points in our country, and it apparently was to be—unlike the treatment of Germany after her surrender—a guarantee occupation not involving extensive administration; there was a question, however, whether Tokyo and the other large cities would be included among the points designated. I considered, further, that there were some ambiguities concerning the eventual form of the Japanese government, and also that complications might result from the language relating to disarmament and war criminals. I therefore instructed Foreign Vice-Minister Matsumoto to make a careful study of the legal aspects of the declaration.

Simultaneously, I thought it desirable to enter into negotiation with the Allied Powers to obtain some clarification, and revision—even if it should be slight—of disadvantageous points in the declaration.

I was received in audience on the morning of the 27th,

and reported to the Emperor on recent happenings, including the negotiations with Moscow, the British general election and the Potsdam Declaration. I stressed that the declaration must be treated with the utmost circumspection, both domestically and internationally; in particular, I feared the consequences if Japan should manifest an intention to reject it. I pointed out further that the efforts to obtain Soviet mediation to bring about the ending of the war had not yet borne fruit, and that our attitude toward the declaration should be decided in accordance with their outcome.

At a meeting of the members of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War, held on the same day, I spoke to the same effect. On this occasion, Chief of Staff Toyoda said that news of the declaration would, sooner or later, transpire, and if we did nothing it would lead to a serious impairment of morale; hence, he suggested, it would be best at this time to issue a statement that the government regarded the declaration as absurd and could not consider it. Premier Suzuki and I objected to this, and as a result it was agreed that for the time being we should wait to see what the response of the U.S.S.R. would be to our approach to her, planning to decide our course thereafter.

To my amazement, the newspapers of the following morning reported that the government had decided to ignore the Potsdam Declaration. I protested without delay to the Cabinet when it met, pointing out that the report was at variance with our decision of the preceding day. What had happened, I learned, was this. There had been held in the Imperial Palace, after adjournment of the Cabinet the day before, a conference for exchange of information between government and high command.

This was a routine weekly meeting without special significance, and I had been absent because of more important business. One of the military participants in that meeting, as I heard it, had proposed the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration; the Premier, the War and Navy Ministers and the two chiefs of staff had hastily assembled for consultation in a separate room, and the Premier had been persuaded by the more militant elements to that course. He then stated at a subsequent press conference that the government had decided to ignore the declaration, and this announcement it was which the press had played up so sensationally.

Why A-Bomb Was Used

It was only after the affair had developed to this point that I first knew of it; despite my thorough dissatisfaction with the position, there was of course no way of withdrawing the statement released by the Premier, and things had to be left as they stood. In the result, the American press reported that Japan had rejected the declaration, and President Truman in deciding for use of the atomic bomb, and the U.S.S.R. in attacking Japan, referred to the rejection of it as justification for their respective actions. The incident was thus a deplorable one in its embarrassment of our move for peace, and was most disadvantageous for Japan.

Meanwhile, despite my repeated instructions to Ambassador Sato in Moscow to press the U.S.S.R. to act quickly on our request for mediation, he did not succeed in obtaining access to any of the Russian officials save Vice-Commissar Lozovsky, until finally he reported that Molotov was back

... "The War and Home Ministers made reports on the Hiroshima bombing. The Army . . . obviously intended not to admit the nature of the atomic attack, but to minimize the effect of the bombing"

in Moscow from Potsdam on 5 August, and would receive him at 5:00 P.M. (11:00 P.M., Japan time) on the 8th. That interview proved, however—as we learned only after the war—to have no relation to our request, but to be for the quite different purpose of notifying the ambassador of the U.S.S.R.'s commencement of war against Japan.

At 8:15 A.M. on 6 August the United States Air Force released over Hiroshima the atomic bomb the detonation of which was to reverberate down through the history of the world. I was informed that the damage was vast. I immediately demanded of the Army the particulars; the American radio had announced that the bomb was one employing atomic fission, and if such a singular explosive had in fact

minimize the effect of the bombing. On the 8th I had an audience, in the underground shelter of the Imperial Palace, with the Emperor, whom I informed of the enemy's announcement of the use of an atomic bomb, and related matters, and I said that it was now all the more imperative that we end the war, which we could seize this opportunity to do. The Emperor approved of my view. . . .

In the early hours of the 9th the radio room of the Foreign Ministry telephoned to inform me of the U.S.S.R.'s broadcast of her declaration of war on us and the large-scale invasion of Manchuria by her forces. (Ambassador Sato, when he met with Commissar Molotov at 11:00 P.M., our time, on the 8th, had been notified of the declaration of war; but the cable



—United Press

THE EMPEROR OF A RUINED JAPAN SURVEYS THE RESULTS OF WAR
"Air raids were destroying not only the large cities, but medium and small towns"

been used, in violation of the international law of warfare, it would be necessary to lodge a protest with the United States.

The Army replied to my inquiry that it could as yet say only that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was one of high effectiveness, and that the details were under investigation. The United States and Great Britain launched large-scale propaganda on the atomic bomb, declaring that its use would alter utterly the character of war and would work a revolution in the life of the human race, and that if Japan did not accept the declaration of the three powers the bomb would continue to be used until the nation was annihilated.

At a meeting of the Cabinet on the afternoon of 7 August the War and Home Ministers made reports on the Hiroshima bombing. The Army, pleading the necessity of awaiting the results of the investigation which had been ordered, obviously intended not to admit the nature of the atomic attack, but to

report of the interview—and consequently of the declaration—which the Russians had assured him would be cleared for dispatch never reached Tokyo.) I visited the Premier early in the morning and told him of the Russian attack. Again I pointed out that the war must stop immediately, and Admiral Suzuki agreed. . . .

The members of the Supreme Council met at 11:00 A.M. I opened the discussion by saying that the war had become more and more hopeless, and now that it had no future, it was necessary to make peace without the slightest delay. Therefore, I said, the Potsdam Declaration must be complied with, and the conditions for its acceptance should be limited to those only which were absolutely essential for Japan.

All members of the Supreme Council already recognized the difficulties in going on with the war; and now, after the employment of the atomic bomb and Russian entry into the war against us, none opposed in principle our acceptance of

... Aug. 9, 1945: "I asked whether the armed services could offer any hope of victory. . . . The War Minister replied that although he could give no assurance of ultimate victory, Japan could still fight another battle"

the declaration. None disagreed, either, that we must insist upon preservation of the national polity as the indispensable condition of acceptance.

The military representatives, however, held out for proposing additional terms—for example, that occupation of Japan should if possible be avoided or, if inescapable, should be on a small scale and should not include such points as Tokyo; that disarmament should be carried out on our responsibility; and that war criminals should be dealt with by Japan. I objected that in view of the recent attitude of Britain, America, Russia and China it was greatly to be feared that any proposal by us of a number of terms would be rejected, and that the entire effort for peace would be in danger of failing.

Unless, therefore, the military services saw a prospect of winning the war, any terms proposed by us should be limited to the minimum of those truly vital; thus, while it was in order to propose other points as our desire, the only condition as such which we should hold out for was that of inviolability of the Imperial house. I asked, then, whether the armed services could offer any hope of victory in case negotiations on terms should be undertaken and should fail.

The War Minister replied that although he could give no assurance of ultimate victory, Japan could still fight another battle. I pressed them to say whether they could be certain of preventing the enemy from landing on our mainland. The Army Chief of Staff answered that we might drive the enemy into the sea if all went very well—though, in war, we could not be confident that things would go well—but that even conceding that a certain percentage of the enemy's troops might succeed in establishing beachheads, he was confident that we could inflict heavy losses on them.

If U. S. Assault Troops Had Landed—

I argued that this would be of no avail: according to the explanation given us by the Army, some part at least of the attackers might still land even after sustaining serious losses; but while it was obvious that the enemy would follow up with a second assault though the first was inadequately rewarded, we should have sacrificed most of our remaining aircraft and other important munitions in our efforts to destroy the first wave. There being no possibility of replenishing our supply of armaments in a short period, our position after the first enemy landing operations would be one of defenselessness, even leaving the atomic bomb out of account. My conclusion was that we had no alternative to stopping the war at this very moment, and we must therefore attempt to attain peace by limiting our counterdemands to the irreducible minimum.

The discussion became rather impassioned, but remained inconclusive, and it neared one o'clock, with a Cabinet meeting scheduled for the afternoon. The Premier stated that the question had to be submitted to the Cabinet also, and the Supreme Council adjourned without having come to any agreement how we should proceed.

At the Cabinet, I again detailed the course of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., the use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet attack on us. There was the same controversy—whether we should accept the Potsdam Declaration with the one

indispensable condition only, or should add the others, as proposed by the War Minister, relating to occupation, disarmament and war criminals. The Navy Minister sided with me, saying that there were no expectations to be indulged if we went on with the war; the War Minister opposed on the ground that if it came to a final battle on Japanese soil we could at least for a time repulse the enemy, and might thereafter somehow "find life out of death," even though there was no certainty of victory.

In rebuttal I observed that according to the opinion of the high command as made known at the meeting of the council members, the prospects of driving the enemy into the sea were by no means bright, while even if we managed to punish them severely during their landings, our relative position would be far worse in the sequel. Discussion reached no issue. The meeting had gone on for hours, and it was now late at night. The Premier asked the Cabinet members to state their conclusions; some equivocated, some agreed with the Army's view, but most supported me.

At that point the Premier stated that he wished to report to the Emperor with me alone. Leaving the Cabinet in session, we went together to the Palace. Upon our being received, the Premier requested that I outline to the Emperor the disagreement in the Supreme Council and the Cabinet, which I did fully. The Premier then asked the Emperor's sanction for calling at once, that night, a meeting in his presence of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War. The Emperor approved, and the Imperial Conference convened shortly before midnight of the 9th. . . .

The Premier opened the conference by saying that, the deliberations at that morning's Supreme Council having failed to result in agreement on the accepting of the Potsdam Declaration, he wished to ask the Emperor to hear personally the opposing views. Thereupon two alternatives were submitted for consideration: one, to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the understanding that it comprised no demand which would prejudice the traditionally established status of the Emperor; the other, to attach in addition the three conditions before mentioned as insisted upon by the Army. . . . Baron Hiranuma, after having asked a number of questions, called for amendment of the reservation in the first alternative to provide that the declaration "comprised no demand which would prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler"; this amendment being approved by all, Hiranuma agreed to that alternative.

Decision From the Emperor

There being still a division of opinion, the Premier said that he regretted that he must humbly beg the Emperor's decision. The Emperor quietly said that he approved the opinion of the Foreign Minister; the confidence of the services in ultimate victory, he said, could not be relied upon, their earlier forecasts having often been at variance with the realities. . . . Now, bearing the unbearable, he would submit to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, thereby to preserve the national polity.

The Imperial Conference thereupon ended, at about half past two. The Cabinet met at 3:00 A.M., and unanimously adopted a decision in conformity with the Emperor's words.

... "Unrest within the Army seemed to be gathering momentum. Frequent reports had come in from the 12th [of August] of plans for coups d'état—such as capturing the Emperor"

I hastened to the Foreign Ministry and drafted the telegram of notification to the Allies on the basis of the Imperial Conference decision. . . .

At 12:45 A.M. of the 12th the Foreign Ministry notified me by telephone of a broadcast announcement of the reply to Japan from America, Britain, Russia and China. There were some unclear points in the reply as we monitored it, and I instructed the Ministry officials in charge to study it; this was done by Vice-Minister Matsumoto and the directors of the Political Affairs and Treaty Bureaus, who foregathered at my house in Azabu at five thirty in the morning. They reported to me as the result of their study that the Allies had in general confirmed the understanding which we had stated in our communication to them. . . .

U. S. Reply "Reassuring"

The Cabinet was called into special session again at 3:00 P.M. to consider the American reply. I commenced with a statement which, as it expressed the view which finally prevailed, I here record in some detail. The United States' response to our inquiry could not be said to be entirely reassuring. We had raised the question of the sovereignty of the Emperor, and the answer was that Japan's sovereignty would not be unlimited during occupation, but that the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would be paramount, in order that the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration might be effectuated.

This was not unforeseen; it is inevitable that under a guarantee occupation the sovereignty of the state will be limited to the extent requisite to implement the surrender terms.

The position of the Emperor nevertheless remained, in principle, unimpaired; paragraph 2 of the reply was accordingly not unacceptable. Paragraph 3 provided that the Emperor was under obligation to carry out the terms of surrender, which was natural. Paragraphs 4 and 6, on the delivery of prisoners of war and the duration of the occupation, respectively, were self-explanatory and offered no difficulty. The problem was paragraph 5.

I reminded my listeners that the idea of establishing the form of government by the freely expressed will of the people appeared in the Atlantic Charter, which the Potsdam Declaration in this particular echoed; but this very provision, that the national polity of Japan was to be determined by the Japanese themselves, negated any suggestion that there should be interference from without. At all events, even if the Allies had any intention of submitting the question to a referendum, it was impossible to conceive that the overwhelming loyal majority of our people would not wish to preserve our traditional system.

On the other hand, there were reasons to believe that much antagonism existed among the Allies to the Imperial system of Japan, but that the Anglo-American leaders had managed to restrain it to the extent that [U. S. Secretary of State] Byrnes' reply evidenced. If we should now demand revisions in its phraseology, it was most probable that we should fail—just as we had failed in the case of the Kellogg-Briand Pact—to obtain them, and if we persisted in debating the point, it was quite likely that the harsher opinions among the Allies would

then be given free rein, and demand for abolition of the Imperial house would be the upshot. In such an event, we should have to be resigned to the complete breaking off of the negotiations. But—I concluded—inasmuch as the Imperial Conference decision of the 9th constituted a recognition that continuation of the war was intolerable even if not impossible, the negotiations for surrender should at all hazards be consummated at their present stage.

In answer to my long argument, War Minister Anami expressed disappointment with the Allied reply in two particulars: that the Emperor was to be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander, and that the ultimate form of government of Japan was to be established by the will of the people. Two or three other Cabinet members followed him with such remarks as that Japan's polity had existed from the time of the gods, and should not be determined by the will of the people, or that there was no alternative to carrying on the fight, because the empire's soldiers could not bear being forced to disarm.

All these suggestions I opposed; the Navy Minister sided with me. Then, suddenly, the Premier came forth with the startling remark that if disarmament was to be enforced upon us, keeping on with the war was inevitable. To obviate the difficulties to which this new argument would patently lead, I thought that the Cabinet meeting had best be adjourned, so I said, "As the official reply of the Allies has not yet arrived, we had better continue our discussion after receipt of it," and the meeting was thereupon recessed to the following day.

I went at once into the Premier's office and expostulated with him that it was no time to be bringing up the question of disarmament, that incessant bandying of words over the enemies' ultimatum was profitless. Unless we were resigned to rupture of the negotiations for peace, I pointed out, there was no alternative to acceptance of their reply as it stood; but, as the Premier himself was well aware, the Emperor did not wish to see the war go on, and not only did it go without saying that the opinion of the Emperor as commander in chief should prevail, but the question now at issue involved the very existence of the Imperial house. I warned the admiral that he should realize that if the opinions of the Premier and the Cabinet should incline to continuation of the war I might be compelled to report individually to the Throne my dissenting view.

Near-Revolt in the Army

Unrest within the Army seemed to be gathering momentum. Frequent reports had come in from the 12th of plans for coups d'état—such as capturing the Emperor and separating the Cabinet ministers from him. The situation was growing very unquiet; the police guard of my house was greatly increased. I sensed that the War Minister was feeling some influence of the activities of the younger officers of the Army which were responsible for these conditions; he continually declaimed at Cabinet meetings and elsewhere the necessity of further bargaining over the surrender terms, since as he maintained we could fight another battle. On each such occasion I argued with equal determination for immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. . . .

Now, at the Cabinet meeting of the afternoon of the 13th,

... Aug. 14, 1945: "The Emperor then spoke: '... Unless the war be brought to end at this moment, I fear that the national polity will be destroyed, and the nation annihilated' "

the War Minister seemed from time to time to fall into reverie, and—though at that morning's Supreme Council meeting he had borne the burden of disputing with me—to have less zest than theretofore for controversy. Some of the ministers—Home Ministers Abe and others—favored trying to secure additional moderation of the Allied terms, with the intention of going on with the war if necessary. I answered that, judging from the Allied Powers' situation, further approaches to them by us not only would be futile but would lead them to doubt the genuineness of our intention to make peace.

Byrnes' reply made to us unquestionably represented the least common denominator of the terms of the several Allies, and it was imperative that we accept them as they now stood, if we were to bring about peace for the sake of the reconstruction of Japan and the welfare of the human race. Navy Minister Yonai, as usual, spoke in agreement with me, but there were still a few dissenting. The Premier then polled the Cabinet. Aside from Munitions Minister Toyoda, who was undecided, the Minister without Portfolio Sakurai, who deferred decision to the Premier, there were Navy Minister Yonai, Finance Minister Hirose, Agriculture and Forestry Minister Ishiguro, Education Minister Ota, Welfare Minister Okada, Transportation Minister Kobiyama, Ministers without Portfolio Yasui, Sakonji and Shimomura, and myself, favoring acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. War Minister Anami, Justice Minister Matsuzaka and Home Minister Abe opposed. Faced with a continuing schism, the Premier again adjourned the meeting.

I did not believe that the War Minister would lend himself to any attempt at a *coup d'état*, but I did fear that mutinousness among his officers might compel him to resign, or that disorder might otherwise develop. This danger made it necessary that a decision be arrived at at once, and I pointed this out to Premier Suzuki immediately upon the recessing of the Cabinet meeting, whereupon he said that he would go to the Palace and ask an Imperial decision.

I attended at the Premier's Official Residence on the 14th for the extraordinary meeting of the Cabinet. Upon my arrival, the Premier took me aside and told me that he wished to hold immediately, in the presence of the Emperor, a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the high command, and by an Imperial decision to put to rest once for all the question of the surrender. And, he added, the topic had been debated *ad nauseam*, there was nothing new to be said, the Emperor was fully conversant with the whole subject; and he therefore intended to have stated at the Imperial Conference only the arguments in contrariety to my opinion. Being in full accord, I said, "That will be fine."

Emperor in an Air-Raid Shelter

Soon, all the Cabinet members were summoned to the palace (we were notified that, it being a sudden call to audience, the wearing of formal attire would be dispensed with, and the ministers who in midsummer were without even neckties borrowed them from the secretaries and managed to preserve a decency barely adequate to the occasion). We assembled, the Cabinet ministers, the chiefs of staff and the others who had attended the Imperial Conference of the 9th, in the air-raid shelter.

The Emperor appeared, and the Premier stated that after

exhaustive deliberation on the Allies' reply to our communication of the 10th neither the Supreme Council members nor the Cabinet had been able to attain unanimity; and, explaining the position of the Foreign Minister and the opposing views, he asked that the latter be stated in the presence of the Emperor. General Umezu, Admiral Toyoda and General Anami, in that order, were called upon by the Premier. The Army men declared that we should negotiate further with the United States, as acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on



—United Press

DIPLOMATS TALKED . . .
From left: Nomura, Hull, Kurusu

the basis of the American reply would endanger the national polity, and if we could not be sure of maintaining it, there was no alternative to carrying on the struggle even at the cost of a hundred million lives. The Navy Chief of Staff was milder in his opinion, saying only that as we could not bear to swallow the American reply as it stood, it was appropriate once more to put forward our views. The Premier called on no others.

The Emperor then spoke: "It was not lightly, but upon mature consideration of conditions within and without the land, and especially of the development taken by the war, that I previously determined to accept the Potsdam Declaration. My determination is unaltered. I have heard the disputation over the recent reply given by the Allied Powers, but I consider that in general they have confirmed our understanding. As to paragraph 5 of the declaration, I agree with the Foreign Minister that it is not intended to subvert the national polity of Japan; but, unless the war be brought to an end at this moment, I fear that the national polity will be destroyed, and

... "The Imperial command to cease hostilities was issued at noon of the 16th. . . . The rest was anticlimax"

the nation annihilated. It is therefore my wish that we bear the unbearable and accept the Allied reply, thus to preserve the state as a state and spare my subjects further suffering. I wish you all to act in that intention. The War and Navy Ministers have told me that there is opposition within Army and Navy; I desire that the services also be made to comprehend my wishes."

All the attendants wept at these reasoned and gracious words, and at conceiving the Emperor's emotions. It was an inexpressibly solemn and moving scene; as we retired down the long corridor, while returning in our cars, and at the



—Defense Dept.

... THE MILITARY STRUCK
Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941

resumed Cabinet meeting, each of us in his thoughts wept again.

Late on the night of the 14th, it was communicated to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China, through the Swiss and Swedish governments, that the Emperor had promulgated an Imperial Rescript accepting the Potsdam Declaration, and was prepared to take necessary steps in connection therewith. During the night of the 14th-15th, there were some disorders in Tokyo. A segment of the Imperial Guards Division in the palace grounds, bent upon seizing and suppressing the phonograph record of the Rescript ending the war, which the Emperor had made for broadcast on the 15th, rose against the higher officers, and there was some bloodshed. The private residences of the Premier and Baron Hiranuma were attacked. In the early morning, we were told of the suicide of the War Minister; then I understood his attitude of the night before. There were many

others who committed suicide, that night and in the following days.

A formal conference of the Privy Council had been scheduled for 10:00 A.M. of the 15th, but the disturbance at the palace during the night had caused it to be delayed, and it was eleven thirty when the meeting opened in the presence of the Emperor. I reported in detail how the war had been terminated. At that point the meeting went into recess, it being noon, to listen to the Emperor's broadcast of the Rescript proclaiming the surrender; as I heard the words, testifying to the ineffable benevolence and unselfishness of the Emperor, I imagined all the nation listening, profoundly moved, as were we all. . . .

Prior to the meeting of the Privy Council the Premier had consulted with me concerning resignation of the Cabinet, which I told him that I thought entirely appropriate. At a meeting held at two o'clock, following directly on adjournment of the Privy Council, the Premier proposed our resignation en bloc, on the grounds that it was regrettable that the Emperor had twice been troubled to make decisions at the crisis of surrender, and that it was proper that men younger and more capable of carrying out the rebuilding of our country should replace us. All the ministers approved, and the Premier tendered our resignations to the Emperor.

The Imperial command to cease hostilities was issued at noon of the 16th. Owing to the breakdown of communications, it was calculated that it would require two days for the order to reach the troops in Japan proper, six days for Manchuria, China and the South Seas, and twelve for New Guinea and the Philippines. The Allies were so advised.

The rest was anticlimax. Prince Higashi-Kuni requested me to continue as Foreign Minister of the Cabinet which he was designated to form, but I declined. I felt no misgivings over having carried out the surrender—having only acted in conformity with the desire of the Emperor. I had in no way, as a Japanese, violated his wishes—but the reasons for Premier Suzuki's resignation applied with full force to me.

"I Had Worked for Peace"

Moreover, though I had worked for a peaceful Japanese-American solution in the days of 1941; now that we were defeated I might be charged as a war criminal, on account of having been Foreign Minister when the war began, and I did not wish to embarrass the new government by my presence. The Higashi-Kuni Cabinet therefore took office with Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister. On 18 August I turned over to Shigemitsu the business of the Foreign and Greater East Asia Ministries, which I had received from him; spoke to the staff members of the two Ministries of how the surrender had come about; and retired forever from public life.

I carried with me, and carry still, the memory ineradicable of those days. As I think today of that time, vividly before my eyes is the scene of the Imperial Conference at which the Emperor decided for surrender, and my feeling of then returns to me: that while the future of Japan is eternal, it is a blessing beyond estimation that this most dreadful of wars has been brought to a close, ending our country's agony and saving millions of lives; with that my life's work has been done, it does not matter what befalls me. [END]